VINOD KUMAR SUBBIAH Vs SARASWATHI PALANIAPPAN
Bench: VIKRAMAJIT SEN,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-005511-005512 / 2014
Diary number: 15806 / 2013
Advocates: VIKAS MEHTA Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 5511-5512 OF 2014
VINOD KUMAR SUBBIAH .…..APPELLANTS
Versus
SARASWATHI PALANIAPPAN …..RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.
1 These Appeals assail the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai, delivered on 13.3.2013,
setting aside the Judgment dated 25.8.2011 of the Trial Court. The Impugned
Judgment dismissed the divorce petition filed by the Appellant.
2 The Appellant and the Respondent were married on 28.6.2004 and moved
to the U.S. on 9.7.2004. They visited Chennai in October 2005 and June 2006.
During the latter visit, the Respondent was three months pregnant and left for
her parental home in Madurai on 10.6.2006 where she gave birth to a male child
on 5.12.2006. The Appellant subsequently filed for divorce under Section 13(1)
(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act on 30.4.2007.
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3 The case put forward by the Appellant is that the Respondent was
verbally abusive; she would insult his family; she would threaten to lodge false
police complaints; and she would threaten to commit suicide placing the blame
on the Appellant and his family. After she left for her parental home in June
2006, the Appellant attempted to bring her back to her matrimonial home but
she refused. The Appellant claims that he has been put through intolerable
mental agony and can no longer continue to be married to the Respondent.
4 The Respondent denied these allegations and claimed that she and the
Appellant lived happily in the U.S., and she only went to her parental home in
June 2006 for her child to be born there. She has pleaded that she returned to
Chennai with her child from March to April 2007, that the divorce petition was
completely unexpected and was the result of a misunderstanding between her
family and that of the Appellant. She subsequently filed a petition seeking
restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
praying that the Appellant be directed to take her back to her conjugal home,
which she pleaded is in the U.S. She alleged that her husband is living a
wayward life, that her father-in-law misbehaved with her, and that her
parents-in-law were negligent with her infant child and asked her to leave the
house when she questioned them about this. She also filed a maintenance
petition seeking Rs. 2 lakhs per month as maintenance.
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5 The Trial Court heard all three petitions together and examined the
evidence submitted by the parties at length. The Appellant has deposed that
when his sister came to the U.S., she initially stayed with him and the
Respondent. However, the Respondent did not like having her in the house, so
she locked the Respondent and his sister out of the house, was abusive towards
them and told them that they belonged to a “prostitute family”. Eventually the
Appellant’s sister was constrained to stay at a Lodge. The Respondent claimed
that the dispute was because her sister-in-law tried to make her join her diamond
business, which she did not want to do. The Trial Court found no truth in the
argument of the Respondent, in light of the fact that she has no background or
knowledge of the diamond business. Furthermore, the Appellant has deposed
that when his brother came to the U.S. to study, he also initially stayed at the
Appellant’s house. However, it is in evidence that the Respondent called the
Appellant at work alleging that his brother was knocking on her door, thus
implying that he was behaving in an untoward manner. She abused the
Appellant and his family in the presence of his brother and threatened to file a
police complaint. The Appellant has deposed that he was forced to make his
brother stay elsewhere. In a subsequent event, the Appellant informed the
Respondent that his parents would be coming to the U.S. The Respondent was
verbally and physically abusive, and called the police alleging domestic
violence. The Appellant was given a warning by the Police. The Respondent
claimed that the incident took place because the Appellant was having an affair
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with a woman named Solai. She claimed that he took her to Solai’s house that
evening and then wanted to go back at night, which is why she called the police.
The Trial Court has justifiably highlighted that summoning the police was
serious because the Appellant was in a foreign country and didn’t know the laws
and procedure. Further, the allegation that he was having an affair was not
accepted, as it was unbelievable that the Respondent had previously not told
anyone about Solai and further that it never came up du ring the attempted
compromise between the families of the two parties. The Respondent claimed
that after having the child, she came to live with the Appellant, which the
Appellant denied. The Respondent also alleged that while she was living with
the Appellant’s family, his parents took the child who was only three months old
away for six hours. By the time they brought him back, he was unconscious due
to starvation. When the Respondent questioned them about this, they asked her
to leave the house with the child, even though it was late in the night. The Trial
Court found this allegation entirely unbelievable. Her allegation that the father
of the Appellant started misbehaving with her and went to the extent of pulling
her hands was also found to be false. The Trial Court also took into
consideration the voice mails and emails from the Respondent to the Appellant,
which were not treated as the main evidence but as evidence intended to
substantiate the oral evidence. It was held that the evidence and the submissions
of the Respondent indicate that she was unwilling to live in the Appellant’s
house in Chennai, and that she wanted him to leave his family in India and live
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in the U.S. with her. It is pertinent to note that the Appellant had lost his job in
the U.S. and was unemployed and consequently had to set up residence in
Chennai. In light of these circumstances, it was found that the Respondent is
not entitled to conjugal rights. An order of dissolution of marriage was passed
and maintenance was fixed at Rs. 25,000 per month.
6 The High Court, however, held that the Appellant’s allegations in his
divorce petition were no more than “the ordinary wear and tear” that takes place
in a marriage. It observed that the Appellant did not give details of the events of
abuse by the Respondent towards his family or the cruelty that was meted out to
him in the U.S. in his main petition or his subsequent counter affidavits. It was
only after filing the petition that the Appellant had produced copies of the
abusive voicemails and emails he received from the Respondent. The High
Court noted that the Trial Court did not need to strictly adhere to hard and fast
rules while entertaining evidence, but nevertheless held that the Trial Court had
acted in haste in allowing the Appellant’s allegations. The High Court found that
the Trial Court, instead of considering whether the Appellant had established
cruelty by adducing evidence, took certain answers from the Respondent’s
Chief examination and cross-examination out of context and held that a case of
cruelty was made out. The High Court stated that in a matrimonial relationship,
parties must be prepared to subject themselves to the normal wear and tear of
life, and that the situation at hand was no more than that. The divorce petition
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was thus dismissed and the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was
allowed.
7 We have carefully considered the matter, and find that we are unable to
uphold the conclusions of the High Court. The Appellant had duly pleaded
instances of mental cruelty which he proved in evidence and documents. An
examination of the divorce petition makes it abundantly clear that various
allegations of cruelty were made out and a number of incidents were mentioned
therein. Further evidence was submitted during the course of the Trial to
substantiate these allegations, which is in keeping with Order VI Rule 2 of the
CPC. Furthermore, we find that the Trial Court examined the evidence at great
length and came to the reasoned conclusion that the actions of the Respondent
amounted to cruelty. If a spouse abuses the other as being born from a
prostitute, this cannot be termed as “wear and tear” of family life. Summoning
the police on false or flimsy grounds cannot also be similarly viewed. Making
it impossible for any close relatives to visit or reside in the matrimonial home
would also indubitably result in cruelty to the other spouse. After a cursory
discussion of the evidence which the Trial Court had discussed threadbare, the
High Court was not justified to set aside the conclusions arrived at by the Trial
Court without giving substantiated reasons.
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8 We thus allow these Appeals and set aside the Impugned Order, but desist
from imposing costs. The Trial Court’s decision granting dissolution of the
marriage between the parties is hereby restored.
9 We allow the Respondent’s Application for disbursement of the amount
deposited by the Appellant towards her legal expenses in pursuance of the Order
dated 4.7.2013.
.................................................J. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
…….............................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi; April 24, 2015.