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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.61 OF 2012

VIVEK RAI & ANR.                                              …PETITIONERS

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL & ORS.                 …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. This  writ  petition  has  been  filed  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution of India seeking to declare Rule 159 of the High Court of  

Jharkhand  Rules,  2001  as  violative  of  Articles  14  and  21  of  the  

Constitution and provisions of  Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of  

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”).  The rule in question is as follows:

“In  the case of  revision  under  Sections   397  and  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure, 1973 arising out of conviction   and  sentence  of  imprisonment,  the  petitioner  shall  state  whether  the  petition  shall  be  accompanied  by  a   certified copy of the relevant order.  If he   has not surrendered the petition shall be  accompanied by  an application  seeking   leave  to  surrender  within  a  specified  period.  On sufficient cause if shown, the  Bench may grant such time and on such  conditions  as  it  thinks  and proper.   No  such  revision  shall  be  posted  for   admission  unless  the  petitioner  has   surrendered to custody in the concerned  Court.”

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2. Case  of  the  petitioners  is  that  they  have  been  convicted  and  

sentenced under Section 498-A  of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”)  and  

Sections  3  and  4  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act.   Against  the  said  

conviction and sentence, their appeal has been dismissed and revision  

petition  was  filed  before  the  High  Court  but  the  same  was  not  

registered on account of impugned Rule 159 as they failed to surrender  

to  custody.   It  is  submitted  that  this  Rule  is  in  conflict  with  the  

provisions  of  Criminal  Procedure  Code  dealing  with  the  statutory  

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and even in a fit case, the High  

Court  cannot  consider  the  revision  petition  and  grant  bail  unless  a  

convicted person covered by the Rules surrenders to custody.  The Rule  

being subordinate legislation could not militate against the substantive  

statutory provision.  Since the Division Bench of the High Court has  

upheld  the  validity  of  the  Rule  and  the  special  leave  petition  was  

dismissed by this Court against the said judgment, the petitioners have  

no other remedy except to approach this  Court  under Article 32 as  

their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 are affected.   

3. A counter affidavit has been filed by the Registrar General of the  

High Court of Jharkhand opposing the prayer for declaring the Rule to  

be  ultra  vires.   Reliance  has  been  placed  on  the  judgment  of  the  

Division Bench of the High Court in Mahadeo Prasad Shrivastav vs.  

High Court of Jharkhand  1   laying down that the Rule could not be  

1 2004 Crl.L.J.4392

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held to be arbitrary, discriminatory or illegal.  Special Leave Petition  

(Crl.) No.4890 of 2004 filed against the said judgment was dismissed  

by  this  Court.   It  has  also  been  stated  that  there  is  an  identical  

provision in Order XXI, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and  

thus  such  a  provision  cannot  be  held  to  be  arbitrary  nor  such  a  

provision, in any manner, be held to be inconsistent with Section 389  

read with Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C.  The High Court is competent to  

frame Rules to regulate its procedure.  Reliance has also been placed  

on a Judgment of this Court in  Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan  

vs. C.B.I.  2    laying  down  that  a  convicted  person  is  required  to  

surrender under Rule 6 of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966,  

unless the Court directs otherwise.

3. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions.

4. We do not find any merit in the challenge to the validity of the  

Rule.   It  is  well  known  practice  that  generally  a  revision  against  

conviction and sentence is filed after an appeal is dismissed and the  

convicted person is taken into custody in Court itself.  The object of the  

Rule is to ensure that a person who has been convicted by two courts  

obeys the law and does not abscond.  The provision cannot thus be  

held to be arbitrary in any manner.  The provision is to regulate the  

procedure of the Court and does not, in any manner, conflict with the  

substantive provisions of the Cr.P.C. relied upon by the petitioners.  A  

2 2006 (5) SCC 752

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similar provision exists in the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.   In  K.M.  

Nanavti vs. State of Bombay  3   this Court considered the scope and  

effect of identical provision of Order XXI Rule 5 of the Supreme Court  

Rules, then applicable, which read as follows :

“When  the  petitioner  has  been  sentenced  to  a  term  of  imprisonment,   the  petition  shall  state  whether  the  petitioner  has  surrendered.  Unless  the  court otherwise orders, the petition shall   not  be  posted  for  hearing  until  the  petitioner  has  surrendered  to  his   sentence”.

5. It  was observed that  the Rule only crystalised the pre-existing  

practice  of  this  Court  and  the  High  Courts.   Further,  question  

considered was whether the Rule violated Article 161 which conferred  

power  on  Governor  to  suspend  the  sentence  as  in  that  case,  the  

Governor  had  suspended  the  sentence  but  still  the  convict  was  

required under the Rule to surrender.  This Court held that power of the  

Governor could not regulate procedure of the Court and if the case was  

to be heard by this Court, unless this Court granted exemption, the  

Rule prevailed.  We are not concerned with the said question in the  

present case.  Relevant observations in the said judgment are :  

“……..This  Rule  was,  in  terms,   introduced into the Supreme Court Rules   last  year  and  it  only  crystallized  the  preexisting practice of this court,  which  is  also the practice in  the High Courts.   That practice is based on the very sound  principle which was recognised long ago  by the Full  Bench of  the High Court  of   

3 (1961) 1 SCR 497

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Judicature,  North  Western  Provinces,  in   1870,  in  the  case  of  The  Queen v.  Bisheshar Pershad [Vol.2 NWP High Court   Reports, p. 441]. In that case no order of   conviction  had  been  passed.  Only  a  warrant  had  been  issued  against  the   accused and as the war rant had been  returned  unserved  a  proclamation  had  been  issued  and  attachment  of  the  property  of  the  accused  had  been  ordered, with a view to compelling him to  surrender.  The  validity  of  the  warrant  had  been  challenged  before  the  High  Court.  The  High  Court  refused  to   entertain  his  petition  until  he  had  surrendered because he was deemed to   be in contempt of a lawfully constituted  authority.  The  accused  person  in   pursuance of the order of the High Court   surrendered  and  after  he  had  surrendered,  the matter  was dealt  with  by the High Court on its merits.  But as   observed above the Rules framed under   Article 145 are only in aid of the powers  of  this  court  under Article  142 and the  main question that falls for consideration   is,  whether  the  order  of  suspension  passed  by  the  Governor  under  Article   161 could operate when this  court  had  been moved for granting special leave to   appeal from the judgment and order of   the High Court. As soon as the petitioner   put  in  a  petition  for  special  leave  to   appeal the matter became sub judice in  this  court.  This  court  under  its  Rules  could  insist  upon  the  petitioner  surrendering  to  his  sentence  as  a  condition  precedent  to  his  being  heard   by  this  court,  though  this  court  could  dispense with and in a proper case could   exempt him from the operation of  that  Rule. It is not disputed that this court has   the power to stay the execution of  the   sentence and to grant bail  pending the  disposal  of  the  application  for  special   leave to appeal. Rule 28 of Order 21 of   the Rules does not cover that period, but   even  so  the  power  of  the  court  under  Article 142 of the Constitution to make  

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such  order  as  is  necessary  for  doing  complete  justice  in  this  case  was  not  disputed  and  it  would  be  open  to  this   court  even  while  an  application  for  special  leave  is  pending  to  grant  bail   under the powers it has under Article 142  to pass any order in any matter which is   necessary for doing complete justice.”

6. Again in Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan (supra), validity  

and  effect  of  identical  Rules  i.e.  Rules  6  and  13-A  of  Order  XXI  of  

Supreme Court Rules, 1966 was considered.  It was observed :

“7. Order  21  relates  to  special  leave  petitions  in  criminal  proceedings  and  criminal appeals. So far as special leave  petitions  are  concerned,  Rule  6  application thereto is in almost identical   language as  that  of  Rule  13-A.  In  both  cases  it  is  stipulated  that  unless  the  petitioner  or  the  appellant  as  the  case  may be has surrendered to the sentence,   the  petition/the  appeal  shall  not  be  registered  and  cannot  be  posted  for   hearing  unless  the  Court  on  written   application for the purpose, orders to the  contrary. In both cases it  is  stated that   where  the  petition/appeal  is   accompanied by such an application that   application  alone  shall  be  posted  for   hearing  before  the  Court  for  orders.   Therefore,  the  position  is  crystal  clear   that  the  criminal  appeal  cannot  be   posted  unless  proof  of  surrender  has   been furnished by the appellant who has   been  convicted.  It  appears  from  the  various orders which have been filed by  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant,  the  effect  of  Order  21  Rule  13-A  has  not   been  dealt  with.  It  may  be  that  the  provision was not brought to the notice  of the Bench. The requirements of Order   21 Rule 13-A are mandatory in character  and  have  to  be  complied  with  except   when an order is passed for exemption  from surrendering.”

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7. In concurring judgment, it was observed :

“16. It  has  been  submitted  that  the  statutory  provisions  of  Section  389(3)   CrPC have an overriding effect over the   Supreme  Court  Rules  and  hence  once  bail  has  been  granted  to  a  convicted   person  by  the  trial  court,  this  Court   cannot insist that he should surrender to  the  sentence  in  terms  of  Rule  13-A  before his appeal can be registered. 17. While  such  a  submission  is   attractive, it does not stand scrutiny for   the simple reason that sub-section (3) of   Section  389  CrPC  empowers  the  trial   court  to  release a  convicted person on  bail  for  such  period  as  will  afford  him  sufficient time to present an appeal and  obtain  orders  of  the  appellate  court   under sub-section (1), namely, release on  bail,  and it  is  only for such period that   the  sentence  of  imprisonment  shall  be  deemed to be suspended. 18. The  basic  fallacy  of  Ms  Jaiswal’s   submission  is  that  it  overlooks  the  question that grant of bail in the appeal   presupposes surrender by the convicted  person. 19. The provisions of Section 389 CrPC  and  that  of  the  Supreme  Court  Rules,   1966 are independent provisions and will   have  to  be  considered  on  their  own  standing.”

8. Only further submission put forward is that inherent power of the  

Court  to  direct  listing of  the case by exempting the requirement of  

surrender has been taken away.  It is pointed out that even in Supreme  

Court  Rules  prohibition  against  listing  without  surrender  is  not  

applicable if the Court otherwise directs.  Such exception is not to be  

found in the impugned Rule.

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9. It has not been disputed even by the learned counsel for the High  

Court  that the Rule does not  affect  the inherent  power of  the High  

Court to exempt the requirement of surrender in exceptional situations.  

It cannot thus, be argued that prohibition against posting of a revision  

petition  for  admission  applies  even  to  a  situation  where  on  an  

application of the petitioner, on a case being made out, the Court, in  

exercise  of  its  inherent  power,  considers  it  appropriate  to  grant  

exemption  from  surrender  having  regard  to  the  nature  and  

circumstances  of  a  case.   Thus,  the  exception  as  found  in  

corresponding Supreme Court Rules that if the Court grants exemption  

from surrender and directs listing of a case, the Rule cannot stand in  

the way of the Court’s exercise of such jurisdiction, has to be assumed  

in the impugned Rule.

10. In these circumstances, we do not find any ground to hold that  

the  impugned  Rule  suffers  from any  infirmity.   The  writ  petition  is  

accordingly, dismissed.

………………………………………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

………………………………………………J.   (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 4, 2015

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