Page 1

1

NOT-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1958 OF 2003

Vikram Singh & Anr. … Appellants

Vs.

State of Rajasthan & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1. This appeal is directed against an order passed by the High  

Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, dismissing the  

writ  petition  filed  by  the  appellants/writ-petitioners  with  

liberty to the writ-petitioners to raise the defence before the  

Collector which was available to them.

2. The issue raised before the High Court on the question is  

whether  in  view of  the provisions  of  Section 15(2)  of  the

Page 2

2

Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act,  

1973  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Act  of  1973’),  the  

Collector has any jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for  

making reference to the Board of Revenue in respect of an  

order passed on June 30, 1970 for determining the ceiling  

area  of  the  land  that  could  be  held  by  the  petitioners  

(appellants)  under  Chapter  III-B  of  the  Rajasthan Tenancy  

Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1955’). The  

facts of the case, in brief, which are necessary for deciding  

the question are that Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955 was  

introduced  by  Section  3  of  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy  

(Amendment) Act, 1980 published in the Rajasthan Gazette  

Extraordinary,  Part  IV-A  dated  21.3.1960  vide  Notification  

No. F.6(2) Rev. B/70 (I) and this chapter came into force with  

effect from 15.12.1963. Chapter III-B provides “Restriction of  

holding land in excess of ceiling area”. Chapter III-B contains  

various sections providing for  declaration of  the extent  of  

agricultural land which can be held by agriculturists and the  

mode  of  determination  of  excess  agricultural  land.  The  

agriculturists  are required to  surrender  excess  land which

Page 3

3

shall vest in the State Government. As per the provisions of  

Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955, appointed date was fixed as  

1.4.1966  by  the  agriculturists  in  accordance  with  the  

provisions of Chapter III-B.

3. It  appears  that  one  Ummaid  Singh,  ancestor  of  the  

appellants  submitted  a  return  before  the  Sub-Divisional  

Officer,  Jalore,  upon  which  a  case  was  registered  bearing  

No.13/68. During the pendency of the case, Ummaid Singh  

expired. His successors-in-interest were taken on record and  

the  proceedings  were  completed.  The  S.D.O.  held  by  an  

order dated September 30, 1979 that 514-1/2 standard acres  

of land were surplus in the hands of the agriculturists. The  

land was surrendered by the petitioner in pursuance of the  

said  order  and  no  appeal  was  preferred.  Hence,  the  said  

order  became final.  The Act  of  1955 was  repealed by  an  

Ordinance and thereafter by the Act of 1973, which came  

into  force  on  1.1.1973,  the  State  Government  was  given  

power to avail the remedies under the Act of 1973 against  

the case decided under the old ceiling law of Chapter III-B by

Page 4

4

making provision under Section 15(2) of the Act of 1973. The  

old law of ceiling has been saved for this purpose by virtue  

of Section 40 of the Act of 1973.

4. It appears from the facts that an application was filed before  

the District Collector, Jalore by the Tehsildar under Section  

232 of the Act of 1955 with a prayer to re-open the mutation  

made  in  accordance  with  the  decision  in  Ceiling  Case  

No.13/68 of the predecessors of the petitioners and prayed  

for cancellation of the said decision and to refer the matter  

before the Board of Revenue. On such prayer,  the District  

Collector issued notice dated August 11, 1999 fixing a date  

that is September 8, 1999. The issuance of such notice had  

been  challenged  on  the  ground  of  inordinate  delay  in  

initiation of  such proceedings under Section 232.  In  these  

circumstances,  the  appellants  filed  a  writ  petition  

challenging the notice dated 11.8.1999.  

5. Mr.  Sushil  Kumar  Jain,  learned  counsel  appearing  in  this  

matter, submitted that the Act of 1973 is a special Act and a  

complete  Code  specifically  dealing  with  the  issues  of

Page 5

5

agriculture  land  ceiling  in  the  State  of  Rajasthan.  He  

submitted that in relation to cases that have attained finality  

under the repealed law, Section 15 has been enacted which  

is  the  only  source  of  power  in  relation  to  cases  already  

decided under the repealed law. The power that is provided  

under Section 15(2) of the Act can be exercised to re-open  

the cases already decided. He further submitted that once  

Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Act of 1955 has been repealed,  

power  under  Section  232  cannot  be  used  or  utilized  to  

determine or re-determine the issues relating to land ceiling.  

The said action, according to him, can now only be taken  

under the provisions of the Act of 1973. Therefore, no right  

has  been  conferred  upon  the  authorities  which  can  be  

exercised under the Act of 1955 excepting all steps can be  

taken under the 1973 Act. He further submitted that Section  

40  of  the  1973  Act  has  repealed  the  entire  Chapter  III-B  

except for the purposes of second proviso to Section 4(1)  

and Section 15(2) of the 1973 Act. Since Section 40 saves  

the  said  Chapter  for  the  purposes  of  Section  15(2)  only,  

latter  part  of  Section  15(2)  specifically  enables  the

Page 6

6

authorities  to  decide  the  cases  in  accordance  with  the  

repealed provisions. Therefore, he submitted that Chapter III-

B is not saved for the purpose of Section 232. Therefore, he  

further submitted that there would be no existing law under  

which  re-determination  can  be  made  once  the  power  is  

exercised under Section 232. It is necessary for us to quote  

Section 15 at this stage for our purpose :

“15(2) Without prejudice to any other remedy that may  be  available  to  it  under  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  1955  (Rajasthan  Act  3  of  1955),  if  the  State  Government, after calling for the record or otherwise, is  satisfied  that  any  final  order  passed  in  any  matter  arising under the provisions repealed by Section 40, is  in contravention of such repealed provisions and that  such order  is  prejudicial  to  the  State  Government  or  that on account of the discovery of new and important  matter or evidence which has since come to its notice,  such order is required to be reopened, it may direct any  officer subordinate to it to reopen such decided matter  and  to  decide  it  afresh  in  accordance  with  such  repealed provisions.”

6. He further pointed out that the entire provision of Section  

15(2)  is  subject  to  the  second  proviso  which  lays  down

Page 7

7

limitation of seven years or up to 30th June, 1979. According  

to him, Section 15(2) saves the “remedies” against a “final  

order” and not “powers” under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.  

He submitted that against a “final order”, the remedy is in  

the nature of an appeal under Section 55 of the Rajasthan  

Tenancy  Act  or  review  under  Section  225  of  the  Act.  

Therefore,  he  submitted  that  at  this  stage  the  authority  

cannot  reopen  the  same.  He  further  submitted  that  the  

power under Section 232 is sought to be exercised after 29  

years  which  cannot,  by  any  stretch  of  imagination,  be  

construed as a reasonable period to sustain the initiation of  

such proceedings. In these circumstances, he submitted that  

the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition and  

remit the matter before the authority for consideration.  

7. Per  contra,  it  is  submitted  by  Dr.  Manish  Singhvi  that  

Chapter  III-B  is  a  substantive  law  with  regard  to  the  

determination of ceiling proceedings and does not provide  

for any machinery provisions with regard to the computation  

of   ceiling.  The  machinery  provisions  like  computation  of  

ceiling land, appeals, reference and revision were provided

Page 8

8

by the Act of 1955. The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on  

Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 repealed Chapter III-B of the  

Act of 1955. The repeal of Chapter III-B by the Act of 1973  

has  both  substantive  as  well  as  procedural  aspects.  

Accordingly,  he submitted  that  the substantive  rights  and  

liabilities under Chapter III-B are being saved by Section 40  

of  the  repealing  Act  as  well  as  Section  6  of  the  General  

Clauses Act. In support of his contention, he relied on the  

Constitution  Bench  judgment  of  this  Court  reported  in  

Bansidhar & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.1 He drew our  

attention  to  paragraph  39  of  the  said  judgment  and  

submitted  that  the  State  of  Rajasthan  has  an  accrued  or  

vested right to the excess land as available on 1.1.1966 in  

terms  of  Chapter  III-B  of  the  Act  of  1973.  Therefore,  the  

substantive rights are duly saved in favour of the State of  

Rajasthan and if there is any excess land then it ought to  

have  been  surrendered  to  the  State  of  Rajasthan  by  the  

appellant/s.

1  (1989) 2 SCC 557

Page 9

9

8. He  further  contended  that  the  main  question  that  the  

procedural  law  which  is  to  be  applied  for  purposes  of  

determination of substantive rights which have accrued in  

favour of State of Rajasthan in terms of excess land under  

Chapter III-B of the ceiling law is governed by Chapter 15(2)  

of  the  Act  of  1973.  Section  15(2)  begins  with  a  rider  or  

caveat which states as follows :

“Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be  available  under  Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  1955,  if  the  State Government….”

9. Thus, Section 15(2) has two components: The first part saves  

the  right  of  the  State  Government  or  any  other  person  to  

pursue  any  remedy  which  is  already  available  under  the  

Rajasthan Tenancy Act; the second part refers to power to re-

open and it is also subject to several riders that it could be re-

opened within a stipulated period of seven years.

10. The power under Section 15(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act  

has been saved and the State of Rajasthan in exercise of power  

proceeded in the matter to avail  the remedy under the said

Page 10

10

Act.  Accordingly,  the  State  has  exercised  its  power  under  

Section  232  of  the  said  Act,  and  no  limitation  has  been  

prescribed  to  reopen  the  proceedings  at  any  point  of  time  

which have been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. This  

aspect of section 15(2)  delineated in two parts is also brought  

forth clearly in the impugned judgment.

11. Therefore, the words “Without prejudice to any other remedy  

that  may  be  available  under  Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  1955”  

would be rendered surplus or redundant if  it  has to be read  

only as power to reopen within a period of seven years. The  

power to reopen was  conferred on the State Government in  

addition to the existing power  under  the Rajasthan Tenancy  

Act. Thus, the power of rider of limitation of seven years would  

only  arise  if  the  State  Government  was  to  reopen  the  

proceedings.  The  power  exercised  in  the  present  case  is  

emanating out  of  Section 232 of  the Rajasthan Tenancy Act  

which stands duly protected and preserved by first four lines of  

Section 15(2) of the Act of 1973.

Page 11

11

12. If the arguments canvassed by the appellants are accepted,  

then the State Government would be denuded of its power to  

refer any matter to the Revenue Board even if fraud, collusion  

or  misrepresentation  comes  to  the  knowledge  of  the  State  

Government. The State Government cannot be denuded of its  

power to rectify any mistake which has been committed earlier  

on account of fraud, misrepresentation or matters pertaining to  

void  transactions.  Thus,  the  exercise  of  power  is  imperative  

and it has been expressly provided in first four lines of Section  

15(2) itself which is in addition to power of reopening, which of  

course is no longer available within limitation of seven years.

13. He  further  submitted  that  Section  232  of  the  Rajasthan  

Tenancy Act does not prescribe any period of limitation. Thus,  

when there is no period of limitation, power can be exercised at  

any point of time. According to him, the reasonable period of  

time in exercise of power is essentially a question of fact. The  

High  Court  has  abdicated its  responsibility  to  determine the  

reasonable period of time and has left it to the authorities to  

determine  the  same.  Therefore,  the  reasonableness  of  the  

period of time has to be decided by the authorities below even

Page 12

12

if the petition is dismissed. He further relied upon a Full Bench  

decision of  Rajasthan High Court  in  Chiman Lal  vs.  State of   

Rajasthan & Ors.2 In support of his contention,  he contended  

that when no period of limitation is provided then it has to be  

exercised within a reasonable time and that will depend upon  

the facts and circumstances of each case like: when there is a  

fraud  played  by  the  parties;  the  orders  are  obtained  by  

misrepresentation  or  collusion  with  public  officers  by  the  

private  parties;  orders  are  against  the  public  interest;  the  

orders are passed by the authorities who have no jurisdiction;  

the  orders  are  passed  in  clear  violation  of  rules  or  the  

provisions of the Act by the authorities; and void orders or the  

orders  are  void ab  initio being  against  the  public  policy  or  

otherwise.  The common law doctrine of public policy can be  

enforced wherever an action affects/offends the public interest  

or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at  

large is evident. In such type of cases, revisional powers can be  

exercised by the authority at any time either  suo motu or as  

and when such orders are brought to their notice.  

2  RLR 2000 (2) 39

Page 13

13

14. The exercise of power whether it is reasonable or not would  

depend upon whether the proceedings on earlier occasion were  

after  due  consideration  of  facts  or  due  to  fraud  or  

misrepresentation. The learned counsel further submitted that  

it  is  a  settled  proposition  of  law  that  fraud  vitiates  all  

transactions  and  the  point  of  limitation  would  never  come  

whenever the fraud is alleged. In the instant case, according to  

him, the appellant has directly availed of writ remedy against  

the notices issued for reference and the appellant got liberty to  

agitate all  points as to whether the fraud was played or not  

and, secondly, whether exercise of power was belated or not.  

Basically, the question is whether the competent authority or  

reference  under  Section  232  was  based  on  fraudulent  

representation or not. It is quintessentially a question of fact to  

be determined by Reference Board which is in the nature of a  

tribunal.  The High Court has also remitted the matter to the  

competent authority to decide the said question in the context  

of Chiman Lal’s case (supra).

Page 14

14

15. After  considering  the  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the  

parties and after considering the counter filed before this Court  

to  which  our  attention  has  been drawn,  it  appears  that  the  

facts  which  have  been  pleaded  by  the  respondents  in  the  

counter would show that on the basis of the misrepresentation,  

the order passed in the land ceiling cases, in particular Ceiling  

Case  No.13/68  and  the  declaration  which  was  filed  by  the  

ancestors of the appellants, would reveal that the declarations  

which have been given by the predecessors of the appellant,  

suffered from suppression of material facts. It is also revealed  

from  the  facts  that  there  is  an  allegation  of  fraud  which  

requires an enquiry. Therefore, the notice has been issued only  

to make an enquiry in the matter. Hence, in the given facts,  

such  notice  cannot  be  said  to  be  bad  at  this  stage.  The  

appellant would only face the enquiry. In view of that, we do  

not intend to interfere with the order passed by the High Court.  

However, we also restrain ourselves from making any comment  

with regard thereto. The point of limitation also can be urged  

by the appellant before the said authorities.

Page 15

15

16. In our opinion, we do not find any reason to interfere with  

the order passed by the High Court. We accept the reasoning of  

the  High  Court.  The  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants,  in  our  opinion,  cannot be accepted by us as the  

same  have  no  substance  and  further  fraud  as  alleged,  if  

proved, all steps would vitiate. On the contrary, it appears that  

the  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  have  

substance and we accept contentions of the respondents.  In  

the  result,  we find  no  merit  in  the  appeal  and the  same is  

dismissed.

…………………………….J. (Gyan Sudha Misra)

New Delhi;   ……………………………J. April 25, 2014. (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

Page 16

16