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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL D.NO. 32135 OF 2013

Veerendra Kumar Dubey …Appellant

Versus

Chief of Army Staff & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. This  appeal  under  Section  31  of  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal Act, 2007, is directed against a judgment and order

dated  14th December  2011  passed  by  the  Armed  Forces

Tribunal, Regional Bench at Lucknow whereby the Tribunal

has dismissed Transferred Application No.16 of 2011 filed by

the appellant in the process affirming an order of discharge

passed  against  the  appellant  by  the  competent  authority

under Rule 13(III)(v) of the Army Rules, 1954.  

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2. The appellant was enrolled as an Operator in the corps

of Artillery of Indian Army on 27th September, 1980. Having

served in that capacity for nearly 12 years, he received a

show cause notice pointing out that he had been awarded

four red ink entries for various offences set out in the notice

and  that  the  appellant  had  become  a  habitual  offender

thereby setting a bad example of indiscipline in the army.

The notice,  on that premise,  called upon the appellant  to

show cause as to why he should not be discharged from

service under Army Rule 13(III)(v) read with Army HQ letter

No.A/15010/150/AG/PS-2(c) dated 28th December, 1988.  

3. The  appellant  submitted  a  reply  to  the  show  cause

notice which does not appear to have cut any ice with the

competent authority resulting in his discharge by an order

dated  14th December,  1992.  Aggrieved,  the  appellant

preferred an appeal before respondent No.2 which proved of

no avail. The authority in the meantime issued a discharge

order/certificate of service on 15th October, 1993 which the

appellant challenged in MP No.1980 of 1994 before the High

Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  at  Jabalpur.  That  petition  was

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dismissed by the High Court on 18th January, 2006 on the

ground of  lack of  territorial  jurisdiction aggrieved whereof

the appellant filed Writ Appeal No.429 of 2006 which came

to  be  transferred  to  the  Armed  Forces  Tribunal,  Regional

Bench, Lucknow and renumbered as Transferred Application

No.16  of  2011.  The  Tribunal  by  its  order  dated  14th

December, 2011 has now dismissed the transferred petition

giving rise to the present appeal.

4. The material facts are not in dispute. It is not in dispute

that the appellant  had within a period of 12 years of  the

service suffered as many as four red ink entries. All these

entries were awarded to him on account of overstaying leave

for a period ranging between 29 days to 66 days. The fourth

red ink entry was earned on account of a severe reprimand

awarded to him by the Commanding Officer in August, 1992.

It is noteworthy that the first red ink entry was made on 25th

July, 1982, the second on 28th December, 1985, the third on

13th September, 1991 and the last on 13th August, 1992. It is

also not in dispute that the appellant had filed a reply to the

show cause notice issued to him in which he had explained

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the reasons for his overstaying the leave period in 1982 and

attributed his failure to report back for duty to the medical

condition of his wife.  In regard to the second red ink entry

he had offered an explanation based on his own illness and

treatment  in  the  district  hospital.  So  also  he had offered

explanations  for  the  other  two  red  ink  entries.  These

explanations  notwithstanding  the  competent  authority

decided to discharge him from service without any enquiry

whatsoever.  

5. Before  the  Courts  below  and  so  also  before  us,  the

competence of the authority who discharged the appellant

was not questioned by the appellant.  What was all the same

argued  at  considerable  length  by  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant was that the availability of power to discharge was

not  enough.  What  was  equally  important  is  whether  the

power  was  exercised  in  a  fair  and  reasonable  manner

keeping in view the guidelines which the Government had

issued  for  such  exercise.  It  was  contended  that  the

Government had prescribed the procedure for the removal of

undesirable and inefficient JCOs, WO and ORs in terms of a

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circular  dated  28th December,  1988.  The  circular,  it  was

contended, postulates not only the issue of a show cause

notice  to  the individual  concerned,  but  also  a  preliminary

enquiry  before  recommending  his  discharge  or  dismissal.

The individual concerned, it was argued, must have had an

adequate opportunity to offer his explanation and to produce

evidence in his defence. Not only that the enquiry ought to

conclude that the allegations stood substantiated warranting

termination  of  service  of  the  delinquent.  The  fact  that

discharge  from  service,  consequent  upon  an  individual

earning  four  red  ink  entries  is  not  mandatory.   This,

according to the learned counsel, was evident from a plain

reading  of  the  procedure  prescribed  by  the  competent

authority.  It was also submitted that while considering the

question  of  retention  or  discharge  based  on  four  red  ink

entries, the Commanding Officer was duty bound to consider

not only the nature of the offences for which such entries

had been awarded but also take into consideration the long

service and the harsh conditions to which the individual had

been exposed during his tenure.  Discharge can under the

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guidelines  issued  by  the  competent  authority  be  ordered

only  where  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  do  so.  The

procedure  prescribed  by  the  competent  authority  for  the

exercise  of  the  power  of  discharge  under  Rule  13  was,

according  to  the  learned  counsel,  observed  but  only  in

breach  thereby  rendering  the  discharge  of  the  appellant

illegal.   

6. On behalf of the respondent it was contended by Mr.

Maninder Singh, Additional Solicitor General that Rule 13 of

the Army Rules did not provide for any specific procedure to

be followed for discharge of undesirable persons or habitual

offenders.  The procedure prescribed for the exercise of the

power of discharge in terms of the circular relied upon by

the  appellant  was,  according  to  the  learned  counsel,

directory  and  did  not  create  any  right  in  the  individual

concerned  to  demand  an  enquiry  in  the  matter.  The

procedure was in any case de hors the provisions of Rule 13

of  the  Army  Rules,  hence  un-enforceable.  Reliance  in

support  was  placed  upon  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in

Union of India and Ors. v. Corporal A.K. Bakshi and

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Anr.  (1996)  3  SCC  65,  Union  of  India  and  Ors.  v.

Rajesh Vyas (2008) 3 SCC 386, and Union of India and

Ors.  v.  Deepak  Kumar  Santra  (2009)  7  SCC  370.

Reliance was also placed upon a recent decision of this Court

in  Union of India v. Balwant Singh (Civil Appeal No.

5616 of 2015) and a three-Judge Bench decision in Union

of India and Ors. v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu (2001) 5

SCC 593 apart from a Division Bench decision of the High

Court  of  Delhi  in  Surinder  Singh  v.  Union  of  India

(2003) 1 SCT 697.

7. Section 22 of  the Army Act,  1950 provides  that  any

person subject to the said Act may be retired, released or

discharged by such authority and in such manner as may be

prescribed. Section 23 envisages the issue of a certificate on

termination of service to every junior commissioned officer,

warrant  officer,  or  enrolled  person,  who  is  dismissed,

removed,  discharged,  retired  or  released  from  service.

Section 191 of the Act empowers the Central Government to

make  rules  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  into  effect  the

provisions of the Act. The rules may, inter alia, provide for

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removal, retirement, or release upon discharge from service

of  persons  subject  to  the  rule.  The  Government  has  in

exercise  of  that  power  framed  Army  Rules,  1953,  Rule

13(III)(v) whereof  applicable to the case at hand empowers

the  Brigade  and  Sub  Area  Commander  to  direct  such

discharge  after  giving  to  the  person  whose  discharge  is

contemplated,  an  opportunity  to  show  cause  against  the

same provided  the  circumstances  of  the  case  permit  the

grant of  such opportunity. Rule 13 (1), (2), (2A), (3)(III)

and the Table below the same are  extracted :

“13. Authorities  empowered  to  authorise discharge – (1) Each of the authorities specified in column 3 of the Table below shall be the competent authority to discharge from service person subject to the Act specified in column 1 thereof on the grounds specified in column 2.

(2) Any power conferred by this rule on any of the aforesaid authorities shall also be exercisable by any other authority Superior to it.

(2A) Where the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff decides; that any person or class or persons subject to the Act should be discharged from service, either unconditionally or on the fulfilment of certain  specified  conditions,  then,  notwithstanding anything  contained  in  this  rule,  the  Commanding Officer  shall  also  be  the  competent  authority  to discharge from service such person or any person belonging to such class in accordance with the said decision.

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(3) In this table ”commanding officer” means the officer  commanding  the  corps  or  department  to which the person to be discharged belongs except that in the case of junior commissioned officers and warrant officers of the Special Medical Section of the Army  Medical  Corps,  the  “commanding  officer” means the Director of the Medical Services, Army, and in the case of junior commissioned officer and warrant officers of Remounts, Veterinary and Farms, Corps, the “Commanding Officer” means the Director Remounts, Veterinary and Farms.

TABLE Category Grounds of

discharge Competent authority to authorize discharge

Manner of discharge

1 2 3 4

Junior Commissioned officers

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Warrant Officer  xxx xxx xxx xxx

Persons enrolled under  the  Act who  have  been attested

III.   (i)  On fulfilling  the conditions  of  his enrolment  or having  reached the stage at which discharge  may  be enforced.  

Commanding Officer in the case of a person of the rank  of  havildar (or  equivalent rank)  where  such person  is  to  be discharged. Otherwise than at his  own  request and  where  the commanding officer  below  the rank of Lieutenant Colonel,  the brigade  or  sub Area Commander, (SRO 116/65

III.   (ii)  On Commanding Applicable  to

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completion  of  a period  of  army service only, there being  no  vacancy in the Reserve

Officer (in case of the  persons unwilling  to extend their Army Service)

person enrolled for both Army service and  Reserve Service. (A person who has the right to  extend  his Army  service  and wishes to exercise that  right  cannot be  discharge under this head)

III  (iii)  Having been  found medically  unfit  for further service

Commanding Officer

To  be  carried  out only  on  the recommendation of  an  Invaliding Board

III (iv) At his own request  before fulfilling  the conditions  of  his enrolment

Commanding Officer

The  Commanding officer  will exercise the power only  when  he  is satisfied as to the desirability  of sanctioning  the application  and the strength of the unit  will  not thereby be unduly reduced.  

III  (v)  All  other classes  of discharge

Brigade/Sub-Area  Commander

The  Brigade  or Sub  Area Commander before  ordering the  discharge shall,  if  the circumstances  of the  case  permit give to the person whose discharge is contemplated  an opportunity  to show  cause against  the contemplated discharge.

Persons enrolled under  the  Act who  have  not been arrested

xxx xxx xxx xxx

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8. A plain reading of the above makes it abundantly clear

that  the  rule  does  not  provide  for  anything  beyond  an

opportunity  to  the  individual  concerned  to  show  cause

against  his  contemplated  discharge  before  the  competent

authority passes any such order of discharge.  That a show

cause notice was issued to the petitioner in the present case

before his discharge is not denied.  On a strict interpretation

of Rule 13(III)(V), therefore, one could perhaps say that the

letter  of  the law has been complied with inasmuch as an

opportunity  has  been  afforded  to  the  appellant  to  show

cause  against  the  contemplated  discharge.  The  question,

however, is whether that was enough having regard to the

procedure  which  the  Government  has  stipulated  for  the

exercise  of  the  power  vested  in  the  competent  authority

under  Rule   13   of   the   Army  Rules  (supra).  The

Government has,  as rightly mentioned by learned counsel

for the appellant,  stipulated not only a show cause notice

which is an indispensable part of the requirement of the Rule

but also an impartial enquiry into the allegations against him

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in which he is entitled to an adequate opportunity of putting

up his defence and adducing evidence in support thereof.

More  importantly,  certain  inbuilt  safeguards  against

discharge from service based on four red ink entries have

also  been  prescribed.  The  first  and  foremost  is  an

unequivocal  declaration  that  mere  award  of  four  red  ink

entries  to  an  individual  does  not  make  his  discharge

mandatory. This implies that four red ink entries is not some

kind of laxman rekha, which if crossed would by itself render

the  individual  concerned  undesirable  or  unworthy  of

retention in the force.  Award of four red ink entries simply

pushes the individual concerned into a grey area where he

can  be  considered  for  discharge.  But  just  because  he

qualifies for such discharge, does not mean that he must

necessarily  suffer  that  fate.  It  is  one  thing  to  qualify  for

consideration  and an entirely  different  to  be found fit  for

discharge.  Four  red  ink  entries  in  that  sense  takes  the

individual closer to discharge but does not push him over. It

is axiomatic that the Commanding Officer is, even after the

award of such entries, required to consider the nature of the

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offence for which such entries have been awarded and other

aspects made relevant by the Government in the procedure

it has prescribed.   

9. We may  at  this  stage  gainfully  extract  the  relevant

portion of the procedure prescribed for dismissal:

“  Procedure  for  dismissal/discharge  of  Undesirable JCOs/WOs/OR:

4. AR  13  and  17  provide  that  a  JCO/WO/OR whose dismissal or discharge is contemplated will be given a show cause notice.  As an exception to this, services of such a person may be terminated without giving  him  a  show  cause  notice  provided  the competent  authority  is  satisfied  that  it  is  not expedient or reasonably practicable to service such a notice. Such cases should be rare, e.g., where the interests  of  the  security  of  the  State  so  require. Where  the  service  of  a  show  cause  notice  is dispensed  with,  the  reasons  for  doing  so  are required to be recorded.  See proviso to AR 17.

5. xxxxxxxxxxxxx

(a) Preliminary  Enquiry.  Before  recommending discharge  or  dismissal  of  an  individual  the authority concerned will ensure:-

(i) that an impartial enquiry (not necessarily a Court of Inquiry) has been made into the allegations against him and that he has had adequate opportunity of putting up  his  defence  or  explanation  and  of adducing evidence in his defence.

(ii) that  the  allegations  have  been substantiated and that the extreme step of termination of the individual’s service is warranted on the merits of the case.

(f) Final orders by the competent Authority. The authority  competent  to  sanction  the

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dismissal/discharge  of  the  individual  will  before passing orders reconsider the case in the light of the individual’s reply to the show cause notice.  A person who has been served with a show cause notice for proposed dismissal may be ordered to be discharged if  it  is  considered  that  discharge  would  meet  the requirements of the case. If the competent authority considers that termination of the individual’s service is not warranted but any of the actions referred to in (b)  to  (d)  of  Para  2  above  would  meet  the requirements  of  the  case,  he  may  pass  orders accordingly.   On the other hand, if  the competent authority accepts the reply of the individual to the show cause  notice  as  entirely  satisfactory,  he  will pass orders accordingly.

Note:-1. As  far  as  possible,  JCO,  WO  and  OR awaiting dismissal orders will not be allowed to mix with other personnel. 2. Discharge from service consequent to four red ink entries is not a mandatory or legal requirement. In  such cases,  Commanding Officer  must  consider the nature of offences for which each red ink entry has  been  awarded  and  not  be  harsh  with  the individuals,  especially  when  they  are  about  to complete the pensionable service.  Due consideration should be given to the long service, hard stations and difficult living conditions that the OR has been exposed  to  during  his  service,  and  the  discharge should  be  ordered  only  when  it  is  absolutely necessary in the interest of service.  Such discharge should be approved by the next higher Commander.”   

10. A careful  reading  of  the  above would  show that  the

competent authority has made it abundantly clear to officers

competent  to  direct  discharge  that  before  discharging  an

individual, not only should there be a show cause notice but

an enquiry into the allegations made against the individual

concerned in which he ought to be given an opportunity of

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putting up his defence and that the allegations must stand

substantiated for a discharge to follow.

11. Para 5(f)(2) (supra) underscores the importance of the

truism  that  termination  of  the  individual’s  service  is  an

extreme step which ought to be taken only if the facts of the

case  so  demand.  What  is  evident  from  the  procedural

mandate given to the authorities is to ensure that discharge

is not ordered mechanically and that the process leading to

the  discharge  of  an  individual  is  humanized  by  the

requirement of an impartial enquiry into the matter and fair

opportunity to the concerned especially when he is about to

complete his pensionable service. Equally significant is the

fact that the authority competent to discharge is required to

take into consideration certain factors made relevant by the

circular  to  prevent  injustice,  unfair  treatment  or  arbitrary

exercise of the powers vested in the Authority competent to

discharge. For instance Note 2 to Rule 5 (supra) requires the

competent  authority  to  take  into  consideration  the  long

service rendered by the individual, the hard stations he has

been posted to and the difficult living conditions to which the

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individual  has  been  exposed during  his  tenure.  It  is  only

when  the  competent  authority  considers  discharge  to  be

absolutely  essential  after  taking  into  consideration  the

factors aforementioned that discharge of the individual can

be validly ordered.  

12. The  argument  that  the  procedure  prescribed  by  the

competent authority  de hors the provisions of Rule 13 and

the breach of that procedure should not nullify the order of

discharge otherwise validly made has not impressed us.  It

is true that Rule 13 does not in specific terms envisage an

enquiry nor does it  provide for consideration of factors to

which we have referred above.  But it  is equally true that

Rule  13  does  not  in  terms  make  it  mandatory  for  the

competent authority to discharge an individual just because

he has been awarded four red ink entries. The threshold of

four  red  ink  entries  as  a  ground  for  discharge  has  no

statutory  sanction.  Its  genesis  lies  in  administrative

instructions  issued  on  the  subject.  That  being  so,

administrative instructions could, while prescribing any such

threshold as well, regulate the exercise of the power by the

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competent  authority  qua an  individual  who  qualifies  for

consideration on any such administratively prescribed norm.

Inasmuch as the competent authority has insisted upon an

enquiry to be conducted in which an opportunity is given to

the  individual  concerned  before  he  is  discharged  from

service,  the  instructions  cannot  be faulted  on the  ground

that  the  instructions  concede to  the individual  more than

what is provided for by the rule. The instructions are aimed

at  ensuring  a  non-discriminatory  fair  and  non-arbitrary

application of the statutory rule.  It may have been possible

to assail the circular instructions if the same had taken away

something that was granted to the individual  by the rule.

That  is  because  administrative  instructions  cannot  make

inroads  into  statutory  rights  of  an  individual.  But  if  an

administrative  authority  prescribes  a  certain  procedural

safeguard  to  those  affected  against  arbitrary  exercise  of

powers, such safeguards or procedural equity and fairness

will not fall foul of the rule or be dubbed  ultra vires of the

statute.  The  procedure  prescribed  by  circular  dated  28th

December,  1988  far  from  violating  Rule  13  provides

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safeguards against an unfair and improper use of the power

vested in the authority, especially when even independent of

the procedure stipulated by the competent authority in the

circular aforementioned, the authority exercising the power

of  discharge  is  expected  to  take  into  consideration  all

relevant factors. That an individual has put in long years of

service giving more often than not the best part of his life to

armed forces, that he has been exposed to hard stations and

difficult living conditions during his tenure and that he may

be  completing  pensionable  service  are  factors  which  the

authority  competent  to  discharge  would  have  even

independent  of  the  procedure  been  required  to  take  into

consideration  while  exercising  the  power  of  discharge.

Inasmuch  as  the  procedure  stipulated  specifically  made

them  relevant  for  the  exercise  of  the  power  by  the

competent authority there was neither any breach nor any

encroachment  by  executive  instructions  into  the  territory

covered  by  the  statute.  The  procedure  presented  simply

regulates the exercise of power which would, but for such

regulation  and  safeguards  against  arbitrariness,  be

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perilously  close  to  being  ultra  vires in  that  the  authority

competent  to  discharge  shall,  but  for  the  safeguards,  be

vested  with  uncanalised  and  absolute  power  of  discharge

without  any  guidelines  as  to  the  manner  in  which  such

power  may  be  exercised.  Any  such  unregulated  and

uncanalised  power  would  in  turn  offend Article  14  of  the

Constitution.

13. Coming  then  to  the  case  at  hand,  we  find  that  no

enquiry  whatsoever  was  conducted  by  the  Commanding

Officer at any stage against the appellant as required under

para  5(a)  of  the  procedure  extracted  above.  More

importantly, there is nothing on record to suggest that the

authority competent had taken into consideration the long

service  rendered  by  the  appellant,  the  difficult  living

conditions and the hard stations at  which he had served.

There is nothing on record to suggest that the nature of the

misconduct leading to the award of red ink entries was so

unacceptable that the competent authority had no option but

to direct his discharge to prevent indiscipline in the force.

We must, in fairness, mention that Mr. Maninder Singh, ASG,

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did not dispute the fact that any number of other personnel

are still in service no matter they have earned four red ink

entries on account of overstaying leave. If that be so, the

only safeguard against  arbitrary exercise of  power by the

authority  would  be  to  ensure  that  there  is  an  enquiry

howsoever summary and a finding about the defence set-up

by the individual besides consideration of the factors made

relevant under the note to para 5(f) of the procedure.  It is

common ground that a red ink entry may be earned by an

individual  for  overstaying  leave  for  one  week  or  for  six

months. In either case the entry is a red ink entry and would

qualify for consideration in the matter of discharge. If two

persons  who  suffer  such  entries  are  treated  similarly

notwithstanding the gravity of the offence being different, it

would be unfair and unjust for unequals cannot be treated

as equals. More importantly, a person who has suffered four

such entries on a graver misconduct may escape discharge

which another individual  who has earned such entries  for

relatively  lesser  offences  may  be  asked  to  go  home

prematurely. The unfairness in any such situation makes it

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necessary to bring in safeguards to prevent miscarriage of

justice.  That  is  precisely  what  the  procedural  safeguards

purport to do in the present case.         

14. Reliance upon the decisions of this Court in the cases

referred  to  earlier  is,  in  our  opinion,  of  no  help  to  the

respondent for the same have not adverted to the procedure

prescribed for the exercise of the power of discharge.   In

Union of India v. Corporal A.K. Bakshi & Anr.  (supra)

the  question  before  this  Court  was  whether  an  order  of

discharge passed in pursuance of the Policy for Discharge of

Habitual  Offenders  could  be  considered  a  discharge

simplicitor  as  envisaged  in  15(2)(g)(ii)  or  if  it  would

tantamount to termination of service by way of punishment

under  Rule  18 of  the  said  Rules.  The Court  came to  the

conclusion that it was a discharge simplicitor and as such it

could  not  be  held  as  termination  of  service  by  way of  a

punishment  for  misconduct.  This  was  clearly  not  a  case

where the procedure for discharge was not followed.  The

Court had, in that case, unequivocally held that there was no

dispute between the parties  that  the procedure had been

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duly followed.  Similarly, the decision of this Court in Union

of India v. Rajesh Vyas (supra) is also distinguishable.  In

that case, the discharge order was challenged on the ground

that it  was passed without regard to the response to the

show  cause  notice  filed  by  the  discharge  order. Upon  a

perusal of the material, this Court held that the case was not

one  wherein  the  discharge  order  was  passed  without

application  of  mind and that  there was evidence to show

that power was exercised upon consideration of all relevant

records. The decision of this Court in  Union of India and

Ors.  v.  Dipak  Kumar  Santra  (supra) is also of  no

relevance  to  the  case  at  hand as  that  case  dealt  with  a

recruit  who  had  failed  twice  in  clerks’  proficiency  and

aptitude test and was discharged under Rule 13(3) of the

Army Rules. Without adverting to the procedure prescribed

for  such  removal,  the  discharge  was  maintained  by  this

Court opining that the discharging authority was empowered

to do so under Rule 13(3) of the Army Rules. Reliance upon

the recent judgment of this Court in Union of India & Ors.

v. Balwant Singh  [Civil Appeal No. 5616 of 2015] is also

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misplaced.  The grievance  of  the  respondent  in  that  case,

primarily,  rested  upon  the  alleged  excessive  punishment

meted  out  for  the  red  ink  entries  suffered  by  him.  The

respondent also claimed to have been discriminated due to

discharge from the Armed Forces.  That was also not a case

where discharge order was challenged as bad in law on the

basis of irregularities nor was it a case where the authority

was said to have failed to follow the necessary procedure.

The decision of the High Court of Delhi in  Surinder Singh

v. Union of India (2003) 1 SCT 697, to the extent the

same toes a line of reasoning different from the one adopted

by us does not lay down the correct proposition and must,

therefore, be confined to the facts of that case only.    

15. In  the  result  this  appeal  succeeds  and  is  hereby

allowed. The order of discharge passed against the appellant

is hereby set aside.  Since the appellant has already crossed

the  age  of  superannuation,  interest  of  justice  will  be

sufficiently  served if  we direct  that  the appellant  shall  be

treated to have been in service till the time he would have

completed the qualifying service for grant of pension.  No

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back  wages  shall,  however,  be  admissible.  Benefit  of

continuity of service for all other purpose shall, however, be

granted  to  the  appellant  including  pension.  Monetary

benefits  payable  to  the  appellant  shall  be  released

expeditiously but not later than four months from the date

of this order. No costs.                         

……………………………………….…..…J.        (T.S. THAKUR)

……………………………………….…..…J.        (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

……………………………………….…..…J.         (R. BANUMATHI)

New Delhi October 16, 2015

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