27 March 2014
Supreme Court
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VIJAY DHANUKA ETC. Vs NAJIMA MAMTAJ ETC.

Bench: CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000678-000681 / 2014
Diary number: 15415 / 2013
Advocates: BRAJESH KUMAR Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.678-681 OF 2014 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS.5090-5093 of 2013)

VIJAY DHANUKA ETC.                …APPELLANTS  

VERSUS

NAJIMA MAMTAJ ETC.        …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T  

 CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J.

Petitioners have been summoned in a complaint  

case for commission of offence under Section 323,  

380 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian  

Penal Code, hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”.  

Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint in the Court of  

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Jangipur,  

Murshidabad  on  1st of  October,  2011,  who  after  

taking  cognizance  of  the  same,  transferred  the

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complaint  to  the  Court  of  Judicial  Magistrate,  

Jangipur, Murshidabad for inquiry and disposal.   

According to the allegation in the complaint  

petition, accused no.1 Rajdip Dey is sub-broker of  

Karvy Stock Broking Limited; whereas other accused  

persons are its officials posted at Kolkata and  

Hyderabad.   The  complainant  alleged  to  be  its  

investor and claimed to have purchased shares from  

Karvi Stock Broking Ltd. through the sub-broker,  

accused  No.  1.   According  to  the  complaint,  a  

dispute arose over trading of shares between the  

complainant and the accused persons and to settle  

the on-going dispute, the accused persons offered  

a proposal to the complainant who consented to it  

and  accordingly,  on  11th of  September,  2011,  

accused  persons  visited  at  her  residence  at  

Raghunathganj  Darbeshpara  to  have  a  discussion  

with the complainant and her husband. According to  

the allegation, the discussion did not yield any  

result and the accused persons started shouting at  

them. Some of the accused persons, according to  

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the allegation, took out a pistol from their bag  

and put the same over the heads of the complainant  

and her husband. It is alleged that they assaulted  

the  complainant  and  her  husband  with  fists  and  

slaps  and  also  abused  them  and  coerced  the  

complainant to sign some papers and snatched away  

the suitcase containing some papers. The aforesaid  

complaint was filed on 1st of October, 2011 in the  

Court  of  Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  

Jangipur,  Murshidabad.   The  learned  Magistrate  

took cognizance of the offence and transferred the  

case  to  the  Court  of  another  Magistrate  for  

inquiry and disposal.  On receipt of the record,  

the transferee Magistrate adjourned the case to  

31st of  October,  2011.   On  the  said  date,  the  

complainant and her witnesses were present.  The  

complainant was examined on solemn affirmation and  

the two witnesses namely Enamul Haque and Masud  

Ali  were  also  examined.   Order  dated  31st of  

October, 2011 shows that they were examined under  

Section  200  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  

1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”).  The  

transferee  Magistrate,  thereafter,  adjourned  the  

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case for orders and on the adjourned date, i.e.  

15th of November, 2011, he directed for issuance of  

summons against the accused persons for offence  

under Section 323, 380 and 506 read with Section  

34 of the IPC.  It is relevant here to state that  

in the complaint, the residence of the accused has  

been  shown  at  a  place  beyond  the  territorial  

jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

Petitioners  challenged  the  order  issuing  

process in four separate applications filed under  

Section 482 of the Code before the High Court,  

inter alia, contending that the accused persons  

being residents of an area outside the territorial  

jurisdiction  of  the  learned  Magistrate  who  had  

issued summons, an inquiry within the meaning of  

Section 202 of the Code was necessary.  It was  

also  contended  that  only  after  inquiry  under  

Section 202 of the Code, the learned Magistrate  

was  required  to  come  to  the  conclusion  as  to  

whether  sufficient  grounds  exist  for  proceeding  

against the accused persons.  Said submission did  

not find favour with the High Court and by common  

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order dated 19th of February, 2013, it rejected all  

the applications.  It is against this common order  

that  the  petitioners  have  filed  these  special  

leave petitions.

Leave granted.

Mr.  Jaideep  Gupta,  learned  Senior  Counsel  

appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that  

the accused persons admittedly were residing at a  

place  beyond  the  area  in  which  the  learned  

Magistrate exercised his jurisdiction, hence, an  

inquiry under Section 202 of the Code was sine qua  

non.  He submits that in the present case, the  

learned  Magistrate  has  not  held  inquiry  as  

envisaged under Section 202 of the Code.   

Ms.  Nidhi,  learned  counsel  representing  

respondent no.1, however, submits that, in fact,  

the learned Magistrate before issuing the process  

has held an inquiry contemplated under the law and  

the order issuing process cannot be faulted on the  

ground that no inquiry was held.  In view of the  

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rival submissions, we deem it expedient to examine  

the scheme of the Code.  

In the present case, we are concerned with an  

order passed in a complaint case.  Section 190 of  

the Code provides for cognizance of offences by  

Magistrates and the same reads as follows:

“190.  Cognizance  of  offences  by  Magistrates.-(1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Chapter,  any  Magistrate of the first class, and  any Magistrate of the second class  specially empowered in this behalf  under  sub-section(2),  may  take  cognizance of any offence-

(a)upon  receiving  a  complaint  of facts which constitute such  offence;

(b)upon a police report of such  facts;

(c)upon  information  received  from  any  person  other  than  a  police officer, or upon his own  knowledge,  that  such  offence  has been committed.

(2)  The  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  may empower any Magistrate of the  second  class  to  take  cognizance  under  sub-section(1)  of  such  offences  as  are  within  his  competence to inquire into or try.”

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Section 190 of the Code finds place in Chapter  

XIV and from its plain reading, it is evident that  

the  competent  Magistrate,  inter  alia,  may  take  

cognizance  of  any  offence,  subject  to  the  

provisions  of  Chapter  XIV,  upon  receiving  a  

complaint of facts which constitute an offence.  

Section  192  of  the  Code  empowers  any  Chief  

Judicial  Magistrate  to  transfer  the  case  for  

inquiry  after  taking  cognizance  to  a  competent  

Magistrate  subordinate  to  him.   In  the  present  

case,  on  receipt  of  the  complaint,  the  learned  

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in exercise  

of the power under Section 192 of the Code, after  

taking cognizance of the offence, had made over  

the  case  for  inquiry  and  disposal  to  the  

transferee Magistrate.  Section 12(2) of the Code  

confers  on  Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  

the  same  powers  as  that  of  a  Chief  Judicial  

Magistrate.  Hence, transfer of the case by the  

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate after taking  

cognizance of the case to transferee Magistrate  

for inquiry and disposal is perfectly in tune with  

the  provisions  of  the  Code.   The  transferee  

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Magistrate,  thereafter,  examined  the  complainant  

and her witnesses and only thereafter issued the  

process.   

Section 200 of the Code, inter alia, provides  

for examination of the complainant on oath and the  

witnesses present, if any.  Same reads as follows:

“200. Examination of complainant. –  A  Magistrate  taking  cognizance  of  an  offence  on  complaint  shall  examine  upon  oath  the  complainant  and the witnesses present, if any,  and  the  substance  of  such  examination  shall  be  reduced  to  writing and shall be signed by the  complainant and the witnesses, and  also by the Magistrate: Provided  that,  when  the  complaint  is made in writing, the Magistrate  need  not  examine  the  complainant  and the witnesses- (a) If a public servant acting or  purporting to act in the discharge  of his official duties or a court  has made the complaint; or (b)  If  the  Magistrate  makes  over  the case for inquiry, or trial to  another  Magistrate  under  section  192: Provided  further  that  if  the  Magistrate makes over the case to  another  Magistrate  under  section  192 after examining the complainant  and  the  witnesses,  the  latter  

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Magistrate  need  not  re-examine  them.”

Under Section 200 of the Code, on presentation  

of  the  complaint  by  an  individual,  other  than  

public  servant  in  certain  contingency,  the  

Magistrate is required to examine the complainant  

on solemn affirmation and the witnesses present,  

if any.  Thereafter, on perusal of the allegations  

made  in  the  complaint,  the  statement  of  the  

complainant  on  solemn  affirmation  and  the  

witnesses examined, if any, various options are  

available to him.  If he is satisfied that the  

allegations made in the complaint and statements  

of  the  complainant  on  oath  and  the  witnesses  

constitute an offence, he may direct for issuance  

of process as contemplated under Section 204 of  

the  Code.   In  case,  the  Magistrate  is  of  the  

opinion  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  

proceeding,  the  option  available  to  him  is  to  

dismiss  the  complaint  under  Section  203  of  the  

Code.  If on examination of the allegations made  

in  the  complaint  and  the  statement  of  the  

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complainant  on  solemn  affirmation  and  the  

witnesses  examined,  the  Magistrate  is  of  the  

opinion  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  

proceeding,  the  option  available  to  him  is  to  

postpone the issue of process and either inquire  

the case himself or direct the investigation to be  

made by a police officer or by any other person as  

he thinks fit. This option is also available after  

the examination of the complainant only. However,  

in a case in which the accused is residing at a  

place  beyond  the  area  in  which  the  Magistrate  

exercises  his  jurisdiction  whether  it  would  be  

mandatory to hold inquiry or the investigation as  

he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether  

or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding,  

is the question which needs our determination.  In  

this connection, it is apt to refer to Section 202  

of  the  Code  which  provides  for  postponement  of  

issue of process.  The same reads as follows:

“202.  Postponement  of  issue  of  process.-(1)  Any  Magistrate,  on  receipt  of  a  complaint  of  an  offence of which he is authorised  to  take  cognizance  or  which  has  been made over to him under section  

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192,  may,  if  he  thinks  fit,  and  shall,  in a case where the accused  is residing at a place beyond the  area  in  which  he  exercises  his  jurisdiction postpone the issue of  process  against  the  accused,  and  either  inquire  into  the  case  himself or direct an investigation  to be made by a police officer or  by such other person as he thinks  fit,  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  whether or not there is sufficient  ground for proceeding:

Provided that no such direction  for investigation shall be made-

(a)where  it  appears  to  the  Magistrate  that  the  offence  complained  of  is  triable  exclusively  by  the  Court  of  Sessions; or

(b)where the complaint has not  been  made  by  a  Court,  unless  the  complainant  and  the  witnesses present, if any, have  been  examined  on  oath  under  Section 200.

(2)  In  an  inquiry  under  sub- section(1), the Magistrate may, if  he  thinks  fit,  take  evidence  of  witness on oath:

Provided that if it appears to  the  Magistrate  that  the  offence  complained  of  is  triable  exclusively  by  the  court  of  Session,  he  shall  call  upon  the  complainant  to  produce  all  his  witnesses and examine them on oath.

(3) If an investigation under sub- section(1) is made by a person not  

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being  a  police  officer,  he  shall  have for that investigation all the  powers conferred by this Code on an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station except the power to arrest  without warrant.”

(underlining ours)

Section  202  of  the  Code,  inter  alia,  

contemplates  postponement  of  the  issue  of  the  

process “in a case where the accused is residing  

at a place beyond the area in which he exercises  

his jurisdiction” and thereafter to either inquire  

into  the  case  by  himself  or  direct  an  

investigation to be made by a police officer or by  

such other person as he thinks fit.  In the face  

of  it,  what  needs  our  determination  is  as  to  

whether in a case where the accused is residing at  

a place beyond the area in which the Magistrate  

exercises his jurisdiction, inquiry is mandatory  

or not.  The words “and shall, in a case where the  

accused is residing at a place beyond the area in  

which he exercises his jurisdiction” was inserted  

by  Section  19  of  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  

(Amendment) Act (Central Act 25 of 2005) w.e.f.  

23rd of June, 2006. The aforesaid amendment, in the  

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opinion of the legislature, was essential as false  

complaints are filed against persons residing at  

far off places in order to harass them.  The note  

for the amendment reads as follows:

“False  complaints  are  filed  against persons residing at far off  places  simply  to  harass  them.  In  order to see that innocent persons  are  not  harassed  by  unscrupulous  persons, this clause seeks to amend  sub-section (1) of Section 202 to  make  it  obligatory  upon  the  Magistrate  that  before  summoning  the  accused  residing  beyond  his  jurisdiction he shall enquire into  the  case  himself  or  direct  investigation  to  be  made  by  a  police  officer  or  by  such  other  person  as  he  thinks  fit,  for  finding  out  whether  or  not  there  was  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding against the accused.”

The use of the expression ‘shall’ prima facie  

makes the inquiry or the investigation, as the  

case may be, by the Magistrate mandatory.  The  

word  “shall”  is  ordinarily  mandatory  but  

sometimes, taking into account the context or the  

intention, it can be held to be directory.  The  

use of the word “shall” in all circumstances is  

not  decisive.   Bearing  in  mind  the  aforesaid  

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principle, when we look to the intention of the  

legislature, we find that it is aimed to prevent  

innocent persons from harassment by unscrupulous  

persons  from  false  complaints.   Hence,  in  our  

opinion, the use of the expression “shall” and the  

background and the purpose for which the amendment  

has been brought, we have no doubt in our mind  

that inquiry or the investigation, as the case may  

be, is mandatory before summons are issued against  

the  accused  living  beyond  the  territorial  

jurisdiction of the Magistrate.  In view of the  

decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of   Udai  

Shankar Awasthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(2013) 2  

SCC 435, this point need not detain us any further  

as in the said case, this Court has clearly held  

that the provision aforesaid is mandatory.  It is  

apt to reproduce the following passage from the  

said judgment:

“40.  The  Magistrate  had  issued  summons  without  meeting  the  mandatory  requirement  of  Section  202  CrPC,  though  the  appellants  were  outside  his  territorial  jurisdiction.   The  provisions  of  Section 202 CrPC were amended vide  the Amendment Act, 2005, making it  

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mandatory to postpone the issue of  process   where  the  accused  resides    in an area beyond the territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  Magistrate  concerned.  The  same  was  found  necessary  in  order  to  protect  innocent  persons  from  being  harassed  by  unscrupulous  persons  and making it obligatory upon the  Magistrate to enquire into the case  himself, or to direct investigation  to be made by a police officer, or  by such other person as he thinks  fit for the purpose of finding out  whether  or  not,  there  was  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against the accused before issuing  summons in such cases.”

(underlining ours)  

In  view  of  our  answer  to  the  aforesaid  

question, the next question which falls for our  

determination  is  whether  the  learned  Magistrate  

before issuing summons has held the inquiry as  

mandated under Section 202 of the Code.  The word  

“inquiry” has been defined under Section 2(g) of  

the Code, the same reads as follows:

“2.     xxx  xxx xxx

(g)”inquiry”  means  every  inquiry,  other than a trial, conducted under  this Code by a Magistrate or Court;

xxx xxx   xxx”

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It is evident from the aforesaid provision,  

every inquiry other than a trial conducted by the  

Magistrate or Court is an inquiry.  No specific  

mode  or  manner  of  inquiry  is  provided  under  

Section 202 of the Code.  In the inquiry envisaged  

under Section 202 of the Code, the witnesses are  

examined whereas under Section 200 of the Code,  

examination of the complainant only is necessary  

with  the  option  of  examining  the  witnesses  

present, if any.  This exercise by the Magistrate,  

for the purpose of deciding whether or not there  

is sufficient ground for proceeding against the  

accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under  

Section 202 of the Code.  In the present case, as  

we  have  stated  earlier,  the  Magistrate  has  

examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and  

the  two  witnesses  and  only  thereafter  he  had  

directed for issuance         of process.   

In view of what we have observed above, we do  

not find any error in the order impugned.

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In the result, we do not find any merit in  

the  appeals  and  the  same  are  dismissed  

accordingly.

………………………………………………………………J  (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

    ………………………………………………………………J

                   (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE) NEW DELHI, MARCH 27, 2014.    

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