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     REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   8468    OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.29044 of 2009)

Vinay Kumar Shailendra …Appellant

Versus

Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee and Anr.  …Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8469   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.35762/2009)

 J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These  appeals  arise  out  of  a  judgment  dated  23rd  

September,  2009 passed by a Division Bench of the High  

Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 11911 of 2009 whereby the  

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High Court has invoked its jurisdiction under Article 226 of  

the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C.  

and directed return of all complaints filed under Section 138  

of  the  Negotiable  Instrument  Act,  1881  in  which  the  

Metropolitan  Magistrates  in  Delhi  have  taken  cognizance  

only because the statutory notices  in  terms of  proviso  to  

Section 138 of the Act have been issued to the drawers of  

the  cheque  from  Delhi.  The  matter  arose  out  of  a  writ  

petition  filed  by  the  Delhi  High  Court  Legal  Services  

Committee in public interest pointing out that a very large  

number of  complaints  under  Section 138 of  the Act  were  

pending  in  Courts  of  Metropolitan  Magistrates  in  Delhi  in  

which  cognizance  had  been  taken  although  the  Courts  

concerned  had  no  territorial  jurisdiction  to  do  so.  The  

Committee’s  case  before  the  High  Court  was  that  such  

complaints were filed among others by financial institutions  

and banks  only  on  the  ground  that  the  statutory  notices  

demanding  payment  against  the  dishonoured  cheque  had  

been  issued  from  Delhi.  Issue  of  a  notice  demanding  

payment  of  the  dishonoured  cheque  was  not,  however,  

sufficient  to  confer  jurisdiction  upon  the  Courts  in  Delhi  

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argued the Committee.  Reliance in support was placed upon  

the decision of this Court in  Harman Electronics Private  

Limited and Anr. v. National Panasonic India Private   

Limited   (2009) 1 SCC 720. The Committee’s grievance  

was that notwithstanding a clear exposition of law on the  

subject by this Court in Harman’s case (supra)  complaints  

had been filed and cognizance taken by the Courts in Delhi,  

relying upon the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v.  

Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510. It was in  

terms contended before the High Court that in the light of  

the pronouncement of this Court in Harman’s case (supra)  

the complaints could not have been entertained nor could  

the accused persons be summoned for trial in the Courts in  

Delhi. It was also argued that number of such complaints is  

so large that the Magistrates in Delhi were unable to handle  

and effectively manage the docket explosion and attend to  

what was otherwise within their  jurisdiction and called for  

their immediate attention.  

3. The contentions urged by the Committee found favour  

with the High Court who relying upon the decisions of this  

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Court  in  Dwarka Nath v.  Income-tax Officer,  Special   

Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr. (AIR 1966 SC 81) and  

Air  India  Statutory  Corporation  and  Ors.  V.  United  

Labour Union and Ors. (1997) 9 SCC 377 held that the  

Constitution did not place any fetters on the extraordinary  

jurisdiction  exercisable  by  the  High  Court  in  a  situation  

where Courts are flooded with complaints which they had no  

jurisdiction to entertain. The High Court further held that a  

direction for return of the complaints for presentation before  

the competent Courts was in the circumstances necessary,  

as Magistrates who had issued the summons were unable to  

dismiss the complaints suo moto in the light of the decision  

of this Court in  Adalat Prasad Rooplal v. Jindal & Ors.   

(2004) 7 SCC 338. The High Court accordingly allowed the  

writ petition with the following directions:

“Consequently,  in  exercise  of  power  under  Article   226  of  the  Constitution  read  with  Section  482  of   Code of Criminal Procedure, we direct return to the   complainants  for  presentation  in  the  Court  of   competent jurisdiction all those criminal complaints   filed under Section 138 of NI Act that are pending in   the  courts  of  Metropolitan  Magistrates  in  Delhi  in   which cognizance has been taken by them without   actually having territorial jurisdiction.”       

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4. The appellant who is a practicing Advocate of the High  

Court of Delhi has, with the permission of this Court, filed  

this appeal which was referred for hearing to a three-Judge  

Bench  by  an  order  dated  3rd November,  2009.  That  is  

precisely how the present appeal alongwith the connected  

appeal filed by Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. against the  

very same order passed by the High Court have come up  

before us.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some  

length. The order passed by the High Court simply directs  

return of  complaints  in cases where the same have been  

filed only because the statutory notices have been issued  

from Delhi.  The direction proceeds on the basis that issue of  

statutory  notices  from  Delhi  by  itself  is  not  sufficient  to  

confer  jurisdiction  on  the  Delhi  Courts  to  entertain  the  

complaints.  Reliance has been placed for that proposition  

upon the decision of this Court in  Harman’s case (supra).  

In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra  

and Anr.  (2014) 9 SCALE 97 we have had an occasion to  

consider  whether  the  view expressed  by this  Court  in  K.  

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Bhaskaran’s case  (supra)  was  sound  and  whether  

complaints under Section 138 could be maintained at a place  

other  than  the  place  where  the  drawee  bank  is  situate.  

Answering the question in the negative this Court held that  

an offence under Section 138 is committed no sooner the  

cheque issued on an account maintained by the drawer with  

a bank and representing discharge of a debt or a liability in  

full or part is dishonoured on the ground of insufficiency of  

funds  or  on  the  ground  that  the  same  exceeds  the  

arrangements  made  with  the  banker.   Prosecution  of  the  

offender and cognizance of the commission of the offence is,  

however,  deferred by the proviso to Section 138 till  such  

time the complainant  has the cause of  action  to  institute  

such  proceedings.  This  Court  found  that  the  proviso  to  

Section 138 does not constitute ingredients of the offence  

punishable  under  Section  138.   The legal  position  on the  

subject was summed up in the following words:

“To sum up:

(i) An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881  is  committed  no  sooner  a   cheque drawn by the accused on an account being   maintained  by  him  in  a  bank  for  discharge  of   debt/liability  is  returned  unpaid for  insufficiency of   

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funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the   arrangement made with the bank. (ii) Cognizance  of  any  such  offence  is  however   forbidden under Section 142 of the Act except upon   a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder   of the cheque in due course within a period of one   month from the date the cause of action accrues to   such payee or holder under clause (c) of proviso to   Section 138. (iii) The cause of action to file a complaint accrues   to a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due   course if

(a) the dishonoured cheque is presented to   the drawee bank within a period of six months   from the date of its issue. (b) If the complainant has demanded payment   of cheque amount within thirty days of receipt   of information by him from the bank regarding   the dishonour of the cheque and (c) If  the  drawer  has  failed  to  pay  the  cheque amount within fifteen days of receipt of   such notice.

(iv) The facts constituting cause of action do not   constitute  the  ingredients  of  the  offence  under   Section 138 of the Act. (v) The  proviso  to  Section  138  simply   postpones/defers institution of criminal proceedings   and taking of cognizance by the Court till such time   cause  of  action  in  terms  of  clause  (c)  of  proviso   accrues to the complainant. (vi) Once  the  cause  of  action  accrues  to  the   complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the   case will  be determined by reference to the place   where the cheque is dishonoured. (vii)  The general rule stipulated under Section 177   of Cr.P.C applies to cases under Section 138 of the   Negotiable  Instruments  Act.  Prosecution  in  such   cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer   of  the cheque only before the Court  within  whose   jurisdiction  the  dishonour  takes  place  except  in   situations  where  the  offence  of  dishonour  of  the   cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed   along  with  other  offences  in  a  single  transaction   within  the  meaning  of  Section  220(1)  read  with   Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is   covered  by  the  provisions  of  Section  182(1)  read   with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.”

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6. In the light of the above pronouncement of this Court  

we have no hesitation in holding that the issue of a notice  

from Delhi or deposit of the cheque in a Delhi bank by the  

payee or receipt  of  the notice by the accused demanding  

payment  in  Delhi  would  not  confer  jurisdiction  upon  the  

Courts in Delhi.  What is  important is whether the drawee  

bank  who  dishonoured  the  cheque  is  situate  within  the  

jurisdiction of the Court taking cognizance. In that view, we  

see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High  

Court which simply requires the Magistrate to examine and  

return the complaints if they do not have the jurisdiction to  

entertain the same in the light of the legal position as stated  

in  Harman’s case (supra). All that we need to add is that  

while examining the question of jurisdiction the Metropolitan  

Magistrates concerned to whom the High Court has issued  

directions shall also keep in view the decision of this Court in  

Dashrath’s case (supra).

7. With the above observations these appeals fail and are  

hereby  dismissed  but  in  the  circumstances  without  any  

orders as to costs.

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………………………………….…..…J.          (T.S. THAKUR)

.……………………………….…..…J.           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

     ………………………..……………..J.      (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi September 4, 2014

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      REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1911    OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5644 of 2010)

Times Business Solution Limited …Appellant

Versus

Databyte  …Respondent

With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1912   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5645 of 2010)  With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1913   OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5280 of 2010)

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These  three  appeals  arise  out  of  an  order  dated  1st  

February,  2010  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  

whereby Criminal M.C. Nos. 281 of 2010, 282 of 2010 and  

296 of 2010 filed by the appellants have been dismissed and  

the orders passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate returning  

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the complaints filed by the appellants under Section 138 of  

the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 for presentation before  

the competent Court upheld.   

3. It is common ground that the cheques in all the three  

cases had been issued on different branches namely, Bank  

of  India,  Ruby  Park  and  ICICI  Bank,  Kolkata  and Punjab  

National Bank, Chapraula, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. which  

are outside Delhi. Complaints under Section 138 of the NI  

Act were all the same filed in Delhi because the cheques had  

been  deposited  by  the  complainants  in  their  Delhi  bank  

accounts for collection and because notice of dishonour was  

issued to the accused persons from Delhi.  Relying upon the  

decision  of  this  Court  in  Ishar  Alloy  Steels  Ltd.  v.  

Jayaswals Neco Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609  the High Court  

held  that  mere  presentation  of  cheques  before  banks  in  

Delhi when the drawee bank is situated outside Delhi will not  

confer jurisdiction upon the Delhi courts nor will the issue of  

a notice of dishonour from Delhi would do so. That view, in  

our opinion, is unexceptionable having regard to the decision  

of this Court in  Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of   

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Maharashtra  and  Another  (2014)  9  SCALE  97.  This  

Court  has  in  that  case  examined  at  length  the  principles  

underlying  Section  138  and  held  that  a  unilateral  act  of  

presentation of the cheque anywhere in the country or issue  

of  a  notice  of  dishonour  from  a  place  chosen  by  the  

complainant does not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the  

Court  from within  whose  jurisdiction  such  presentation  is  

made  or  notice  issued.  Following  the  view  taken  by  this  

Court in Dashrath’s case (supra) we have no hesitation in  

holding  that  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  refusing  to  

interfere  with  the  orders  passed  by  the  Metropolitan  

Magistrate.  These appeals  accordingly  fail  and are hereby  

dismissed but in the circumstances without any no orders as  

to costs.

………………………………….…..…J.          (T.S. THAKUR)

.……………………………….…..…J.           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

     ………………………..……………..J.      (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi September 4, 2014

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      REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1914  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.690 of 2011)

M/s K K. Ploycolor India Ltd. & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

Global Trade Finance Ltd. & Anr. …Respondents

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1915   OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.718 of 2011)

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1916  OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.749 of 2011)

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These  appeals  arise  out  of  an  order  dated  15th  

September, 2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at  

Bombay whereby Crl. Application Nos.1491, 2759 and 2760  

of 2010 have been allowed and the orders passed by the  

Magistrate  set aside and the matter  remitted back to the  

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Magistrate  with  the direction  that  the  criminal  complaints  

filed  by  the  complainants-respondents  herein  shall  be  

disposed of expeditiously.

3. Complaints  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  

Instrument  Act,  1880  appear  to  have  been  filed  by  the  

respondent-company  in  the  Court  of  Metropolitan  

Magistrate,  Bandra  which  were  entertained  by  the  

Magistrate and process issued against the accused persons.  

Revision  applications  were  then  filed  before  the  Court  of  

Sessions  at  Bombay  challenging  the  jurisdiction  of  the  

Magistrate to entertain the complaints. The Revisional Court  

relying  upon  Harman Electronics  Private  Limited  and  

Anr.  v.  National  Panasonic  India  Private  Limited  

(2009) 1 SCC 720 held that the Magistrate did not have  

the  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  complaints.   The  orders  

passed by the Magistrate were set aside and the complaints  

directed  to  be  returned  for  presentation  before  the  

competent  Court.  Aggrieved  by  the  said  orders  the  

complainant preferred Criminal Applications No.1491, 2759  

and 2760 of 2010 before the High Court who relying upon  

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the decision of this Court in  K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran  

Vaidhyan  Balan  (1999)  7  SCC  510 and  three  other  

decisions of the Bombay High Court held that the Magistrate  

had the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the cheque  

had been presented before a bank at  Bombay which fact  

was,  according  to  the  High  Court,  sufficient  to  confer  

jurisdiction upon the Magistrate to entertain the complaints  

and try the cases. The orders passed by the Revisional Court  

were accordingly  set  aside and the Magistrate directed to  

proceed with the trial of the cases expeditiously as already  

noticed.  The present special leave petitions have been filed  

by the accused persons assailing the view taken by the High  

Court.

4. A plain reading of the orders passed by the High Court  

would  show  that  the  judgment  proceeds  entirely  on  the  

authority of the decision of this  Court in  K. Bhaskaran’s  

case (supra). That decision has been reversed by this Court  

in  Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra  

and  Anr.  (2014)  9  SCALE  97.  This  Court  has,  on  an  

elaborate consideration of the provision of Section 138 and  

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the law on the subject, held that presentation of a cheque  

for collection on the drawee bank or issue of a notice from a  

place  of  the  choice  of  the  complainant  would  not  by  

themselves  confer  jurisdiction  upon  the  Courts  where  

cheque  is  presented  for  collection  or  the  default  notice  

issued demanding payment from the drawer of the cheque.  

Following the said decision we have no hesitation in holding  

that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order  

passed by the Sessions Judge.  

5. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the  

order passed by the High Court and restore those passed by  

the Revisional Court. The parties are, however, left to bear  

their own costs.

………………………………….…..…J.          (T.S. THAKUR)

.……………………………….…..…J.           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

     ………………………..……………..J.      (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi

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September 4, 2014

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      REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1917  OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.7619 of 2011)

Suku …Appellant

Versus

Jagdish and Anr.  …Respondents

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1918  OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.7772 of 2011)

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of an order dated 15th June,  

2011  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Kerala  at  Ernakulam  

whereby the High Court has held that the presentation of a  

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cheque  by  the  complainant  in  a  bank  at  Krishnapuram,  

Kayamkulam, Kerala did not confer jurisdiction upon Courts  

at Kayamkulam to entertain a complaint under Section 138  

of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act  and  try  the  accused  

persons for the offence.

3. It  is  not  in  dispute that  the cheque in  question was  

issued  by  the  respondent  on  Syndicate  Bank,  Gokaran  

branch in Karnataka which was presented for collection by  

the complainant at Krishnapuram, Kayamkulam, Kerala but  

dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. The complainant then  

filed complaint at Kayamkulam in the State of Kerala which  

were  returned  by  the  Magistrate  to  be  filed  before  the  

proper Court as the Court at Kayamkulam, Kerala, had no  

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the same.  The matter was  

taken up before the High Court by the complainants in Crl.  

M.C.  Nos.514 of  2011 and 1653 of  2011 which  the High  

Court has dismissed by the impugned order holding that the  

presentation of the cheque to a Bank in Kerala would not by  

itself  confer  jurisdiction  upon  the  Kerala  Court.  The  High  

Court has in support of that view relied upon the decision of  

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this  Court  in  Harman Electronics  Private Limited and  

Anr.  v.  National  Panasonic  India  Private  Limited  

(2009) 1 SCC 720 where this Court held that the issue of  

notice to the drawer of the cheque does not by itself give  

rise to a cause of action to confer jurisdiction upon the Court  

to take cognizance.

4. The view taken by the Magistrate based as it is on the  

decision of this Court in Harman’s case (supra) does not, in  

our opinion, call  for any interference by this Court, in the  

light  of  the  pronouncement  of  this  Court  in  Dashrath  

Rupsingh Rathod  v. State of Maharashtra and Another   

(2014) 9 SCALE 97  where this  Court has examined the  

issue at some length and held that presentation of a cheque  

by the complainant at a place of his choice or issue of notice  

by him to the accused demanding payment of the cheque  

amount  are  not  sufficient  by  themselves  to  confer  

jurisdiction  upon  the  courts  where  such  cheque  was  

presented  or  notice  issued.   Following  the  decision  in  

Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case (supra), we affirm the  

order passed by the High Court.

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5. These  appeals  accordingly  fail  and  are,  hereby,  

dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to  

costs.

………………………………….…..…J.          (T.S. THAKUR)

.……………………………….…..…J.           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

     ………………………..……………..J.      (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi September 4, 2014

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      REPPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.)NO. 338 OF 2010

T.A.M.A. Jawahar …Appellant

Versus

Arun Kumar Gupta …Respondent

AND

TRANSFERRED CASE (CRL.) NO.4 OF 2012

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

Transfer  Petition  (Crl.)  No.338  of  2010  and  Transferred  

Case  (Crl.)  No.4  of  2012  are  delinked  and  to  be  posted  for  

hearing separately.

………………………………….…..…J.          (T.S. THAKUR)

.……………………………….…..…J.           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

     ………………………..……………..J.      (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi September 4, 2014

22