REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 697 of 2006

Vishram Singh Raghubanshi                    …Appellant

Versus

State of U.P.                                           …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  under  Section  19  of  the  

Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971,  (hereinafter  called  the  `Act  1971’)  

arising out of impugned judgment and order dated 5.5.2006 passed by  

the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Contempt of Court  

Case No. 13 of 1999.   

2. FACTS:

A) Appellant  is  an  advocate  practising  for  last  30 years  in  the  

District Court, Etawah (U.P.).  On 25.7.1998, he produced one Om  

Prakash  for  the  purpose  of  surrender,  impersonating  him  as  Ram

Kishan S/o Ashrafi Lal who was wanted in a criminal case in the court  

of IInd ACJM, Etawah.  There was some controversy regarding the  

genuineness of the person who came to surrender and therefore, the  

Presiding Officer of the Court raised certain issues.  So, the appellant  

misbehaved  with  the  said  officer  in  the  court  and  used  abusive  

language.  

B) The Presiding Officer of the court vide letter dated 28.9.1998  

made a complaint against the appellant to the U.P. Bar Council and  

vide letter dated 27.10.1998 made a reference to the High Court for  

initiating contempt  proceedings  under  Section 15 of  the Act,  1971  

against him.  The High Court considered the matter and issued show  

cause notice on 5.5.1999 to the appellant.   In response to the said  

notice, the appellant submitted his reply dated 24.5.1999, denying the  

allegations made against him, but, tendering an apology in the form of  

an  affidavit  stating  that  he  was  keeping  the  court  in  the  highest  

esteem.   

C) The Bar Council of U.P. dismissed the complaint referred by  

the Presiding Officer vide order dated 18.3.2001, but the Allahabad  

High  Court  did  not  consider  it  proper  to  accept  the  explanation  

submitted by the appellant  or  accept  the apology tendered by him,  

rather, it framed the charges against the appellant on 27.9.2004.  In  

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response to the same, the appellant again submitted an affidavit dated  

18.10.2005 tendering an apology similar to one in the affidavit filed  

earlier.   

D) The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court considered the  

matter  on  judicial  side,  giving  full  opportunity  to  the  appellant  to  

defend himself.   The High Court ultimately held the appellant guilty  

of committing the contempt and sentenced him to undergo 3 months  

simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/-.  Hence this appeal.  

3. This Court vide order dated 26.6.2006 suspended the operation  

of sentence and directed the appellant to deposit the fine of Rs. 2,000/-  

in this Court, which seems to have been deposited.   

4. Shri  Sanjeev  Bhatnagar,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant, has submitted that he would not be in a position to defend  

the  contemptuous  behaviour  of  the  appellant  but  insisted  that  the  

appellant  is  aged and ailing person and had tendered absolute  and  

unconditional  apologies  several  times.  Thus,  the  apology  may  be  

accepted and the sentence of three months simple imprisonment be  

quashed.   

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5. On the contrary, Shri R.K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing  

for the respondent, has vehemently opposed the prayer made by Shri  

Bhatnagar  and  contended  that  the  appellant  does  not  deserve  any  

lenient  treatment  considering  the  language  used  by  him  to  the  

Presiding Officer of the court and such a person does not deserve to  

remain in a noble profession.  He further contended that the apology  

has  not  been  tendered  at  the  initial  stage.  The  first  apology  was  

tendered only after receiving show cause notice dated 5.5.1999 from  

the High Court and under the pressure. More so, the language of the  

apology  is  not  such  which  shows  any  kind  of  remorse  by  the  

appellant,  thus,  considering  the  gravity  of  the  misbehaviour  of  the  

appellant, no interference is wanted.  Therefore, the appeal is liable to  

be rejected.  

6. We  have  considered  the  rival  contentions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.   

7. Admittedly, the case of impersonification of the person to be  

surrendered  is  a  serious  one,  however  we are  not  concerned as  to  

whether  the  appellant  had  any  role  in  such  impersonification,  but  

being an officer of the court, if any issue had been raised in this regard  

either by the court or opposite counsel, it was the duty of the appellant  

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to satisfy the Court and establish the identity of the person concerned.  

The conduct of the appellant seems to have been in complete violation  

and  in  contravention  of  the  “standard  of  professional  conduct  and  

etiquette” laid in Section 1 of Chapter 2 (Part-VI) of the Bar Council  

of  India  Rules  which,  inter-alia,  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  

maintain towards the court a respectful attitude and protect the dignity  

of the judicial  office.   He shall  use his best  efforts  to restrain and  

prevent his client from resorting to unfair practices etc. The advocate  

would conduct himself with dignity and self respect in the court etc.  

etc.   

There may be a case, where a person is really aggrieved  of  

misbehaviour/conduct or bias of a judicial officer. He definitely has a  

right to raise his grievance,  but it  should be before the appropriate  

forum and by resorting to the procedure prescribed for it. Under no  

circumstances, such a person can be permitted to become the law unto  

himself  and proceed in  a  manner  he wishes,  for  the reason that  it  

would render the very existence of the system of administration of  

justice at a stake.  

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8. Before proceeding further with the case, it may be necessary to  

make  reference  to  certain  parts  of  the  complaint  lodged  by  the  

Presiding Officer to the High Court against the appellant:   

(i) During the course of cross examination in a criminal case on  

22.8.1998,  the  appellant  was  advised  that  he  should  ask  

questions  peacefully  to  the  witness  on  which  the  appellant  

stepped over dias of the court and tried to snatch the paper of  

statement from him and started abusing him that “Madarchod,  

Bahanchod, make reference of contempt to the High Court”  

and stepped  out, abusing similarly from the court room.  

(ii) In  another  incident  on  25.7.1998,  three  accused  persons  

namely,  Ram  Krishan,  Ram  Babu  and  Rampal  surrendered  

before  the  court  and  filed  an  application  no.  57Kha  for  

cancellation  for  non-bailable  warrants,  and  the  whole  

proceeding was completed by him.  Aforesaid three accused  

persons,  namely,  Ram  Krishan  and  Ram  Babu  were  real  

brothers  and sons of  Ashrafi  Lal.   On 30.7.1998 order was  

passed  to  release  them  on  bail  but  before  they  could  be  

released,  it  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  court  that  right  

accused Ram Krishan son of Ashrafi Lal had surrendered and  

sent  to jail.   This  fact  was brought before the court  by the  

mother of the person Om Prakash who was actually sent to jail  

on 1.8.1998, of which enquiry was done and after summoning  

from jail the person in the name of Ram Krishan  stated in the  

court that his name was Om Prakash, son of Sh. Krishan Jatav.  

The  complainant  Bhaidayal  was  also  summoned  who  also  

verified the above fact. Thereafter, an  inquiry was conducted  

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by the Presiding Officer  who found the  involvement  of  the  

appellant in the above case of impersonification.  

9. The  High  Court  examined  the  complaint  and  the  reply  

submitted by the appellant to show cause notice issued by the High  

Court.  The High Court did not find the explanation worth acceptable  

and,  thus,  vide  order  dated  27.9.2004,  framed  charges  against  the  

appellant  in  respect  of  those  allegations  dated  22.8.1998  and  

25.7.1998 respectively.   

10.   It  is  not  the case of the appellant  that  he was not  given full  

opportunity to defend himself or lead evidence in support of his case.  

The appellant has not chosen to defend himself on merit before the  

High Court, rather he merely tendered apology thrice.  Even before us,  

Shri Sanjeev Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the appellant, has fairly  

conceded that the appellant had been insisting from the beginning to  

accept his apology and let him off. Mr. Bhatnagar’s case has been that  

in the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly considering the  

age  and  ailment  of  the  appellant,  apology  should  be  accepted  and  

sentence of three months simple imprisonment be set aside.  

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11. It  is settled principle of law that it  is the seriousness of the  

irresponsible acts of the contemnor and degree of harm caused to the  

administration of justice, which would decisively determine whether  

the matter should be tried as a criminal contempt or not. (Vide:  The  

Aligarh Municipal Board & Ors. v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union  

& Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1767).

12. The court has to examine whether the wrong is done to the  

judge personally or it is done to the public.  The act will be an injury  

to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the  

people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to  

deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance  

upon the court’s administration of justice or if it  is  likely to cause  

embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his  

judicial duties. (See: Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. v. The State  

of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10; and Perspective Publications (P.) Ltd. &  

Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221).  

13. In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of  

Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2176, this Court held that the power to  

punish  for  contempt  is  vested  in  the  judges  not  for  their  personal  

protection only, but for the protection of public justice, whose interest  

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requires that decency and decorum is preserved in courts of justice.  

Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of Justice are protected  

by the law, and shielded in the discharge of their duties; any deliberate  

interference with the discharge of such duties either in court or outside  

the  court  by  attacking  the  presiding  officers  of  the  court  would  

amount  to  criminal  contempt  and  the  courts  must  take  serious  

cognizance of such conduct.

14. In  E.M.Sankaran  Namboodiripad  v.  T.Narayanan  

Nambiar, AIR 1970 SC 2015, this Court observed that contempt of  

court  has  various  kinds,  e.g.  insult  to  Judges;  attacks  upon  them;  

comment  on pending proceedings with a tendency to prejudice fair  

trial;  obstruction  to  officers  of  Courts,  witnesses  or  the  parties;  

scandalising the Judges or the courts; conduct of a person which tends  

to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or  

disregard.  Such acts  bring the court  into disrepute  or  disrespect  or  

which offend its dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its authority.  

In a given case, such a conduct be committed “in respect of the whole  

of the judiciary or judicial system”.  

The  court  rejected  the  argument  that  in  particular  

circumstances conduct of the alleged contemnor may be protected by  

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution i.e. right to freedom of speech and  

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expression,  observing that  the words of  the second clause,   of  the  

same provision bring any existing law into operation, thus provisions  

of the Act 1971 would come into play and each case is to be examined  

on its own facts and the decision must be reached in the context of  

what was done or said.     

15. Thus, it is apparent that the contempt jurisdiction  is to uphold  

majesty and dignity of the law courts and the image of such majesty in  

the minds of the public cannot be allowed to be distorted. Any action  

taken on contempt or punishment enforced is aimed at protection of  

the freedom of individuals and orderly and equal  administration of  

laws and not for the purpose of providing immunity from criticism to  

the judges. The superior courts have a duty to protect the reputation of  

judicial  officers  of  subordinate  courts,  taking  note  of  the  growing  

tendency  of  maligning  the  reputation  of  judicial  officers  by  

unscrupulous practising advocates who either  fail  to secure desired  

orders  or  do  not  succeed  in  browbeating  for  achieving  ulterior  

purpose.  Such an issue touches upon the independence of not only the  

judicial officers but brings the question of protecting the reputation of  

the Institution  as a whole.  

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16. The  dangerous  trend  of  making  false  allegations  against  

judicial  officers  and  humiliating  them  requires  to  be  curbed  with  

heavy hands, otherwise the judicial system itself would collapse. The  

Bench and the Bar  have to  avoid unwarranted situations  on trivial  

issues that hamper the cause  of justice and are in the interest of none.  

“Liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with  

license to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much  

less the Judiciary”.  A lawyer cannot be a mere mouthpiece of his  

client  and  cannot  associate  himself  with  his  client  maligning  the  

reputation  of  judicial  officers  merely  because  his  client  failed  to  

secure the desired order from the said officer.  A deliberate attempt to  

scandalise  the  court  which  would  shake  the  confidence  of  the  

litigating public in the system, would cause a very serious damage to  

the Institution of judiciary.  An Advocate in a profession should be  

diligent and his conduct should also be diligent and conform to the  

requirements of the law by which an Advocate plays a vital role in the  

preservation  of  society  and  justice  system.  Any  violation  of  the  

principles of professional  ethics by an Advocate is unfortunate and  

unacceptable. (Vide: O.P. Sharma & Ors. v. High Court of Punjab  

& Haryana, (2011) 5 SCALE 518).       

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17. This  Court  in  M.B.  Sanghi  v.  High  Court  of  Punjab  &  

Haryana & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 600, observed as under:  

“The  foundation  of  our  system which  is  based  on the  independence and impartiality of those who man it will be  shaken  if  disparaging  and  derogatory  remarks  are  made  against  the presiding judicial  officer  with impunity….It  is  high  time  that  we  realise  that  much  cherished  judicial  independence  has  to  be  protected  not  only  from  the  executive or the legislature  but also from those who are an  integral part of the system. An independent judiciary is of  vital importance to any free society”.

18. This  leads  us  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the  facts  and  

circumstances   referred hereinabove warrant  acceptance  of apology  

tendered by the appellant.  

The famous humorist  P.G. Wodehouse in his work “The Man  

Upstairs (1914)” described apology :

 “The right sort of people do not want apologies,  and the wrong sort take a mean advantage of them.”

The  apology  means  a  regretful  acknowledge  or  excuse  for  

failure.  An explanation offered to a person affected by one’s action  

that no offence was intended, coupled with the expression of regret for  

any that may have been given.  Apology should be unquestionable in  

sincerity.  It should be tempered with a sense of genuine remorse and  

repentance, and not a calculated strategy to avoid punishment

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19. Clause  1  of  Section  12  and  Explanation  attached  thereto  

enables the court to remit the punishment awarded for committing the  

contempt of court on apology being made to the satisfaction of the  

court.  However,  an  apology  should  not  be  rejected  merely  on  the  

ground that it is qualified or tempered at a belated stage if the accused  

makes  it  bona  fide.  There  can  be  cases  where  the  wisdom  of  

rendering an apology dawns only at a later stage.  

20. Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a justification,  

or an appropriate punishment for an act which is in contempt of court.  

An apology can be accepted in case the conduct for which the apology  

is  given is  such that  it  can  be “ignored without  compromising the  

dignity  of  the  court”,  or  it  is  intended  to  be  the  evidence  of  real  

contrition.  It should be sincere. Apology cannot be accepted in case it  

is hollow; there is no remorse; no regret; no repentance, or if it is only  

a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such an apology can merely  

be termed as paper apology.   

21. In  Re: Bal Thackeray, Editor Samna,  (1998) 8 SCC 660,  

this  Court  accepted  the  apology tendered by the  contemnor  as  the  

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Court came to conclusion that apology was unconditional and it gave  

an expression of regret and realisation that mistake was genuine.  

22. In  L.D. Jaikwal  v.  State of  U.P.,  AIR 1984 SC 1374,  the  

court noted that it cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say sorry- and forget'  

school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying  

'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer.  

(See also: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot & Anr.,  AIR 2006 SC 2007)   

So an apology should not be paper apology and expression of  

sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen; for it is one  

thing to 'say' sorry-it is another to 'feel' sorry.

23. An apology for criminal contempt of court must be offered at  

the earliest since a belated apology hardly shows the “contrition which  

is the essence of the purging of a contempt”. However, even if the  

apology  is  not  belated  but  the  court  finds  it  to  be  without  real  

contrition and remorse,  and finds  that  it  was merely tendered as a  

weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.   If the apology  

is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going  

to impose punishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act  

of a cringing coward. (Vide : Mulkh Raj v. The State of Punjab,  

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AIR 1972 SC 1197; The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v.  

State of Assam & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1925; C. Elumalai and Ors.  

v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj and Anr.,  AIR 2009 SC 2214; and  Ranveer  

Yadav v. State of Bihar,  (2010) 11 SCC 493).

24. In  Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The State of West  

Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189, this Court while dealing with a  

similar issue observed as under:  

“…..Of course, an apology must be offered and that too  clearly and at the earliest opportunity. A person who  offers a belated apology runs the risk that it may not be  accepted  for  such  an  apology  hardly  shows  the  contrition  which  is  the  essence  of  the  purging  of  a  contempt.  However, a man may have the courage of  his convictions and may stake his on proving that he is  not in contempt and may take the risk. In the present  case the appellants  ran the gauntlet  of such risk and  may be said to have fairly succeeded.”

25. This Court has clearly laid down that apology tendered is not  

to be accepted as a matter of course and the Court is not bound to  

accept the same.  The court is competent to reject the apology and  

impose the punishment  recording reasons for the same.  The use of  

insulting  language  does  not  absolve  the  contemnor  on  any  count  

whatsoever. If the words are calculated and clearly intended to cause  

any  insult,  an  apology  if  tendered  and  lack  penitence,  regret  or  

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contrition, does not deserve to be accepted. (Vide: Shri Baradakanta  

Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr.,  AIR 1974 SC  

710;  The  Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar etc.,  

AIR 1976 SC 242;  Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta & Ors., AIR  

1983 SC 1151;  Mohd. Zahir Khan v.  Vijai Singh & Ors.,   AIR  

1992 SC 642; In  Re: Sanjiv Datta,  (1995) 3 SCC 619; and  Patel  

Rajnikant Dhulabhai & Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai &  

Ors., AIR 2008 SC 3016).  

26. In the instant case, the appellant has tendered the apology on  

24.5.1999 after receiving the show cause notice from the High Court  

as  to  why  the  proceedings  for  criminal  contempt  be  not  initiated  

against him. It may be necessary to make the reference to the said  

apology, the relevant part of which reads as under:  

“That  from  the  above  facts,  it  is  evident  that  the  deponent has not shown any dis-regard nor abused the  Presiding  Officer,  learned  Magistrate  and  so  far  as  allegations against him regarding surrender of Om Prakash  is the name of Ram Kishan are concerned, the deponent has  no knowledge regarding fraud committed by Asharfi Lal in  connivance with others and deponent cannot be blamed for  any fraudulent act.

That notwithstanding mentioned in this affidavit, the  deponent tenders unconditional apology to Mr. S.C. Jain,  IInd Addl.  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Etawah  if  for  any  conduct of the deponent the feelings of Mr. S.C. Jain  are  hurt.  The  deponent  shall  do  everything  and  protect  the  dignity of judiciary.                                 (Emphasis added)

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27. On 24.11.2005, the appellant has submitted an affidavit saying  

as under:  

“That the deponent expresses his unqualified remorse for  the incident giving rise to the present contempt application.  The  deponent  tenders  his  unconditional  apology  to  this  Hon’ble  Court  and to  Shri  Suresh  Chandra Jain,  the then  A.C.J.M.-2  Etawah  for  the  entire  incident  without  any  qualification  or  pre-condition.  The  deponent  gives  the  following solemn undertaking that no such incident would  occur in future. The deponent has immense respect for this  Hon’ble Court and all other Courts of Law in the land.

The  deponent  also  expresses  bona  fide,  genuine  and  heart-felt  regret  for  the  occurrence  which  the  deponent  consider a blot on him”.

28. The  High  Court  considered  the  case  elaborately  examining  

every  issue  microscopically  and  held  that  there  was  no  reason  to  

disbelieve  the  facts  stated  by  the  judicial  officer  against  the  

contemnor/appellant,  the  facts  were  acceptable,  and  it  was  clearly  

proved that the contemnor was guilty of gross criminal contempt.  The  

charges levelled against the appellant stood proved.  A Judge has to  

discharge his duty and  passes order in the manner as he thinks fit to  

the best of his capability under the facts and circumstances of the case  

before him.  No litigant, far less an advocate, has any right to take the  

law in his own hands.  The contemnor abused the Judge in most filthy  

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words unworthy of mouthing by an ordinary person and that is true  

without any justification for him ascending the dais   during the course  

of the proceedings and then abusing the judicial officer in the words  

“Maaderchod, Bahanchod, High Court Ko Contempt Refer Kar”.  The  

courts certainly cannot be intimidated to seek the favourable orders.  

The appellant  intimidated the presiding officer  of the court  hurling  

filthiest  abuses  and  lowered  the  authority  of  the  Court,  which  is  

tantamount to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings.  

The charge  which stood proved against  the  appellant  could not  be  

taken lightly and in such a fact-situation the apology tendered by him,  

being not bona fide, was not acceptable.

29. We have considered the facts and circumstances of the case.  

The show cause notice was given by the High Court on 5.5.1999. The  

appellant submitted his reply on 24.5.1999.  The charges were framed  

against him on 27.9.2004 and in his first affidavit dated 18.10.2005,  

the appellant had denied all the allegations made against him. The so-

called apology contained ifs and buts.  Appellant is not even sure as to  

whether  he  has  committed  the  criminal  contempt  of  the  court  or  

whether  the  most  filthy  abuses  could  hurt  the  Presiding  Officer.  

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Appellant  has been of the view that the Officer was a robot and has  

no heart at all, thus incapable of having the feelings of being hurt.

      The appellant filed second affidavit dated 24.11.2005 tendering  

apology.  The apology has been tendered under pressure only  after  

framing  of the charges by the High Court in the Criminal Contempt  

when appellant realised that he could be punished.  The apology was  

not tendered at the earliest opportunity, rather  tendered belatedly just  

to  escape  the  punishment  for  the  grossest  criminal  contempt  

committed by him.  The language used by the Advocate for a judicial  

officer where he practices regularly and earns his livelihood is such  

that  any  apology  would  fall  short  to  meet  the  requirement  of  the  

statutory provisions. There has been no repent or remorse on the part  

of the appellant at an initial stage.  Had it been so, instead of making  

grossest and scandalous allegations against the judicial officer, writing  

complaint against him to the Administrative Judge in the High Court  

of Allahabad, the appellant could have gone to the concerned judicial  

officer and tendered apology in open court.   

The  appellant  instead of  yielding to  the  court  honestly  and  

unconditionally, advanced a well guarded defence by referring to all  

the facts that led to the incident. Apology tendered by the appellant  

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gives an impression that the same was  in the alternative and not a  

complete surrender before the law. Such attitude has a direct impact  

on the court’s independence, dignity and decorum. In order to protect  

the  administration  of  public  justice,  we  must  take  action  as  his  

conduct and utterances cannot be ignored or pardoned. The appellant  

had no business to overawe the court.   

Thus,  we are  of  the  view that  the apology tendered by the  

appellant had neither been sincere nor bona fide and thus, not worth  

acceptance.

30. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. A copy  

of the judgment and order be sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate,  

Etawah, for taking the appellant into custody and send him to the jail  

to serve out the sentence.  

                                                    …………….....................J.                                       (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………............................J.          (SWATANTER KUMAR)  New Delhi,               June 15, 2011

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