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“REPORTABLE”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3194      OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.20379 of 2006)

Ved Mitter Gill … Appellant

versus

Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh and others … Respondents

WITH

TRANSFERRED CASE (C)  NO.41 OF 2010

TRANSFERRED CASE (C)  NO.42  OF 2010

TRANSFERRED CASE (C)  NO.43 OF 2010

TRANSFERRED CASE (C)  NO.44 OF 2010

J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1. Through this common order we propose to dispose of the Special Leave  

Petition (C) No. 20379 of 2006 as well as the Transferred Case (C) Nos. 41-44 of  

2010.  The aforesaid transferred cases were pending before the High Court of  

Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the High Court’).  

Whilst the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20379 of 2006  came to be filed before  

this Court assailing the order dated 1.5.2006 passed by the High Court in Civil  

Writ Petition No. 5682 of 2006.  The prayer for transfer was premised on the fact  

that  the transferred  cases  were  couched  in  the  same factual  foundation  and  

raised  similar  legal  issues,  as  were  being  canvassed  through  Special  Leave

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Petition (C) No. 20379 of 2006.  In the above view of the matter, while disposing  

of the special leave petition, as well as, the transferred cases, we shall refer to  

the facts in Ved Mitter Gill’s case, i.e., the matter pending in this Court as against  

the order passed by the High Court on 1.5.2006 dismissing Civil  Writ Petition  

No.5682 of 2006.

2. Leave granted.

3. In January 2004, appellant-Ved Mitter Gill was holding charge of the post  

of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh.  At the same  

juncture, Dalbir Singh Sandhu (petitioner in Transferred Case (C) No. 42 of 2010)  

was also holding the post of Deputy Superintendent of Jail, whilst Paramjit Singh  

Rana  (petitioner  in  Transferred  Case  (C)  No.  41  of  2010)  was  posted  as  

Assistant Superintendent of Jail,  Nishan Singh (petitioner in Transferred Case  

(C) No. 44 of 2010) and Inder Singh (petitioner in Transferred Case (C) No. 43 of  

2010) were working as Head Warder and Warder respectively.

4. Whilst  the  appellant/petitioners  were  discharging  their  duties  in  the  

capacity indicated hereinabove, four under trials namely Jagtar Singh Hawara,  

Paramjit Singh and Jagtar Singh Tara (who were facing trial for the assassination  

of a former Chief Minister of Punjab Shri Beant Singh) and Jagdev Singh, who  

was being tried for the charge of murder, escaped from the Model Jail, Burail,  

Chandigarh, by digging an underground tunnel.  The approximate length of the  

tunnel  is stated to be 94 feet.  The description of the above tunnel has been  

expressed  in  a  report  dated  15.4.2004  submitted  by  an  Enquiry  Committee

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constituted to go into the lapses committed by the jail authorities in the above  

episode of escape, as also to determine, the remedial measures for prevention of  

such  a  jail-break  in  future.   The  description  of  the  tunnel  in  the  report,  is  

reproduced below:

“2.4  An inspection of barrack No.7 of Burail Jail from where four undertrial  escaped made a number of revelations.  The 94 feet long and about 21” x  21” broad tunnel was a very professionally done job.  The tunnel had three  sections, two vertical and one horizontal as under:

a) Vertical straight Section below the barrack 14’

b) Horizontal  portion  with  almost  perfect  precision  and direction

72’

c) Vertical  portion  outside  the  main  perimeter  wall  used  for  exit.   It  was  slightly  inclined  for  easy  footage for escape”

08’

The aforesaid under-trials had escaped during the night intervening January 21-

22, 2004.  Resultantly, a first information report bearing no. 17 was registered at  

Police Station Sector 34, Chandigarh.  The appellant, as well as, the petitioners  

came to be detained after the registration of the first information report.   

5. By  an  order  dated  1.3.2004,  the  Advisor  to  the  Administrator,  Union  

Territory,  Chandigarh  having  invoked  clause (b)  to  the  second  proviso  under  

Article  311(2) of the Constitution of India, dismissed the appellant from service  

with immediate effect.  Similar orders were passed against the petitioners.

6. Dissatisfied with the order dated 1.3.2004,  the appellant  as well  as the  

petitioners,  assailed  the  respective  orders  of  their  dismissal  from service,  by  

preferring appeals to the Administrator,  Union Territory,  Chandigarh.   General

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(Retd.)  S.F.  Rodrigues,  the  then  Administrator  of  the  Union  Territory,  

Chandigarh, adjudicated upon their appeals both on merits, as well as, on their  

maintainability.  Insofar as the merits are concerned, he arrived at the conclusion,  

that the competent authority had rightly invoked clause (b) of the second proviso  

under  Article  311(2)  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   Insofar  as  the  issue  of  

maintainability  is  concerned,  the  Administrator  of  the  Union  Territory  of  

Chandigarh  recorded,  that  the  appeals  were  not  maintainable,  as  the  order  

passed  by  the  Advisor  to  the  Administrator,  Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh,  

constituted  an  order  passed  by  the  Government,  from  which  there  was  no  

remedy of appeal.

7. The order of dismissal from service dated 1.3.2004, passed by the Advisor  

to the Administrator of the Union Territory of Chandigarh, as well as the order  

dated 11.2.2005 passed by the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh were  

assailed  by  the  appellant,  as  well  as  by  the  petitioners,  before  the  Central  

Administrative  Tribunal,  Chandigarh  Bench  (hereinafter  referred  to  as,  the  

Administrative Tribunal).  Ved Mitter Gill, the appellant herein, preferred Original  

Application No. 149/PB of 2005, Dalbir Singh Sandhu filed Original Application  

No.  97/PB  of  2005,  Paramjit  Singh  Rana  had  raised  his  challenge  by  filing  

Original Application No. 188/PB of 2005, whereas, Nishan Singh and Inder Singh  

filed Original Application Nos. 39/PB and 40/ PB of 2005 respectively.

8.   All  the  above  applications  were  dismissed by  the  Administrative  Tribunal  

through a common order dated 30.1.2006.  Ved Mitter Gill  assailed the order

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dated 30.1.2006 passed by the Administrative Tribunal before the High Court, by  

preferring Civil Writ Petition No. 5682 of 2006.  The same was dismissed by an  

order dated 1.5.2006.  The order passed by the High Court on 1.5.2006 came to  

be challenged before this Court through Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20379 of  

2006.  The same has given rise to the present appeal.  The writ petitions filed by  

the others,  namely,  Dalbir Singh Sandhu, Paramjit  Singh Rana, Nishan Singh  

and Inder Singh were pending before the High Court.   Separate writ petitions  

were preferred on their  behalf,  wherein  they had assailed the common order  

passed by the Administrative Tribunal dated 30.1.2006.  The above writ petitions  

were transferred to this Court, to be heard along with the Special Leave Petition  

(C) No. 20379 of 2006.  This is how the present appeal and petitions have jointly  

come up for hearing before us.

9. It  is  imperative  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case,  to  extract  

herein,  the order dated 1.3.2004, passed by the Advisor to the Administrator,  

Union Territory,  Chandigarh against  Ved Mitter Gill.   The same is accordingly  

being reproduced hereunder:

“CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION HOME DEPARTMENT

ORDER

Shri V.M. Gill, Deputy Superintendent Model Jail, Chandigarh (under  suspension) was appointed as Clerk on 1.1.1988 and thereafter promoted  as  Assistant  Superintendent  Jail  on  28.3.1990  and  was  promoted  as  Deputy  Superintendent  Jail,  Model  Jail,  Chandigarh  vide  order  dated  25.5.2001.   He  was  thus  required  to  be  fully  aware  of  his  duties  as  prescribed in the Punjab Jail Manual  as adopted for the Union Territory  Chandigarh and the duty orders passed by the Superintendent, Model Jail,  Chandigarh  dated  29.5.2001,  read  along  with  paras  92  to  132  of  the

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Punjab  Jail  Manual,  for  the  enforcement  of  laws,  rules,  regulations,  directions  and  orders  concerning  the  management  of  the  jail  and  the  prisoners confined therein.  The said Shri V.M. Gill by virtue of his duties  as such was required to do all acts and things necessary or expedient for  ensuring the safe custody of all the prisoners at any time receive into or  confined in the jail as well as for enforcing and maintaining discipline and  order amongst such prisoners and all subordinate officers of the jail.  The  said Shri Gill was fully aware that he was required to see for himself every  prisoner  once in  every  24 hours  and to  visit  every  barrack,  ward,  cell,  compartment and every other part of the jail and premises thereof every  24 hours.  It was thereof his duty to be present every evening when the  prisoners  were  locked  up  for  the  night  and  every  morning  when  the  prisoners  were  taken  out  of  the  sleeping  wards,  cells  or  other  compartments,  satisfy  himself  both  by  night  and  morning  that  all  the  prisoners were present and in safe custody and to forthwith report every  unusual occurrence of a serious nature to the Superintendent of the Model  Jail.  The said Shri Gill was fully aware of his duties that he was required at  uncertain  times,  atleast  once  a  week  to  cause  each  prisoner  and  all  clothing  and  bedding  and  all  wards,  cells  and  other  compartments,  workshops, latrines and other places frequented by the prisoners, to be  thoroughly searched for prohibited articles; to regulate all interviews and  communications  between  the  prisoners  and  persons  who  were  not  prisoners and to prevent all persons who were not duly authorized by the  competent authority from entering the jail premises or having any access  of any kind to, or communication with any prisoner, and to arrange that the  proper officer of the jail was present during all the interviews held;

And whereas on the night intervening January 21/22, 2004, four under trial  prisoners namely Jagtar Singh Hawara, s/o Sher Singh, Paramjit  Singh,  s/o Jagjit Singh, Jagtar Singh Tara, s/o Sadhu Singh and Dev Singh, s/o  Madan Singh lodged in the Model Jail,  Burail  escaped through a tunnel  dug from their barrack.  The first three under-trials namely Jagtar Singh  Hawara, s/o Sher Singh, Paramjit Singh, s/o Jagjit Singh and Jagtar Singh  Tara,  s/o  Sadhu  Singh  were  being  tried  to  their  involvement  in  the  assassination of S. Beant Singh, then Chief Minister, Punjab and had links  with Babbar Khalsa International a terrorist organization, while Dev Singh  was being tried for murder.  The said Shri V.M. Gill was fully aware that  Jagtar  Singh Hawara S/o Sher Singh, Paramjit  Singh,  s/o.  Jagjit  Singh,  Jagtar  Singh  Tara,  s/o  Sadhu  Singh  were  dreaded  terrorists  and  high  security prisoners;

And whereas a case F.I.R. No.17, dated 22.1.2004 under Sections 223,  224, 452, 457, 120-B, 121, 121-A, 123, 217, 221 IPC, P.S. 34, Chandigarh  was registered with respect to the escape of the above mentioned under  trials,  and  from  the  evidence  obtained  during  the  course  of  the

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investigation of the case, it is apparent that the said Shri V.M. Gill, was  involved in the conspiracy to facilitate the escape of the under trials by  willfully neglecting his  duties and by providing them support  in different  forms.  This is evident from some of the following instances:-

(1) Curtains were allowed to be hung on doors and windows from inside  the  barrack  occupied  by  the  said  under  trials,  resulting  in  absence  of  visibility from outside and facilitating the prisoners to carry out their plans  unobserved  in  violation  of  paras  324,  327  and  328  of  the  Punjab  Jail  Manual, 1996 as adopted for the Union Territory, Chandigarh.  The said  Shri Gill, willfully ignored the suspicious activities of the under trials and did  not conduct special search of their barrack in violation of paras 97, 98,  100(a), (b) & (f) of the said Manual.

(2) No action was taken by the said Shri V.M. Gill despite reports of lights  of the barrack housing the said under trials being switched off during the  night hours, playing of television or radio at high volume and continuous  flowing of water, facilitating activities of the said under trials in digging of  the escape tunnel and disposing the excavated soil, in violation of paras  325 and 329 of the said Manual.

(3)   No thorough checking  of  the barrack  housing the under  trials  was  carried  out  by  the  said  Shri  Gill  in  violation  of  provisions  of  the  said  Manual, including para 97.

(4)  A tunnel was reportedly discovered in the barrack then housing the  three under trials of the Beant Singh case during June, 2002.  The said  Shri  V.M.  Gill  in  complicity  with  the  under  trials  and  other  jail  officials  suppresses these facts.  In November, 2002 a large number of prohibited  articles were recovered from the above mentioned under trials, which had  been earlier allowed to be delivered to them in complicity with the under  trials  as  well  as  their  co-conspirators.   After  recovery  of  the  prohibited  articles, strict action as warranted under Punjab Jail Manual was not taken  against  the  under  trials  or  any  other  delinquent  jail  official.   The  investigation have revealed that a large number of prohibited articles have  again  been recovered from the cell  of  the escaped under  trials,  clearly  indicating the complicity of the said Shri V.M. Gill, who willfully contravened  the provisions of the said Manual including paras 105 and 110.  It was also  found that a number of articles such as cell phone (not recovered), weight  lifting iron rod,  rope,  emergency light,  radio,  portable  fan,  electric  wires  etc., directly assisted the said under trials to escape from the Jail.

(5)  Meeting of the under trials with the other suspected prisoners within  the jail as well as conspirators outside the jail were neither supervised nor  checked in violation of para 106 of the said Manual.

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(6)  The said Sh. Gill, was arrested on Jan. 27, 2004 and on his disclosure  statement a book titled ‘True Stories of great escapes’ was recovered from  his official residence in the jail.  A rough site plan prepared by the police  revealed  that  the  tunnel  through  which  the  under  trials  escaped  had  similarities with the tunnel mentioned in the said book.

And whereas the above conduct of the said Shri Gill establishes that he  was directly involved in the conspiracy to help the above-mentioned under  trials to escape from the Model Jail, Chandigarh.  It has also come to light  during investigation that three of the escaped under trials had linkage with  the  Babbar  Khalsa  International,  a  known  and  a  dreaded  terrorist  organization, which is involve in anti-national and anti-State activities.  The  said Shri V.M. Gill is a senior, permanent and non-transferable official of  the Model Jail, Chandigarh and junior jail officials, who are witnesses in the  above  case  are  not  likely  to  come  forward  to  depose  against  him  if  disciplinary proceedings are initiated so long as he remains in service, for  fear of earning his wrath in future.  Further, due to the involvement of the  escaped under trials, with the Babbar Khalsa International, a known and  dreaded  terrorist  organization,  no  witness  is  likely  to  come  forward  to  depose against him in the disciplinary proceedings, if initiated, due to fear  of life.  Independence assessment also is that three of the escaped under  trials are likely, inter alia, to pose a danger to the lives of the people.  In  these  circumstances  I  am  satisfied  that  the  holding  of  an  inquiry  as  contemplated by Article 311 (2)  (b) of  the Constitution of  India and the  Punjab  Civil  Services  (Punishment  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1970  as  made  applicable  to  the  employees  of  Union  Territory,  Chandigarh,  is  not  reasonably practicable;

And whereas I am of the view that in the face of such grave culpable acts  of omission and commission there is no justification for the continuation in  service of Shri Gill as he has betrayed all responsibility placed upon him by  law and rules.  From the facts that have transpired, I conclude that there  has been misconduct of such magnitude by Shri V.M. Gill that the severest  penalty permissible by law is called for.

Now,  therefore,  I  being  the  competent  authority  exercising  the  powers  conferred by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, having come to the  conclusion that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, hereby  dismiss the said Shri V.M. Gill, from service with immediate effect.

Sd/- Advisor to the Administrator,  

U.T., Chandigarh

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Dated 1.3.2004”

Orders  passed  against  the  other  petitioners  were  premised  on  the  same  

foundation, and were to the same effect.   

10. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellant/petitioners  

pleaded, non-application of mind, arbitrariness, discrimination, and malice in fact  

as well as in law.  Insofar as the issue of non- application of mind is concerned, it   

was the vehement contention of the learned counsel, that they were not assigned  

duties  as  would  render  them blameworthy  for  the  abovementioned  jail-break.  

Besides various contentions advanced on the instant aspect of the matter, the  

primary submission of the learned counsel was, that personnel from the police  

department were in overall supervisory control, and that, they regulated not only  

the ingress and egress of jail  mates and other visitors, but also materials and  

articles  which  were  permitted  to  enter  the  jail  premises.  In  the  above  

background,  it  was  the  vehement  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant/petitioners, that they have been made scapegoats for something that  

others were truly responsible for.   

11. To adjudicate upon the above contention advanced at the hands of the  

learned counsel for the appellant/petitioners, it  is necessary to understand the  

duties and responsibilities assigned to appellant-Ved Mitter Gill, whose case has  

been  taken  as  the  lead  case.   The  duty  chart  depicting  the  responsibilities  

assigned to the officers of  Model  Jail,  Burail,  Chandigarh,  is available on the  

record of the case.  A relevant extract thereof is being reproduced hereunder:

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“1.  Sh. V.M. Gill, Dy. Supdt. Jail He shall perform his duties under the immediate directions and orders of  the Supdt. Jail.  The duties of the Dy. Supdt. Jail are contained in para 91  to 132 of the Punjab Jail Manual.  In addition to his normal duty he will hold  the charge of matters relating to:-

i) Establishment ii) Accounts iii) Court cases (pending in various courts) iv) Diet purchase and all miscellaneous matters.”

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IMPORTANT NOTE

1. Besides above duties Executive Officers will perform all other duties  assigned to them from time to time in accordance with the provision  of Punjab Jail Manual.

2. All  Executive Officer  will  be present  inside Jail  in their  respective  executive charge daily at the time of lock-up and lock-outs.

3. All  will  make night  rounds  to  see the  security  arrangements  and  satisfy themselves that inmates are in safe custody.

4. All will accompany the Superintendent, Jail on his weekly parade (on  every Monday) inspection of prisoners as per provision of para 75 of  the Punjab Jail Manual.

Sd/- Superintendent,

Model Jail, Chandigarh”

(emphasis is ours)

A  perusal  of  the  duty  chart  relating  to  Ved  Mitter  Gill  reveals,  that  he  was  

responsible  for  duties  expressed in  paragraphs  92  to  132 of  the  Punjab  Jail  

Manual.  Extracts of the Punjab Jail Manual are also available on record of the  

case,  only  a  few  relevant  paragraphs,  which  highlight  the  duties  and  

responsibilities  vested  on  the  shoulders  of  Ved  Mitter  Gill  as  Deputy  

Superintendent of Police, Jail, are being extracted hereunder:

“97.  Duties of Deputy Superintendent as to safety of prisoners, discipline,  visits and attendance. – (1) The Deputy Superintendent shall do all acts  and things which may be necessary or  expedient  for  ensuring the safe

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custody of all prisoners at any time received into or confined in the jail, as  well as for enforcing and maintaining discipline and order amongst such  prisoners and all subordinate officers of the jail at any time serving under  his orders or control. (2)   The Deputy Superintendent  shall,  atleast  once in every twenty-four  hours,-

(a) himself see every prisoner for the time being confined in the jail; (b) visit every barrack, ward, cell, compartment, and every other part  of the jail and the premises thereof, including the hospital; and shall,  save as provided in the rules, regulations, directions and orders for  the time being in force in that behalf, always remain present within  the jail or the premises thereof.

Note- The Deputy Superintendent is permitted to be absent for meals at  such times and for such periods as the Superintendent  may specify,  or  when required to appear in a Court of Justice, or when leave of absence is  granted by the Superintendent.

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100.  Duties as to lock-up,  counting,  labour,  food and reporting unusual  occurrences.-  (1)  It shall be the duty of the Deputy Superintendent to-

(a)  be present every evening when the prisoners are locked up for  the night and every morning when the prisoners are taken out of the  sleeping wards, cells or other compartments; (b) satisfy himself, both night and morning, that all the prisoners are  present and in safe custody; (c)  allot  to  each  prisoner  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  a  proper  task  and  satisfy  himself  that  every  such  prisoner,  who  is  fit  for  labour,  is  daily  put  to  proper  labour  and  performs his allotted task and, for this purpose, to check the tasks  allotted and visit the workshops frequently while the prisoners are  engaged at work; (d) be present at and superintend the daily weighing and serving out  of  rations  and  satisfy  himself  that  the  food-stuffs  are  properly  cleaned and cooked; (e) supervise the distribution of food and satisfy himself that each  prisoner receives his proper quantities at the prescribed times, and  to (f)  forthwith report every unusual occurrence of a serious nature, to  the Superintendent.

(2)   The Superintendent  may by a written  order  take  over  such of  the  duties of the Deputy Superintendent as he may deem necessary for the  efficient running of the jail.

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(3)  Every action taken under sub-rule (2) shall forthwith be reported by the  Superintendent to the Inspector-General giving full justification therefor and  the Inspector-General may confirm, modify or cancel such order.

101.  Duty of Deputy Superintendent on admission of prisoner. - Upon the  admission of every prisoner the Deputy Superintendent shall-  

(a) examine or cause to the examined the warrant or order under  which such prisoner is committed to the Jail and satisfy himself that  it is in all respects complete, in order and valid; (b)  remove, or cause to be removed, from such prisoner all money  or other articles found on him, including (if such prisoner is not, by  law, entitled to retain it) his wearing apparel and (in such case) shall  provide him with a complete Jail out-fit; (c) take measures to preserve and protect all property taken from, or  belonging to, the prisoner which may come into his hands; and  (d) shall satisfy himself that the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act,  and these rules, as to the admission of prisoners, are duly complied  with.

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105.  Deputy Superintendent to search weekly for prohibited articles.- The Deputy Superintendent shall, at uncertain times, at least once a week,  cause each prisoner, and all clothing and bedding, and all wards, cells and  other compartments, workshops, latrines and other places frequented by  prisoners, to be thoroughly searched for prohibited articles.

106. Deputy Superintendent to regulate interviews and communications.-  It shall be the duty of the Deputy Superintendent to regulate all interviews  and  communications  between  prisoners  and  persons  who  are  not  prisoners and to prevent all persons who are not duly authorised in that  behalf by competent authority from entering the jail premises or having any  access of any kind to, or communication with, any prisoner, and to arrange  that the proper officer of the Jail is present during all interviews held.

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110. Deputy Superintendent to hold parade every Sunday.- The Deputy Superintendent shall hold a parade of all the prisoners for the  time being confined in the jail on every Sunday Evening and shall,

(a) carefully inspect every prisoner;  (b)  examine  the  clothing,  bedding  and  utensils  etc.,  of  every  prisoner; (c) check the muster roll  and satisfy himself that every prisoner is  present or accounted for;

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and satisfy himself generally that everything is in proper order. He  shall enter a report of his inspection in his journal, noting therein the  state  of  the  clothing,  cleanliness,  numerical  strength  and  other  matters of importance relating to the prisoners.

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117.  The Deputy Superintendent shall enter daily in his journal:- (a) the time the wards were opened; (b) the members of the staff (if any) who were absent; (c) the time prisoners began work; (d)  the time work  was stopped in  the forenoon and when it  was  recommenced; (e) the time work was stopped for the day; and (f) the time the lock-up was completed; (g) that the gratings and locks of the jail were got tested and found  intact.

xxx xxx xxx

120. Deputy Superintendent responsible for the efficiency of the guard.-  (1)  The  Deputy  Superintendent  shall  satisfy  himself  that  a  sufficient  strength of the guard to meet all emergencies is at all times present at the  jail  and ready to be armed,  and that the warders  sleep in the quarters  allotted to them and do not leave the jail premises without permission. (2)  The Deputy  and the Assistant  Superintendent  shall  at  least  once a  week  in  addition  to  their  routine  night  round  search  the  relieved  and  relieving night guards between the gates (after 10 P.M. and before 4.00  A.M.).”

(emphasis is ours)

It is not necessary for us to further delve into the nature of duties assigned to  

appellant-Ved Mitter Gill in his capacity as Deputy Superintendent Jail, because  

we  have  highlighted  the  relevant  paragraphs  of  Punjab  Jail  Manual,  which  

meticulously  highlight  the  nature  of  his  duties  and  responsibilities.   Having  

examined  the  same,  we  are  satisfied,  that  the  responsibility  of  jail  inmates  

exclusively rests on the shoulders of the jail staff.  On the evaluation of the duties  

and responsibilities of posts of Assistant Superintendent Jail, Head Warder and

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Warder, there remains no room for any doubt, about the other petitioners also,  

that  they  too  were  similarly  responsible  for  securing  the  detention  of  all  jail  

inmates.  We, therefore find no merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the  

appellant/petitioners,  that  it  was  not  them,  but  police  personnel  from  the  

Chandigarh Police Department, who were responsible for the supervisory control  

over jail inmates, at the Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh.

12. Another contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the  

appellant/petitioners  was,  that  the  entire  action  initiated  at  the  hands  of  the  

respondents was vitiated,  on account  of  malice in fact  as also malice in law.  

Insofar  as  the  instant  aspect  of  matter  is  concerned,  our  attention  has  been  

invited to the factual  position pleaded in Civil  Miscellaneous Nos.  8930-31 of  

2010  in  Civil  Writ  Petition  No.5147-CAT  of  2007.   It  would  be  pertinent  to  

mention,  that  the aforesaid  civil  miscellaneous application was filed by Dalbir  

Singh  Sandhu,  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police.   Our  pointed  attention  was  

invited  to  the  following  factual  position  expressed  in  the  aforesaid  civil  

miscellaneous application:

“….Interestingly a perusal of the record filed before the Criminal Court by  the Chandigarh Police of the Special Mulakat Register shows that in those  copies the signatures of the supervisory staff i.e. the Chandigarh Police is  missing.  Apparently these documents have been also considered by the  competent  authority  to  pass  the  impugned  order  against  the  petitioner.  Photocopies of some of the pages of the Special Mulakat Register have  been annexed earlier. The typed copies of the same for the corresponding  days  as  submitted  by  the  prosecution  before  the  Criminal  Court  and  apparently which were considered by the competent authority to terminate  the services of the petitioner are annexed herewith as Annexures A/1 and  A/2 respectively.”

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Having  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  pleadings  extracted  

hereinabove, and having perused the annexures A/1 and A/2 referred to in the  

above pleadings, we are satisfied that the contention advanced at the hands of  

the learned counsel  for the appellant/petitioners is wholly misconceived.   The  

presence  of  police  personnel  to  extend  external  support  to  a  jail  facility  is  

understandable.  There is nothing wrong about the same.  Police personnel may  

be posted outside the jail premises, for obvious reasons.  Such police personnel  

would be oblivious of the activities within the four walls of the jail  itself.   The  

presence of police personnel within the administrative framework of a jail, is out  

of the question.  The appellant/petitioners have not placed any material on the  

record  of  the  case  to  demonstrate,  that  police  personnel  from  the  police  

department  were  assigned  duties  within  the  barracks  of  Model  Jail,  Burail,  

Chandigarh.  In our considered view, within the jail premises, only the jail staff  

can be permitted to function.  And in case of lapses within the jail premises, it is  

the jail staff alone which is responsible.  Based on the factual position brought to  

our notice from the pleadings and annexures referred to above, it is not possible  

for us to accept the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for  

the appellant/petitioners, that the action initiated against the appellant/petitioners  

can be vitiated for the reasons of malice in fact or malice in law.

13. Out  of  the  submission  advanced  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant/petitioners, the contention which could have been of some significance  

was, that the reasons mentioned in the impugned order of dismissal from service,

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were a mechanical repetition of grounds routinely and casually expressed without  

application of  mind,  in  such like orders.   And in that  view of  the matter,  the  

contention, that the satisfaction recorded by the disciplinary authority does not  

constitute a valid satisfaction in the eyes of law.  It was in the instant context, that  

the learned counsel  invited our attention to some judgments rendered by this  

Court.   First  of  all,  reliance was placed on Tarsem Singh v. State of  Punjab,  

(2006)  13  SCC  581.   Our  pointed  attention  was  invited  to  the  following  

observations recorded therein:

“10.   It  is  now a  well-settled  principle  of  law that  a  constitutional  right  conferred upon a delinquent cannot be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily  or  out  of  ulterior  motive  or  merely  in  order  to  avoid  the  holding  of  an  enquiry.  The learned counsel appearing on behalf  of the appellant has  taken  us  through  certain  documents  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  ultimately  the  police  on  investigation  did  not  find  any  case against  the  appellant in respect of the purported FIR lodged against him under Section  377 IPC.  However,  it  may not be necessary for us to go into the said  question.

11.  We have noticed hereinbefore that the formal enquiry was dispensed  with only on the ground that the appellant could win over aggrieved people  as well as witnesses from giving evidence by threatening and other means.  No material has been placed or disclosed either in the said order or before  us to show that subjective satisfaction arrived at by the statutory authority  was based upon objective criteria.  The purported reason for dispensing  with the departmental proceedings is not supported by any document.  It is  further evident that the said order of dismissal was passed, inter alia, on  the  ground  that  there  was no  need  for  a  regular  departmental  enquiry  relying  on  or  on  the  basis  of  a  preliminary  enquiry.   However,  if  a  preliminary enquiry could be conducted, we fail to see any reason as to  why a formal departmental enquiry could not have been initiated against  the appellant.  Reliance placed upon such a preliminary enquiry without  complying with the minimal requirements of the principle of natural justice  is against all canons of fair play and justice.  The appellate authority, as  notice hereinbefore, in its order dated 24-6-1998 jumped to the conclusion  that he was guilty of grave acts of misconduct proving complete unfitness  for police service and the punishment awarded to him is commensurate  with the misconduct although no material therefor was available on record.

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It is further evident that the appellate authority also misdirected himself in  passing the said order insofar as he failed to take into consideration the  relevant facts and based his decision on irrelevant factors.

12. Even the  Inspector  General  of  Police  in  passing  his  order  dated  26-11-1999,  despite  having  been  asked  by  the  High  Court  to  pass  a  speaking order,  did not assign sufficient or cogent reason.  He, like the  appellate authority,  also proceeded on the basis that  the appellant  was  guilty of commission of offences which are grave and heinous in nature  and bring a bad name to the police force of the State on the whole.  None  of  the  authorities  mentioned  hereinbefore  proceeded  on  the  relevant  material for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that in the facts and  circumstances of the case sufficient cause existed for dispensing with the  formal  enquiry.  This  aspect  of  the matter  has been considered by this  Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 362, wherein  relying upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court,  inter  alia, in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, it was held:  (Jaswant Singh case (supra), SCC p. 368, para 4)

“Although  Clause  (3)  of  that  article  makes  the  decision  of  the  disciplinary authority in this behalf final such finality can certainly be  tested in a court of law and interfered with if the action is found to be  arbitrary or mala fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or  merely a ruse to dispense with the inquiry.”

13.  In that case also like the present one, the attention of the Court was  not drawn to any material existing on the date of passing of the impugned  order in support of the allegations contained in the order dispensing with  the departmental enquiry.”  

(emphasis is ours)

Learned  counsel  thereupon  placed  reliance  on  State  of  Punjab  v.  Harbhajan  

Singh,  (2007)  15  SCC  217.   They  invited  our  attention  to  the  following  

observation recorded therein:

“3. Learned counsel then contended that no departmental enquiry could be  held against the respondent in view of his involvement with terrorists.  In  the suit, the State did not place any material to establish that any case was  made out for dispensation of a regular departmental enquiry as required  under clause (2) to Article 311 of the Constitution of India.  The question is  now covered by a recent decision of this Court in Tarsem Singh v. State of  Punjab,  (2006)  13  SCC 581,  wherein  this  Court  has  opined  that  if  no  material is brought to the notice of the Court on the date of passing of the

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impugned order in support of the allegations contained therein as to why it  was  impractical  to  hold  a  regular  disciplinary  proceeding,  the  order  of  termination would not be sustainable.”

(emphasis is ours)

14. In  order  to fully  clarify  the legal  position on the issue in  hand,  learned  

counsel for the Chandigarh Administration, invited our attention to the decision  

rendered in Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, (2009) 9  

SCC 24.  In the above cited judgment, this Court having placed reliance on Union  

of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, Satyavir Singh v. Union of India,  

(1985) 4 SCC 252, Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 10 SCC 659, Union of  

India v. R. Reddappa, (1993) 4 SCC 269 and Indian Railway Construction Co.  

Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579, recorded its conclusions as under:

“26. The law laid down by this Court being clear and explicit, the question  which  would  arise  for  our  consideration  is  whether  in  then  prevailing  situation,  what a reasonable man taking a reasonable view would have  done.

27. The High Court in its judgment opined: (i) That the statement of the disciplinary authority that "I am convinced that  it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry" is against the dicta laid  down by this Court in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398. (ii)  In  the  absence  of  any  reason,  much  less  recorded,  as  has  been  mandated under the Rule, to show that it was not reasonably practicable to  hold  a  disciplinary  inquiry,  we are  of  the  opinion  that  the  discretionary  power was exercised for extraneous purpose to dismiss the delinquents  and that the same is arbitrary and perverse since no reasonable person  could form such an opinion on the given material and thus the impugned  orders of dismissal are hit  by malice also. The alleged incident and the  impugned orders of dismissal were all dated 31-1-2004 which shows the  haste in which the disciplinary authority has acted. (iii)  While invoking the stringent extraordinary provisions like Rule 14(ii),  principles  of  natural  justice  require  every  care  to  be  taken  by  the  authorities  concerned.  Any  haste  in  invoking  such  stringent  provisions,  without even complying with the mandatory requirements of the provision,  would make such decision of  the disciplinary  authority  illegal,  being an  abuse of power conferred upon it.

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(iv)  It can very well be held that the impugned orders of dismissal suffer  from want of materials and in the absence of any material to substantiate  the mere oral  stand of  the Department  that  holding an inquiry  was not  reasonably practicable, without offering any reasons, much less in writing,  as mandated by law, the impugned orders of  dismissal  are liable to be  quashed. (v)  In  the  case  in  hand,  since  the  authorities  have  invoked  the  extraordinary  power  under  Rule  14(ii)  dispensing  with  the  inquiry,  and  further since the alleged incident was held to be not proved by the criminal  court, after thorough trial, the appellate and revisional authorities ought to  have  considered  the  said  aspect  of  acquittal  while  imposing  the  punishment. Therefore, we are of the view that the fact of acquittal is a  circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment in this case.

We with respect are unable to agree therewith. 28.  The disciplinary authority in its order dated 31-1-2004 categorically  stated: (i)  That the delinquent employees attempted to cause bodily harm to Shri  S.M. Krishnan; created an ugly scene which brought a bad name to the  Railways;  officers  who  tried  to  protect  Shri  S.M.  Krishnan  were  badly  abused; Shri S.M. Krishnan and his family were threatened to be killed if  he goes to Chennai; it was a pre-planned attempt as a handwritten poster  was displayed in the workshop as well as at the railway station wherein it  was stated that Shri S.M. Krishnan will die on 31-1-2004 and his cremation  will be done at 1430 hours when Train No. 6128 leaves the railway station. (ii) That all of them have conspired and assaulted Shri S.M. Krishnan as a  result whereof he could not undertake the journey and had to go by road  with escort. (iii)  The formality of holding a disciplinary proceeding was dispensed with  stating:

“  You  along  with  other  associates  threatened,  intimidated  and    terrorized  all  the  officers.  The  atmosphere  of  violence,  general  indiscipline and insubordination is prevailing. In view of this situation  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  not  reasonably  practicable  to  hold  an  enquiry.”

29.  It was concluded: “I,  therefore,  in  exercise of  the powers  conferred upon me under  Rule  14(ii)  of  the  Railway  Servants  (Discipline  &  Appeal)  Rules,  1968,  hereby  dismiss  you  from  railway  service  with  effect  from  31-1-2004 (A/N). You are required to hand over the railway property  in  your  custody.  You  are  also  required  to  vacate  the  railway  quarters, if in occupation, within one month from the date on which a  copy of this notice is delivered. You are hereby advised that under  Rules  18  and  19  of  the  Railway  Servants  (Discipline  &  Appeal)

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Rules,  1968, you  may  prefer  an  appeal  against  these  orders  to  CWM/GOC provided that:

(i) The appeal is preferred within a period of 45 days from the  date on which a copy of this notice is delivered. (ii)  The  appeal  is  to  be  preferred  in  your  own  name  and  presented to the authority to whom the appeal lies and does  not contain any disrespectful and improper language.”

30.  An order of a disciplinary authority in a case of this nature,  as laid  down by this Court in     Tulsiram’s case     (supra), must be judged by a court    exercising power of judicial review by placing himself in his armchair. The  disciplinary authority was a man at the spot. He acted on the basis of a  report made to him. He also knew about the written poster having been  displayed. The atmosphere which was prevailing in the workshop must be  known to him.  Not only  the disciplinary  authority  but  also the appellate  authority, having regard to the materials brought on record, arrived at the  said finding.

xxx xxx xxx

33.  While thus considering as to whether there had been enough material  before the disciplinary authority for the purpose of arriving at its satisfaction  that it was not reasonably practicable to hold departmental proceedings,  the appellate authority, in our opinion, was entitled to consider the situation  prevailing  from  the  confidential  reports  submitted  by  other  employees.  They were not relied upon for the purpose of proving misconduct but for  the  purpose  that  in  the  situation  which  was  prevailing,  whether  it  was  reasonably  practicable  to hold  an enquiry.  There is  no dispute that  the  protection  accorded  to  an  employee  by  reason  of  the  constitutional  provision of mandate of recording of reasons is of great significance. Such  reasons, in our opinion, in the instant case, have been recorded.

xxx xxx xxx

35.  So far as the finding of the High Court that the orders of dismissal  suffer from want of material  is concerned, the orders of  the disciplinary  authority themselves disclose existence of sufficient materials. Before the  statutory authorities, the incident was not denied. Lodging of the first report  was  also  not  denied.  The  fact  that  one  of  the  delinquent  officials  was  arrested on the same day was not denied. Arrest of others after a period of  two weeks also stood admitted. Display of handwritten poster both at the  workshop and at the railway station had also not been denied.

36.  We do not find that before the High Court the delinquent employees  brought on record any material  that the grounds stated in the orders of

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dismissal  were  wholly  non-existent.  No  mala  fides  on  the  part  of  the  disciplinary authority was attributed.  It is not the case of the delinquent  employees that the disciplinary authority in passing the said order took into  consideration any irrelevant fact not germane therefor or failed to take into  consideration any relevant fact.”

(emphasis is ours)

15. Before  delving  into  the  pointed  issues  canvassed  at  the  hands  of  the  

learned counsel representing appellant/petitioners, it is necessary for us to notice  

the parameters laid down by this Court  for  invoking clause (b) of  the second  

proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.  Insofar as the instant aspect  

of  the matter  is  concerned,  the norms stipulated by this  Court  for  the above  

purpose, require the satisfaction of three ingredients.  Firstly, that the conduct of  

the  delinquent  employee  should  be  such  as  would  justify  one  of  the  three  

punishments,  namely,  dismissal,  removal  or reduction in rank.   Secondly,  the  

satisfaction of  the competent  authority,  that it  is not reasonably practicable to  

hold an inquiry, as contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.  

And  thirdly,  the  competent  authority  must  record  the  reasons  of  the  above  

satisfaction in writing.

16. On the issue whether it  is  reasonably practicable  to hold an inquiry  as  

contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is concerned, this  

Court elaborately expressed the required norms, in Union of India v. Tulsiram  

Patel (supra), as under:

“130.   The  condition  precedent  for  the  application  of  clause  (b)  is  the  satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably practicable  to  hold"  the  inquiry  contemplated  by  clause  (2)  of  Article 311.  What  is  pertinent to note is that the words used are "not reasonably practicable"  and  not  ‘impracticable’. According  to  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  ‘practicable’  means  "Capable  of  being  put  into  practice,  carried  out  in

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proviso under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, were made out.  The first  

ingredient,  which is a prerequisite to the sustainable application of  the above  

clause (b) is, that the delinquency alleged should be such as would justify, any  

one of the three punishments, namely, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.  

We have already extracted hereinabove the order dated 1.3.2004, whereby, the  

appellant-Ved Mitter Gill was dismissed from service, with immediate effect.  Its  

perusal  reveals,  that  the punishment  was based on reasons (recorded in the  

impugned order) divided into different compartments.  The first is contained in the  

first paragraph, which deals with the duties and responsibilities vested with Ved  

Mitter  Gill,  as  Deputy  Superintendent,  Model  Jail,  Burail,  Chandigarh.   The  

second component deals with the escape of four under-trials from Model Jail,  

Burail, Chandigarh.  Three of the under-trials, who had escaped, were involved in  

the assassination of Shri Beant Singh, a former Chief Minister of State of Punjab.  

The instant paragraph also records, the factum that the said three under-trials  

were having links with Babbar Khalsa International, a terrorist organization.  The  

fourth under-trial was being tried separately, for the offence of murder.  The third  

component  of  the  impugned  order,  relates  to  the  material  taken  into  

consideration to evaluate the lapses committed by the appellant/petitioners, as  

would  reveal  their  involvement  with  reference  to  the  alleged  delinquency,  

justifying the punishment of dismissal from service.   

21. We shall now advert to the factual position emerging from the above.  A  

reference was first of all made to the duties and responsibilities assigned to the  

appellant – Ved Mitter Gill.  Having detailed the express duties assigned to him in

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paragraph 11 above, we have concluded therefrom, that the responsibility of all  

the jail inmates (safe custody of all prisoners) rested on his shoulders, and the  

petitioners herein, who assisted him in the same.  The appellant – Ved Mitter Gill  

was required to satisfy himself once in every twenty-four hours, about the safe  

custody of the prisoners.  He was also duty-bound to visit every barrack, ward,  

cell  and compartment  every  twenty-four  hours.   He was to  be present  every  

morning and evening, when the prisioners were taken out of the sleeping wards  

or cells or other compartments, and then, restored to the same.  He was to make  

a daily report by day-break and by night, that all the prisoners were present, and  

in  safe  custody.   He  was  also  required  to  report  forthwith,  any  unusual  

occurrence.  He was required at least once a week to inspect clothing, beddings,  

as  well  as,  other  articles,  by  thoroughly  checking  all  places  frequented  by  

prisoners.  And to make a report, if he discovered any prohibited article, during  

the checking. The petitioners were associated with the appellant and assisted  

him in discharging his aforementioned duties.  Had the appellant - Ved Mitter Gill,  

and the petitioners, performed their duties diligently, there could not have been  

any possibility, of the escape under reference.  It cannot be overlooked, that the  

escape was made good, by digging the escape tunnel, which measured ninety-

four feet in length (with diagonal dimensions of 21” x 21”).  Six separate reasons  

have been expressed, by the competent authority in arriving at its conclusion.  

We  have  extracted  the  impugned  order  dated  1.3.2004,  in  its  entirety,  

hereinabove.   It  fully  establishes  the  inferences  recorded  by  us.   The  

determination  by  the  competent  authority,  when  viewed  dispassionately  with

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reference to the duties assigned to Ved Mitter Gill, leaves no room for any doubt,  

that the competent authority was justified in concluding, that the four prisoners  

referred to above could never have escaped, if the appellant – Ved Mitter Gill,  

and  the  petitioners,  had  diligently  discharged  the  duties  assigned  to  them.  

Having  so  concluded,  about  the  responsibility  and  blameworthiness  of  the  

appellant/petitioners,  there can be no doubt  that  the punishment  of  dismissal  

from service, was fully justified, as their delinquency had resulted in the escape  

of four dreaded prisoners.

22. The  second  ingredient  which  needs  to  be  met,  for  a  valid  exercise  of  

clause (b) to the second proviso under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India,  

is  the  satisfaction  of  the  competent  authority,  that  it  was  not  reasonably  

practicable,  to  hold  a  regular  departmental  enquiry,  against  the  employees  

concerned.  On the question whether it was reasonably practicable to hold an  

inquiry, the competent authority has recorded its conclusion in the paragraphs,  

preceding  the  one  depicting  the  involvement  of  the  appellant/petitioners.  

Amongst the reasons indicated, it has been recorded, that Ved Mitter Gill being a  

senior, permanent and non-transferable officer of Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh,  

his  junior  jail  officers,  who  alone  would  have  been  witnesses  in  such  

departmental  proceedings,  were not likely to come forward to depose against  

him, for fear of earning his wrath in future.  The links of the escaped under-trial  

prisoners, with the Babbar Khalsa International, a known and dreaded terrorist  

organization were also clearly expressed in the impugned order, as one of the

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reasons,  for  it  being  impracticable,  to  hold  an  inquiry  against  the  

appellant/petitioners.   It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge,  and  it  would  be  

proper to take judicial notice of the fact, that a large number of terrorists came to  

be acquitted during the period in question, on account of the fact, that witnesses  

did not appear to depose against them on account of fear, or alternatively, the  

witnesses  who  appeared  before  the  concerned  courts,  for  recording  their  

deposition, turned hostile, for the same reason.  The situation presented in the  

factual narration noticed in the impugned order, clearly achieves the benchmark,  

for the satisfaction at the hands of the competent authority, that it would not have  

been  reasonably  practicable,  to  hold  a  departmental  proceeding  against  the  

appellant/petitioners, in terms of the mandate contained under Article 311(2) of  

the Constitution of India.

23. The third essential ingredient, for a valid application of clause (b) to the  

second  proviso  under  Article  311(2)  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  is  that,  the  

competent authority must record, the reasons of the above satisfaction in writing.  

In  the  present  case,  there  is  no  serious  dispute  on  this  issue,  because  the  

reasons for the satisfaction have been recorded by the competent authority in the  

impugned order (dated 1.3.2004) itself.

24. For the reasons recorded above, we are satisfied, that all the parameters  

laid down by this Court, for a valid/legal application of clause (b) to the second  

proviso under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, were duly complied with.

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25. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioners, lastly placed reliance on two  

sets of facts.  Firstly, it was contended, that with reference to the same jail-break  

incident,  a departmental  proceeding was also initiated against  D.S. Rana, the  

then Superintendent, Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh.  It was pointed out, that the  

aforesaid D.S. Rana, was holding the post of Superintendent, Model Jail, Burail,  

Chandigarh, as a deputationist from the State of Punjab.  It was submitted, that  

the State  of  Punjab had not  invoked clause (b)  to the second proviso under  

Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, against the aforesaid D.S. Rana.  It  

was  pointed  out,  that  the  abovementioned  D.S.  Rana,  has  been  issued  a  

chargesheet, for the same charges on which the appellant/petitioners have been  

dismissed from service.  It was submitted, that a regular departmental enquiry  

was being conducted against the aforesaid D.S. Rana.  The pointed contention of  

learned counsel was, that if a regular departmental enquiry can be conducted  

against  the  aforesaid  D.S.  Rana,  then  it  can  also  be  conducted  against  the  

appellant/petitioners.  Secondly, it was the contention of the learned counsel, that  

a regular trial was ongoing, against the appellant, and the petitioners herein, as  

also, against the aforesaid D.S. Rana, in furtherance of first information report  

bearing no. 17 registered at Police Station Sector 34, Chandigarh.  Yet again, it  

was the contention of the learned counsel, that if witnesses can appear in open  

court  proceedings  before  the  trial  court,  with  reference  to  the  same  set  of  

allegations, they could surely have appeared, in a departmental proceeding as  

well.

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26.  We have given our thoughtful consideration to the above noted contention  

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner.  It is  

not possible for us to place the appellant and the petitioners before this Court, on  

the same pedestal as the aforesaid D.S. Rana, the then Superintendent, Model  

Jail, Burail, Chandigarh (referred to by in the submission noticed above).  The  

reason for this is, that Ved Mitter Gill was holding the senior-most, permanent  

and non-transferable position, at Model Jail,  Burail,  Chandigarh, whereas D.S.  

Rana, referred to in the submission advanced, was only a deputationist at the  

said jail.  Accordingly, whilst Ved Mitter Gill would always remain superior to the  

jail  staff  who  would  be  summoned  as  witnesses,  in  the  departmental  

proceedings, the aforesaid D.S. Rana would not fall within the same parameter.  

D.S.  Rana belonged to a different  cadre.   After  his  repatriation  to his  parent  

cadre, he could not exercise any supervisory or administrative control over the  

staff of the Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh.  Accordingly, the parallel sought to be  

drawn  between  the  controversy  in  the  present  case,  and  the  departmental  

proceedings  initiated  against  the  abovementioned  D.S.  Rana,  erstwhile  

Superintendent, Jail, is fallacious.

27.  Insofar as the holding of a trial, and the appearance of witnesses therein is  

concerned, yet again, the analogy invoked by the learned counsel representing  

the appellant/petitioners, is wholly misconceived.  Whilst in a criminal prosecution  

proof  is strict,  and must  be based on cogent  and acceptable evidence.   In a  

criminal case, there is no alternative but to establish guilt of an accused, based

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on acceptable evidence.  The evidence is to be produced before the Court, trying  

the criminal case.  There is no way the same can be exempted, as in the case of  

a departmental  proceeding.   Insofar  as the present  controversy is concerned,  

there  is  a  constitutional  provision  creating  an  exception.   Clause  (b)  of  the  

second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, is the exception in  

question, which authorizes the course adopted by the respondents.  The reasons  

for  dispensing  with  the  departmental  enquiry,  cannot  be dependent  upon the  

holding or not holding of criminal proceedings, against the appellant/petitioners.  

Once the parameters stipulated in clause (b) of  the second proviso to Article  

311(2) of the Constitution of India are satisfied, the submissions advanced at the  

hands of the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioners, would not arise.

28.  No other submission was advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for  

appellant/petitioners.  For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in  

the  present  appeal,  and  the  connected  transferred  cases.   The  same  are  

accordingly dismissed.

…..…………………………….J.   (Jagdish Singh Khehar)

…..…………………………….J.       (S.A. Bobde)

New Delhi; March 26, 2015.

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ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.4               SECTION IVB

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal  No. 3194/2015 @ SLP(C) No. 20379/2006

VED MITTER GILL                                    Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

U.T. ADMINISTRATION, CHANDIGARH  & ORS             Respondent(s) WITH T.C.(C) No. 41/2010 T.C.(C) No. 42/2010 T.C.(C) No. 43/2010 T.C.(C) No. 44/2010 [HEARD BY HON'BLE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND HON'BLE  S.A.BOBDE,JJ.]

Date : 26/03/2015 This appeal and transferred cases were called on for judgment  today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. M. C. Dhingra,Adv.                                         Ms. Naresh Bakshi,AOR

For Respondent(s)Ms. Naresh Bakshi,AOR                     

Ms. Kamini Jaiswal,AOR

                   Mr. Sudarshan Singh Rawat,AOR                               

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar pronounced the judgment of the  

Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.A. Bobde.

Leave granted in S.L.P.(C) No.20379 of 2006.

For the reasons recorded in the Reportable judgment, which is placed on  

the file, the appeal, and the connected transferred cases are dismissed.

(Parveen Kr. Chawla) (Renu Diwan)

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   Court Master Court Master