REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.166 OF 2012         (Arising out of Special  Leave  Petition (Crl.) No.1548/2011)

VASANTI DUBEY         . Appellant

Versus

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH        ..  

Respondent  

J U D G E M E N T

GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant herein has challenged the order dated  

24.1.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur  

by  which  the  Criminal  Revision  Petition  No.  839/2004 was  

dismissed holding therein that the impugned order passed by  

the  Special Judge (under the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988) District Narsinghpur did not suffer from any  apparent  

error of jurisdiction.

3. In the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of  

the  case  to  be  related  hereinafter,  the  question  inter  alia  

which falls  for  determination  by this  Court  is  whether  the  

Magistrate/Special  Judge  could  straightway  direct  for  

submission of charge-sheet in case he refused to accept final  

report/closure report  of the police/investigating agency and  

thereafter direct the police to submit charge-sheet  in case he  

was of the opinion that the case was not fit to be closed and it  

required  to  be  proceeded  further.  The  question  which  also  

requires  consideration  is  whether  the  Special  Judge  could  

refuse to accept closure report and direct reinvestigation of the  

case for the second time in order to proceed further although  

he was confronted with the legal impediment indicating lack of  

sanction for prosecution in the matter.  

4. However,  the  question  for  determination  is  not  a  

new or an extra-ordinary one as the question has cropped up  

time and again before this Court as to what course is left open  

for  a Magistrate in a situation when the police submits final  

report  under  Section  173,  Cr.P.C.  or  closure  report  is  

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submitted by  any other  investigating agency stating that the  

case is not made out on account of lack of evidence or  for any  

other reason.

5. But  before  we  proceed  to  deal  with  the  question  

involved herein, it is essential to state the salient facts and  

circumstances  of  this  matter  which  has  reached  upto  this  

Court by way of this special leave petition.  On perusal of the  

materials  on  record,  it  emerges  that  the  appellant  –  Smt.  

Vasanti Dubey  was posted as the Block Development Officer,  

Janpad Panchayat, Gotegon, Narsinghpur (M.P.) and in that  

capacity was competent to award a contract for constructing  

concrete road in the village Baroda.  The contract was awarded  

to one Dinesh Kumar Patel who was the Sarpanch of village  

Baroda for constructing the concrete road in the village and  

was  initially  paid  a  sum  of  Rs.15,000/-  vide  cheque  No.  

101626 dated 27.2.2001 for execution of the contract.  He was  

further  paid  a  sum of  Rs.15,000/-  vide  cheque  No.101629  

dated  8.5.2001  for  execution  of  the  contract  which  was  

awarded to him.  The awardee Sarpanch - Dinesh Kumar Patel  

was  still  further  paid  Rs.10,000/-  vide  cheque  No.101635  

dated 23.5.2001 and the balance  payment of Rs. 10,000/-  

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was  also  finally  paid  to  him vide  cheque  No.319586  dated  

1.8.2001 towards full and final settlement of the consideration  

for the above mentioned contract.   Admittedly, all the afore-

mentioned payments were made to the Sarpanch contractor -  

Dinesh Kumar Patel which were due to be paid to him and the  

cheques were duly encashed.

6.  However,  the  Sarpanch/contractor  after  several  

days of receipt of the final payment, filed a complaint  against  

the appellant/BDO – Smt. Vasanti Dubey in the  Special Police  

Establishment,  Lokayukta  Office,  Jabalpur  stating  inter-alia  

that the complainant - Dinesh Kumar Patel had been paid a  

sum of Rs.40,000/- only with respect to the contract awarded  

to him and  when the balance payment of Rs.10,000/- was  

demanded  by  him,  the  appellant  demanded  a  sum  of  

Rs.3,000/- as commission.  The complainant’s  further case is  

that he although paid  a sum of Rs.500/-, he felt aggrieved  

and hence did not pay any further amount to the appellant  

but preferred to lodge a complaint on 7.8.2001  in regard to  

the illegal demand  made by her.  Since the alleged incident  

was  falling  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Special  Police  

Establishment,  Lokayukta  Office,  Bhopal,  a  case  was  

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registered against the appellant on the basis of the complaint  

on the same date i.e. 7.8.2001 under Sections 7 and  13(1)(d)  

read with Section  13(1)(2)   of  the Prevention of Corruption  

Act, 1988.   

7. The Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta Office,  

proceeded to investigate the matter and carried out detailed  

investigation and also recorded statements of various persons  

including that of the complainant on 26.3.2002.  In course of  

investigation, the complainant resiled from his earlier version  

and stated that he had made a false complaint at the instance  

of  someone  else  whose  name  he  did  not  divulge.   Further  

statement of one Shankar Singh  was also recorded that the  

complainant  had paid Rs.2,500/- to the appellant  when she  

had  gone  to  the   bathroom and  the  money  thereafter  was  

recovered  from  her.   The  police   also  seized   various  

documents from the office of the BDO located in the office of  

Janpad  Gotegaon  which  included  the  files   containing  the  

details of the cheques  from which  payment had been  made  

to the complainant.   After completion of the investigation by  

the Office of Lokayukta  who was competent  to get the matter  

investigated by the police and in view  of the statement of  the  

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complainant that he made false complaint at the instance of  

someone else as also on account of  the fact that the entire  

payment except Rs. 10,000/- had been made by the appellant  

-  Smt. Vasanti Dubey to the complainant  prior to the date on  

which   the  complaint  was  filed,  it  was  inferred  that  the  

complaint  did  not  disclose  commission  of  any  offence  and  

hence the Lokayukta  directed that a  closure report  be filed  

in regard to the complaint lodged against Vasanti Dubey and  

appropriate  action be initiated against  the  complainant  for  

lodging a false complaint.

8. Accordingly,  the  closure  report  was  submitted  

before the  Special Judge, Narsinghpur  but by order dated  

5.8.2002, the Special Judge  refused to accept the same.  He  

thus  rejected the  closure  report  and thereafter  directed  the  

police  to  file  charge-sheet in the  case against  the appellant  

against which the State Government filed a criminal revision  

bearing Criminal Revision No. 1206/2002 in the High Court  

challenging  the  order  of  the  Special  Judge  who  refused  to  

accept the closure report and issued direction for submission  

of the charge-sheet against the appellant.   

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9. The  learned  single  Judge  of  the  High  Court   by  

order  dated  14.1.2003  was  pleased  to  allow  the  Revision  

Petition and quashed  the order passed by the Special Judge  

who had refused  to accept the closure report and had directed  

submission  of  charge-sheet   against  the  appellant   on  the  

ground that there is no power  expressly or impliedly conferred  

under the Code on a magistrate to call   upon the police to  

submit a charge-sheet when police had sent a report under  

Section  169 of the Code stating that there is no  case made  

out  for sending up  an accused for a trial.  The learned single  

Judge took this view relying upon the ratio of the authoritative  

pronouncement  of  this  Court  delivered  in  the  matter  of  

Abhinandan Jha & Ors.  Vs.  Dinesh Mishra1 wherein it  was  

observed  that the functions of the  magistrate and the police  

are entirely different and  though the magistrate may or may  

not  accept  the  report  and take  action according  to  law,  he  

cannot   impinge  upon  the  jurisdiction   of  the  police  by  

compelling them  to  change their opinion so as to accord  with  

his  view.   The  learned  Judge  also  took  notice   of  the  

observation  of the Supreme Court which had  further been  

pleased  to  hold  therein  that  the  magistrate  however,  while  1 AIR 1968 SC 117 = (1967) 3 SCR 668

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disagreeing with a final report/closure report  of a case can  

take cognizance under  Section  190(1)(c)  or   order    further  

investigation  under  Section  156(3)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure  but cannot  straightaway  direct  for  submission of  

charge-sheet to the police.  Applying the aforesaid test  as  laid  

down by this Court in the case of Abhinandan  Jha (supra), the  

impugned  order  passed  by  the  Special  Judge,  Narsinghpur  

was  held  to  be  illegal  and  without  jurisdiction  and  

consequently  was  quashed.   However,  the  learned  single  

Judge had added an observation in the judgment and order  

that if the learned Special Judge thinks it fit  and appropriate  

to  take  cognizance,  the  same  can  be  taken  under  Section  

190(c)  of the Code of Criminal Procedure or he  may direct the  

Lokayukta police for further investigation.  As already stated  

the revision  accordingly was allowed and the impugned order  

of the Special Judge dated  5.8.2002 was quashed.   

10. The Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta Office,  

Jabalpur, thereafter again got the complaint examined in the  

light of the statement  of the witnesses and the evidence and  

noticed that there were no materials  against the appellant  to  

proceed as she had   made all payments from  27.2.2001 up to  

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2.8.2001 yet  a  complaint  dated  7.8.2001 was  subsequently  

filed by the complainant - Dinesh Kumar Patel  alleging that  

the appellant  had demanded commission/bribe  of Rs.2,500/-  

from  the  complainant  in  order  to  clear  his  bills  which  

complaint  was  found  to  be  untrustworthy  and  hence  

unacceptable since all payments had already been received by  

the complainant prior to the lodgement of complaint specially  

in view of the subsequent version of the complainant that he  

had lodged a malicious complaint at the instance  of  a rival  of  

the appellant.   

11. The Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta Office,  

therefore,  once  again  filed  an  application/closure  report  

before the Special Judge, Narsinghpur but the Special Judge,  

Narsinghpur  this  time  again  rejected  the  closure  report  by  

order dated 18.5.2004  observing  therein that it  had been  

clarified  by order dated 5.8.2002 that there is sufficient basis  

to  take  cognizance   against  the  appellant  -   Smt.  Vasanti  

Dubey and there is no  change in the circumstance on the  

basis  of  which  closure  report  can  be   accepted  clearly  

overlooking  that  the  High  Court   had  already  quashed  the  

order dated 5.8.2002 passed by the Special Judge  as it had  

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held that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to direct the  

police to submit  charge sheet in case he refuses to accept  

closure  report  although  he  could  take  cognizance   under  

Section 190(C) of the Cr.P.C. or direct  further investigation of  

the case.  In pursuance of this, further investigation was done  

by  the  Special  Police  Establishment,  Lokayukta  Office  and  

closure   report  was   submitted  after  completion  of  

reinvestigation.   On  this  occasion,  when  the  Special  Judge  

refused to accept closure report, it was his statutory and legal  

duty  to either  pass a fresh order taking cognizance  if  he  

refused  to  dismiss  the  complaint   and  proceed  with  the  

enquiry   under  Section  200  Cr.P.C.   by  examining  the  

complainant  after which he had  to record reasons why he  

disagreed with the closure report.  But the Special Judge  did  

not  discharge   this  legal  obligation  and  simply   in  a  

mechanical manner directed the investigating agency to obtain  

sanction to prosecute  the appellant despite the fact that the  

investigating agency  had consistently  reported that sufficient  

evidence was not there to justify prosecution of the appellant.  

At  this  stage,  if  the  Special  Judge  found  that  there  were  

sufficient ground to proceed, it could have taken  cognizance  

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but having been confronted  with the legal impediment  that it  

could  not  proceed  without  sanction  for  prosecution,  the  

Special Judge directed to reinvestigate  the matter once again  

for the second time and also directed the investigating agency  

to obtain sanction for prosecution.          

12. Hence,  the  appellant   assailed   the  order  of  the  

Special Judge dated 18.5.2004 by filing  a criminal revision  

petition No.  839/2004 but the High Court  on this  occasion  

dismissed the revision petition and was pleased to hold that  

the order of the Special Judge who had refused to  accept the  

closure  report  for  the  second  time  did  not  suffer  from any  

apparent   error  of  jurisdiction.   The  learned  single  Judge  

while dismissing the revision  petition observed that  it shall  

still be open to the appellant  to raise all such pleas as are  

available to  her under the law in case charge-sheet is filed  

against her.  

13. However,  the  learned  single  Judge  completely  

missed  the  ratio  laid  down in  the  case  of  Abhinandan  Jha  

(supra)  which  had been  relied  upon by  the  learned  single  

Judge of the High Court  on an earlier occasion also when the  

order of  the Special Judge refusing to accept closure report  

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and directing  submission  of  charge-sheet  was quashed  and  

the entire legal position was summed up in unequivocal terms  

as follows:-

“There is no power, expressly or impliedly  conferred under the Code, on a Magistrate  to call upon the police to submit a charge- sheet, when they have sent a report under  Section 169 of the Code, that there is no  case made out for sending up an accused  for trial.  The functions of the magistrate  and the  police  are  entirely  different,  and  though,  the   Magistrate  may or  may not  accept the report, and take suitable action  according to law, he cannot impinge upon  the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling  them  to  change  their  opinion  so  as  to  accord with his view.”

This position has been further reiterated and reinforced  in a  

recent judgment of this Court delivered in the matter of  Ram  

Naresh Prasad vs.  State  of  Jharkhand2,  wherein it has been  

held   that  when  the  police   submitted  a  final  report  of  

investigation  of  the  case which in colloquial  term is called  

closure  report,  the  magistrate  cannot  direct  the  police  to  

submit  the  charge-sheet.   However,  on  the   basis  of  the  

material in the charge-sheet, he may take cognizance or direct  

further investigation.  In fact, this position is clearly  laid down  

2 (2009) 11 SCC 299

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under Section 190 read with Section  156 of the Cr.P.C. itself  

and the legal position has been time and again  clarified  by  

this Court  in several pronouncements  viz.  in the matter of  

Bains vs. State3, wherein their lordships have summarised the  

position as follows:-

“1. When a Magistrate  receives a complaint,  he may, instead of taking cognizance at once  under  Section  190(1)(a)  direct  a  police  investigation under Section 156(3) ante;

2.  Where,  after  completion  of  the  investigation,  the  police  sends  an  adverse  report  under  Section 173(1),  the  Magistrate  may take  any of the following  steps :  

“i.  If  he  agrees  with  police  report,  and  finds  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  further,  he  may  drop  the  proceeding  and  dismiss  the  complaint.  

ii. He may not agree with the police  report  and  may  take  cognizance  of the offence on the basis of the  original complaint,  under Section  190(1)(a) and proceed to examine  the  complainant  under  Section  200.  

iii. Even  if  he  disagrees  with  the  police report, he may either take  cognizance  at  once  upon  the  complaint,  direct  an  enquiry  under Section 202 and after such  

3 AIR 1980 SC 1883 = 1980 (4) SCC 631  

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enquiry take action under Section  203.   However,  when  the  police  submits a final report  or closure  report in regard to a case which  has been lodged by the informant  or  complainant,  the  magistrate  cannot  direct  the  police  to  straightway  submit  the  charge- sheet as  was the view expressed  in the matter of  Abhinandan Jha  (supra) which was relied upon in  the  matter  of   Ram Naresh  Prasad (supra).”

14. Thus  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  even  after  the  

police report indicates that no case is made out against the  

accused,  the magistrate can  ignore the same and can take  

cognizance   on applying his mind  independently  to the case.  

But in that situation,   he has two options  (i)  he may not  

agree  with the  police  report  and direct   an enquiry   under  

Section 202 and after such enquiry  take action under Section  

203.  He is also entitled to take cognizance under Section 190  

Cr.P.C. at once if he disagrees with the adverse police report  

but even in this circumstance, he cannot straightway direct  

submission of the charge-sheet by the police.    

15. In the light of the aforesaid  legal position, when we  

examined the merit of the instant matter, we noticed that the  

order dated 18.5.2004 passed earlier  by the  Special  Judge  

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straightway directing  the police  to submit  charge-sheet  was  

quashed by the learned single Judge of the High Court and  

liberty was left open to him either to take cognizance under  

Section 190(c) of the Cr.P.C. or direct the Lokayukta Police for  

further investigation.   In spite of this order, the  Special Judge  

did not pass an order  taking  cognizance which he could have  

done  under Section 190(c) of the Cr.P.C.    However,  he chose  

to  direct  office  of  the  Lokayukta  to  enter  into  further  

investigation  which  after  further  investigation  assigned  

reasons  given  out  hereinbefore,  stating  that  in  view  of  the  

statement of the complainant that he had complained at the  

instance of a rival of the accused as also the fact that entire  

payment had already been made by the complainant prior to  

the lodgement of complaint, no case was made out against the  

complainant.  In spite of this, if the Special Judge considered  

it  legal  and appropriate  to  proceed in  the  matter,  he  could  

have  taken  cognizance  upon the  complaint  and could  have  

proceeded  further as per the provision under Section 200 of  

the Cr.P.C. by examining the complainant and if  there were  

sufficient ground for proceeding, he could have issued process  

for attendance of the accused.  However, such process could  

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not have been issued, unless the magistrate found that the  

evidence  led  before  him  was  contradictory  or  completely  

untrustworthy.   Conversely, if he found from such evidence  

that sufficient  ground was not there for  proceeding  i.e.  no  

prima facie  case against the accused was made out, he had to  

dismiss  the complaint,  since the complaint did not disclose  

the commission of  any offence.  But instead of  taking any  

step either by issuing  the process or dismissing the complaint  

at  once,  he  could  have  taken  immediate  step  as  a  third  

alternative to make an enquiry  into the truth or  falsehood of  

the complaint  or for an investigation to be made by the police  

for ascertaining whether there was any prima facie evidence so  

as to justify the issue of process.  In short,  on receipt of a  

complaint, the magistrate is not bound  to take cognizance but  

he can without taking cognizance direct investigation by the  

police  under  Section  156(3)  of  Cr.P.C.   Once,  however,  he  

takes  cognizance  he must examine the complainant and his  

witnesses under Section 200.  Thereafter, if he  requires police  

investigation  or  judicial  enquiry,  he  must   proceed  under  

Section 202.  But in any case he cannot direct the Police to  

straightaway file charge-sheet which needs to be highlighted  

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as this point is often missed by the Magistrates in spite of a  

series  of  decisions  of  this  Court  including  the  case  of  

Abhinandan  Jha  (supra)  and  Ram Naresh  Prasad (supra)  

referred to hereinbefore.  

16. When  the  facts  of  the  instant  matter  is  further  

tested on the anvil of the aforesaid  legal position, we find that  

the  Special  Judge  instead  of  following  the  procedure  

enumerated in the Cr.P.C.  appeared to insist on rejecting the  

closure  report  given  by  the  Special  Police  Establishment,  

Lokayukta Office and in the process consistently committed  

error of law and jurisdiction not only  once, but twice.  On the  

first  occasion  when  the  order  of  the  Special  Judge  was  

quashed and set aside by the High Court granting liberty to  

the  Special  Judge  either  to  take cognizance under  Section  

190(c) or order for  further  investigation as he had committed  

an error of jurisdiction by  directing the police to  straightway  

submit  the  charge-sheet  against  the  accused-petitioner,  the  

Special  Judge  did  not  consider   it  appropriate  to  take  

cognizance but ordered for further investigation by Lokayukta  

Police  and when the matter was reinvestigated by the Special  

Police  Establishment  of  the  Lokayukta   Office,  the  Special  

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Judge  in  spite  of  the  finding  of  the  investigating  agency  

holding that no further material to proceed in the matter was  

found, refused to accept the closure report and this time  it  

further  realized  that it could not proceed in the matter as  

there  was   no  sanction  for  prosecution,  which  the  Special  

Judge obviously noticed  since he was not in a position  to  

take  cognizance  directly   under  Sections  7,  13(1)(d)  of  the  

Prevention of Corruption Act in absence of sanction which was  

a statutory requirement.  In spite of this,  he refused to accept  

closure report but recorded a direction  to obtain  sanction for  

prosecution  of  the  appellant   and  thereafter  ordered  for  

reinvestigation of the complaint  for the second time creating a  

peculiar and anomalous situation which is not in consonance  

with  the  provision  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  

enumerated under the Chapter relating to conditions requisite  

for initiation of proceedings.

17. It  may be worthwhile to highlight at this stage that  

the enquiry under Section 200 Cr.P.C. cannot be given a go-

bye  if  the  Magistrate  refuses  to  accept  the  closure  report  

submitted by the investigating agency as this enquiry is legally  

vital to protect the affected party from a frivolous complaint  

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and  a  vexatious  prosecution  in  complaint  cases.   The  

relevance, legal efficacy and vitality of the enquiry enumerated  

under Section 200 Cr.P.C., therefore, cannot be undermined,  

ignored or underplayed as non compliance of enquiry under  

Section 200 Cr.P.C. is of vital importance and necessity as it is  

at  this  stage  of  the  enquiry  that  the  conflict  between  the  

finding arrived at by the investigating agency and enquiry by  

the  Magistrate  can  prima  facie  justify  the  filing  of  the  

complaint  and  also  offer  a  plank  and  a  stage  where  the  

justification of the order of cognizance will come to the fore.  

This process of enquiry under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is surely  

not a decorative piece of legislation  but is of great relevance  

and value to the complainant as well as the accused.   

18. It is no doubt possible to contend that at the stage  

of taking cognizance or refusing to take cognizance, only prima  

facie case has to be seen by the Court.   But the argument  

would be fit for rejection since it is nothing but mixing up two  

different  and  distinct  nature  of  cases  as  the  principle  and  

procedure applied in a case based on Police report which is  

registered on the basis of First Information Report cannot be  

allowed to follow the procedure in a complaint case.  A case  

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based on a complaint cannot be allowed to be dealt with and  

proceeded as if it were a case based on Police report.  While in  

a  case  based  on  Police  report,  the  Court  while  taking  

cognizance will  straightaway examine whether a prima facie  

case is made out or not and will not enter into the correctness  

of  the  allegation  levelled  in  the  F.I.R.,  a  complaint  case  

requires  an  enquiry  by  the  Magistrate  under  Section  200  

Cr.P.C. if he takes cognizance of the complaint.  In case he  

refuses  to  take  cognizance  he  may  either  dismiss  the  

complaint  or  direct  the  investigating  agency  to  enter  into  

further investigation.  In case, he does not exercise either of  

these two options, he will  have to proceed with the enquiry  

himself  as  envisaged  and  enumerated  under  Section  200  

Cr.P.C.  But, he cannot exercise the fourth option of directing  

the Police to submit a charge-sheet as such a course is clearly  

not envisaged under the Cr.P.C. and more so in a complaint  

case.  As already stated, this position can be clearly deduced  

from  the  catena  of  decisions  including  those  referred  to  

hereinbefore but needs to be reinstated as time and again this  

magisterial error reaches up to this Court for rectification by  

judicial intervention.   

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19. The instant matter is one such example and is one  

step ahead wherein the Special Judge was confronted with yet  

another legal impediment of lack of sanction for prosecution  

giving  rise  to  a  peculiar  situation  when  he  noticed  and  

recorded that he could not proceed in the matter  under the  

Prevention of Corruption Act without sanction for prosecution,  

but in spite of this  he directed to obtain sanction, ordered for  

reinvestigation  and consequently   refused to  accept  closure  

report.  

20. Since  the  Special  Judge  in  the  instant  matter  

refused to accept the closure report dated 18.05.2004 without  

any enquiry or reason why he refused to accept it which was  

submitted  by  the  Special  Police  Establishment,  Lokayukta  

Office,  Jabalpur  after  reinvestigation for  which reasons had  

been  assigned  and  there  was  also  lack  of  sanction  for  

prosecution against  the   appellant  which was necessary for  

launching prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act,  

we deem it just and appropriate to hold that the Special Judge  

clearly  committed  error  of  jurisdiction  by  directing  

reinvestigation of the matter practically for the third time in  

spite  of  his  noticing that  sanction for  prosecution was also  

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lacking,  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  Special  Police  

Establishment,  Lokayukta  Office,  after  reinvestigation  had  

given its report why the matter was not  fit to be proceeded  

with.

21. We  are  therefore  of  the  considered  view  that  the  

Special Judge in the wake of all these legal flaws as also the  

fact that the Special Judge under the circumstance was not  

competent  to  proceed  in  the  matter  without  sanction  for  

prosecution, could not have ordered for reinvestigation of the  

case for  the third time by refusing to accept  closure report  

dated  18.05.2004.   This  amounts  to  sheer  abuse  of  the  

process  of  law  resulting  into  vexatious  proceeding  and  

harassment of the appellant for more than 10 years without  

discussing any reason why he disagreed with the report of the  

Lokayukta and consequently the closure report which would  

have emerged if the Special Judge had carefully proceeded in  

accordance  with  the  procedure  enumerated  for  initiation  of  

proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure.   

22. In view of the  aforesaid  discussion  based on the  

existing  facts  and  circumstances,  we  deem  it  just  and  

appropriate  to set aside the impugned order  passed by the  

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Special  Judge  refusing  to  accept  the  closure  report  dated  

18.05.2004 and consequently the judgment and order of the  

High  Court   by  which  the  order  of  the  Special  Judge  was  

upheld,  also stands quashed and set aside.   Accordingly, the  

appeal is allowed.  

                …..……………………..J      (Asok Kumar Ganguly)

        …………………………J      (Gyan Sudha Misra

New Delhi, January 17, 2012

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