19 February 2015
Supreme Court
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VIPULBHAI M. CHAUDHARY Vs GUJARAT COOP. MILK MARKT. FED. LTD

Bench: ANIL R. DAVE,KURIAN JOSEPH
Case number: C.A. No.-003047-003047 / 2015
Diary number: 1501 / 2014
Advocates: ANIP SACHTHEY Vs


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3047 OF 2015 (Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 6237/2014)

Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary … Appellant (s)   

Versus

Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing  Federation Limited and others … Respondent (s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3048 OF 2015 (Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 3799/2014)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3049  OF 2015 (Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 5270/2014)

J U D G M E N T  

KURIAN, J.:

Leave granted.    

2. Whether in the absence of a specific provision on removal by  

no confidence in the Act, Rules or even Bye-laws of a Cooperative  

Society, the Chairperson/elected office bearer can be removed by a  

motion of no confidence, is the short but complex question.

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REPORTABLE

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3. Appellant was removed from the office of the Chairperson of  

the  first  respondent–cooperative  society  through  a  no  confidence  

motion.  Aggrieved,  appellant  filed  a  writ  petition  which  was  

dismissed as per the impugned judgment and thus the appeal.

4. Shri  Kapil  Sibal,  Shri  H.  Ahmedi  and  Shri  Harin  P.  Raval,  

learned Senior Counsel led the arguments on behalf of the appellant.  

Shri Tushar Mehta, Additional Solicitor General, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan,  

Shri Ashok Desai and Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, Shri Sanjay  

R. Hegde and Shri B. S. Patel, learned Counsel, led the arguments on  

behalf of the respondents.

5. International  Cooperative  Alliance  Statement  on  the  

Cooperative Identity was adopted in Manchester, United Kingdom on  

23.09.1995. The ‘cooperative’ is defined as:

“A  co-operative  is  an  autonomous  association  of  persons  united  voluntarily  to  meet  their  common  economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations  through  a  jointly-owned  and  democratically- controlled enterprise.”  

(Emphasis supplied)

6. The  Statement  also  provides  for  ‘values’  on  which  

cooperatives should model themselves, which reads as follows:

“Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help,  self-responsibility,  democracy,  equality,  equity  and  

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solidarity.  In  the  tradition  of  their  founders,  co-operative members believe in the ethical values  of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring  for others.”

(Emphasis supplied)

7. The  Statement  further  provides  for  ‘seven  cooperative  

principles’ as guidelines by which the cooperatives put their values  

into practice. Following are the principles:

“1st Principle: Voluntary and Open Membership

Co-operatives  are  voluntary  organizations,  open  to  all persons able to use their services and willing to  accept  the  responsibilities  of  membership,  without  gender,  social,  racial,  political  or  religious  discrimination.

2nd Principle: Democratic Member Control

Co-operatives  are  democratic  organizations  controlled  by  their  members,  who  actively  participate  in  setting  their  policies  and  making  decisions.  Men  and  women  serving  as  elected  representatives are accountable to the membership.  In primary co-operatives members have equal voting  rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives at  other  levels  are  also  organized  in  a  democratic  manner.

3rd Principle: Member Economic Participation

Members contribute equitably to, and democratically  control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part  of that capital is usually the common property of the  co-operative.  Members  usually  receive  limited  compensation,  if  any,  on  capital  subscribed  as  a  condition  of  membership.  Members  allocate  surpluses  for  any  or  all  of  the  following purposes:  

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developing their co-operative, possibly by setting up  reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible;  benefiting  members  in  proportion  to  their  transactions  with  the  co-operative;  and  supporting  other activities approved by the membership.

4th Principle: Autonomy and Independence

Co-operatives  are  autonomous,  self-help  organizations  controlled  by  their  members.  If  they  enter  to  agreements  with  other  organizations,  including governments, or raise capital from external  sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic  control  by  their  members  and  maintain  their  co- operative autonomy.

5th  Principle:  Education,  Training  and  Information

Co-operatives  provide  education  and  training  for  their  members,  elected representatives,  managers,  and employees so they can contribute effectively to  the development of their co-operatives. They inform  the general  public –  particularly young people and  opinion leaders – about the nature and benefits of  co-operation.

6th  Principle:  Co-operation  among  Co- operatives

Co-operatives serve their members most effectively  and  strengthen  the  co-operative  movement  by  working  together  through  local,  national,  regional  and international structures.

7th Principle: Concern for Community

Co-operatives work for the sustainable development  of  their  communities  through policies  approved by  their members.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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8. The cooperative movement in India started at the beginning  

of  the  20th century.  Though  the  movements  were  also  based  on  

some of the values and principles stated above, it appears that the  

cooperatives in India did not have effective autonomy, democratic  

functioning and professional  management.  The National  Policy on  

Cooperatives  announced  by  the  Department  of  Agriculture  and  

Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India adopted in  

March, 2002, is wholly based on the definition, values and principles  

stated above.  97th Amendment to the Constitution of India, in fact,  

gave a constitutional frame to this policy.

9. Apart  from  providing  for  the  right  to  form  cooperative  

societies  to  be  a  fundamental  right  under  Article  19  of  the  

Constitution of India and insertion of Article 43B under the Directive  

Principles of State Policy on promotion of cooperative societies, the  

amendment  also  introduced  a  new  Part  IXB  on  Cooperative  

Societies. Reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  

amendment would give a clear picture as to the need to strengthen  

the democratic basis and provide for a constitutional status to the  

cooperative  societies.  Thus,  one  has  to  see  the  constitutional  

aspirations  on the  concept  of  cooperative societies  after  the 97 th  

Amendment in the Constitution of India which came into effect on  

12.01.2012.

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“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS The  co-operative  sector,  over  the  years,  has  

made significant  contribution  to  various  sectors  of  national  economy  and  has  achieved  voluminous  growth.  However,  it  has  shown  weaknesses  in  safeguarding  the  interests  of  the  members  and  fulfilment of objects for which these institutions were  organised.  There  have  been  instances  where  elections  have  been  postponed  indefinitely  and  nominated office bearers or administrators remaining  in-charge of these institutions for a long time. This  reduces the accountability of the management of co- operative  societies  to  their  members.  Inadequate  professionalism in management in many of the co- operative institutions  has led to  poor  services  and  low productivity.  Co-operatives need to run on well  established democratic principles and elections held  on time and in  a  free and fair  manner.  Therefore,  there is  a  need to  initiate  fundamental  reforms  to  revitalize these institutions in order to ensure their  contribution  in  the  economic  development  of  the  country and to serve the interests of members and  public at large and also to ensure their autonomy,  democratic  functioning and  professional  management.

2.  The  "co-operative  societies"  is  a  subject  enumerated  in  Entry  32  of  the  State  List  of  the  Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and the State  Legislatures have accordingly enacted legislations on  co-operative societies. Within the framework of State  Acts,  growth  of  co-operatives  on  large  scale  was  envisaged as part of the efforts for securing social  and  economic  justice  and  equitable  distribution  of  the  fruits  of  development.  It  has,  however,  been  experienced that in spite of considerable expansion  of  co-operatives,  their  performance  in  qualitative  terms  has  not  been  up  to  the  desired  level.  Considering the need for reforms in the Co-operative  Societies Acts of the States, consultations with the  State  Governments  have  been  held  at  several  occasions  and  in  the  conferences  of  State  Co- operative Ministers. A strong need has been felt for  amending  the  Constitution  so  as  to  keep  the  co-

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operatives  free  from  unnecessary  outside  interferences and also to ensure their  autonomous  organisational  set  up  and  their  democratic  functioning.

3.  The  Central  Government  is  committed  to  ensure that the co-operative societies in the country  function in a democratic,  professional,  autonomous  and  economically  sound  manner.  With  a  view  to  bring  the  necessary  reforms,  it  is  proposed  to  incorporate a  new Part in the Constitution so as to  provide  for  certain  provisions  covering  the  vital  aspects  of  working  of  co-operative  societies  like  democratic,  autonomous  and  professional  functioning.  A  new  article  is  also  proposed  to  be  inserted  in  Part  IV  of  the  Constitution  (Directive  Principles of State Policy) for the States to endeavour  to  promote voluntary  formation,  autonomous  functioning,  democratic  control and  professional  management of cooperative societies. The proposed  new  Part  in  the  Constitution,  inter  alia,  seeks  to  empower the Parliament in respect of multi-State co- operative societies and the State Legislatures in case  of other co-operative societies to make appropriate  law, laying down the following matters, namely:—

(a)  provisions for incorporation, regulation  and winding up of co-operative societies based  on the principles of      democratic member- control,  member-economic  participation  and  autonomous functioning;

(b)  specifying  the  maximum  number  of  directors  of  a  co-operative  society  to  be  not  exceeding twenty-one members;

(c) providing for a fixed term of five years  from  the  date  of  election  in  respect  of  the  elected  members  of  the  board  and  its  office  bearers;

(d) providing for a maximum time limit of  six months during which a board of directors of  co-operative  society  could  be  kept  under  supersession or suspension;

(e) providing for independent professional  audit;

(f) providing for right of information to the  members of the co-operative societies;

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(g) empowering the State Governments to  obtain  periodic  reports  of  activities  and  accounts of co-operative societies;

(h)  providing  for  the  reservation  of  one  seat  for    the  Scheduled  Castes  or  the  Scheduled Tribes and two seats for women on  the board of every co-operative society, which  have  individuals  as  members  from  such  categories;

(i)  providing  for  offences  relating  to  co- operative societies and penalties in respect of  such offences. 4.  It is expected that these provisions will  not  

only  ensure  the  autonomous  and  democratic  functioning  of  co-operatives,  but  also  ensure  the  accountability of management to the members and  other stakeholders and shall  provide for deterrence  for violation of the provisions of the law.

5.  The  Bill  seeks  to  achieve  the  above  objectives.”

(Emphasis supplied)

10. Article  43B  of  the  Constitution  of  India  provides  for  

promotion of cooperative societies:

“43B.  The State shall  endeavour  to  promote  voluntary  formation,  autonomous  functioning,  democratic  control and  professional  management  of co-operative societies.”

(Emphasis supplied)

11. Part  IXB  of  the  Constitution  of  India  is  titled  as  “The  

Cooperative Societies”. A few provisions would be relevant for our  

consideration.

• Article 243ZH(b) defines “board”:

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“243ZH(b)  “board”  means  the  board  of  directors or  the  governing  body of  a  co-operative  society,  by  whatever  name  called,  to  which  the  direction  and  control  of  the  management  of  the  affairs of a society is entrusted to;”

(Emphasis supplied)

 

• Article 243ZH(c) defines “cooperative society”:

“243ZH(c)  “co-operative  society”  means  a  society registered or deemed to be registered under  any  law  relating  to  co-operative  societies  for  the  time being in force in any State;”

• “Office bearer” is under Article 243ZH(e):

“243ZH(e)  “office  bearer”  means  a  President,  Vice-President,   Chairperson,  Vice-Chairperson,  Secretary or Treasurer of a co-operative society and  includes any other person to be elected by the board  of any co-operative society;”    

• Article  243ZJ  provides  for  the  number  and  term  of  

members of the board and its office bearers:

“243ZJ.  (1)  The  board  shall  consist  of  such  number  of  directors  as  may  be  provided  by  the  Legislature of a State, by law:

Provided that the maximum number of directors  of  a  co-operative  society  shall  not  exceed twenty- one:

Provided further that the Legislature of a State  shall, by law, provide for the reservation of one seat  for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and  two seats for women on board of every co-operative  

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society  consisting  of  individuals  as  members  and  having  members  from  such  class  or  category  of  persons.

(2) The term of office of elected members of the  board and its office bearers shall be five years from  the date of election and the term of office bearers  shall be coterminous with the term of the board:

Provided  that  the  board  may  fill  a  casual  vacancy on the board by nomination out of the same  class  of  members  in  respect  of  which  the  casual  vacancy has arisen, if the term of office of the board  is less than half of its original term.

(3)  The  Legislature  of  a  State  shall,  by  law,  make  provisions  for  co-option  of  persons  to  be  members of the board having experience in the field  of banking, management, finance or specialization in  any other field relating to the objects and activities  undertaken by the co-operative society as members  of the board of such society:

Provided  that  the  number  of  such  co-opted  members shall not exceed two in addition to twenty- one directors specified in the proviso to clause (1):

Provided further  that  such  co-opted  members  shall not have the right to vote in any election of the  co-operative  society  in  their  capacity  as  such  member  or  to  be  eligible  to  be  elected  as  office  bearers of the board:

Provided also that the functional directors of a  co-operative  society  shall  also  be the members  of  the board and such members shall be excluded for  the purpose of counting the total number of directors  specified in first proviso of clause (1).”

(Emphasis supplied)

 

• Article  243ZT  provides  for  continuance  of  the  existing  

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laws:  

“243ZT. Notwithstanding anything in this Part,  any  provision  of  any  law  relating  to  co-operative  societies in force in a State immediately before the  commencement of the Constitution (Ninety Seventh  Amendment)  Act,  2011,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  this  Part,  shall  continue to  be  in  force  until  amended  or  repealed  by  a  competent  Legislature or other competent authority or until the  expiration  of  one  year  from such  commencement,  whichever is less.’.”

(Emphasis supplied)

 

12. Thus, by 12.01.2013, all laws on cooperative societies were  

bound to  be restructured in  consonance with the Ninety  Seventh  

Amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  India  and,  in  any  case,  any  

provision in the Act or Rules or Bye-laws otherwise inconsistent with  

the  Constitution  will  be  inoperative  thereafter.  Articles  43B  and  

243ZT are mandates to all the States and the competent authorities  

to structure cooperative societies as conceived in the Constitution of  

India, if not already there. Therefore, we have to see whether the  

Act,  Rules  or  Bye-laws  contain  any  provision  for  democratic  

functioning.   

13. The first legislation on cooperative movement in India was  

the  Cooperative  Credit  Societies  Act,  1904  and,  thereafter,  the  

cooperative societies emerged in India as State sponsored/promoted  

institutions. The main objective was only credit intended to relieve  

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the poor agriculturists from the clutches of moneylenders. The first  

urban  cooperative  credit  society  under  the  Act  of  1904  was  

registered in Kanjivaram in erstwhile Madras province1. The traits of  

democracy  were  present  in  the  very  first  legislation  through  the  

principle “one man, one vote”. Since the first legislation was limited  

to the credit societies, a new legislation was introduced 8 years later  

as  “Cooperative  Societies  Act,  1912”.  The  restriction  regarding  

registration  limited  to  credit  societies  was  taken  away  and  any  

society  established  with  the  object  of  promoting  the  economic  

interests  of  its  members  in  accordance  with  the  cooperative  

principles, or a society established with the object of facilitating the  

operations of such a society, could be registered2.

14. Under  the  Government  of  India  Act  of  1919  (Montague  

Chelmsford  Reforms),  cooperation  became  a  provincial  subject  

which gave a further impetus to the movement. This gave birth to  

several cooperative land mortgage banks. The first of its kind was  

registered in Punjab. Close to independence and thereafter, we see a  

radical change and increased growth in the cooperative movement.  

Activities were spread to all spheres of human endeavour, and thus  

1  “Brief History of Urban Cooperatives” adapted from a paper by O.P. Sharma  published  on  Reserve  Bank  of  India  website  –  www.rbi.org.in/scripts/briefhistory.aspx.

2  The Co-operative Movement in India by Eleanor M. Hough, Fourth Edition,  1959

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in 2002, National Policy on Cooperatives was announced.  

15.  The  cooperative  societies  having  been  conferred  a  

constitutional status by the Ninety Seventh Amendment, the whole  

concept of cooperatives has undergone a major change. In 1993, the  

local self-governments, viz., panchayats and municipalities were also  

given constitutional status under Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution  

of India by the 73rd and 74th Amendments. The Statement of Objects  

and  Reasons  would  show  that  the  Constitution  wanted  the  local  

bodies to function as vibrant democratic units of self-government.  

After  two  decades,  cooperative  societies  were  given  the  

constitutional  status  by including them under  Part  IXB.  The main  

object for the said amendment was also to ensure “their autonomy,  

democratic functioning and professional management”.

16. The  National  Policy  on  Cooperatives  announced  in  March  

2002 has recognized democracy, equality, equity and solidarity as  

values of cooperatives. Cooperative society has been declared as a  

democratic institution.  Democratic principles have all through been  

recognized  as  one  of  the  cooperative  principles  though  the  

constitutional affirmation of those principles came only in 2012.  

17. The principle of representative democracy is the election of  

representatives by the people otherwise eligible to caste their vote  

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and  the  people  thus  elected,  constituting  the  body  for  the  

management  of  an  institution.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  cooperative  

societies, after the amendment in the Constitution, there has to be a  

Board  of  elected  representatives,  which  may  be  called  Board  of  

Directors  or  Governing  Body  or  a  Managing  Committee,  etc.,  to  

which  the  members  entrust  the  direction  and  control  of  the  

management of the affairs of the society. That representative body  

selects one among the elected representatives as its Chairman or  

any other office bearer, as the case may be. Selection is the act of  

carefully choosing someone as the most suitable to be the leader or  

office bearer. Thus, there is a lot of difference between election of  

delegates/representatives to  constitute a  body and selection of  a  

person by the body from amongst the elected members to be the  

leader. It is to be borne in mind that the management and control of  

the society is entrusted to the representative body, viz., the Board of  

Directors and that the Chairperson elected by the Board of Directors  

is the Chairperson of the society and not of the Board of directors.

18. In  Bhanumati  and  others v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  

through its  Principal  Secretary and others3,  the  cooperative  

principles governing democratic institutions have been discussed in  

detail; no doubt while dealing with the Panchayati Raj institutions.  

3  (2010) 12 SCC 1

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However,  the  basic  democratic  principles  governing  both  the  

institutions,  enjoying the constitutional  status,  are the same and,  

therefore, it  would be profitable to refer to the discussion on the  

principles. To quote:

“58. These institutions must run on democratic  principles. In democracy all  persons heading public  bodies  can  continue  provided  they  enjoy  the  confidence of the persons who comprise such bodies.  This is the essence of democratic republicanism. This  explains why this provision of no-confidence motion  was  there  in  the  Act  of  1961  even  prior  to  the  Seventy-third Constitution Amendment and has been  continued  even  thereafter.  Similar  provisions  are  there in different States in India.

66. Democracy  demands  accountability  and  transparency  in  the  activities  of  the  Chairperson  especially  in  view  of  the  important  functions  entrusted  with  the  Chairperson  in  the  running  of  Panchayati  Raj  institutions.  Such  duties  can  be  discharged by the Chairperson only if he/she enjoys  the continuous confidence of the majority members  in  the  panchayat.  So  any  statutory  provision  to  demonstrate  that  the  Chairperson  has  lost  the  confidence  of  the  majority  is  conducive  to  public  interest  and adds  strength  to  such  bodies  of  self- governance.  Such  a  statutory  provision  cannot  be  called either unreasonable or ultra vires Part IX of the  Constitution.”

19. In  Pratap  Chandra  Mehta v.  State  Bar  Council  of  

Madhya Pradesh and others4 and in  Usha Bharti v.  State of  

Uttar Pradesh and others  5  , the concept of democratic principles  

4  (2011) 9 SCC 573 5  (2014) 7 SCC 663

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governing  the  democratic  institutions  have  been  discussed.  In  a  

democratic  institution,  confidence is  the  foundation on which the  

superstructure  of  democracy  is  built.  The  bedrock  of  democratic  

accountability  rests  on  the  confidence  of  the  electorate.  If  the  

representative body does not have confidence in the office bearer  

whom  they  selected,  democracy  demands  such  officer  to  be  

removed in a democratic manner.  

20. A cooperative society is registered on cooperative principles  

of  democracy,  equity,  equality  and  solidarity.  Democratic  

accountability,  mutual  trust,  fairness,  impartiality,  unity  or  

agreement of feeling among the delegates, cooperativeness,  etc.,  

are some of the cardinal dimensions of the cooperative principles. A  

body built on such principles cannot be led by a captain in whom the  

co-sailors have no confidence.  

21. If  a  person  has  been  selected  to  an  office  through  

democratic process, and when that person looses the confidence of  

the representatives who selected him, those representatives should  

necessarily have a democratic right to remove such an office bearer  

in whom they do not have confidence, in case those institutions are  

viewed under the Constitution/statues as democratic institutions.  

22. In  Bhanumati case  (supra),  at  paragraph-67,  this  Court  

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elaborated on this principle:  

“67. Any head of a democratic institution must  be prepared to face the test of confidence. Neither  the  democratically  elected  Prime  Minister  of  the  country nor the Chief Minister of a State is immune  from such a test  of  confidence under the Rules of  Procedure framed under Articles 118 and 208 of the  Constitution.  Both  the  Prime  Minister  of  India  and  Chief Ministers of several States heading the Council  of  Ministers  at  the  Centre  and  in  several  States  respectively  have  to  adhere  to  the  principles  of  collective responsibilities to their respective houses  in accordance with Articles 75(3) and 164(2) of the  Constitution.”

23. In  Pratap Chandra Mehta case (supra), at paragraph-45,  

the principle has been discussed as follows:

“45. In the instant case, the election process as  contemplated  under  the  relevant  laws  is  that  the  members of a State Bar Council are elected by the  electorate of advocates on the rolls of the State Bar  Council  from  amongst  the  electorate  itself.  The  elected  members  then  elect  a  Chairman,  a  Vice- Chairman and the Treasurer of the State Bar Council  as well as constitute various committees for carrying  out  different  purposes  under  the  provisions  of  the  Advocates Act. In other words, the body which elects  the  Chairman  or  Vice-Chairman  of  a  State  Bar  Council always consists of members elected to that  Council. The democratic principles would require that  a person who attains the position of a Chairman or  Vice-Chairman,  as  the  case  may  be,  could  be  removed  by  the  same  electorate  or  smaller  body  which  elected  them  to  that  position  by  taking  recourse  to  a  “no-confidence  motion”  and  in  accordance with the Rules.  The body that elects a  person to such a position would and ought to have  the right to oust him/her from that post, in the event  

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the majority members of the body do not support the  said  person  at  that  time.  Even  if,  for  the  sake  of  argument, it is taken that this may not be generally  true, the provisions of Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules  make it clear, beyond doubt, that a “no-confidence  motion”  can  be  brought  against  the  elected  Chairman provided the conditions stated in the said  Rules are satisfied.”

24. In Usha Bharti case (supra) also, this Court eloquently held  

at paragraph-53 as follows:

 “53. In our opinion, the provision for removing  

an  elected  representative  such  as  Panchayat  Adhyaksha is of fundamental importance to ensure  the democratic functioning of the Institution as well  as to ensure the transparency and accountability in  the  functions  performed  by  the  elected  representatives.”

25. No doubt, in the cases referred to above, the respective Acts  

contained  a  provision  regarding  no  confidence.  What  about  a  

situation  where  there  is  no  express  provision  regarding  no  

confidence?  Once  the  cooperative  society  is  conferred  a  

constitutional status, it should rise to the constitutional aspirations  

as a democratic  institution.  So,  it  is  for  the respective legislative  

bodies  to  ensure  that  there  is  democratic  functioning.  When  the  

Constitution is eloquent, the laws made thereunder cannot be silent.  

If the statute is silent or imprecise on the requirements under the  

Constitution, it is for the court to read the constitutional mandate  

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into  the  provisions  concerned  and  declare  it  accordingly.  Article  

243ZT has given a period of one year to frame/reframe the statues  

in  consonance with Part  IXB and thereafter,  i.e.,  with effect  from  

12.01.2013, those provisions which are inconsistent with Part IXB,  

cease to operate.

26. Silence in Constitution and abeyance as well has been dealt  

extensively by Michael Foley in his celebrated work “The Silence of  

Constitutions”. To quote from the Preface:

“Abeyances refer to those constitutional gaps which  remain  vacuous  for  positive  and  constructive  purposes. They are not, in any sense, truces between  two or  more defined positions,  but  rather  a set  of  implicit  agreements  to  collude  in  keeping  fundamental  questions  of  political  authority  in  a  state  of  irresolution.  Abeyances  are,  in  effect,  compulsive  hedges  against  the  possibility  of  that  which  is  unresolved  being  exploited  and  given  meanings almost  guaranteed to generate profound  division  and  disillusionment.  Abeyances  are  important,  therefore,  because  of  their  capacity  to  deter  the  formation  of  conflicting  positions  in  just  those areas where the potential for conflict is most  acute. So central are these abeyances, together with  the  social  temperament  required  to  sustain  them,  that  when they become the subject  of  heightened  interest and subsequent conflict, they are not merely  accompanied by an intense constitutional crisis, they  are themselves the essence of that crisis.”

27. In Part II, Chapter Four, the author has also dealt with the  

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constitutional  gaps  and  the  arts  of  prerogative.  To  the  extent  

relevant, it reads as follows (Page-82):  

“Gaps in a constitution should not be seen as simply  empty space. They amount to a substantial plenum  of  strategic  content  and  meaning  vital  to  the  preservation  of  a  constitution.  Such  interstices  accommodate  the  abeyances  within  which  the  sleeping giants of potentially acute political conflict  are communally maintained in slumber. Despite the  absence of any documentary or material form, these  abeyances are real, and are an integral part of any  constitution.  What  remains  unwritten  and  indeterminate can be just  as much responsible for  the operational character and restraining quality of a  constitution  as  its  more  tangible  and  codified  components. …”

28. Where the Constitution has conceived a particular structure  

on certain institutions, the legislative bodies are bound to mould the  

statutes  accordingly.  Despite  the  constitutional  mandate,  if  the  

legislative body concerned does not carry out the required structural  

changes in the statutes, then, it is the duty of the court to provide  

the statute with the meaning as per the Constitution. … “The job of  

the Supreme Court is not to expound the meaning of the constitution  

but  to  provide  it  with  meaning”6.  The  reference  obviously  is  to  

United States Supreme Court. As a general rule of interpretation, no  

doubt, nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute. However,  

6  Walter Berns, ‘Government by lawyers and judges’, Commentary, June, 1987  at p.18.

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when there are adequate grounds to justify an inference, it is the  

bounden duty of the court to do so.  …“It is a corollary to the general  

rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken  

from  a  statue  unless  there  are  adequate  grounds  to  justify  the  

inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to  

express”7.  According  to  Lord  Mersey  in  Thompson  (Pauper) v.  

Goold  and  Co.8…  “It  is  a  strong  thing  to  read  into  an  Act  or  

Parliament words, which are not there, and in the absence of clear  

necessity, it is wrong to do”. In the case of cooperative societies,  

after  the  Ninety  Seventh  Amendment,  it  has  become  a  clear  or  

strong  necessity  to  do  the  strong  thing  of  reading  into  the  

legislation, the constitutional mandate of the cooperative societies  

to  be  governed  as  democratic  institutions.  … “The  constitutional  

provisions have to be construed broadly and liberally having regard  

to the changed circumstances and the needs of time and polity”9.  

29. Article 243ZT of the Constitution requires the laws relating to  

cooperative societies in force in States prior to the commencement  

of  the  Amendment  Act  to  be  in  tune  with  and  in  terms  of  the  

constitutional concept and set up of cooperative societies. In fact, a  

7  Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statues, Twelfth Edition, page-33. 8  [1910] A.C. 409. 9  Constitutional  Bench  decision  in  State  of  West  Bengal  and  others v.  

Committee  for  Protection  of  Democratic  Rights,  West  Bengal  and  others  reported in [(2010) 3 SCC 571, Paragraph-45.

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period of one year has been provided in the Constitution from the  

commencement of the amendment for the required amendment or  

repeal by the competent legislature or by the competent authority,  

of  laws  which  are  inconsistent  with  Part  IXB.  As  a  corollary,  the  

Constitution  enables  the  competent  legislature  or  authority  to  

suitably amend the existing provisions in their laws in tune with the  

constitutional  mandate.  Thereafter,  in  case there continues to be  

silence  in  the  Act  or  Bye-laws,  the  court  will  have  to  read  the  

constitutional  requirements  into  the  existing  provisions.  It  is  

essentially  a  process  of  purposive  construction  of  the  available  

provisions  as  held  by  this  Court  in  Pratap  Chandra  Mehta  

case (supra).  

30. Bye-law 18.2 of the first respondent, pertaining to the office  

of the Chairperson of the Federation falling vacant before the expiry  

of his elected term, will have to be analysed in the light of the above  

principle. The provision reads as follows:

“18.2.The  Chairperson  of  the  Federation  will  be  elected by the Board for the Term of three years  and he /  she  shall  continue to  hold  his  /  her  office  till  the  new Chairperson  is  elected  and  takes  over.  He  /  she  shall  be  honorary  Chairperson.  In  case  the  elected  Chairperson  vacates his / her office before expiry of his / her  term or  due to  any  other  reason the  post  of  Chairman falls vacant, the Board shall elect the  new Chairperson for the remaining term. The election of the Chairperson will take place  

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in  the  first  Board  meeting  of  the  Federation  after  the  expiry  of  the  term  of  the  elected  Chairperson  or  when  the  Chairperson’s  post  falls vacant. In his / her absence, the meeting  shall elect its own Chairperson for that meeting  from  amongst  the  eligible  members  present.  The  Chairperson  in  such  event  shall  exercise  such power as may be delegated to him by the  Board  of  Directors.  The  Managing  Director  of  the Federation shall not be entitled to vote and  contest  the  election  for  the  post  of  Chairperson.”  

(Emphasis supplied)

31. Bye-law 23 deals with the powers of the Board of Directors:

“23.Powers and Functions of the Board The  entire  administration,  management  and  control of the Federation shall be vested in the  Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall  have and  exercise  all  such  powers  and  enter  into  all  such  agreements  made,  all  such  arrangements, take all such proceeding and do  all such acts and things as may be necessary or  proper  for  the  due  management  of  the  Federation  and  for  carrying  out  objects  for  which  the  Federation  is  established  and  for  securing  and furthering  its  interest  subject  to  the provisions of the Act or  such act  as shall  hereafter take its place and to any rules which  may  be  passed  by  the  State  Government  in  pursuance of the said Act and subject also to  these Bye-Laws and / or any Bye-law which may  be duly made by the Federation.”

32.    Thus, the entire administration, management and control  

of the Federation are vested in the Board of Directors as per the  

Bye-law.  This  is  in  terms of  proviso  to  Section 73 of  the Gujarat  

Cooperative  Societies  Act,  1961  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  

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Act”). The Section reads as follows:

“Section  73  :-  Final  authority  of  society  –  Subject to the provisions in this Act and the rules,  the final authority of every society shall vest in the  general  body of  the  members  in  general  meeting,  summoned in such a manner as may be specified in  the bye-laws:

Provided that, where the bye-laws of a society  provide  for  the  election  of  delegates  of  such  members,  the  final  authority  may  vest  in  the  delegates of such members elected in the prescribed  manner, and assembled in general meeting.”

 

33. The  General  Body  of  the  first  respondent-Federation,  in  

terms of Bye-law 13.1 comprises of the following:

“13.1 The General  Meeting shall  consist  of  the following:-

(1) The  Chairman  of  each  of  the  affiliated  Milk  Unions enrolled as Ordinary Members;

(2) The Registrar; (3) The Dairy Management Expert co-opted by the  

Board; (4) Managing Director of the Federation; (5) A nominee of the National Dairy Development  

Board  as  long  as  the  loan  /  interest  of  the  National  Dairy  Development  Board  have  not  been fully repaid by the Federation.

The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall preside  over the General Meeting. In case of his absence, the  meeting  shall  elect  a  Chairman  from  among  the  members present.”

34. The  composition  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  first  

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respondent-Federation is provided under Bye-law 18.1:  

“18.1 The Board will consist of the following:

(i) Chairman  of  the  affiliated  milk  unions  enrolled as ordinary members;

(ii) Registrar  or  his  representative not  below  the rank of Joint Registrar [C.S.];

(iii) One Dairy Management Expert  to  be co- opted by the Board;

(iv) Managing  Director  of  the  Federation  [ex- officio];

(v) A  nominee  of  the  National  Dairy  Development Board as long as the loan /  interest of the National Dairy Development  Board have not  been fully  repaid  by the  Federation.”

35. “Committee” is defined under Section 2(5) of the Act:

“Section 2(5) “committee” means the Managing  Committee or other governing body of a society to  which the direction and control of the management  of the affairs of a society is entrusted to.”  

36. “Officer” is defined under Section 2(14) of the Act:  

“Section 2(14) “officer” means a person elected  or  appointed  by  a  society  to  any  office  of  such  society  according  to  its  bye-laws;  and  includes  a  chairman,  vice-chairman,  president,  vice-president,  managing  director,  manager,  secretary,  treasurer,  member  of  the  committee,  and  any  other  person  elected or appointed under this Act, the rules or the  bye-laws, to give directions in regard to the business  of such society.”

 

37. Section 4 of the Act provides for the registration of societies:  

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“Section 4- Societies which may be registered –  A society, which has as its object the promotion of  the  economic  interests  or  general  welfare  of  its  members  or  of  the  public,  in  accordance  with  co- operative principles,  or  as  society established with  the object of facilitating the operations of any such  society, may be registered under this Act:

Provided that it shall not be registered if, in the  opinion of the Registrar, it is economically unsound,  or its registration may have an adverse effect upon  any other society, or it is opposed to, or, its working  is likely to be in contravention of public policy.”

38. A conjoint reading of all the provisions under the Act and the  

Bye-laws  of  the  Society  would  clearly  show  that  the  functional  

authority  of  the first  respondent-Federation vests  in  the Board of  

Directors. The entire administration, management and control of the  

Federation is with the Board. Thus, the Board of Directors is bound to  

do all  such acts  and things as  may be necessary  for  the proper  

management  of  the  Federation.  The  Chairperson  of  the  first  

respondent is elected by the Board for a term of three years and  

after the 97th Amendment to the Constitution, the term is five years.  

When the post of Chairperson falls vacant, the Board is bound to  

elect  a  new  Chairperson  for  the  remaining  term.  The  post  of  

Chairperson may fall  vacant on account of variety of reasons like  

resignation,  death  or  cessation  of  membership  in  the  Board,  

operation of Section 76B of the Act, i.e., removal by the Registrar on  

account of persistent default or misconduct.

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39.  The removal by no confidence is not expressly provided in  

the Bye-laws. Neither is there any such provision in the Act or Rules.  

The only enabling provision is Bye-law 18.2 which mandates that in  

case  the  office  of  the  Chairperson  of  the  Federation  falls  vacant  

before the expiry of his term for any reason, the Board has to elect a  

new Chairperson for the remaining term.  

40. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant,  

inviting  reference  to  the  doctrine  of  casus  omissus and  placing  

reliance on the Full-Bench decision of the High Court of Kerala in  

S.  Lakshmanan,  President,  Thiruvilwamal  Weavers  Co-

operative  Society v.  V.Velliankeri,  Member  of  Board  of  

Directors, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd.  

and others10 and the decisions of the other High Courts submits  

that no such power of removal of the Chairperson by no confidence  

can be read into the provisions of  the Act,  Rules or  Bye-laws.  To  

quote from                              S. Lakshmanan case (supra) :

“16.  The  Committee  is  elected  by  following  the  procedure  prescribed under  the  Act  and the  Rules  and is guaranteed a tenure as prescribed in the Bye- laws, by virtue of Rule 39(1). It can only be removed  by the procedure prescribed in the Act or the Rules  or the Bye-laws. The only contingency under which  the Committee may be removed before the end of its  tenure  is  indicated  in  Section  33(1) of  the  Act.  Section  33(1) of the Act envisages the passing of a  

10  AIR 2002 Kerala 325

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no-confidence  motion  by  the  General  Body  which  results  in  wholesale  removal  of  the  Committee.  Barring this provision, there is no other provision by  which  an  elected  individual  member  of  the  Committee  can  be  removed.  We  are,  therefore,  unable  to  accept  the  contention  of  the  appellants  that such a drastic power can be read into the Act,  even where there are no provisions. …”

41. In  Veeramachaneni Venkata Narayana v.  The Deputy  

Registrar  of  Co-operative  societies,  Eluru,  West  Godavari  

District and others11, at paragraph-10, the view taken by the High  

Court of Andhra Pradesh, is as under:

“10. …  As sufficient safeguards are provided in the  event  of  an  office-bearer  of  the  committee  not  conducting  himself  properly  or  not  discharging  his  duties as required of him under the provisions of the  Act,  the  Rules  and  the  bye-laws,  the  Legislature  obviously did not intend to provide for the removal of  an office-bearer of a committee by way of passing of  ‘no-confidence’ motion against him.”

42. In  Hindurao  Balwant  Patil  and  another

v.  Krishnaro Pashuram Patil  and others12,  the  High  Court  of  

Bombay took the view that:  

“10. … The Act, Rules and the bye-laws do no confer  any  right  upon  the  members  of  the  Board  of  Directors  to  remove  the  Chairman  and  the  Vice- Chairman by passing a mere vote of no confidence.  Therefore it will not be proper to confer such a wider  

11  I.L.R. [1975] A.P. 242 12  AIR 1982 Bombay 216

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power upon the board of directors by taking recourse  to the doctrine of implied or inherent power.”

43. In  Jagdev  Singh v. The  Registrar,  Co-operative  

Societies, Haryana and others13, the Full-Bench of High Court of  

Punjab and Haryana held as follows:

“22.  ….  the  answer  to  the  question  posed  in  the  beginning of the judgment, is that in absence of any  provision  in  the  Punjab  Co-operative  Societies  Act,  1961, Rules and the Bye-laws made thereunder (as  also in the Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984,  Rules and the Bye-laws made thereunder) for moving  a  no-confidence  in  the  President  of  a  Managing  Committee/ Chairman of a Board of Directors of a Co- operative Bank, it is not permissible to move such a  motion,  inasmuch  as  such  a  power  cannot  be  inferred nor such a power is inherent in the members  of  the  Managing  Committee/Director  of  the  Bank.  The  Office  bearers  can  only  be  removed  in  accordance  with  Section  27  of  the  Act  read  with  Rules 25 and 26 of the Rules. With respect we are  unable  to  agree  with  the  law  laid  down  by  the  Division Bench in Haji Anwar Khan's case (AIR 1980  Punjab & Haryana 306)  (supra)  (which was a case  under the Wakf Act), to our mind, does not lay down  correct law.”

44. It  may  be  seen  that  all  these  decisions  dealt  with  the  

pre-Ninety Seventh Amendment status of the cooperative societies.  

The amendment providing constitutional status to the societies has  

brought out radical changes in the concept of cooperative societies.  

Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core  

13  AIR 1991 P & H 149

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constitutional values of a cooperative society. Such societies are to  

be registered only if they are founded on cooperative principles of  

democracy, equality, equity and solidarity.  

45. We may also refer to another argument by Shri Sibal. That  

once the Act provides for a fixed term, the only mode of unsettling  

the  term is  as  provided under  the  Act.  In  the  instant  case,  it  is  

Section 76B of the Act, which reads as follows:

“76B. Removal of officer. - (1) If, in the opinion of  the Registrar, any officer makes persistent default or  is negligent in performance of the duties imposed on  him by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws or does  anything which is prejudicial to the interests of the  Society or where he stands disqualified by or under  this Act, the Registrar may, after giving the officer an  opportunity  of  being  heard,  by  order  remove such  officer and direct the Society to elect or appoint a  person or a qualified member in the vacancy caused  by  such  removal  and  the  officer  so  elected  or  appointed shall hold office so long only as the officer  in  whose  place  he  is  elected  or  appointed  would  have held if the vacancy had not occurred.

(2)  The  Registrar  may,  by  order,  direct  that  the  officer so removed shall be disqualified to hold or to  contest  election  for  any  office  in  the  society  from  which he is removed and in any other society for a  period not exceeding four years from the date of the  order  and  such  officer  may  stand  disqualified  accordingly."

46. The provision simply deals with removal for misconduct or  

persistent  default/non-performance.  A  person  with  good  conduct  

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may still not earn the confidence of the people who selected him to  

the office. The very concept of cooperation is to work jointly towards  

the same end. Unless there is cooperativeness among the elected  

cooperators who constitute the Governing Body for  achieving the  

object  for  which  the  society  is  constituted  and  for  which  those  

representatives are elected by the members entrusting them with  

the management of affairs of the society, there will be total chaos.  

Cooperation among the cooperators is  the essence of democratic  

functioning of a cooperative society. If there is no democracy in a  

cooperative  society,  it  ceases  to  be  a  cooperative  society  as  

conceived by  the  Constitution  of  India  under  the  Ninety  Seventh  

Amendment.  

47. There is no quarrel with the well-settled proposition that a  

right to elect is not a fundamental right nor a common law right; it is  

a statutory right,  and any question relating to election has to be  

resorted within the four corners of the Act as held by this Court in  

Jyoti Basu and others v.  Debi Ghosal and others14.  To quote  

paragraph-8:

“8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to  democracy,  is,  anomalously  enough,  neither  a  fundamental right nor a common law right. It is pure  and simple, a statutory right.  So is the right to be  elected.  So  is  the  right  to  dispute  an  election.  Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right  

14  (1982) 1 SCC 691

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to  be elected and no right  to  dispute an election.  Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject  to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an  action at common law, nor in equity. It is a statutory  proceeding to which neither the common law nor the  principles of equity apply but only those rules which  the  statute  makes  and  applies.  It  is  a  special  jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to  be exercised in accordance with the statute creating  it. Concepts familiar to common lawand equity must  remain  strangers  to  election  law  unless  statutorily  embodied. A court has no right to resort to them on  considerations  of  alleged  policy  because  policy  in  such matters as those, relating to the trial of election  disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of  election disputes, court is put in a strait-jacket. Thus  the  entire  election  process  commencing  from  the  issuance  of  the  notification  calling  upon  a  constituency to elect a member or members right up  to  the  final  resolution  of  the  dispute,  if  any,  concerning  the  election  is  regulated  by  the  Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1951,  different  stages of the process being dealt with by different  provisions  of  the Act.  There can be no election to  Parliament  or  the  State  Legislature  except  as  provided by  the  Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1951 and again, no such election may be questioned  except in the manner provided by the Representation  of  the  People  Act.  So  the  Representation  of  the  People Act has been held to be a complete and self- contained  code  within  which  must  be  found  any  rights claimed in relation to an election or an election  dispute. We are concerned with an election dispute.  The  question  is  who  are  parties  to  an  election  dispute and who may be impleaded as parties to an  election  petition.  We  have  already  referred  to  the  scheme of the Act. We have noticed the necessity to  rid  ourselves  of  notions  based on  common law or  equity. We see that we must seek an answer to the  question within the four corners of the statute. What  does the Act say?”

48. In  the  background  of  the  constitutional  mandate,  the  

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question is not what the statute does say but what the statute must  

say. If the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws do not say what they  

should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to  

read the constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts. … “In so far  

as  in  its  Act  Parliament  does  not  convey  its  intention  clearly,  

expressly  and completely,  it  is  taken to  require  the  enforcement  

agencies who are charged with the duty of applying legislation to  

spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may be done either- (a)  

by  finding  and  declaring  implications  in  the  words  used  by  the  

legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the  

express  language  as  conferring  a  delegated  legislative  power  to  

elaborate  its  meaning in  accordance with  public  policy  (including  

legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation”15.

49. The conventional view is that the legislature alone makes the  

law. But as Bennion puts it:  

“The truth is that courts are inescapably possessed  of  some  degree  of  legislative  power.  Enacted  legislation  lays  down  rules  in  advance.  The  commands of Parliament are deliberate prospective  commands. The very concept of enacted legislation  postulates an authoritative interpreter who operates  ex  post  facto.  No  such  interpreter  can  avoid  legislating in the course of exercising that function. It  can  be  done  by  regarding  the  breadth  or  other  obscurity  of  the  express  language  as  conferring  a  delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning  

15  Bennion on Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, 6th Edition, p.136.

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in  accordance  with  public  policy  (including  legal  policy)”16.

  

50. According to Donaldson J.:

“The duty of the courts is to ascertain and give effect  to  the  will  of  Parliament  as  expressed  in  its  enactments.  In  the  performance  of  this  duty  the  judges do not act as computers into which are fed  the  statues  and  the  rules  for  the  construction  of  statues  and  from  whom  issue  forth  the  mathematically correct answer. The interpretation of  statutes  is  a  craft  as  much  as  a  science  and  the  judges,  as  craftsmen,  select  and  apply  to  the  appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. They are  not legislators, but finishers, refiners and polishers of  legislation which comes to them in a state requiring  varying degrees of further processing.”17

51. In  the  celebrated  case  of  Seaford  Court  Estates v.  

Asher18, Lord Denning has succinctly summarized the principle on  

the role of the court. To quote:

“Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it  must  be  remembered  that  it  is  not  within  human  powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which  may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to  provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity… A  judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the  draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive  task of finding the intention of the Parliament, and  he must do this not only from the language of the  statue,  but  also  from a consideration of  the social  conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief  

16  Bennion on Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, 6th Edition, p.137. 17  Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways Inc. [1968] 3 WLR 714 at 732.  18  [1949] 2 All ER 155

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which it  was passed to remedy, and then he must  supplement the written word so as to give “force and  life”  to  the intention of  the legislature.  … Put into  homely  metaphor  it  is  this:  A  judge  should  ask  himself the question how, if the makers of the Act  had themselves come across this ruck in the texture  of it, they would have straightened it out? He must  then do as they would have done. A judge must not  alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he  can and should iron out the creases.”

52.  In  Rattan  Chand  Hira  Chand v.  Askar  Nawaz  Jung  

(Dead) by Lrs. and others19,  this Court, at paragraph-17 of the  

judgment, has also dealt with the principles in following words:

“17. … The legislature  often fails  to  keep pace  with the changing needs and values nor is it realistic  to  expect  that  it  will  have  provided  for  all  contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not  only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step in  to fill the lacuna. When courts perform this function  undoubtedly  they  legislate  judicially.  But  that  is  a  kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated  to them to further the object of the legislation and to  promote  the  goals  of  the  society.  Or  to  put  it  negatively,  to  prevent  the  frustration  of  the  legislation or perversion of the goals and values of  the society. So long as the courts keep themselves  tethered to the ethos of the society and do not travel  off its course, so long as they attempt to furnish the  felt  necessities  of  the  time  and  do  not  refurbish  them, their role in this respect has to be welcomed.”

53. The cooperative society registered under the Central or the  

State  Act  is  bound  to  function  as  a  democratic  institution  and  

conduct  its  affairs  based  on  democratic  principles.  Democratic  

19  (1991) 3 SCC 67

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functioning  on  democratic  principles  is  to  be  reflected  in  the  

respective  Acts  or  Rules  or  Bye-laws  both  on  the  principle  and  

procedure. If not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles  

into the Act or Rules or Bye-laws. If a procedure is prescribed in any  

Act or Rule or Bye-law regarding election of an office bearer by the  

Board, as defined under Article 243ZH(b) of the Constitution of India,  

and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no confidence, the  

same procedure  has  to  be  followed.  In  case  there  is  no  express  

provision under the Act or Rules or Bye-laws for removal of an office  

bearer, such office bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss  

of  confidence by following the  same procedure by which he was  

elected to office.

54. Now  that  this  Court  has  declared  the  law  regarding  the  

democratic set up of a cooperative society and that it is permissible  

to remove an elected office bearer through motion of no confidence,  

and since in many States, the relevant statutes have not carried out  

the  required  statutory  changes  in  terms  of  the  constitutional  

mandate,  we  feel  it  just  and  necessary  to  lay  down  certain  

guidelines. However, we make it clear that these guidelines are open  

to  be  appropriately  modified  and  given  statutory  shape  by  the  

competent legislature/authority. Having gone through the provisions  

regarding motion of no confidence in local self-governments, we find  

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that there is no uniformity with regard to the procedure and process  

regarding  motion  of  no  confidence.  Some  States  provide  for  a  

protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months,  

to  the  office  bearers  in  office  before  moving  a  motion  of  no  

confidence. However, majority of the States provide for two years  

and a gap of another one year in case one motion of no confidence  

is defeated. Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 provides for a protection  

of two years and one year, Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 provides for a  

protection of two years and one year, Himachal Pradesh Panchayati  

Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and two years,  

Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993  

provides for a protection of two and a half years, Madhya Pradesh  

Municipalities Act, 1961 provides for a protection of two years and  

one year, Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection  

of  two  years  and  one  year,  Orissa  Panchayat  Samiti  Act,  1959  

provides for a protection of two years, Orissa Grama Panchayats Act,  

1964 provides for a protection of two years, Punjab Panchayati Raj  

Act,  1994  provides  for  a  protection  of  two  years,  Rajasthan  

Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and  

one  year,  Rajasthan  Municipalities  Act,  2009  provides  for  a  

protection of two years and Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1947,  

as followed by Uttarakhand, provides for a protection of two years  

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and one year. Having regard to the set up in local self-governments  

prevailing in many of the States as above, we direct that in the case  

of cooperative societies registered under any Central or State law, a  

motion of  no confidence against  an office bearer shall  be moved  

only after two years of his assumption of office. In case the motion  

of  no  confidence  is  once  defeated,  a  fresh  motion  shall  not  be  

introduced within another one year. A motion of no confidence shall  

be  moved  only  in  case  there  is  a  request  from one-third  of  the  

elected members of the Board of Governors/Managing Committee of  

the  cooperative  society  concerned.  The  motion  of  no  confidence  

shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty  

per cent of the elected members present in the meeting.

55. Though for different reasons, we agree with the view taken  

by the High Court of Gujarat.  The  contra views expressed by the  

High  Courts  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  Bombay,  Kerala  and  Punjab  and  

Haryana  are  no  more  good  law  in  view  of  the  Ninety  Seventh  

Amendment to the Constitution of India.

56. The appeals  are  accordingly  dismissed.  There  shall  be  no  

order as to costs.

                                         

..…….…..…………J.                    (ANIL R. DAVE)

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..……………………J.                         (KURIAN JOSEPH)

New Delhi; March 19, 2015.  

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