REPORTABLE

IN     THE     SUPREME     COURT     OF     INDIA

CIVIL     APPELLATE     JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     NO. 11774 OF     2018  

VASANT GANPAT PADAVE (D)  BY LRS. & ORS.               ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (DEAD)  THRU LRS. & ORS.                     ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL     APPEAL     NOS. 11775-11798 OF     2018  

SHRI ARJUN HARI  KAMBLE AND ETC. ETC.            ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (DEAD)  THRU LRS. & ORS.                     ...RESPONDENT(S)

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T

ASHOK     BHUSHAN,J.

These appeals have been filed against the common

judgment  dated  01.08.2014  of  High  Court  of  Bombay

dismissing a bunch of writ petitions including those

filed by the present appellants.  

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2. It shall be sufficient to notice the facts in

Civil  Appeal  filed  by  Vasant  Ganpat  Padave  for

deciding these appeals.  

3. One  Balwant  Sawant  was  landlord  of  Survey

No.92/2,  corresponding  to  new  Survey  No.  31  Hissa

No.2/10,  admeasuring  about  0.01.3  H.R.  at  Village

Padavewadi,  Taluka  &  District  Ratnagiri.   Balwant

Sawant  died  on  10.05.1950  leaving  behind  Smt.

Indirabai Balwant Sawant, his widow as his legal heir

and representative.  Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant,

widow became the owner of the said property.  Her

name  was  mutated  in  the  Revenue  Records.   Bombay

Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was amended

by Act 15 of 1957.  Section 32 as amended provided

that on 01.04.1957 (Tillers Day), every tenant shall

be deemed to have purchased from the landlord free

from  all  encumbrances  the  land  held  by  him  as  a

tenant.   The  predecessor  of  the  appellants  were

tenants prior to 1956-1957, i.e. prior to 01.04.1957.

The  proceedings  for  declaring  the  appellants  as

purchaser under Section 32G were initiated during the

lifetime  of  the  landlady,  Smt.  Indirabai  Balwant

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Sawant but the mutation entry No. 1341 recorded that

since landlady Indirabai Balwant Sawant is a widow,

the proceedings as contemplated under Section 32G are

suspended.   On  12.05.1975,  Smt.  Indirabai  Balwant

Sawant executed last Will and Testament in favour of

Anant Mahadev Sawant, respondent No.1. Smt. Indirabai

Balwant  Sawant  died  on  07.05.1999.   The  name  of

respondent No.1 was mutated in the Revenue Records on

29.02.2000, with regard to which no notice was issued

to  the  appellants,  hence  they  were  not  aware  of

either the death of Indirabai or mutation in favour

of respondent No. 1.   

4. In the year 2008, when the appellants came to

know that landlady has died and in her place name of

respondent  No.1  has  been  mutated,  they  filed  an

application  on  05.09.2008  before  respondent  No.2  -

Additional Tahsiladar & A.L.T. Ratnagiri, Maharashtra

for fixing the purchase price under Section 32G of

the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,

1948 (hereinafter referred to as “1948 Act”).  The

respondent  No.1  filed  reply  and  opposed  the  said

application.   The  respondent  No.2  allowed  the

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application of appellants by order dated 09.09.2011.

The  respondent  No.2  held  that  predecessors  of

appellants  were  tenants  prior  to  1956-1957.

Proceedings  under  Section  32G  for  declaring  the

appellants  as  purchasers  were  initiated  during  the

lifetime of the landlady and the same were suspended

on  08.01.1964  during  the  lifetime  of  the  landlady

being a widow.  Respondent No.2 fixed the purchase

price and directed the appellants to deposit the same

to enable issue of Sale Certificate in favour of the

appellants.   Aggrieved  against  the  order  dated

09.09.2011, the respondent No.1 filed an appeal under

Section  74  of  the  1948  Act  before  the  respondent

No.3- Sub-Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra.

The respondent No.3 allowed the appeal vide its order

dated 08.01.2013.  The respondent No.3 held that the

appellant ought to have issued notice under Section

32F  within  the  time  as  prescribed  and  no  notice

having been issued within the time as prescribed, the

appellants have lost right of purchase.   

5. The appellants aggrieved by the order of the Sub-

Divisional  Officer  filed  a  Revision  Application

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before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.  There were

other revisions filed by several other tenants who

were  aggrieved  by  the  order  of  Sub-Divisional

Officer.   The  Maharashtra  Revenue  Tribunal  by  a

common order dated 20.04.2013 dismissed the revisions

and  confirmed  the  order  of  Sub-Divisional  Officer.

The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held that applicants

were  under  legal  obligation  to  give  intimation

expressing  their  desire  to  purchase  within  time

stipulated under Section 32F, which having not been

given,  no  right  of  purchase  is  available  to

applicants.   Aggrieved  against  the  judgment  of

Maharashtra  Revenue  Tribunal,  writ  petitions  were

filed by the appellants and several other similarly

situated  tenants.   All  the  writ  petitions  were

dismissed by common judgment dated 01.08.2014 of the

High  Court,  against  which  judgment,  these  appeals

have been filed.   

6. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  challenging

the impugned order submits that by operation of law,

i.e. by Section 32 as amended by Act 15 of 1957, all

tenants  were  deemed  to  have  purchased  from  their

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landlord  the  land  held  by  them  but  in  case  of

appellants, the said purchase was suspended since on

the Tillers Day, the landlady was a widow, who had

protection  under  Section  31(3)  and  with  regard  to

whom the purchase was suspended.  It is submitted

that the landlady or her legal heirs having never

given  any  notice  for  termination  of  tenancy  under

Section 31(3), after expiry of period as mentioned in

Section 31(3), appellants shall be treated to have

purchased the land in his tenancy.  It is submitted

that under         Section 32F, notice of intention

to purchase the land under tenancy was given by the

appellants as soon as they came to know about the

death of the landlady.     No notice having been

given by the legal heirs of the landlady informing

about her death or any intention to terminate the

tenancy, the appellants could exercise their right of

purchase only when they came to know about the death,

i.e. in the year 2008.  It is submitted that for

enabling  the  appellants,  who  were  tenants,  to

exercise the right of purchase, the notice by legal

heirs was necessary.  When no notice was issued by

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the  respondent  No.1.,  i.e.,  legal  heir  of  the

landlady that he has succeeded to tenancy, no cause

of action arose for appellants to exercise right of

purchase, thus the right of purchase shall not be

defeated due to the above reason.  It is submitted

that right of deemed purchase on the Tillers Day is

only suspended in the case of landlady, who was widow

and after her death, the right of purchase shall be

revived  in  favour  of  the  tenant  and  Courts  below

committed error in rejecting the application filed by

the appellants for purchase.  Learned counsel for the

appellants has further submitted that appellant being

permanent tenants, provisions of Section 31 were not

attracted, hence, there was no period of limitation

for purchase by the tenants.   

7. Learned counsel for the respondents refuting the

submissions  of  the  appellants  contends  that  the

appellants  having  not  exercised  their  right  of

purchase  within  the  time  stipulated  under  Section

32F, the right given under Section 32F, i.e., right

of purchase of the tenant is lost and no error has

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been committed by the Courts below in rejecting the

application filed by the appellants for purchase of

the  land.   He  submits  that  death  of  the  landlady

having occurred on 07.05.1999, appellants cannot be

permitted to move an application for purchase in 2008

on the ground that they were not aware of the death

of the landlady.  The period for exercising the right

of  purchase  is  statutorily  fixed,  which  cannot  be

extended  by  anyone.   Learned  counsel  for  the

respondents  submits  that  the  issues  raised  by  the

appellant are fully covered by the judgment of this

Court in  Appa Narsappa Magdum (D) Through LRS. Vs.

Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar and Others, (1999) 4 SCC

443.

8. Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  in  support  of

their  respective  submissions  has  relied  on  various

judgments of this Court, which shall be referred to

while considering the submissions in detail.

9. Before  we  proceed  to  consider  the  respective

submissions of the parties, it is necessary to look

into the Statutory Scheme of the 1948 Act.  The 1948

Act was enacted to amend the law relating to tenancy

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of  agricultural  lands  and  to  make  certain  other

provisions relating to those lands.  Chapter III of

the Act deals with “Special Rights and Privileges of

Tenants and Provisions for Distribution of Land for

Personal  Cultivation”.   Section  31  of  the  Act

provides  for  Landlord’s  right  to  terminate  tenancy

for  personal  cultivation  and  non-agricultural

purpose.  Section 31 of the Act is as follows:- 31. Landlord’s right to terminate tenancy for  personal  cultivation  and  non- agricultural  purpose.(1)  Notwithstanding anything  contained  in  sections  14  and  30 but subject to sections 31A to 31D (both inclusive),  a  [landlord  (not  being  a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III- AA) may], after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-section (2), terminate the tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy), if the  landlord  bona-fide  requires  the  land for any of the following purposes:––  

(a) for cultivating personally, or  (b) for any non-agricultural purpose.

(2) The notice required to be given under sub-section (1) shall be in writing, shall state  the  purpose  for  which  the  landlord requires the land and shall be served on the  tenant  on  or  before  the  31st  day  of December 1956. A copy of such notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the Mamlatdar. An application for possession under section 29  shall  be  made  to  the  Mamlatdar  on  or before the 31st day of March 1957.  

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(3)  Where  a  landlord  is  a  minor,  or  a widow,  or  a  person  subject  to  mental  or physical disability then such notice may be given  [and  an  application  for  possession under section 29 may be made,]––  

(i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority;

(ii)  by  the  successor-in-title  of  a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;  

(iii) within one year from the date on which  mental  or  physical  disability ceases to exist; and  (iv)           

[Provided  that  where  a  person  of  such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions  of  this  sub-section  shall  not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in  the  sub-section  unless  before  the  31st

day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes  and  bounds  and  the  Mamlatdar  on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such person  in  the  land  is  separated,  having regard  to  the  area,  assessment, classification  and  value  of  the  land,  in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a large proportion].

10. Section  31A  enumerate  the  conditions  of

termination of tenancy.  Section 32 of the 1948 Act

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was comprehensively amended by Act No. 15 of 1957.

Various  measures  of  agrarian  reform  under  which

tillers of the soil were made the owners of the land,

was introduced in the Act by Act No. 15 of 1957.

This  Court  in  Amrit  Bhikaji  Kale  and  Others  Vs.

Kashinath Janardhan Trade and Another (1983) 3 SCC

437  noticed the object of amendment Act No. 15 of

1957 in following words:-

“6. The  Tenancy  Act  was  comprehensively amended  by  Amending  Act  15  of  1957.  The amendment  brought  in  a  revolutionary measure of agrarian reforms making tiller of the soil the owner of the land. This was done to achieve the object of removing all intermediaries between tillers of the soil and the State. Section 32 provides that by mere  operation  of  law,  every  tenant  of agricultural land situated in the area to which the Act applies shall become by the operation of law, the owner thereof. He is declared to be a deemed purchaser without anything more on his part. A Constitution Bench of this court in  Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v.  State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459 held that:

“The  title  of  the  landlord  to  the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tillers’ day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the landlord and the tenant. The  title  of  the  land  which  was vested  originally  in  the  landlord passes to the tenant on the tillers’ day and this title is defeasible only

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in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or commit default in payment of the price  thereto  as  determined  by  the Tribunal.”

Therefore,  it  is  unquestionably established that on the tillers’ day, the landlord’s  interest  in  the  land  gets extinguished  and  simultaneously  by  a statutory sale without anything more by the parties,  the  extinguished  title  of  the landlord  is  kindled  or  created  in  the tenant.  That  very  moment  landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken. The absent non-cultivating  landlord  ceases  to  have that ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes  the  owner  thereof.  This  is unquestionable. The landlord from the date of  statutory  sale  is  only  entitled  to receive the purchase price as determined by the Tribunal under Section 32-G. In other words, the landlord ceases to be landlord and  the  tenant  becomes  the  owner  of  the land and comes in direct contact with the State.  Without  any  act  of  transfer  inter vivos  the  title  of  the  landlord  is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and  Janardhan  was  the  tenant.  Tarachand landlord  was  under  no  disability  as envisged  by  Section  32-F.  Therefore  on April  1,  1957  Janardhan  became  deemed purchaser and Mr Lalit could not controvert this position.”

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11. Section  32  as  amended  by  Act  No.  15  of  1957

provided that on the day of 1st April, 1957 (Tillers

Day), tenants shall be deemed to have purchased from

their landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting

thereon on the said day, the land held by them as

tenant.  Section 32(1), which is relevant for the

present case is as follows:- “32. Tenants deemed to have purchased land on tillers’ day.- [(1)] On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the tillers’ day”) every tenant shall, [subject to the other provisions of this section and the  provisions  of]  the  next  succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his  landlord,  free  of  all  encumbrances subsisting  thereon  on  the  said  day,  the land held by him as tenant, if––  

(a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof  and  cultivates  land personally;  

(b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and  

(i)  the  landlord  has  not  given notice  of  termination  of  his tenancy under section 31; or  

(ii)  notice  has  been  given  under section  31,  but  the  landlord  has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under  section  29  for  obtaining possession of the land; [or]  

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[(iii)  the  landlord  has  not terminated  his  tenancy  on  any  of the  grounds  specified  in  section 14,  or  has  so  terminated  the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining  possession  of  the lands] :   

                … … …    …”

12. Section  32F,  which  is  relevant  in  the  present

case is as follows:- “32F. Right  of  tenant  to  purchase  where landlord  is  minor,  etc.- (1) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the preceding sections,––  

(a)  where  the  landlord  is  a  minor,  or  a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the tenant shall have the  right  to  purchase  such  land  under section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled  to  terminate  the  tenancy  under section 31 [and for enabling the tenant to exercise  the  right  of  purchase,  the landlord  shall  send  an  intimation  to  the tenant  of  the  fact  that  he  has  attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31] :  

[Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions  of  this  sub-section  shall  not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st

day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes  and  bounds  and  the  Mamlatdar  on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such

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person  in  the  land  is  separated,  having regard  to  the  area,  assessment, classification  and  value  of  the  land,  in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in a larger proportion].

(b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

[(1A)  A  tenant  desirous  of  exercising the  right  conferred  on  him  under  sub- section  (1)  shall  give  an  intimation  in that  behalf  to  the  landlord  and  the Tribunal  in  the  prescribed  manner  within the period specified in that sub-section] :

[Provided that, if a tenant holding land from a landlord (who was a minor and has attained  majority  before  the  commencement of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Laws (Amendment)  Act,  1969)  has  not  given intimation as required by this sub-section but being in possession of the land on such commencement is desirous of exercising the right conferred upon him under sub-section (1), he may give such intimation within a period of two years from the commencement of that Act].  

(2) The provisions of sections 32 to 32E (both  inclusive)  and  sections  32G  to  32R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase.

13. The facts of the present case as noticed above

indicate that although predecessor-in-interest of the

appellants were tenants of the land in question since

before 01.04.1957 but on the relevant day, i.e. the

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Tillers  Day,  the  land  was  held  by  Smt.  Indirabai

Balwant  Sawant,  who  was  widow,  hence  the  deemed

purchase  as  contemplated  by  Section  32  stood

suspended by virtue of Section 31(3).  Section 31

enumerates landlord’s right to terminate tenancy for

personal  cultivation  and  non-agricultural  purpose.

In case of a minor or a widow or a person subject to

mental or physical disability, by virtue of Section

31(3), an application for termination of tenancy and

application for possession can be made by the minor

on the date on which he attains majority and by the

successor-in-title of a widow within one year from

the date on which her interest in the land ceases to

exist.  Widow,          Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant

having  died  on  07.05.1999,  her  interest  ceased  on

07.05.1999, which by virtue of Will was successed by

respondent No.1.  Thus, by virtue of Section 31(3)

(ii), the respondent No.1 had a right to give notice

of  termination  of  tenancy  and  application  for

possession within one year from 07.05.1999.  From the

facts of the present case it is apparent from the

record that neither any notice was given by the widow

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in her lifetime for termination of tenancy nor her

successor-in-title,  i.e.  respondent  No.1  gave  any

notice under Section 31 for termination of tenancy

within  one  year  from  07.05.1999  and  it  was  on

05.09.2008, the appellants made an application under

Section  32F  for  purchase  of  land.  The  Sub-

Divisional Officer, Revenue Tribunal as well as the

High Court rejected the claim of the appellant only

on the ground that appellants, i.e. tenants failed to

exercise their right of purchase within the period as

prescribed under Section 32F(1), they held that the

appellant had a right of purchase under Section 32

within one year from the expiry of the period during

which successor-in-interest of landlady was entitled

to  terminate  the  tenancy  under  Section  31.  The

tenants having not exercised their right of purchase

within  two  years  from  07.05.1999,  the  right  of

purchase of the appellants has been lost.

14. This  Court  had  occasion  to  consider  the

provisions of Sections 31, 32 and 32F of the 1948 Act

in large number of cases.  It is useful to notice few

of such cases, which are relevant for deciding the

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issues raised in these appeals.  In  Amrit Bhikaji

Kale  (supra),  this  Court  held  that  Section  32F

postponed  the  date  of  compulsory  purchase  by  the

tenant where the landlord is a minor or a widow.  In

paragraph No.8, following has been laid down:-

“8. It may be mentioned that Section 32-F has  no  application  to  the  facts  of  this case.  Section  32-F  postponed  the  date  of compulsory purchase by the tenant where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability on the  tillers’  day.  Section  32-F  has  an overriding  effect  over  Section  32  as  it opens  with  a  non-obstante  clause.  The combined  effect  of  Sections  32-F  and  32 would show that where the landlord is under no disability as envisaged by Section 32-F the tenant of such landlord by operation of law would become the deemed purchaser but where  the  landlord  is  of  a  class  or category as set out in Section 32-F such as a minor, a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the date of compulsory  sale  would  be  postponed  as therein  provided.  Now,  if  Tarachand,  the landlord was under no disability and he was alive  on  April  1,  1957  and  he  was  the owner,  his  tenant  Janardhan  became  the deemed purchaser. This conclusion, in our opinion, is unassailable.”

15. In Anna Bhau Magdum, since deceased by His Legal

Representatives Vs. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai, (1995)

5  SCC  243,  this  Court  had  occasion  to  consider

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Section  32F(1A)  of  1948  Act.   In  the  above  case,

original owner by gift deed dated 04.09.1953 gifted

the  land  to  respondent,  who  was  a  minor  and  who

attained the majority on 17.01.1965.  The proceedings

under Section 32-G of the Act were started in respect

of the said land in the year 1960, but in view of the

fact  that  the  landlord  was  a  minor,  the  said

proceedings  were  dropped.   Fresh  proceedings  were

initiated in the year 1975 under Section 32-G before

the  Additional  Tehsildar  and  Agricultural  Lands

Tribunal.   Additional  Tehsildar  passed  an  order

holding  that  the  tenant  has  lost  his  right  to

purchase the land and declared that the purchase of

land  by  the  tenant  has  become  ineffective.   On

remand, the Tehsildar again held that tenant could

exercise  his  right  of  purchase  by  sending  an

intimation upto 17.01.1967 and since the tenant had

failed  to  send  such  an  intimation,  his  right  of

purchase is forfeited.  It was also held that by the

amendment  incorporated  in  Section  32F(1A)  by

Maharashtra Act 49 of 1969, a further opportunity was

given to the tenant to exercise his right of purchase

19

by sending the intimation upto 17.10.1971 and that

even during this period of extension the tenant did

not  avail  of  the  opportunity.   An  appeal  and  the

revision filed by the tenant was dismissed.  Writ

petition  filed  by  the  tenant  was  also  dismissed

against which the appeal was filed.  In Paragraph

Nos.  10,  12  and  13,  following  was  held  by  this

Court:-

“10. In the present case it is not disputed that the tenant did not send any intimation as required by sub-section (1)(a) either up to 17-1-1967 or even up to 17-10-1971 as provided by the proviso under sub-section (1-A) of Section 32-F. Moreover, the tenant in his statement given on 25-8-1960 before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal stated that he was aware that the respondent-landlord would be attaining majority on 17-1-1965. Thus there was non-compliance on the part of the tenant with the provisions of sub- section (1-A) of Section 32-F of the Act and on that basis it has been held that the tenant  could  not  avail  the  right  of purchase  conferred  under  Section  32  read with Section 32-F of the Act.

12. It  cannot,  therefore,  be  said  that there is an automatic purchase of the land by the tenant in a case where the landlord happens  to  be  a  minor  or  a  widow  or  a person  subject  to  any  mental  or  physical disability as mentioned in Section 32-F. In such a case the right of purchase conferred on the tenant can be effective only if it

20

is  exercised  in  accordance  with  the provisions of Section 32-F.

13. ………………We are, therefore, of the opinion that  requirement  regarding  intimation  by the tenant to the landlord prescribed under sub-section  (1-A)  of  Section  32-F  is mandatory in nature and the failure on the part of the tenant in the present case to give  such  an  intimation  to  the  landlord within the prescribed period has resulted in the tenant having failed to avail the right to purchase conferred on him and it has  been  rightly  held  that  the  tenant having  failed  to  exercise  the  right  to purchase conferred on him by the Act was liable  to  summary  eviction  under  Section 32-P(1) of the Act.”

16. Again in  Appa Narsappa Magdum (D) Through LRS.

vs. Akubai Ganpati Nimbalkar & others, (1994) 4 SCC

443, this Court had occasion to examine Section 32F

and Section 31 of the Act.  The facts of the case as

noticed in paragraph No.2 are as follows:-

“2. As  landlady  Shevantibai  was  a  widow, the  deemed  date  of  statutory  purchase  by the appellant-tenant was postponed. It is not in dispute that his right to purchase the land was for that reason governed by the  provisions  of  Section  32-F  of  the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.  Shevantibai  died  on  8-12-1965.  The appellant thereafter on 15-6-1968 gave an intimation to the heirs of Shevantibai that he  was  interested  in  purchasing  the  land under Section 32-F of the Act. On 9-7-1968, the  legal  representatives  of  Shevantibai applied under Section 32-P of the Act for a

21

declaration  that  as  the  tenant  had  not complied with the requirements of Section 32-F  the  sale  has  become  ineffective  and therefore  the  possession  of  land  may  be restored to them as their holding was less than  the  ceiling  area.  The  Tehsildar granted that application. Aggrieved by that order, the appellant filed an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer who allowed it and remanded  the  case  for  deciding  it  under Section  32-G  of  the  Act.  Therefore,  the heirs  of  Shevantibai  filed  a  revision petition  before  the  Maharashtra  Revenue Tribunal  and  contended  that  since  the tenant  had  failed  to  exercise  his  right under  Section  32-F  within  the  stipulated period, the purchase had become ineffective and, therefore, the Sub-Divisional Officer was  in  error  in  allowing  the  appeal  and sending  the  matter  back  to  the  Tehsildar for deciding the same under Section 32-G. The Tribunal accepted this contention and allowed  the  revision  application  and restored the order passed by the Tehsildar. The High Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal.”

17. The submission on behalf of the appellants that

heirs of the landlady had not given any intimation to

the  appellants  about  her  death  and  therefore  they

could  not  have  known  who  are  the  heirs  of  the

landlady and give intimation to them was rejected.

The submission that the period of one year should be

counted from the date of the knowledge of the tenants

22

was also not accepted.  In Paragraph No. 4, following

has been laid down:-

“4. It was submitted by the learned counsel that  this  being  a  welfare  legislation enacted for the benefit of tenants should be construed in a liberal manner. He also submitted  that  the  heirs  of  the  landlady had  not  given  any  intimation  to  the appellant about her death and therefore he could not have known who were the heirs of the landlady and given intimation to them. He submitted that the period of one year should  be  counted  from  the  date  of  the knowledge of the tenant. We cannot accept this  submission  because  the  language  of Sections 32-F and 31 is quite clear and the period of one year will have to be counted in accordance with the said provisions and not from the date of the knowledge of the tenant. The provision of law being clear, we cannot in such a case grant relief on the basis of equity.”

18. Sudam Ganpat Kutwal, Power-of-Attorney-Holder of

Shankar  Sitaram  Bhosle  Vs.  Shevantabai  Tukaram

Gulumkar  (Dead)  by  LR.  Maruti  Shankar  Pachpute,

(2006) 7 SCC 200 was a case where provisions of 1948

Act especially Sections 31 and 32F were elaborately

considered.  The appellant was inducted as tenant of

agricultural  land  in  the  year  1954  and  was

cultivating the land personally.  The landlord filed

an application under Section 31 read with Section 29

23

in the year 1958. An order was made directing that

possession of half of the land should be delivered to

the landlord for her bonafide personal cultivation.

Landlord filed another case in the year 1964 seeking

possession of the remaining half of the land on the

ground  that  the  appellant  had  committed  certain

defaults.  The petition was rejected.  The landlord

died on 23.03.1975, and thereafter her successor-in-

title’s  name  was  entered  in  the  record-of-rights.

Successor-in-title filed an application under Section

32P read with Section 32F for a declaration that the

deemed statutory purchase by the tenant be declared

as void and ineffective, as the tenant had failed to

fulfil the mandatory requirement of giving a notice

of intimation of purchase within the time stipulated

under  Section  32F(1A).   Agricultural  Land  Tribunal

accepted the contention of successor-in-title holding

that tenant had failed to issue a notice of purchase.

The  appellant  had  filed  a  writ  petition  aggrieved

with the order of Agricultural Land Tribunal, which

writ petition was dismissed.  The issue, which was

24

considered  by  this  Court  has  been  noticed  in

Paragraph No. 14 to the following effect:-

“14. The dispute in this appeal relates to the question as to whether it was necessary for  the  tenant  to  issue  a  notice  of intimation of purchase under Section 32-F (1-A) of the Act to the successor-in-title of Anusuyabai in regard to the half portion retained by him under Section 31-B(1) read with Section 31(1) of the Act and whether the failure to do so resulted in forfeiture of the tenant’s right to the said land or right to purchase the said land under the Act.”

19.  After noticing various provisions of the Act,

this  Court  in  Paragraph  No.  23  of  the  judgment

recorded its conclusions, which is to the following

effect:-

“23. The  position  as  disclosed  by  a combined and harmonious reading of Sections 31, 32, 32-F and 32-G may be stated thus:

(a) Where the landlord has not served on the  tenant,  a  notice  of  termination  [as stated in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 32], the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land on the tillers’ day (1- 4-1957);

(b)  Where  the  tenant  is  deemed  to  have purchased the land on the tillers’ day (1- 4-1957), the Lands Tribunal is required to issue  notice  and  determine  the  price  of land to be paid by the tenant. Where there is  a  deemed  purchase,  but  the  right  to

25

purchase  is  postponed,  the  Land  Tribunal shall determine the price of land, as soon as may be after the postponed date. (c) A landlord had a right to give notice and  make  an  application  for  possession after terminating the tenancy, if he wanted the  land  bona  fide  for  personal cultivation, provided the notice was served on the tenant on or before 31-12-1956 (with copy to the Mamlatdar) and application for possession under Section 29 was filed on or before 31-3-1957.

(d) A landlord widow is also entitled to make  an  application  for  possession  under sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 31 which is an enabling provision, extends the time within which the widow can seek possession under Section  31(1)  of  the  Act,  beyond  31-12- 1956. As a result, where the landlord is a widow, then the notice required under sub- section (1) of Section 31 may be given and the  application  for  possession  under Section 29 may be made by her so long as her  interest  in  the  land  exists.  Such notice can also be given by the successor- in-title of the widow within one year from the date on which the interest of the widow in the land ceases to exist.

(e) Where the landlord is a widow [and she does not exercise her right under Section 31(1) of the Act], the right to purchase under the deemed purchase is postponed till the expiry of the period during which such (disabled)  landlord  is  entitled  to terminate the tenancy under Section 31(3). The  tenant  desirous  of  exercising  such right shall, however, give an intimation in that  behalf  to  the  landlord  and  the Tribunal  within  one  year  thereafter,  as required under Section 32-F(1-A).

26

Consequently, where the landlord, being a widow as on 1-4-1957, does not choose to terminate  the  tenancy  for  personal cultivation,  the  tenancy  continues  during her lifetime and on the death of the widow, her successor-in-title will have the right to  terminate  the  tenancy  within  one  year from the date of death of the widow. The tenant  shall  have  the  right  to  purchase such  land,  under  Section  32,  within  one year from the expiry of the period during which such successor-in-title of the widow is given the right to terminate the tenancy under Section 31(3) by giving an intimation as required under Section 32-F(1-A).

(f)  Where  a  landlord,  who  is  a  widow, exercises  her  right  of  termination  and secures possession of part of the tenanted land for personal cultivation under Section 31(1) of the Act, then there is no question of her successor-in-title giving a notice of  termination  within  one  year  from  the date on which the widow’s interest ceases to  exist.  When  Section  31(3)  ceases  to apply, Section 32-F also will not apply and there is no need for the tenant to give any intimation under Section 32-F(1-A).

(g) On an order for possession being made in favour of a widow landlord in regard to land up to 50% of the tenanted land under Section  31(1)  read  with  Section  31-B(1), the widow will get possession of such land and the tenant continues in possession in regard to the remaining land. In regard to the  land  remaining  with  the  tenant,  rent has to be fixed under Section 31-D, until the  purchase  price  is  determined  under Section 32-G(5) and is paid by the tenant purchaser.”

27

20. In the above case, this Court held that there was

no need at all for the tenant to issue any notice of

intimation  to  the  landlord  as  successor-in-tile  as

the landlord has lost right to terminate the tenancy

regarding remaining half land.  The contention that

tenant  in  facts  of  that  case  has  to  issue  notice

under Section 32F within the period prescribed was

rejected while observing following in paragraph No.

27:-  

“27. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent relied on the decisions of this Court in Amrit Bhikaji Kale v.  Kashinath Janardhan Trade (1983) 3 SCC 437, Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai (1995) 5 SCC 243, Appa  Narsappa  Magdum v.  Akubai  Ganapati Nimbalkar (1999) 4 SCC 443 and  Balchandra Anantrao Rakvi v. Ramchandra Tukaram (2001) 8 SCC 616 to contend that the tenant has to issue  a  notice  under  Section  32-F  within the period prescribed and if he fails to do so, he loses the right to purchase the land and  the  landlord  will  become  entitled  to the same absolutely. These were all cases where the landlord under disability had not sought possession for personal cultivation under Section 31(1) and where admittedly, Sections  31(3)  and  32-F  applied  and consequently,  there  was  an  obligation  on the  part  of  the  tenant  to  send  an intimation under Section 32-F(1-A). None of the cases related to a widow landlord who had  terminated  the  tenancy  during  her lifetime and taken possession of a portion

28

of the tenanted land. Therefore, the said decisions will not apply.”

21. The next judgment to be noticed is Tukaram Maruti

Chavan Vs. Maruti Narayan Chavan (Dead) by LRS. And

Others  (2008)  9  SCC  358,  which  judgment  has  been

relied by Revenue Tribunal also in the present case.

The  facts  of  the  case  have  been  noticed  in  the

Paragraph Nos. 2 to 5, which are to the following

effect:-  

“2. The  relevant  facts  leading  to  the filing of this appeal, as emerging from the case  made  out  by  the  appellant,  may  be summarised as follows:

The  dispute  arose  out  of  the provision of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands  Act,  1948 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the Act”) relating to the land being Gat No. 44, measuring 5 hectares and 24 ares in Village Malangaon, Kavathe, Mahankal Tehsil of Sangli District in the  State  of  Maharashtra  (in  short “the  disputed  land”).  Late  Smt Narmadabai who was a widow, was the original  landowner  of  the  disputed land. She died in 1964 leaving behind her two sons, Ramchandra and Laxman Bhau Sutar.

3. On 1-4-1957 i.e. on the Tiller’s Day, the  appellant  was  in  cultivation  of  the disputed  land.  The  original  tenant  named Maruti died subsequently in 1994 during the pendency of the writ petition in the High

29

Court of Judicature at Bombay. The original tenant  had  initiated  proceedings  under Section  32-G  of  the  Act  before  the Additional  Tahsildar,  Kavathe  Makhanlal, and the case was decided in his favour with the  purchase  price  of  the  disputed  land being fixed. Thereafter, one of the heirs of the deceased landowner Narmadabai, named Laxman,  preferred  an  appeal  to  the appellate authority against the said order. After the matter was remanded back to the Additional  Tahsildar,  again  an  order affirming the previous position was passed in favour of the tenant under Section 32-G. This  time,  the  other  heir  of  late  Smt Narmadabai,  namely,  Ramchandra,  challenged the  said  order  before  the  Sub-Divisional Officer, Miraj, and he again by his order dated 31-3-1978, remanded the matter to the Tahsildar  for  a  detailed  enquiry  and decision on the following points:

“(1) The clear title of the disputed land  of  the  applicant  Ramchandra should be enquired.

(2) The point of giving notice under Section  32-F  of  the  Act  to  the landlord and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal  should  be  enquired  as  per the provisions under Section 32-F of the Act.”

4. When  the  matter  came  up  before  the Tahsildar, he passed an order holding the second respondent as the sole owner of the disputed land. The purchase of the disputed land  by  the  appellant  was  therefore declared  to  be  ineffective  for  want  of notice under Section 32-F and the disputed land was ordered to be disposed of under Section  32-P  of  the  Act.  Thereafter,  the appellant preferred a revision before the

30

Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal but the same was dismissed.

5. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal,  the  appellant  filed  a  writ petition  before  the  Bombay  High  Court  on 28-12-1983.  The  Bombay  High  Court  by  its impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  16-4- 1999, dismissed the said writ petition on the ground that the respondent (Ramchandra) was the sole owner of the disputed land in pursuance of the letters of administration obtained by him from the civil court. It is this decision of the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal in respect of which the writ petition was filed.”

22. The contention of the appellant has been noticed

in Paragraph No.10 of the judgment, which is to the

following effect:-

“10. The learned counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that if Sections 31 and 32-F are read together, then the tenant is not  required  to  give  any  notice  to  the landlord because neither Narmadabai nor her successor-in-interest ever gave any notice to the tenant under Section 31 of the Act. Counsel  for  the  respondent  on  the  other hand  contended  that  Section  32-F  is  a complete  section  in  itself  and  the provision  of  the  earlier  sections  cannot influence  or  have  overriding  effect.  He therefore  contended  that  whatever  be  the right of the landlord under Section 31, the same  gets  separated  by  virtue  of  the provisions of Section 32-F. This contention was  negated  by  the  counsel  for  the appellant arguing that Section 32-F cannot be said to have overriding effect on all the earlier sections.”

31

 23. This  Court  held  that  tenant  was  under  legal

obligation or statutory duty to give notice of his

intention  to  purchase  the  land  as  required  under

Section 32F.  In Paragraph No. 13, following has been

stated:-

“13. In our view, the High Court correctly pointed out that the provisions of Section 32-F  are  independent  in  nature  and  are separate from the provisions under Section 31  of  the  Act.  The  exception  mentioned under Section 32-F(1) to sub-section (2) is limited to the sections referred to in it i.e.  from  Sections  32  to  32-E  (both inclusive) and Sections 32-G to 32-R (both inclusive).  Further  the  expression “Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding  sections”  under  sub-section  (1) of Section 32-F is of paramount importance. Considering the fact that Section 31 is not included  in  the  sections  mentioned  under sub-section  (2)  of  Section  32-F,  and  the expression  “Notwithstanding  anything contained in the preceding sections” under sub-section (1) of Section 32-F, we are of the  view  that  the  right  given  to  the landlord under Section 31 has nothing to do with the right given to the tenant under Section  32-F  for  purchasing  the  land  and consequently  it  has  to  be  held  that  the appellant in this case was under a legal obligation or statutory duty to give notice of his intention to purchase the land as required under Section 32-F.”

24. The submission of the appellant that she could

not serve a notice since she was not sure of the

32

title of the disputed land was also not accepted by

this Court.  Following was observed by this Court in

Paragraph No.18:-    

“18. The  learned  counsel  appearing  on behalf of the appellant has argued before us  that  the  appellant  could  not  serve  a notice to the landowner since he was not sure about the title of the disputed land owing to a dispute between the two sons of late Smt Narmadabai who were claiming the title  of  the  disputed  land.  We  cannot accept  this  contention  of  the  appellant. The order passed by the Tahsildar, Kavathe Mahankal,  lays  down  the  fact  that  Shri Ramchandra, Respondent 2 in this case, had produced a certified copy of the judgment and  order  dated  28-4-1966,  passed  by  the Senior Joint Civil Judge in Miscellaneous Application No. 25 of 1965 in which it has been declared that Shri Ramchandra is the owner of the disputed land on the basis of the will executed by his mother late Smt Narmadabai.  The  appellant  also  in  his deposition admitted that:

“The owner of the said land was Smt Narmadabai  Bhau  Sutar.  Narmadabai died before 10/12 years. Ramchandra Bhau Sutar filed suit on the basis of the  will,  and  got  transferred  the land of Narmadabai in his name.”

25. The ratio of the above noted judgments can be

restated in following words:-

33

(i) For a landlord suffering from a disability

on  the  Tillers  Day  i.e.  01.04.1957,  the

deemed purchase shall be suspended. (ii) Landlord suffering from a disability has a

right under Section 31(3) of the Act to

give notice of termination of tenancy and

file an application for possession. (iii) Under Section 31(3), a minor, within one

year from date on which he attains majoriy;

a successor-in-title of a widow within one

year from the date on which her interest in

the  land  ceases  to  exist;  and  landlord

within  one  year  from  the  date  on  which

his/her  mental  or  physical  disability

ceases  to  exist  can  also  give  an

application for termination of tenancy and

possession. (iv) Under  Section  32F  tenant  has  right  to

purchase  where  landlord  was  minor  or  a

widow  or  a  person  subject  to  mental  or

physical disability within one year from

the expiry of the period during which such

landlord  is  entitled  to  terminate  the

tenancy under Section 31.   

34

(v) The tenant, in event, does not exercise his

right  of  purchase  within  the  period  as

prescribed under Section 32F(1)(a), his/her

right to purchase shall be lost.         

26. In the present case, it is undisputed fact that

landlady  died  on  07.05.1999  and  within  one  year

thereafter  her  successor-in-title  did  not  exercise

his right under Section 31(3) and thereafter within

one  year  tenant  has  not  given  any  intimation  for

purchase  as  contemplated  by  Section  32(F).   The

question to be answered is as to whether in the above

facts,  Sub-Divisional  Officer,  Revenue  Tribunal  as

well as the High Court were right in their conclusion

that  right  of  the  tenant,  i.e.  the  appellant  has

lost,  he  having  not  issued  any  intimation  for

purchase of the land within one year from expiry of

the period as contemplated under Section 31(3).

27.  The  ratio  of  this  Court  as  noticed  above

especially  in  judgments  of  this  Court  in  Appa

Narsappa Magdum (supra), Sudam Ganpat Kutwal(supra)

and Tukaram Maruti Chavan (supra) clearly support the

submission  of  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents

35

that the appellants having not exercised their right

to  purchase  under  Section  32F(1)  read  with  (1A)

within the time prescribed the right of purchase of

the tenant is lost. But there is one aspect of the

matter  which  needs  to  be  noted  and  has  not  been

considered in the above judgments rendered by two-

Judge Benches of this Court which we shall notice

hereinafter.  

28. The  1948  Act  was  amended  by  Tenancy  and

Agricultural  Lands  Laws  (Amendment)  Act,  1969.

Section 32F was also amended by the above Amendment

Act, 1969. It is useful to refer to the Statement of

Objects and Reasons which led to amendment in Section

32  of  the  Act.  L.A.  Bill  No.  LXII  of  1969  was

introduced in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly on

18th August,  1969.  The  Statement  of  Objects  and

Reasons of the Bill are relevant for the present case

which are to the following effect:

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS.

It has come to the notice of Government that a number of tenants in the Bombay area and the Vidarbha region of the State, failed to acquire ownership right in the lands held by them on account of their

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being dispossessed from the land otherwise than in the manner laid down in the relevant tenancy law. It is, therefore, expedient to amend the tenancy laws in force in these regions for safe­guarding the interest of these dispossessed tenants.

It is also noticed that a large number of tenants in the Bombay area of the State holding land from landlords who were minors have lost right to purchase land for their failure to give intimation within the period laid down in sub­section (IA) of section 32, It is, therefore, necessary to give these tenants a fresh opportunity to purchase land. Section 32F is, therefore, being suitably amended for that purpose.

As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, in Civil appeals Nos. 312(N) and 313(N) of 1966 from the judgement of the High Court of Gujarat regarding jurisdiction of Civil Court in certain matters, it has also become necessary to suitably amend certain sections of the tenancy laws in force in the three regions of the State.

The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”

29. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is

noticed that a large number of tenants in the Bombay

area of the State holding lands from landlords who

were  minors  have  lost  right  to  purchase  land  for

their failure to give intimation within the period

laid  down  in  sub-section  (1A)  of  Section  32.  The

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above reason lead to the amendment. By Amendment Act,

1969 in Section 32F sub-section (1) in clause (a)

following words were added: “and  for  enabling  the  tenant  to  exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send  an  intimation  to  the  tenant  of  the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord  is  entitled  to  terminate  the tenancy under section 31”

30. The above amendment caste a statutory obligation

on a landlord who has attained the majority to send

intimation  to  the  tenant.  The  above  amendment  was

made to enable the tenant to exercise the right of

purchase  which  was  the  object  and  purpose  of  the

amendment.  

31. Section  31(3)  enumerates  three  categories  of

landlord who suffers from one or other disabilities

due to which the right of purchase of tenant has been

suspended on Tillers Day.  The three categories of

landlord  have  been  empowered  to  give  notice  of

termination  of  tenancy.  Section  31(3)  for  ready

reference is reproduced again:

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“Section 31(3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may be given [and an application for possession under section 29 may be made,]––  

(i)  by  the  minor  within  one  year from  the  date  on  which  he  attains majority;

(ii) by the successor-in-title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;  

(iii) within one year from the date on which mental or physical disability ceases to exist; and  

(iv)        ”    

32. Amendment in Section 32(1)F(a) added by Act No.49

of 1969 expressly covered a case of landlord who was

minor  and  has  attained  majority.  Intimation  by  a

minor  landlord  who  has  attained  majority  has  been

made a statutory obligation of the landlord so that

tenant may exercise his right of purchase. The other

two categories which are a widow or a person subject

to  mental  or  physical  disability  have  not  been

expressly included in the amendment incorporated in

Act 49 of 1969. The Statement of Objects and Reasons

of the amendment given in 1969 as well as the express

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provisions of such amendment are for the purposes and

object  to  enable  the  tenant  to  exercise  right  of

purchase.  When  for  one  category  of  landlord  i.e.

minor it is mandated that he will intimate the tenant

after he attained the majority so that tenant may be

enabled to exercise the right of purchase, we are of

the view that the same object has to be read in two

other categories of landlord that is the successor-

in-title of a widow and a landlord whose mental or

physical  disability  has  been  ceased.  When  the

legislative object is to facilitate a tenant of a

disabled  landlord  after  cessation  of  disability  to

exercise right of purchase, the same benefit needs to

be  extended  to  other  two  categories  of  disabled

landlord. We do not find any distinction in three

categories  of  disabled  landlord  nor  tenant  of  a

landlord who was a minor can be put on any higher

footing as compared to other landlords suffering from

the above two disabilities. The question may be asked

that amendment only expressly included the landlord

who has attained majority to send intimation and the

legislature consciously did not include the other two

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categories of landlord i.e. successor-in-interest of

a  widow  and  landlord  of  a  mental  and  physical

disability ceases to exist. The Objects and Reasons

and express amendment made by Act 49 of 1969 were

with  a  view  to  enable  the  tenant  to  exercise  his

right of purchase. The said legislative intendment is

to be extended to all tenants of landlords who were

suffering from disability on the Tillers Day, whether

successor-in-title  of  a  widow  or  a  landlord  whose

mental or physical disability ceases. All the three

categories  of  tenants  should  be  extended  the  same

benefit and provision should be interpreted so that

all tenants may be enabled to exercise their right of

purchase effectively and in real sense.  

33. As in the present case tenant’s case is that he

was unaware of the death of the landlady since for

the last several years she was living in Bombay, the

date of knowledge of death of the landlady cannot be

said to be a irrelevant factor and unless the tenant

is  aware  of  the  death  of  landlady  or  in  case  of

landlord  suffering  from  physical  or  mental

disability,  how  he  will  exercise  his  right  of

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purchase is an important question. The 1948 Act and

the Amendments made by 1969 Act were with intent to

facilitate  tenants  to  exercise  their  right.  The

Amendments  by  Act  15  of  1957  was  agrarian  reform

making tillers of the soil the owners of the land

which was done to achieve the object of making all

tillers  of  the  soil  as  owners  of  the  land.  While

interpreting  the  provisions  of  Section  32F,  1A  as

well as Section 31(3) the purpose and object of the

1948 Act, amendments made therein from time to time

cannot be lost sight.  

34. When  Section  32F  of  Act  1948  gives  right  to

purchase  to  a  tenant  whose  landlord  was  suffering

from a disability on Tillers Day, the exercise of

right  to  purchase  by  such  tenant  has  to  be

interpreted in a manner so as to make the exercise of

right meaningful and effective. The above said right

cannot  be  defeated  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not

exercised within period prescribed when the tenant is

unaware as to when the period has begun.  

35. The period prescribed for exercising the right to

purchase  is  not  a  period  of  limitation  but  a

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reasonable period prescribed for the exercise of a

right. The knowledge of cessation of disability of

landlord by the tenant can only be commencement of

period prescribed.

36. When a statute gives a right to a tenant, statute

needs to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the

right workable, effective and meaningful. Such right

cannot be defeated unless it is proved that tenant

even after knowing that disability has ceased does

not exercise his right within the period prescribed.  

37. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Appa

Narsappa  Magdum  (supra)  has  expressly  rejected  the

submission that tenant had no intimation of the death

of landlady. Further judgments of this Court in Sudam

Ganpat  Kutwal  (supra) and  Tukaram  Maruti

Chavan(supra)  also  laid  down  the  same  ratio.  The

judgments in the above three cases were rendered by

the two-Judge Benches in which cases the amendments

made  by  Act  49  of  1969  were  neither  raised  or

considered. We, thus, are of the view that the ratio

laid down in the above cases needs to be reconsidered

and explained in view of the object and purpose for

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which amendments were made in Section 32F(1)(a) by

Act  49  of  1969  as  noticed  above.  We,  thus,  refer

following  questions  for  consideration  of  a  larger

Bench: (1) Whether  the  object  and  purpose  of  amendment

made in Section 32F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969 is

also relevant and applicable for exercise of

right to purchase by a tenant of landlord who

was  widow  or  suffering  from  mental  and

physical disability on Tillers Day ? (2) Whether the successor-in-interest of a widow

is also obliged to send an intimation to the

tenant of cessation of interest of the widow

to enable the tenant to exercise his right of

purchase.  (3) In the event the answer to above question (1)

or (2) is in affirmative, whether decision of

this  Court  in  Appa  Narsappa  Magdum,  Sudam

Ganpat  Kutwal  and  Tukaram  Maruti  Chavan

(supra)needs reconsideration and explanation.   

38. Let the papers be placed before the Hon’ble the

Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench. In the

meantime, we direct that the parties shall maintain

the status quo.

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   ......................J.  

                           ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.                              ( AJAY RASTOGI )

New Delhi,  December 14, 2018.        

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