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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1205 OF 2014

Yogendra Yadav & Ors. … Appellants

Vs.

The State of Jharkhand & Anr. … Respondents

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. The  appellants  are  original  Accused  Nos.1  to  3  

respectively in P.S. Meharma Case No.155 of 2004 registered  

under Sections 341, 323, 324, 504 and 307 read with Section  

34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short,  ‘the IPC’).  The FIR  

was  lodged  on  23/09/1994  by  complainant  Anil  Mandal  

alleging that the appellants assaulted him and his men on  

22/09/2004.  On the same day the appellants also filed FIR in  

respect of the same incident dated 22/09/2004 alleging that

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complainant  Anil  Mandal,  Baldev  Mandal  and  others  

assaulted them.  This FIR was registered at P.S.  Meharma  

being Case No.156 of 2004 under Sections 147, 148, 149,  

448, 341, 323 and 380 of the IPC.  

2. In both the cases, after investigation, charge-sheet was  

submitted.   While the cases were going on before the 2nd  

Additional Sessions Judge, Godda, both the parties agreed to  

compromise the cases.  A Panchayat was held where with  

the  intervention  of  the  well-wishers  a  compromise  was  

arrived  at.   A  compromise  petition  dated 16/11/2011 was  

signed by both the parties and it was filed in the Court of 2nd  

Additional Sessions Judge, Godda.  An application was filed  

under Section 231(2) read with Section 311 of the Code of  

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’) being S.C.  

No.  9/05  for  recalling  PWs  1  to  6  for  further  cross-

examination on the point of compromise.

3. Learned Additional  Sessions Judge by his order dated  

16/11/2011  disposed  of  the  said  application.   Learned  

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Additional Sessions Judge observed that compromise petition  

was signed by the informant and the injured, their signatures  

were  identified  by  the  lawyers  and,  therefore,  the  

compromise  was  genuine.   He,  however,  observed  that  

offences  under  Sections  324,  341,  323  of  the  IPC  are  

compoundable with the permission of the court and offences  

under Sections 326, 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC are  

non-compoundable.  He, therefore, accepted the application  

in respect of offences under Sections 323, 324 and 341 of  

the  IPC.    The  said  offences  were  compounded  and  the  

accused  were  acquitted  of  the  same.   Prayer  for  

compounding of offences under Sections 326, 307 read with  

Section  34  of  the  IPC  was  rejected.   Learned  Additional  

Sessions  Judge  rejected  the  application  for  recalling  of  

witnesses.  He directed that the case should proceed against  

the accused for offences under Sections 326, 307 read with  

Section 34 of  the IPC.   This  order  was challenged by the  

appellants in the High Court of Jharkhand.  By the impugned  

order  the High Court  dismissed the challenge,  hence,  this  

appeal.   

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4. Now,  the  question  before  this  Court  is  whether  this  

Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and  

307 of the IPC which are non-compoundable.   Needless to  

say that  offences which are non-compoundable cannot be  

compounded  by  the  court.    Courts  draw  the  power  of  

compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code.  The  

said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh   v.  

State of  Punjab  1  ).   However,  in  a  given  case,  the  High  

Court  can  quash  a  criminal  proceeding  in  exercise  of  its  

power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the  

fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and  

the victim has no objection, even though the offences are  

non-compoundable.   In  which  cases  the  High  Court  can  

exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend  

on facts and circumstances of each case.  Offences which  

involve  moral  turpitude,  grave  offences  like  rape,  murder  

etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because  

that will have harmful effect on the society.   Such offences  

cannot  be  said  to  be  restricted  to  two individuals  or  two  1 (2012) 10 SCC 303

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groups.  If  such offences are quashed, it may send wrong  

signal  to  the  society.   However,  when  the  High  Court  is  

convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature  

and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and  

where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account  

of compromise would bring about peace and would secure  

ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.  In such  

cases,  the  prosecution  becomes  a  lame  prosecution.  

Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time  

and  energy.   That  will  also  unsettle  the  compromise  and  

obstruct restoration of peace.   

5. In Gian Singh  this Court has observed that where the  

High Court  quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to  

the  fact  that  the  dispute  between  the  offender  and  the  

victim  has  been  settled  although  the  offences  are  not  

compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of  

criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice  

in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is  

put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of  

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justice being the ultimate guiding factor.  Needless to say  

that the above observations are applicable to this Court also.  

6. Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  have  requested  this  

Court  that  the  impugned  order  be  set  aside  as  the  High  

Court has not noticed the correct position in law in regard to  

quashing  of  criminal  proceedings  when  there  is  a  

compromise.   Affidavit  has  been  filed  in  this  Court  by  

complainant-Anil Mandal, who is respondent No. 2 herein.  In  

the affidavit he has stated that a compromise petition has  

been filed in the lower court.  It is further stated that he and  

the  appellants  are  neighbours,  that  there  is  harmonious  

relationship between the two sides and that they are living  

peacefully.  He has further stated that he does not want to  

contest the present appeal and he has no grievance against  

the  appellants.   Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  have  

confirmed that the disputes between the parties are settled;  

that parties are abiding by the compromise deed and living  

peacefully.   They  have  urged  that  in  the  circumstances  

pending proceedings be quashed.   State of Jharkhand has  

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further  filed  an  affidavit  opposing  the  compromise.   The  

affidavit does not persuade us to reject the prayer made by  

the appellant and the second respondent for quashing of the  

proceedings.   

7. In  view of  the  compromise  and  in  view of  the  legal  

position which we have discussed hereinabove, we set aside  

the  impugned  order  dated  4/7/2012  and  quash  the  

proceedings  in  S.C.No.9/05  pending  on  the  file  of  2nd  

Additional Sessions Judge, Godda.  The appeal is disposed of.

…………………………………..J (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

…………………………………..J (N.V. Ramana)

New Delhi; July 21, 2014.

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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1498 OF 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8795 of 2012]

 Manohar Singh … Appellant

Vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant is original Accused No. 3.  He was tried  

along with his father Hukum Singh – original Accused No. 1  

and his mother Prem Bai  – original  Accused No.  2 by the  

Judicial Magistrate, Dewas (Madhya Pradesh) in Crime Case  

No. 1680/2009 for offences punishable under Section 498A

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of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the IPC’) and Section 4  

of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short,  ‘the Dowry  

Act’).   By  judgment  and  order  dated  29/9/2010  learned  

Magistrate  acquitted  the  appellant  and  the  other  two  

accused.  Being aggrieved by this order the State of Madhya  

Pradesh preferred appeal in the Sessions Court, Dewas being  

Criminal Appeal No.12/2011.  The Sessions Court set aside  

the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant and two  

others under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced them  

to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment each and to pay  

a fine of Rs.500/- each.  For offence under Section 4 of the  

Dowry  Act  each  of  them  was  sentenced  to  rigorous  

imprisonment  for  two years and to pay a fine of  Rs.500/-  

each,  in  default,  to  undergo  simple  imprisonment  for  two  

months each.  

3. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the  

accused  carried  criminal  revision  to  the  High  Court  of  

Madhya Pradesh.  The High Court by the impugned order set  

aside the conviction and sentence of original Accused Nos. 1  

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and  2  i.e.  the  father  and  mother  of  the  appellant.   The  

conviction of  the appellant  was,  however,  confirmed.   His  

sentence was reduced to six months and fine of Rs.500/- on  

each  count.   Both  the substantive  sentences  were to  run  

concurrently.   Being  aggrieved  by  this  judgment  the  

appellant filed the present appeal.

4. On  21/1/2013  the  appellant  sought  permission  to  

implead the complainant i.e. his wife Reena as respondent  

No. 2.   A statement was made that the appellant was willing  

to  pay  monetary  compensation  to  his  wife  in  lieu  of  

substantive  sentence  of  imprisonment.   Permission  to  

implead  the  complainant-wife  Reena  was  granted.   The  

appellant  was  directed  to  deposit  Rs.25,000/-  as  litigation  

expenses.  Respondent No. 2 was permitted to withdraw the  

said amount unconditionally.  Subject to deposit, notice was  

issued to respondent No. 2 to consider whether the appellant  

can be asked to pay some suitable monetary compensation  

to  respondent  No.  2  in  lieu  of  substantive  sentence  of  

imprisonment.  On 24/3/2014 counsel for the appellant made  

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a  statement  that  the  matter  is  likely  to  be  settled.   We  

directed respondent No. 2 – wife to remain present in the  

Court  on  28/3/2014.   Accordingly  on  28/03/2014  she  

remained  present  in  the  Court.   She  stated  that  if  the  

appellant  pays  her  Rs.2,50,000/-  (Rupees  two  lacs  fifty  

thousand only) as compensation, she is ready to settle the  

matter.  This Court, therefore, directed the appellant to bring  

a  demand  draft  of  Rs.2,50,000/-  in  the  name  of  Reena  

(respondent No. 2).  This Court noted that the said demand  

draft can be given to her in case after hearing the parties  

and  considering  the  legal  position,  this  Court  permits  

settlement at this stage.   

5. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant,  

learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh and learned  

counsel  for  respondent  No.  2.     Learned counsel  for  the  

appellant  and  learned counsel  for  respondent  No.  2  have  

requested  the  Court  to  show  leniency  in  view  of  the  

settlement.   Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh has  

opposed this prayer.  

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6. Section 498-A of the IPC is non-compoundable.  Section  

4  of  the  Dowry  Act  is  also  non-compoundable.   It  is  not  

necessary to state that non-compoundable offences cannot  

be compounded by a Court.  While considering the request  

for compounding of offences the Court has to strictly follow  

the mandate of Section 320 of the Code.  It is, therefore, not  

possible to permit compounding of offences under Section  

498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Act.  However, if  

there is a genuine compromise between husband and wife,  

criminal complaints arising out of matrimonial discord can be  

quashed,  even  if  the  offences  alleged  therein  are  non-

compoundable,  because  such  offences  are  personal  in  

nature and do not have repercussions on the society unlike  

heinous offences like murder, rape etc. (See Gian Singh   v.  

State of Punjab  2  ).  If the High Court forms an opinion that  

it is necessary to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of  

the process of any court or to secure ends of justice, the  

High Court can do so.  The inherent power of the High Court  

under Section 482 of the Code is not inhibited by Section  2 (2012) 10 SCC 303

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320 of the Code.  Needless to say that this Court can also  

follow such a course.

7. In  Narinder Singh  v.  State of Punjab3, this Court  

was dealing with a situation where the accused was charged  

for offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, which is  

a  non-compoundable  offence.  The  parties  arrived  at  a  

compromise  at  the  stage  of  recording  of  evidence.   A  

petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing  

of  the proceedings in  view of  the compromise.   The High  

Court refused to quash the proceedings.  This Court set aside  

the High Court’s order and quashed the proceedings in view  

of  the compromise.   While doing so,  this  Court  laid down  

certain  guidelines.   In  Guideline  No.(VII),  this  Court  

considered a situation where a conviction is recorded by the  

trial court for offence punishable under Section 307 of the  

IPC  and  the  matter  is  at  appellate  stage.   This  Court  

observed that in such cases, a mere compromise between  

the  parties  would  not  be  a  ground  to  accept  the  same  

3 JT 2014 (4) SC 573

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resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been  

convicted by the trial court.  This Court observed that in such  

cases where charge is proved under Section 307 of the IPC  

and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime, there  

was no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a  

crime. The observation of this Court must be read obviously  

in the context of a non-compoundable offence under Section  

307 of the IPC.  It is trite that a non-compoundable offence  

cannot be compounded at any stage (See Gyan Singh  v.  

State of Punjab4).  However, a compoundable offence can  

be compounded in view of a compromise, if the Court finds it  

proper  to  do  so  even  after  conviction  if  the  appeal  is  

pending.   

8. In this case, the appellant is convicted under Section  

498-A  of  the  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo  six  months  

imprisonment.  He is convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry  

Act  and  sentenced  to  undergo  six  months  imprisonment.  

Substantive sentences are to run concurrently.  Even though  

4 (2012) 10 SCC 303

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the appellant and respondent No. 2-wife have arrived at a  

compromise, the order of conviction cannot be quashed on  

that  ground  because  the  offences  involved  are  non-

compoundable.   However,  in  such  a  situation if  the  court  

feels that the parties have a real desire to bury the hatchet  

in the interest of peace, it can reduce the sentence of the  

accused to the sentence already undergone.  Section 498-A  

of  the  IPC  does  not  prescribe  any  minimum punishment.  

Section 4 of the Dowry Act prescribes minimum punishment  

of six months but proviso thereto states that the Court may,  

for  adequate  or  special  reasons  to  be  mentioned  in  the  

judgment,  impose a  sentence of  imprisonment  for  a  term  

which may be less than six months.  Therefore, sentence of  

the appellant can be reduced to sentence already undergone  

by him.   

9. Now the question is  whether  a case for  reduction of  

sentence is  made out  particularly  when the appellant  has  

undergone  only  seven  days  sentence  out  of  six  months  

sentence imposed on him.  We see no reason why in this  

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case  we  should  not  reduce  the  appellant’s  sentence  to  

sentence already undergone by him.  There can be no doubt  

about  the  genuine  nature  of  compromise  between  the  

appellant  and  respondent  No.2-wife.   The  appellant  has  

offered to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to respondent No.2-

wife as compensation.  A demand draft drawn in the name of  

respondent No.2 is brought to the Court.  As directed by us  

even litigation costs of Rs.25,000/- has been deposited by  

the  appellant  in  the  Court.    Respondent  No.2-wife  has  

appeared  in  this  Court  on  more  than  one  occasion  and  

requested this Court to take compromise into consideration  

and pass appropriate orders.  Learned counsel for the parties  

have requested us to take a kindly view of the matter.  The  

affidavit filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh opposing the  

prayer of the parties does not impress us.

10. We must also note that the trial court had acquitted the  

appellant.   Though the Sessions Court  reversed the order  

and convicted the appellant for two years,  the High Court  

reduced  the  sentence  to  six  months.   The  appellant  and  

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respondent No.2 were married in 2007.  About seven years  

have gone by.  Considering all these circumstances, in the  

interest of peace and amity, we are of the opinion that the  

appellant’s sentence must be reduced to sentence already  

undergone by him.

11. In the circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed.  The  

conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A of the IPC  

and under Section 4 of the Dowry Act is maintained but the  

sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to sentence  

already undergone by him, subject to the condition that the  

appellant pays a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lacs fifty  

thousand  only)  to  respondent  No.2-wife  as  compensation.  

Impugned order stands modified to the above extent.  

12. We  must  note  that  a  Demand  Draft  in  the  sum  of  

Rs.2,50,000/- drawn in the name of respondent No.2 Reena  

has been handed over to her counsel by learned counsel for  

the appellant on 18/7/2014.

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13. In view of this, bail bond of the appellant, if any, stands  

discharged.  

……………………………..J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

………………………………J. (N.V. Ramana)

New Delhi; July 21, 2014.

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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1169 OF 2014

SATHIYAMOORTHY AND ORS. …Appellants

Versus

STATE REPRESENTED BY THE  INSPECTOR OF POLICE, MADURAI …Respondent

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. The appellants who are original  Accused Nos.  1 to  6  

respectively were tried in the court of Additional District and  

Sessions Judge, Madurai in Sessions Case No.444 of 2005 for  

various offences under the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the  

IPC’)  on  the  allegation that  on 11/11/2004  at  about  8.00  

p.m.  when  complainant  Ayyanar  and  his  son  Murugesan  

were  standing  at  a  common  place  all  the  accused  came

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there  and  formed  an  unlawful  assembly  with  deadly  

weapons.  Accused No. 2 unlawfully restrained Murugesan.  

Accused No.  1 attacked complainant-Ayyanar with an iron  

rod.   He  also  attacked  Murugesan  with  an  aruval.  

Complainant Ayyanar lodged the FIR.

2. After  completion  of  investigation,  the  accused  were  

sent up for trial.  At the trial the prosecution examined 16  

witnesses.   The  accused  denied  the  prosecution  case.  

Learned  Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge  found  

Accused Nos. 1 to 6 guilty under Section 148 of the IPC.  He  

sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment  

for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each, in default, to  

undergo two months rigorous imprisonment.  Accused No. 1  

was  found  guilty  under  Section  325  of  the  IPC  and  was  

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years  

and  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,  in  default,  to  undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for three months.  Accused No. 2 was  

found guilty under Section 341 of the IPC and was sentenced  

to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment and to pay  

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a fine of Rs.200/-, in default, to undergo four weeks rigorous  

imprisonment.  Accused No. 2 was also found guilty under  

Section  325  read  with  Section  149  of  the  IPC  and  was  

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years  

and  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,  in  default,  to  undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for six months.  Accused Nos. 3 to 6  

were found guilty under Section 325 read with Section 149 of  

the  IPC.   Each  of  them  was  sentenced  to  rigorous  

imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-  

each, in default,  to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  six  

months.  Substantive sentences were to run concurrently.  

3. Being aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence  

the  appellants-accused  preferred  an  appeal  to  the  High  

Court.  By the impugned order the High Court partly allowed  

the appeal.  The order of conviction passed by the trial court  

was  confirmed.   However,  the  sentence  imposed  under  

Section 325 of the IPC on Accused No. 1, sentence imposed  

under  Section  325  read  with  Section  149  of  the  IPC  on  

Accused  No.  2  and  sentence  imposed  under  Section  325  

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read with Section 149 of the IPC on Accused Nos. 3 to 6 was  

reduced to two years rigorous imprisonment instead of three  

years rigorous imprisonment.  Rest of the order of the trial  

court was confirmed.  Being aggrieved by the judgment and  

order, the appellants-accused have filed the present appeal.  

4. During  the  pendency  of  the  appeal  on  25/04/2014  

victim-Murugesan remained present in this Court.   He had  

filed an application for impleadment which was granted.  He  

stated that he would like to compound the offences.  That  

statement was recorded and the matter was adjourned to  

consider the prayer.  An application has been filed by the  

appellants  praying  that  offences  may  be  permitted  to  be  

compounded.   It  is  stated  in  the  application  that  victim  

Murugesan  and  the  accused  are  cousins  and  they  have  

decided to settle the disputes amicably.  It is further stated  

that  pursuant  to  this  decision  the  accused  have  paid  a  

reasonable amount to victim Murugesan as per the decision  

of  family  elders  and  they  have  entered  into  an  amicable  

settlement  in  their  village  much  before  the  accused  

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surrendered as per the orders of this Court.  A copy of the  

statement of victim Murugesan dated 30/9/2012 stating that  

he  has  entered  into  a  compromise  with  the  accused  is  

annexed to the application.

5. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants-

accused, Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General (AC)  

and  learned  counsel  for  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu.   They  

confirmed  that  parties  have  entered  into  a  compromise.  

They submitted that  in  view of  the settlement,  this  Court  

may compound the offences as that will accord a quietus to  

all disputes between the parties.  Counsel submitted that the  

accused  and  the  complainant  are  cousins.   After  the  

compromise  they  have  been  staying  peacefully  in  the  

village.  It is in the interest of both sides to bury the hatchet  

and lead a peaceful life.   

6. Offences  under  Sections  341  and  325  are  

compoundable.   In  view  of  the  settlement  they  can  be  

permitted  to  be  compounded.   However,  offences  under  

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Sections  148  and  149  of  the  IPC  are  not  compoundable.  

Hence,  permission to  compound them cannot  be granted.  

However, since the accused and the victim have entered into  

a compromise, we feel that it would be in the interest of both  

sides to reduce the sentence awarded to the accused under  

Sections  325 and 341 of  the IPC to  the sentence already  

undergone.   

7. In  Ram Lal  and anr.    v.    State of J  & K  5    the  

accused were convicted for offence under Section 326 of the  

IPC, which is non-compoundable.  Looking to the fact that  

the parties had arrived at a settlement and victim had no  

grievance, this Court reduced the sentence for the offence  

under  Section  326 to  sentence already undergone by the  

appellants-accused.  We are inclined to follow similar course.  

8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.  The offences  

under  Sections  341  and  325  of  the  IPC,  for  which  the  

appellants are convicted, are permitted to be compounded  

5 (1999) 2 SCC 213

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because  they  are  compoundable.   The  appellants  are  

acquitted of the said offences.   The appellants are stated to  

have undergone more than six months imprisonment. So far  

as  offences  under  Sections  148  and  149  of  the  IPC  are  

concerned,  the  conviction  of  the  appellants  for  the  said  

offences is reduced to the sentence already undergone by  

them  subject  to  the  appellants  paying  Rs.30,000/-  as  

compensation to victim-Murugesan.  Compensation be paid  

within three months from the date of this judgment.   

9. This Court has already released the appellants on bail.  

In  view of  this  order  the bail  bonds of  the appellants are  

discharged  subject  to  payment  of  compensation  of  

Rs.30,000/- as directed by us.  If compensation is not paid  

consequences will follow.

………………………………J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

………………………………J. (N.V. Ramana)

New Delhi;

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July 21, 2014.

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