22 November 2012
Supreme Court
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VADLAKONDA LENIN Vs STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,RANJAN GOGOI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000126-000126 / 2009
Diary number: 37591 / 2007
Advocates: SANDEEP NARAIN Vs D. MAHESH BABU


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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.     126     OF     2009   

Vadlakonda Lenin  …Appellant Versus

State of Andhra Pradesh  …Respondent

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

RANJAN     GOGOI,     J.   

This appeal is directed against the judgment  

and order dated 29.9.2006 passed by the High Court  

of Andhra Pradesh affirming the conviction of the  

accused-appellant under Section 302 IPC and the  

sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him.  

2. On 18.4.2003 at about 10.30 a.m. PW 1, Ponnam  

Pedda Sathaiah, the father of the deceased, filed a  

FIR in the Maripeda police station stating that he

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had given his daughter, Vadlakonda Radha, in  

marriage to the accused-appellant in the year 1999.  

At the time of marriage a sum of Rs.50,000 was  

claimed to have been given by the first informant  

as dowry, inspite of which, according to the first  

informant, the accused-appellant had been demanding  

more dowry and on that account committing  

atrocities on his daughter. In the FIR filed it was  

alleged that in the early morning of 18.4.2003 the  

accused-appellant had murdered his wife while she  

was sleeping and had run away. It was further  

alleged by the first informant that on coming to  

know of the incident he rushed to the appellant’s  

house and saw his daughter taking her last breath.  

Thereafter, he had brought her to the Area Hospital  

at Mahbubabad but on the way to the hospital she  

died at about 8.00 a.m.  

3. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, a case under  

section 302 and 304B of the IPC was registered. In  

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the course of the investigation inquest was held on  

the dead body and the same was sent for post mortem  

examination. A large number of witnesses were  

examined and their statements were recorded under  

section 161 Cr.P.C. On 3.5.2003 the accused-

appellant who was absconding was arrested from his  

house. On the same day at the instance of the  

accused-appellant PW 15, M. Laxminarayana, the Sub-

Divisional Police Officer of Mahabubabad recovered  

a tapper knife (M.O.6) and a blood stained shirt of  

the accused (M.O.7).  

4. Charge sheet under section 302 and 498A IPC was  

submitted against the accused-appellant. However in  

the trial court, charge under section 302 alone was  

framed. The trial ended in the conviction of the  

accused-appellant who, as already noticed, was  

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  

life. The aforesaid conviction and sentence having  

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been affirmed by the High Court this appeal, by  

special leave, has been filed.

5. We have heard Mr. J.M. Sharma, learned counsel  

for the appellant and Mr. Mayur R. Shah, learned  

counsel for the respondent-State.

6.  Of the 15 witnesses examined by the  

prosecution, the evidence tendered by PWs 1 and 2  

(father and brother of the deceased); the evidence  

of  PW 3, Ponnam Buchamma, who is a neighbour and  

who had seen the deceased lying on cot in her house  

with bleeding injuries from the neck and the  

accused running away from the place; the evidence  

of PW 10,  who was a witness to the seizure of  

material objects No. 6 and 7 and PW 15, the Sub-

Divisional Police Officer of Mahabubabad who had  

recovered material objects 6 and 7 on the basis of  

the statement made by the accused (Exh.P8) as well  

as the evidence of PW 12, Dr. Vaidehi, the Medical  

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Officer who had performed the post mortem, would be  

relevant, and therefore, must be noticed in some  

details.

7. PWs 1 and 2 have deposed in the same vein. From  

the evidence of the said two witnesses, it  

transpires that the accused, though had received a  

sum of Rs.50,000 at the time of his marriage, had  

been persistently demanding more dowry and  

harassing and assaulting his wife i.e. the deceased  

from time to time. It also transpires from the  

evidence of PW 1 and 2 that in the evening before  

the occurrence there was a betrothal ceremony of  

the brother of the deceased, which was attended,  

amongst others, by PWs 1, 2 as well as the accused  

and the deceased. A plot of land measuring one and  

half acres and Rs.30,000 was offered as dowry to  

the brother of the deceased which had led to  

further renewed demands for additional dowry by the  

accused. Immediately after the ceremony a quarrel  

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had taken place between the accused and the  

deceased as a result of which the deceased went to  

her co-sister’s place (PW 5) to spend the night. In  

the early morning, she came to her own house and  

was lying in a cot when, according to PWs 1 and 2,  

the accused caused knife injuries on the neck of  

the deceased. According to the said witnesses  

though the deceased was taken to the hospital she  

died en-route.  

8. PW 3 had deposed that in the early morning of  

the day of the occurrence while she was going to  

the stools side she noticed the deceased lying in  

the cot of her house with injuries on the neck from  

which she was bleeding. PW 3 had also deposed that  

she saw the accused running away from the house.  

The co-sister of the deceased to whose house the  

deceased had gone after the quarrel with the  

accused was examined as PW 5. She, however, did not  

support the prosecution case. PW 3 had however  

admitted that in the early morning of 18.4.2003 as  

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the deceased had not come out of her house she went  

to the house of the deceased and found her lying in  

the cot with injuries on the neck. PW 10, as  

already noticed, had deposed to the recovery of  

M.O. Nos.6 and 7 on the basis of the statement made  

by the accused (Ex.P.8) before PW 15, the Sub-

Divisional Police Officer.  PW 12 is the Doctor who  

had performed the post mortem on the deceased. He  

had deposed that he found incised wound involving  

the whole of the neck of the deceased and also cut  

wounds of the hyoid bone and the trachea.  

Corresponding to the said external injuries, PW 12  

found the carotid vessels (the major vital blood  

vessels supplying blood to the brain) as well as  

the wind pipe of the deceased to have been cut. PW  

15 is the Sub-Divisional Police Officer before whom  

the accused had made the statement (Exh.P8) leading  

to the recovery of material object No. 6 (knife)  

and material object No. 7 (blood stained shirt). PW  

15 had also deposed that the whereabouts of the  

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accused after the incident were not known and he  

could be arrested only on 3.5.2003.  

9. Coupled with the above, from the examination of  

the accused under section 313 Cr.P.C., it  

transpires that the accused was not available after  

the incident. The absence of the accused has been  

sought to be explained by him by stating that he  

could come to know of the news of the death of his  

wife from the newspapers after which he had  

reported the incident to his sister.

10. A careful consideration of the evidence adduced  

by the prosecution would go to show that there is  

no direct evidence of any eye witness to the crime  

alleged against the accused. However, it transpires  

from the depositions of the prosecution witnesses  

that certain circumstances inimical to the accused  

have been proved by the prosecution in the present  

case. Such circumstances which have been culled out  

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by the learned trial court and also by the High  

Court can be summarised as below:  

i) The accused had been making demands for dowry  and on that account was harassing,  intimidating and committing atrocities on the  deceased;

ii) the accused and the deceased alognwith PWs 1  and 2 had attended the betrothal function of  the brother of the deceased in the evening  prior to the incident. Immediately after the  incident, there was a quarrel between the  accused and the deceased;

iii) in the early morning of the next day the  deceased was found by PW 3, lying in a cot in  her own house with injuries on her neck;

iv) the accused was found by PW 3 to be running  away from the place.

v) the whereabouts of the accused was not known  after the incident and he could be arrested  only on 3.5.2003; and

vi) the accused had stated in his examination  under section 313 Cr.P.C. that he came to  know of the incident only from the  newspapers, whereafter he had explained the  whole incident to his sister.

11. The culpability of the accused-appellant, in  

the absence of any direct evidence, has to be  

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judged on the basis of the circumstances enumerated  

above. The principles of law governing proof of a  

criminal charge by circumstantial evidence would  

hardly require any reiteration save and except that  

the circumstances on which the prosecution relies  

must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt and such  

circumstances must be capable of giving rise to an  

inference which is inconsistent with any other  

hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. It is  

only in such an event that the conviction of the  

accused, on the basis of the circumstantial  

evidence brought by the prosecution, would be  

permissible in law. In this regard a reference to  

the “five golden principles”  enunciated by this  

Court in Sharad     Birdhichand     Sarda     v.     State     of    

Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 may be recapitulated  

for which purpose para 153 of the judgment in the  

above case may be usefully extracted below:  

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show  that the following conditions must be fulfilled  before a case against an accused can be said to be  fully established:

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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of  guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated  that the circumstances concerned 'must or should'  and not 'may be' established. There is not only a  grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may  be proved' and 'must be or should be proved’  as  was held by this Court in Shivaji     Sahebrao     Bobade    v. State     of     Maharashtra   : (1973) 2 SCC 793 where  the following observations were made:

certainly, it is a primary principle that the  accused must be and not merely may be guilty  before a Court can convict, and the mental  distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long  and divides vague conjectures from sure  conclusions.

(2) the facts so established should be consistent  only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the  accused, that is to say, they should not be  explainable on any other hypothesis except that  the accused is guilty.

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive  nature and tendency.

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis  except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete  as not to leave any reasonable ground for the  conclusion consistent with the innocence of the  accused and must show that in all human  probability the act must have been done by the  accused.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant has  

vehemently argued that in the present case the  

prosecution has failed to prove the most vital  

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circumstance of the case, namely, motive of the  

accused for committing the alleged crime. Infact,  

according to the learned counsel, no charge against  

the accused having been framed under section 498A  

IPC inspite of specific allegations of demand of  

dowry and harassment etc. of the deceased by the  

accused the motive for commission of the alleged  

offence remain unsubstantiated. Learned counsel has  

also pointed out that the prosecution case to the  

effect that the deceased had left her house in the  

evening prior to the incident and has spent the  

night in the house of co-sister, PW 5, has not been  

established. It is also urged that, in any case, if  

the deceased had spent night in the house of the  

co-sister, as claimed by the prosecution, no  

explanation has been forthcoming as to how she  

could be seen by PW 3 lying injured in the cot in  

her own house in the morning. Learned counsel has  

further submitted that PW 3 has contradicted  

herself on a vital part of the prosecution story,  

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namely, the point of time when she had seen the  

deceased lying in the cot and the accused fleeing  

away from the place. While at one place PW 3 had  

claimed to have seen the above sequence of events  

while going to the stools side, in her cross-

examination she had stated that she saw the same  

while returning.  

13. In reply, the learned State Counsel has  

contended that prosecution case cannot fail merely  

on account of the absence of proof of any motive on  

the part of the accused to commit the crime.  

Learned counsel has submitted that the evidence of  

PWs 1 and 2 amply demonstrates that demand for  

dowry was made by the accused from time to time and  

also the ill-treatment meted out by the accused to  

the deceased.  The incident had taken place in the  

house of the accused to which the deceased had  

returned in the early morning. It is pointed out  

that PW 3, who had seen the accused fleeing away  

from the place of occurrence, is related to both  

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the sides and, therefore, is eminently reliable.  

The absence of accused for a period of nearly 15  

days after the incident and the recoveries made on  

the basis of the statement of the accused has been  

pointed out by the learned counsel as sufficient  

proof of the involvement of the accused in the  

crime alleged against him. The contradictions in  

the evidence of PW 3, according to the learned  

counsel, are minor and insignificant. Learned  

counsel has also pointed out that though PW 5 was  

declared hostile, she had, infact, supported the  

prosecution case to the extent that in the early  

morning of the day of the incident, as the deceased  

had not come out from her house, PW 5 had gone to  

the house of the deceased and found her lying on  

the cot with injuries on the neck.

14. We have considered the submissions advanced on  

behalf of the parties and the entire evidence on  

record. Upon such consideration we find that from  

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the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 it is crystal clear  

that the accused had been persistently demanding  

additional dowry from the deceased and had been  

ill-treating her. From the evidence tendered by the  

said two witnesses it is also clear that  

immediately before the incident there was a quarrel  

between the accused and the deceased. In the early  

morning of 18.4.2003 the deceased was found lying  

injured in the cot in her own house by PW 3 as well  

as by PW 5.  Nobody except the accused was in the  

house immediately before the occurrence.  The  

accused was seen fleeing away from the house by PW  

3. Thereafter, the whereabouts of the accused were  

not known until he was arrested on 3.5.2003. After  

his arrest, the accused had made a statement (Exh.  

P.8) on the basis of which a knife and a blood  

stained shirt of the accused (M.Os. 6 and 7) were  

recovered. The explanation offered by the accused  

for his absence for a period of nearly 15 days  

following the death of his wife is unnatural and  

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opposed to all cannons of acceptable human conduct  

and behaviour. The aforesaid circumstances which  

have been proved and established by prosecution, in  

our considered view, squarely satisfies the test  

laid down by this Court in Sharad     Birdhichand     Sarda    

(supra).  The principles laid down in the aforesaid  

decision have been consistently reiterated by this  

court and exhaustively considered in a very recent  

decision in Sathya Narayanan v. State Rep. by  Inspector of Police (decided on November 2, 2012).  (Reported in J.T. 2012 (11) SC 57).

15.  Having considered the totality of the facts of  

the present case and the principles of law as  

above, we are left with no doubt whatsoever that in  

the present case the prosecution has established  

beyond all reasonable doubt that it is the accused  

alone and nobody who had committed the offence.  

Accordingly, we are of the view that the conviction  

of the accused and the sentence imposed on him by  

the learned trial court as affirmed by the High  

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Court will not justify any interference. We,  

therefore, dismiss the appeal and affirm the  

conviction of the accused under section 302 IPC and  

the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him.

................J. [P. SATHASIVAM]

................J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

New Delhi, November 22, 2012.      

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