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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.1546 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.23890/2014)

Vijay Kumar Ahluwalia

& Ors.              ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Bishan Chand Maheshwari & Anr.          …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This  appeal  is  filed  against  the  final  judgment

and order dated 04.08.2014 passed by the High Court

of Delhi at New Delhi in RCR No. 76 of 2013 whereby

the  High  Court  dismissed  the  revision  filed  by  the

appellants  herein  against  the  judgment  dated

13.08.2012 of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi by

which the leave to contest the application filed by the

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appellants-tenant has been dismissed and the eviction

petition  under  Section  14(1)(e)  of  the  Delhi  Rent

Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”)

filed by respondent No.1  was decreed.

3) We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate

the issue involved in this appeal.   

4) One Miri Mal was the owner of the shop situated

on the ground floor of property bearing No. 1548/V,

Nai  Sarak,  Delhi-110 006 (hereinafter  referred to  as

“the suit shop”). Miri Mal let out the suit shop to one

Ram Prakash in 1944 on monthly rent of ‘Ek Ana’. Miri

Mal died in 1974 leaving behind his widow-Smt. Ram

Piari, who became the owner/landlady of the suit shop

by inheritance. After the death of Miri Lal, Ram Piari

started  collecting  rent  from  Ram  Prakash.    Ram

Prakash died in 1989 leaving behind his son (appellant

herein). Smt. Ram Piari died issueless in 1994.

5) Almost after 17 years of the death of Smt. Ram

Piari, on 28.07.2011, Respondent No.1 herein claiming

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to be the adopted son of Miri Mal and Smt. Ram Piari,

filed  an  application  under  Section  14(1)(e)  of   Act

seeking appellants’ eviction from the suit shop being

Case  No.  E-167/2011.  Respondent  No.1  sought

eviction,  inter  alia, on  the  ground  that  he  is  the

adopted son of Miri Mal and Smt. Ram Piari, therefore,

became the owner and landlord of  the suit  shop on

their  death  as  their  adopted  son  by  inheritance.

Respondent No.1 sought eviction on the ground of his

bona fide need to start a business in the suit shop.  

6) In  order  to  prove  his  ownership  over  the  suit

shop, respondent No.1  filed some documents which

included one adoption deed dated 14.03.1978 alleged

to have been executed by Smt. Ram Piari.  

7) The appellants, on receipt of the summons of the

application, filed an application with an affidavit under

Section 25B(4) of the Act by raising grounds therein

and sought  leave  to  contest  the  application  filed  by

respondent No.1 for eviction. Since the issue relating

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to  the  ownership  of  respondent  No.1  over  the  suit

shop, on the strength of adoption deed surfaced for the

first time in these proceedings, the appellants in his

leave to contest the application denied the ownership

of  respondent  No.1  over  the  suit  shop  so  also  the

relationship of landlord and tenant between them. The

appellants also denied the  bona fide need set up by

respondent No.1 contending, inter alia, that alternative

suitable accommodation in the building in question is

available to respondent No.1 on other floors and hence

the plea of  bona fide need is not genuine. These were

essentially  the  grounds  on  which  the  appellants

sought leave to contest the application on merits.  

8) Respondent No.1 denied the averments made by

the appellants in the application for leave to contest.

The appellants then filed rejoinder and reiterated their

grounds already taken in the application for leave to

contest.

9) By order dated 13.08.2012, the Additional Rent

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Controller  dismissed  the  application  filed  by  the

appellants for leave to contest and passed an eviction

order against the appellants from the suit shop.  

10) Felt aggrieved by the said order,  the appellants

filed  revision  before  the  High  Court.  By  impugned

judgment dated 04.08.2014, the High Court dismissed

the revision.  

11) Challenging  the  order  of  the  High  Court,  the

appellants   have  filed  this  appeal  by  way of  special

leave before this Court.

12) Heard Mr. Nikunj Dayal, learned counsel for the

appellants  and  Mr.  S.  Gurukrishna  Kumar,  learned

senior counsel for respondent No.1.  Respondent No.2

refused  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  the  service  of

notice  issued  to  him  under  registered  cover.   This

refusal on the part of respondent No.2 is deemed as

proper service.

13) Learned counsel for the appellants (tenant) while

assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned

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order  contended that  the  Rent  Controlling  Authority

and the High Court erred in dismissing the appellants’

application for leave to contest the eviction application

filed by respondent No.1. It was his submission that

keeping in view the grounds raised by the appellants

in the application, especially, three grounds, namely,

first, relating to ownership of respondent No.1 over the

suit shop, second, the existence of the relationship of

landlord  and  tenant  between  them  and,  third,  the

availability  of  alternative  suitable  accommodation  in

the same building for accomplishing the need,  prima

facie,  a case is  made out to contest  the  respondent

No,1’s application for eviction on merits.    The Rent

Controlling Authority and the High Court should have,

therefore,  granted leave to contest respondent No.1’s

application on merits on these grounds.

14) In reply,  learned senior  counsel  for  respondent

No.1  supported  the  impugned  order  and  contended

that no case is made out to interfere in the impugned

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order  which,  according  to  him,  is  based  on  proper

reasoning calling no interference in this appeal.

15) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the record of the case, we find force

in  the  submissions  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellants.

16) The  short  question,  which  arises  for

consideration  in  this  appeal,  is  whether  the  Courts

below were justified in rejecting the application filed by

the  appellants  under  Section  25B(4)  of  the  Act  for

grant of leave to contest the eviction proceedings filed

by  respondent  No.1  against  the  appellants  under

Section 14 (e) of the Act on merits?   

17) In our considered opinion, the application filed by

the appellants under Section 25B(4) of the Act seeking

leave to contest the eviction application of respondent

No.1  should  have  been  allowed  to  enable  the

appellants (tenant) to contest the eviction application

on its  merits.  In  other  words,   keeping  in  view the

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grounds raised by the appellants, we are of the opinion

that  a  prima  facie case  was  made  out  entitling  the

appellants  to  contest  the  application  of  respondent

No.1 on merits. The grounds raised by the appellants,

if  accepted,  could  result  in  dismissal  of  respondent

No.1’s eviction application thereby disentitling him to

claim appellants’ eviction from the suit shop.

18) We  find  that  the  ground  relating  to  proof  of

ownership  of  respondent  No.1  over  the  suit  shop,

which was based on the alleged adoption deed set up

by him, for the first time, after 17 years coupled with

the  ground  in  relation  to  devolution  of  tenancy

between the parties after the death of Smt. Ram Piari

and lastly, the ground relating to  bona fide need and

availability  of  the  alternative  accommodation  did

disclose  prima  facie  facts  within  the  meaning  of

sub-sections  4  and  5  of  Section  25B  of  the  Act  to

contest the eviction application of respondent No.1 on

merits.  

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19) It  is,  inter  alia, for  the  reasons,  though  prima

facie, that, firstly, the appellants had not attorned to

respondent No.1 as the owner of the suit shop and, in

turn, his status as landlord; Secondly, there was no

evidence  to  prove  the  existence  of  relationship  of

landlord and tenant between the parties; and Thirdly,

specific  averments  were  made  by  the  appellants  to

show  availability  of  alternative  accommodation  to

satisfy the need of respondent No.1, if it really existed.

20) The  aforesaid  grounds,  in  our  view,  were

sufficient for granting leave to the appellants to contest

the eviction application of respondent No.1 on merits.

21) It  is  a  settled  principle  of  law  that  while

considering the grant of leave to contest the eviction

proceedings under the Rent Laws, the Authority/Court

is not expected to examine the merits and demerits of

the grounds raised in the application for grant of leave

to  contest  and if  the Authority/Court  finds that  the

grounds raised prima facie disclose a defence which, if

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accepted, may result in non-suiting the landlord from

claiming eviction,  the tenant is entitled to obtain leave

to contest the eviction proceedings on merits. In this

case, we find that the appellants-tenant have made out

such grounds and are, therefore, entitled for grant of

leave  to  contest  the  eviction  proceedings  filed  by

respondent No.1 against them on merits.

22) In the light of foregoing discussion, we are unable

to  concur  with  the  reasoning  and  the  conclusion

arrived at by the Rent Controlling Authority and the

High Court.

23) As  a  result,  the  appeal  succeeds  and  is

accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and the

order  passed  by  the  Additional  Rent  Controlling

Authority  dated  13.08.2012  in  E-167/2011

(Annexure-P-6 of SLP) are set aside. As a consequence

thereof, the application filed by the appellants under

Section 25B(4) of the Act dated 29.08.2011 (Annexure

P-3  of  SLP)  is  allowed.  The  appellants-tenant  are

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granted  leave  to  contest  the  application  filed  by

respondent  No.1  under  Section  14  of  the  Act  on

merits.  

24) The eviction case filed by respondent No.1 being

Case No. E-167/2011 out of which this appeal arises

is  accordingly  restored  to  its  original  file  before  the

Additional Rent Controlling Authority for its disposal

on merits in accordance with law.  

25) The appellants are directed to deposit the entire

arrears  of  rent  payable  from the  date  of  application

filed  by  respondent  No.1  for  their  eviction  and

continue to deposit the monthly rent on or before 15th

of  each  month  at  the  rate  determined  by  the  High

Court  till  final  orders  are  passed  by  the  Rent

Controlling Authority.  Failure to deposit the arrears

including  monthly  rent,  as  directed  herein,  would

result in refusal to contest the eviction proceedings.

26) Let the arrears be deposited within one month.

Depending  upon  the  result  of  the  final  order,

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appropriate  orders  for  payment  of  rent  deposited be

passed.  

27) Before  parting  with  the  case,  we  consider  it

apposite to mention that we have not expressed any

opinion  on the  merits  of  the  grounds  raised  by  the

parties.  The  Rent  Controlling  Authority  would,

therefore,  decide  the  case  on  merits  strictly  in

accordance with law without being influenced by any

of our observations made in this order.  

28) Since the matter relates to eviction, we direct the

Rent  Controlling  Authority  to  decide  the  same

expeditiously.    

                                ………...................................J. [J. CHELAMESWAR]

                                         …...……..................................J.     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; February 07, 2017  

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