03 May 2013
Supreme Court
Download

VIMAL KANWAR Vs KISHORE DAN .

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
Case number: C.A. No.-005513-005513 / 2012
Diary number: 37518 / 2011
Advocates: RAVINDRA S. GARIA Vs R. N. PODDAR


1

Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5513 OF 2012 (arising out of SLP(C)No.6367 of 2012)

VIMAL KANWAR & ORS.        …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

KISHORE DAN & ORS.           ….RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

The present appeal is filed against the judgment of  

the  Rajasthan High Court,  Jaipur Bench in S.B. Civil  

Misc. Appeal No. 1831 and 2071 of 2003.   By the  

impugned judgment dated 29th  July, 2011, the Rajasthan  

High Court  upheld the compensation awarded by the Motor  

Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter referred  

to as the ‘Tribunal’)  and observed as  follows:

“13. In the situation, in the light of the  above  detail and analysis  it appears that the  learned tribunal’s basis of calculating amount of  compensation might be erroneous but in totality  determined, assessed and awarded total amount of  compensation Rs.14,93,700/­ is proper and  justified, and there  is no  adequate  basis  for  increasing or reducing it. Therefore, judgment  dated 21.06.2003 by Motor Accident Claims  Tribunal, Jaipur is affirmed and appeals by the  appellants and Insurance Company are dismissed.”

1

2

Page 2

2. The factual matrix of the case is that on 14th  

September, 1996 one Mr. Sajjan Singh Shekhawat was  

sitting on his scooter which was parked on the side of  

the road and was waiting for one Junior Engineer, N.  

Hari Babu and another whom he had called for discussion.  

At that time, the non­applicant No.1, driver of the Jeep  

No.RJ­10C­0833 came driving from the Railway Station  

side with high speed, recklessly and negligently and hit  

the scooter. Sajjan Singh along with his scooter came  

under the Jeep and was dragged with the vehicle.  Due to  

this accident fatal injuries was caused to him and on  

reaching the Hospital he expired.  The scooter was also  

damaged completely.

3.  Appellant no. 1, the wife of the deceased was aged  

about 24 years;  appellant no. 2, the  daughter was aged  

about 2 years and appellant no. 3,   the   mother   was  

aged about 55 years at the time of   death of the  

deceased.  They jointly filed an application to the Tribunal  alleging that  

negligent and rash driving by non-applicant no. 1 caused the death of Sajjan Singh and  

claimed compensation of Rs.80,40,160/­.   It was brought  

to the notice of the Tribunal that non­applicant no. 1,  

the jeep driver was in the employment of the non­

2

3

Page 3

applicant no. 2 and the non­applicant no. 3, the United  

India Insurance Co. Ltd. was the insurer of the vehicle.  

4. The non­applicant No.3, Insurance Company on  

appearance filed written statement and alleged that the  

vehicle owner has violated the conditions of the  

Insurance Policy by not informing them about the  

accident.  Further,  according to the Insurance Company  

the vehicle owner should prove the fact that at the time  

of accident, the Jeep driver, non­applicant No.1 was  

holding a valid and effective driving licence.

5. Altogether five issues were framed by the Tribunal:

“1. Whether due to the vehicle in question Jeep  No. RJ 10C 0833 being driven by driver, non­ applicant No.1 on 14.09.1996, in front of  Assistant Engineer Office, PWD, within the  jurisdiction of Police Station Churu,  negligently and recklessness and caused  accident and injuries due to which Sajjan  Singh Shekhawat S/o Bhanwar Singh expired.

2. Whether above said vehicle driver at the time  accident was in employment of non­applicant  No.2 and was working for his benefit and  profit.  

3. Whether the non­applicant No.3, Insurance  Company in view of the preliminary objections  and preliminary statement in their reply, are  relieved of their liability and if not what  is the effect thereon.  

4 Whether the applicant are entitled to get the  claim amount or any other justified amount,  and if yes which applicant is entitled to how  much compensation and from which non­ applicant.

5. Relief.”.

3

4

Page 4

6. The first issue was answered by the Tribunal in an  

affirmative manner.  It was  held that the reckless and  

negligent driving of the driver of  Jeep No.RJ 10C 0833  

caused the accident which resulted in the death of  

Sajjan Singh Shekhawat.   Issue Nos. 2 and 3 were also  

decided in favour of the applicants.

7. Issue Nos. 4 and 5 were related to the entitlement  

of appellants towards the claims and the relief to be  

granted.   The Tribunal determined the compensation to  

be granted in favour of the appellants at Rs.14,93,700/­  

jointly.  

8. The actual salary of the deceased was reduced by  

the Tribunal by deducting certain amounts towards  

Provident Fund, Pension and Insurance.   Without any  

reason, the Tribunal also reduced the salary at Rs.  

8,000/­ per month though actual salary of the deceased  

as per Last Pay Certificate (for short ‘LPC’) was Rs.  

8,920/­. Out of such reduced salary of Rs. 8,000/­,  the  

Tribunal further deducted a sum of Rs.1,000/­ per  month  

towards Provident Fund, Pension and Insurance and  

thereby  considered  the  actual salary of deceased to  

be  Rs.7,000/­ per month.  An amount of Rs. 4500/­ was  

added to it towards future income and, thereby the net  

4

5

Page 5

income of deceased was assessed at 11,500/­ per month  

(Rs.7,000/­ + Rs.4,500/­).

9. Admittedly, Sajjan Singh died at the age of 28  

years and 7 ½  months .  He was in the services of the  

State Government posted as an Assistant Engineer.   In  

the normal course,   he would have continued in the  

services of the State Government upto February, 2026,  

until attaining 58 years or   upto   February, 2028,  

until attaining 60 years. As per the decision of this  

Court in the case of  Sarla Verma & Ors.   v. Delhi  

Transport Corporation & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121,   Sajjan  

Singh having died at the age of  28 years 7 ½ months,  

the multiplier of 17 is applicable in calculating the  

compensation.   But the Tribunal applied the lower  

multiplier of 15 on the ground  that the wife would be  

getting family pension and would get job on the  

compassionate ground and the daughter, aged about 2  

years would get married in future.

10. Though the High Court noticed the aforesaid mistake  

it upheld the compensation.    A notional deduction of  

income tax was made by the High Court from the salary of  

the deceased apart from the deduction of  annual pension  

and came to the conclusion that the award passed by the  

5

6

Page 6

Tribunal was just and proper as  apparent from paragraph  

11 of the judgment which reads as under:  

“11. If calculate according  to the rate of  tax in the year 1996, we find that in the  assessment year 1996­97 on Rs.40,000/­ no tax was  payable.   On further income of Rs.20,000/­, 20%  was payable, on further income of Rs.60,000/­,  30% of income was taxed.  1/3rd of the salary or  Rs.15,000/­ which ever was less was standard  deduction.  Accordingly deducting Rs.15,000/­ as  standard deduction taking into account the  savings and on applying rebate of Rs.12,000/­  under Section 80C of the Income Tax Act, the  amount which remains, on that Rs.5812/­ is  payable as tax. Thus, deducting taxable amount  out of income is Rs.1,01,228/­. The appellant  Vimal Kanwar has herself stated that after death  of her husband she receives Rs.1460/­ per month  as pension.   The pension received on death of  husband should also be deducted.   Thus, on  deducting annual pension of Rs.17,520/­ the  income is Rs.1,83,708/­ per annum. According to  Sarla Verma judgment increasing 50%   for future  prospects the amount becomes Rs.1,25,562/­ per  annum, out of this deducting 1/3rd  for personal  expenses of the deceased and applying multiplier  of 17 according to age of the deceased this  amount is Rs.14,23,036/­. The tribunal on account  of being deprived of income the deceased has  granted Rs.14,78,700/­ to the deceased.”

11. The High Court noticed that the Tribunal wrongly  

applied the multiplier of 15 but refused to interfere  

with the award on the following grounds:

“12.  IT is correct, that despite the revise  LPC being on record and showing salary to be  Rs.8920/­ the tribunal has accepted salary to  be Rs.8000/­ only out of this on account of  GPF  and  State  Insurance  Rs.1000/­  has been  deducted  and monthly  income  is assessed  as  Rs.7,000/­. Thereafter, taking into account  increasing income in future etc. Rs.4500/­  has been added and monthly income is assessed  

6

7

Page 7

to be Rs.11500/­ this assessment according to  evidence on record and established law, does  not appear to be proper. It is also worth  mentioning that the tribunal for granting  compensation to the appellants has taken unit  method has basis but while doing so the  amount that the deceased would have spent on  his personal expenses which is deductable as  per judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in  the Sarla Verma case and other cases has not  been deducted, because of which the  dependency is not properly assessed.  Thereafter, the multiplier of 15 applied by  the tribunal also does not seen to be in  accordance to law. It is also worth  mentioning that assessing amount in the said  manner the tribunal had not deducted the  payable income tax and the amount of pension  received by Smt. Vimal Kanwar due to death of  deceased. Similarly, while assessing  dependency deduction for GPF and State  Insurance, addition of Rs.4,500/­ in monthly  income and multiplier of 15 etc. is not in  accordance with law.   But it is worth  mentioning that taking income of the deceased  at the time of the accident is Rs.8,920/­,  deducting  payable  income  tax and amount  of  pension received by the wife of the deceased,  the amount on account of loss of income to be  given to the appellant comes to  Rs.14,23,036/­. It appears that the tribunal  on account of loss of income has granted  Rs.14,78,700/­ and for all the remaining  heads a total of Rs.15,000/­ only, which is  definitely too less. All the three appellants  should be granted proper compensation under  heads of cooperation from the deceased, loss  of love and affection and service,  protection, last rites, lost of estate and on  doing this the situation that emerges is  that, the total amount of Rs.14,93,700/­  awarded by tribunal as compensation is  justified and therefore, any interference in  the amount of awarded compensation is not  proper desirable or necessary.”

7

8

Page 8

12. Two appeals, one preferred by the appellants­

claimants and another by the Insurance Company, were  

dismissed by the High Court by common impugned judgment  

dated 29th July, 2011.  

13. From the facts and circumstances of the case,  the  

grievance of the appellants can be summarized as  

follows:­  

(i)   No amount can be deducted towards Provident  

Fund, Pension and Insurance amount from the actual  

salary of the victim for calculating compensation.

(ii)   In the absence of any evidence, the Court  

suo motu   cannot deduct any amount towards income tax  

from the actual salary of the victim.

 (iii) On the facts of the present case, the  

Tribunal and the High Court should have doubled the  

salary by allowing 100% increase towards the future  

prospects and  

(iv) The Tribunal and the High Court failed to  

ensure payment of just and fair compensation.

Reliance was also placed on decisions of this Court  

which will be discussed later in this judgment.

14. The respondents have appeared but no counter  

affidavit has been filed by them.  Learned counsel for  

8

9

Page 9

the respondents merely justified the award passed by the  

Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court.  

15. The issues involved in this case are:

(i) Whether Provident Fund, Pension and Insurance  

receivable by the claimants come within the periphery of  

the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “Pecuniary  

Advantage” liable for deduction.  

(ii) Whether the salary receivable by claimant on  

compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of  

the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “Pecuniary  

Advantage” liable for deduction.  

(iii) Whether the income tax is liable to be  

deducted for determination of compensation under the  

Motor Vehicles Act and

(iv)  Whether the compensation awarded to the  

appellants is just and proper.

16. For determination of the aforesaid issues, it is  

necessary to notice the relevant facts as mentioned  

hereunder.  

17. Smt. Vimal Kanwar, PW­3 (appellant no.1 herein),  

who is the wife of the deceased has stated in her  

examination in chief that her husband obtained BE Degree  

from Jodhpur University in First Class and he was  

directly appointed to the post of Assistant Engineer in  

9

10

Page 10

the year 1994. At the time of accident he was 28 years  

old and was getting salary of Rs.9,000/­ per month.  If  

he had been alive he would have got promoted upto the  

rank of Chief Engineer.   

18. Ram Avtar Parikh,  PW­2  is  an employee  of Public  

Works Department, where the deceased was working.   He  

stated that  Sajjan Singh was  working on  the  post of  

Assistant Engineer and at that time his monthly salary  

was Rs.8,920/­.   In support of his   statement he  

produced the Last Pay Certificate and the Service Book  

(Exh. 1.) of the deceased.  

19. The first issue is “whether Provident Fund, Pension  

and Insurance receivable by claimants come within the  

periphery  of the  Motor Vehicles Act  to be  termed as  

“Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction.”

The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before  

this Court in   Helen C. Rebello (Mrs) and others  vs.  

Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation & Anr.  

reported in  (1999) 1 SCC 90.   In the said case, this  

Court held that  Provident Fund, Pension, Insurance  

and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed  

deposits, etc. are all a “pecuniary advantage”  

receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death but  

all these have no correlation with the amount receivable  

1

11

Page 11

under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental  

death.   Such an amount will not come within the  

periphery  of the  Motor Vehicles Act  to be  termed as  

“pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction.   The  

following was the observation and finding of this Court:

 “35.  Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the  provident fund which is a deferred payment out of  the contribution made by an employee during the  tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs  are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of  the accidental death. This amount is secured, is  certain to be received, while the amount under the  Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable  only on the happening of the event, viz., accident,  which may not take place at all. Similarly, family  pension is also earned by an employee for the  benefit of his family in the form of his  contribution in the service in terms of the service  conditions receivable by the heirs after his death.  The heirs receive family pension even otherwise  than the accidental death. No correlation between  the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is  received either by the insured or the heirs of the  insured on account of the contract with the  insurer, for which the insured contributes in the  form of premium. It is receivable even by the  insured if he lives till maturity after paying all  the  premiums.  In  the  case  of  death,  the  insurer  indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in  terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again,  this amount is receivable by the claimant not on  account of any accidental death but otherwise on  the insured's death. Death is only a step or  contingency in terms of the contract, to receive  the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance,  shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a  pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on  account of one's death but all these have no  correlation with the amount receivable under a  statute occasioned only on account of accidental  death.  How  could such  an  amount  come within  the  periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as  “pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction. When we  seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be  on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se,  

1

12

Page 12

between them and not to which there is no semblance  of any correlation. The insured (deceased)  contributes his own money for which he receives the  amount which has no correlation to the compensation  computed as against the tortfeasor for his  negligence on account of the accident. As  aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation  under the Act is on account of the injury or death  without making any contribution towards it, then  how can the fruits of an amount received through  contributions of the insured be deducted out of the  amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The  amount under this Act he receives without any  contribution. As we have said, the compensation  payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory  while the amount receivable under the life  insurance policy is contractual.”

20. The second issue is “whether the salary receivable  

by the claimant on compassionate appointment comes  

within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be  

termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction.”

 “Compassionate appointment” can be one of the  

conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to  

that effect is framed by the employer.   In case, the  

employee dies in harness i.e. while in service leaving  

behind the dependents, one of the dependents may request  

for compassionate appointment to maintain the family of  

the deceased employee dies in harness.   This cannot be  

stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on  

account of one’s death and have no correlation with the  

amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account  

of accidental death.  Compassionate appointment may have  

1

13

Page 13

nexus with the death of an employee while in service but  

it is not necessary that it should have a correlation  

with the accidental death.  An  employee dies in harness  

even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain  

the family of the deceased one of the dependents may be  

entitled for compassionate appointment but that cannot  

be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” that comes under the  

periphery of Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received  

on such appointment is not liable for deduction for  

determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles  

Act.   

21. The third issue is “whether the income tax is  

liable to be deducted for determination of compensation  

under the Motor Vehicles Act”

In the case of   Sarla Verma & Anr.(Supra),    this  

Court held “generally the actual income of the deceased  

less income tax should be the starting point for  

calculating the compensation.”  

This Court further observed that “where the annual  

income is in taxable range,   the word “actual salary”  

should be read as “actual salary less tax”.  Therefore,  

it is clear that if the annual income comes within the  

taxable range income tax is required to be deducted for  

determination of the actual salary.  But while deducting  

1

14

Page 14

income­tax from salary, it is necessary to notice the  

nature of the income of the victim.  If the victim is  

receiving income chargeable under the head “salaries”  

one should keep in mind that under Section 192 (1) of  

the Income­tax Act, 1961 any person responsible for  

paying any income chargeable under the head “salaries”  

shall at the time of payment, deduct income­tax on  

estimated income of the employee from   “salaries” for  

that financial year.  Such deduction is commonly known  

as tax deducted at source (‘TDS’ for short).  When the  

employer fails in default to deduct the TDS from  

employee salary, as it is his duty to deduct the TDS,  

then the penalty for non­deduction of TDS is prescribed  

under Section 201(1A) of the Income­tax Act, 1961.

Therefore, in case the income of the victim is only  

from “salary”, the presumption would be that the  

employer under Section 192 (1) of the Income­tax Act,  

1961 has deducted the tax at source from the employee’s  

salary.  In case if an objection is raised by any party,  

the objector is required to prove by producing evidence  

such as LPC to suggest that the employer failed to  

deduct the TDS from the salary of the employee.   

1

15

Page 15

However, there can be cases where the victim is not a salaried person  

i.e. his income is from sources other than salary, and the annual income falls  

within taxable range, in such cases, if any objection as to deduction of tax is  

made by a party then the claimant is required to prove that the victim has  

already  paid  income  tax  and  no  further  tax  has  to  be  deducted  from the  

income.

22. In the present case, none of the respondents  

brought to the notice of the Court that the income­tax  

payable by the deceased Sajjan Singh was not deducted at  

source by the employer­ State Government.   No such  

statement was made by Ram Avtar Parikh, PW­2 an employee  

of Public Works Department of the State Government who  

placed on record the Last Pay Certificate and the  

Service Book of the deceased.  The Tribunal or the High  

Court on perusal of the Last Pay Certificate, have not  

noticed that the income­tax on the estimated income of  

the employee was not deducted from the salary of the  

employee during the said month or Financial Year.   In  

absence of such evidence, it is presumed that the salary  

paid to the deceased Sajjan Singh as per Last Pay  

Certificate was paid in accordance with law i.e. by  

deducting the income­tax on the estimated income of the  

deceased Sajjan Singh for that month or the Financial  

1

16

Page 16

Year.   The appellants have specifically stated that  

Assessment Year applicable in the instant case is 1997­

98 and not 1996­97 as   held by the High Court.   They  

have also taken specific plea that for the Assessment  

Year 1997­98 the rate of tax on income more than  

40,000/­ and upto Rs.60,000/­ was 15% and not 20% as  

held by the High Court.  The aforesaid fact has not been  

disputed by the respondents.   

23. In view of the finding as recorded above and the  

provisions of the Income­tax Act, 1961, as discussed, we  

hold that the High Court was wrong in deducting 20% from  

the salary of the deceased towards income­tax, for  

calculating the compensation.   As per law, the  

presumption  will be that employer­State  Government  at  

the time of payment of salary deducted income­tax on the  

estimated income of the deceased employee from the  

salary and in absence of any evidence, we hold that the  

salary as shown in the Last Pay Certificate at  

Rs.8,920/­ should be accepted which if rounded off comes  

to Rs.9,000/­ for calculating the compensation payable  

to the dependent(s).   

24. The fourth issue is “whether the compensation  

awarded to the appellants is just and proper.”

1

17

Page 17

For determination of this issue, it is required to  

determine the percentage of increase in income to be  

made towards prospects of advancement in future career  

and revision of pay.  In General Manager, Kerala State  

Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas  

(1994) 2 SCC 176 this Court noticed the age and income  

of the deceased for determination of future prospects of  

advancement in life and career.   The Court held as  

follows:

“19.  In the present case the deceased was 39 years  of age. His income was Rs 1032 per month. Of course,  the future prospects of advancement in life and  career should also be sounded in terms of money to  augment the multiplicand. While the chance of the  multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the  rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and  the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever  is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is  a more difficult exercise. Indeed, many factors have  to be put into the scales to evaluate the  contingencies  of the future. All contingencies  of  the future need not necessarily be baneful. The  deceased person  in  this  case had  a more  or  less  stable job. It will not be inappropriate to take a  reasonably liberal view of the prospects of the  future and in estimating the gross income it will be  unreasonable to estimate the loss of dependency on  the present actual income of Rs 1032 per month. We  think, having regard to the prospects of advancement  in the future career, respecting which there is  evidence on record, we will not be in error in  making a higher estimate of monthly income at Rs  2000 as the gross income.”  

25. In   New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Gopali & ors.  

reported in AIR 2012 SC 3381 this Court noticed that the  

1

18

Page 18

High Court determined the compensation by granting 100%  

increase in the income of the deceased.   Taking into  

consideration the fact that in the normal course, the  

deceased would have served for 22 years and during that  

period his  salary  would  have certainly doubled, this  

Court, upheld the judgment of the High Court.  

26. In  K.R. Madhusudhan v. Administrative Officer  

(2011) 4 SCC  this Court observed that there can be  

departure from the rule of thumb and held as under:­

“10.  The present case stands on different factual  basis where there is clear and incontrovertible  evidence on record that the deceased was entitled  and in fact bound to get a raise in income in the  future, a fact which was corroborated by evidence on  record. Thus, we are of the view that the present  case comes within the “exceptional circumstances”  and not within the purview of the rule of thumb laid  down by Sarla Verma1 judgment. Hence, even though  the deceased was above 50 years of age, he shall be  entitled to increase in income due to future  prospects.”

27. Recently in  Santosh Devi v. National Insurance  

Company Ltd.  reported in  (2012) 6 SCC 421  this Court  

found it difficult to find any rationale for the  

observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in  

Sarla Verma’s case and observed as follows:

“14.  We find it extremely difficult to fathom any  rationale for the observation made in para 24 of the  judgment in Sarla Verma case2 that where the  deceased was self­employed or was on a fixed salary  without provision  for annual increment, etc.,  the  

1

19

Page 19

courts will usually take only the actual income at  the time of death and a departure from this rule  should be made only in rare and exceptional cases  involving special circumstances. In our view, it  will be naïve to say that the wages or total  emoluments/income of a person who is self­employed  or who is employed on a fixed salary without  provision for annual increment, etc., would remain  the same throughout his life.

15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone  across the board. It does not make any distinction  between  rich and  poor.  As  a matter  of  fact,  the  effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the  cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on  those who are self­employed or who get fixed  income/emoluments. They are the worst affected  people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to  generate additional income necessary for sustaining  their families.

18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the  observations in the last three lines of para 24 of  Sarla Verma’s judgment, the Court had intended to  lay  down an absolute rule  that  there will  be  no  addition in the  income  of  a person  who  is  self­ employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it  would  be  reasonable  to  say  that  a  person who  is  self­employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also  get 30% increase in his total income over a period  of time and if he/she becomes the victim of an  accident then the same formula deserves to be  applied for calculating the amount of compensation.”

28. In the case of New India Assurance Co.Ltd.(Supra),  

this Court noticed that the High Court determined the  

compensation by granting 100% increase in the income of  

the deceased.  Taking into consideration the fact that  

in the normal course, the deceased would have served for  

22 years and during that period his salary would have  

1

20

Page 20

certainly doubled, upheld the judgment of the High Court  

with following observation:

“20.We are also of the view that the High Court  was  justified  in      determining the amount  of compensation by granting   100%   increase  in       the income of the deceased. In the  normal course, the   deceased   would   have  served for 22 years and during that period his  salary would  have   certainly doubled because  the employer was paying 20% of his salary as  bonus per year.”

29. Admittedly, the date of birth of deceased Sajjan  

Singh being 1st February, 1968;  the submission that he  

would have continued in service upto 1st February, 2026,  

if 58 years is the age of retirement or 1st  February,  

2028, if 60 years is the age of retirement is accepted.  

He was only 28 years 7 ½ month old at the time of death.  

In normal course, he would have served the State  

Government minimum for about 30 years.   Even if we do  

not take into consideration the future prospect of  

promotion which the deceased was otherwise entitled and  

the actual pay revisions taken effect from 1st January,  

1996 and 1st January, 2006, it cannot be denied that the  

pay of the deceased would have doubled if he would  

continued  in services  of the  State till the  date of  

retirement.   Hence, this was a fit case in which 100%  

increase in the future income of the deceased should  

2

21

Page 21

have been allowed by the Tribunal and the High Court,  

which they failed to do.   

30. Having regard to the facts and evidence on record,  

we estimate the monthly income of the deceased Sajjan  

Singh at Rs.9,000 x 2 = Rs.18,000/­ per month.   From  

this his personal living expenses, which should be 1/3rd,  

there being three dependents has to be deducted.  

Thereby, the ‘actual salary’ will come to Rs.18,000 –  

Rs.6,000/­ = Rs.12,000/­ per month or Rs.12,000 x 12  

=1,44,000/­ per annum.  As the deceased was 28 ½ years  

old at the time of death the multiplier of 17 is  

applied, which is appropriate to the age of the  

deceased.  The normal compensation would then work out  

to be Rs.1,44,000/­ x 17 =Rs.24,48,000/­ to which we add  

the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the  

estate by providing a conventional sum of Rs.  

1,00,000/­; loss of love and affection for the daughter  

Rs.2,00,000/­, loss of love and affection for the widow  

and the mother at Rs.1,00,000/­ each i.e. Rs.2,00,000/­  

and funeral expenses of Rs.25,000/­.   

31. Thus, according to us, in all a sum of  

Rs.29,73,000/­  would be a fair, just and reasonable  

award in the circumstances of this case.   

2

22

Page 22

32. The rate of interest of 12% is allowed from the  

date of the petition filed before the Tribunal till  

payment is made.   

33. Respondent No.3 is directed to pay the total award  

with interest minus the amount (if already paid) within  

three months.  The appellant No.2­daughter who was aged  

about 2 years at the time of accident of the deceased  

has already attained majority; money may be required for  

her education and marriage.   In the circumstances, we  

direct respondent No.3 to deposit 25% of the due amount  

in the account of appellant no.1­the wife.  Out of the  

rest 75%   of the due amount, 35% of the amount be  

invested in a Nationalized Bank by fixed deposit for a  

period of one year in the name of the daughter­appellant  

No.2.  Out of the rest 40% of the due amount, 20% each  

be invested in a Nationalized Bank by fixed deposit for  

a period of one year in the name of the appellant Nos. 1  

and 3, the wife and the mother respectively.  

34. The award passed by the Tribunal dated 21st  June,  

2003 and the judgment dated 29th  July, 2011 of the  

Rajasthan High Court stand modified to the extent above.  

The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observation and  

direction.  No separate order as to costs.

2

23

Page 23

………..………………………………………..J.        (G.S. SINGHVI)

………………………………………………….J.            (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

NEW DELHI, MAY 03, 2013.

2