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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) NO.36 of 2016  

V. VASANTHAKUMAR ...PETITIONER VERSUS

H.C.BHATIA AND ORS. ...RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, CJI. 1. This  petition,  filed  in  public  interest,  raises questions  touching  possible  structural  reforms  at  the highest echelons of the Indian judicial system. Similar questions have been addressed in the past not only by the Law Commission but also by this Court on the judicial side.  We  may  briefly  refer  to  the  same  to  place  the issues that fall for determination in proper perspective.

2. In its 14th Report dated 26th September, 1958, the Law Commission of India advocated the need for a restrained approach  towards  grant  of  special  leaves  to  appeal against judgments and orders passed by the High Courts. The  Commission  felt  that  a  liberal  grant  of  leave  to

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appeal had the tendency to adversely affect the prestige of the High Courts. It said:   

“(13)  Although  the  exercise  of  the jurisdiction  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution  by  the  Supreme  Court  in criminal  matters  sometimes  serves  to prevent injustice, yet the Court might be more chary of granting special leave in such matters as the practice of granting special  leave  freely  has  a  tendency  to affect the prestige of the High Courts.”

3. Then came the 95th report dated 1st March, 1984 in which the Law Commission proposed the setting up of a Constitutional Division within the Supreme Court, in the following words:

“6.4  If  the  proposed  constitutional division is to be created, it will have to be assigned a part of the business of the  Supreme  Court  within  its jurisdiction  as  at  present  provided. The  second  issue  that  falls  to  be considered  is,  what  matters  should  be assigned  to  that  division.   In  this connection,  there  are  two  principal alternatives to be considered as per (a) and (b) below:

(a) This division may be entrusted with the adjudication  of  all  public  law  cases within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. If  this  alternative  is  accepted,  its jurisdiction would comprise–

(i) every  case  involving  a substantial question of law as to the  interpretation  of  the

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Constitution, or an order or rule issued under the Constitution;

(ii) every  case  involving  a  question of  Constitutional  law,  not falling within (1) above;

(iii) every appeal against the decision of a High Court, rendered under Article 226 of the Constitution;

(iv) every appeal against the decision of a tribunal under article 136 of the Constitution (whether such tribunal is created by law passed by  virtue  of  article  323-A  or Article 323-B of the Constitution or  otherwise),  where  a  question of  administrative  law  is involved.

(b) In  the  alternative,  only  matters  of Constitutional  law  may  be  assigned  to the proposed Constitutional Division. If this  alternative  is  accepted,  its jurisdiction  would  only  the  items  (i) and (ii) mentioned in (a) above.  The jurisdiction would then cover only the following:

(i) every  case  involving  a  substantial question  of  law  as  to  the interpretation of the Constitution or an  order  or  rule  issued  under  the Constitution, and

(ii)every  case  involving  a  question  of constitutional law, not falling within (i) above.

Our preference is for alternative (b) above.  It is easier to define precisely and  locate  such  matters,  confined  to constitutional  law  proper.   We appreciate  that  question  of

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constitutional  and  administrative  law often  dovetail  into  each  other, particularly  in  proceedings  under article 226 of the Constitution (which may reach the Supreme Court on appeal). But,  in  our  opinion,  it  would  be desirable  to  make  the  jurisdiction  of the  proposed  division  narrow  and compact, at least for the present.                 

Accordingly,  we  recommend  that  the proposed Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court should be entrusted with the  cases  of  the  nature  mentioned  in alternative (b) above. It follows that other  matters  coming  to  the  Supreme Court  will  be  assigned  to  its  Legal Division.

6.5.  Of  course,  the  creation  of  two divisions in the abstract does not end the matter. For practical implementation of  the  proposed  scheme,  it  will  be necessary  to  deal  with  at  least  two concrete matters, namely, (1) when can a constitutional  issue  be  said  to  be “involved”  and  (ii)  what  will  be  the machinery  for  allocating  cases  between two divisions.

As  to  the  first  matter,  which relates to the criterion to be adopted, we  should  make  it  clear  that  a  case should  be  regarded  as  “involving  a” constitutional  issue  only  when  the decision  of  that  issue  is  absolutely necessary  for  the  disposal  of  the controversy. The mere fact that a party has raised a constitutional issue is not enough. Although, it may not always be possible to determine at the outset (at the  time  of  allocation  of  the  case), whether  the  case  “involves”  a constitutional issue in the above sense,

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it  may  still  be  useful  to  bear  this aspect in mind”

    4. Two years later in  Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice and Others (1986) 4 SCC 767, a Constitution Bench of this Court while disposing of a Writ Petition in which the petitioner had prayed for adoption of a uniform approach and sensitivity in special leave petitions filed by the less fortunate of the litigants as was shown in the case of two big industrialists for whom the Court had held a late night sitting to consider their prayer for bail, held that special leave petitions filed by “small men” were entitled to the same consideration as is given to  those  filed  by  “big  industrialists”.  This  Court declared that it had always regarded the poor and the disadvantaged  to  be  entitled  to  preferential consideration  over  the  rich  and  the  affluent,  the businessmen and the industrialists. That is because the weaker section of the Indian humanity had been deprived of justice for several years on account of their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, and on account of their social and economic backwardness and resultant lack of capacity to  assert  their  rights.  This  Court  rejected  the suggestion that it was not giving to the “small men” the

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same  treatment  as  it  was  giving  to  the  “big industrialists”.  

5. Having said that, this Court declared that it was never intended to be a regular court of appeal against orders made by the High Courts and the Sessions Courts or the Magistrates. It was created as an apex court for the purpose of laying down the law for the entire country and for  that  purpose  it  was  given  the  extraordinary jurisdiction  to  grant  special  leave  to  appeal  under Article  136  of  the  Constitution  so  that  it  could interfere  whenever  it  found  that  the  law  was  not correctly appreciated or applied by the lower courts or tribunals. The jurisdiction was also held to be available for  correction  of  grave  miscarriage  of  justice.  More importantly, this Court held that every case, where the apex court finds some error, need not be entertained for otherwise,  the  Court  would  become  a  regular  court  of appeal and be reduced to a position where it will not be able to remedy any injustice at all, on account of the tremendous backlog of cases which will get accumulated. This Court said:

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“We must realise that in the vast majority of cases the High Courts must become final even if they are wrong. The apex court can also be wrong on occasions but since there is no further appeal, what the apex court says is final.  That is why one American Judge  said  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the United States: “We are right because we are final: we are not final because we are right”.   We  must,  therefore,  reconcile ourselves to the idea that like the apex court which may be wrong on occasions, the High Courts may also be wrong and it is not every error of the High Court which the apex court can possibly correct.  We think it would be desirable to set up a National Court of Appeal which would be in a position to entertain appeals by special leave  from  the  decisions  of  the  High Courts and the Tribunals in the country in civil, criminal, revenue and labour cases and so far as the present apex court is concerned, it should concern itself only with  entertaining  cases,  involving questions of constitutional law and public law.  But until any such policy decision is endorsed by the government, the apex court must interfere only in the limited class  of  cases  where  there  is  a substantial question of law involved which needs to be finally laid at rest by the apex court for the entire country or where there  is  grave,  blatant  and  atrocious miscarriage of justice.”    

6. The Law Commission of India took another two years after  the  above  observations  to  reiterate  its recommendation whereunder it had proposed the splitting of the Court into two divisions. While doing so the Law Commission gave an additional reason namely the handicap

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which the litigant from more distant parts of the Country like Tamil Nadu in South, Gujarat in the West and Assam and  other  States  in  the  East  face  in  the  matter  of accessing  justice  before  the  Supreme  Court.   The Commission observed:

“......The  result  is  that  those  coming from distant places like Tamil Nadu in the South, Gujarat in the West and Assam and other  States  in  the  East  have  to  spend huge amount on travel to reach the Supreme Court.  There  is  a  practice  of  bringing one’s own lawyer who handled the matter in the High Court to the Supreme Court. That adds  to  the  cost.   And  an  adjournment becomes  prohibitive.  Adjournment  is  a recurrent phenomenon in the Court. Costs get multiplied.  Now if the Supreme Court split into Constitutional Court and Court of Appeal or a Federal Court of Appeal, no serious exception could be taken  to the Federal Court of Appeal sitting in Benches in  places  North,  South,  East,  West  and Central  India.   That  would  not  only considerably  reduce  costs  but  also  the litigant will have the advantage of his case being argued by the same advocate who has helped him in the High Court and who may  not  required  to  travel  to  long distances.  Whenever  questions  of constitutionality occur, as pointed out in that report, the Supreme Court can sit in en banc at Delhi and deal with the same. This cost benefit ratio is an additional but  important  reason  for  reiterating support  to  the  recommendations  made  in that report.”             

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7. Then  came  the  229th report  dated  5th August,  2009 submitted  by  the  Law  Commission,  whereunder,  it  once again recommended restructuring of the Supreme Court by setting up of a Constitution Bench at Delhi and Cessation benches in four regions namely; Delhi, Chennai/Hyderabad, Kolkata  and  Mumbai.  Drawing  support  from  the  system prevalent in other countries like Italy, Egypt, Portugal, Ireland,  United  States  and  Denmark  the  Commission recommended that:

“(1)A  Constitution  Bench  be  set  up  at Delhi to deal with constitutional and other allied issues as aforesaid.

(2) Four Cassation Benches be set up in the Northern region/zone at Delhi, the Southern  region/zone  at Chennai/Hyderabad,  the  Eastern region/zone at Kolkata and the Western region/zone at Mumbai to deal with all appellate  work  arising  out  of  the orders/judgments of the High Courts of the  particular region.

(3) If it is found that Article 130 of the Constitution  cannot  be  stretched  to make  it  possible  to  implement  the above  recommendations,  Parliament should enact a suitable legislation/ Constitutional  amendment  for  this purpose.”     

8. In Mathai @ Joby v. George & Anr., (2010) 4 SCC 358, this Court was once more confronted with the question

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whether Special Leave Petitions should or should not be entertained  against  every  kind  of  order.  This  Court noticed that Special Leave Petitions were being filed by the  litigants  against  almost  every  kind  of  order resulting in piling up of huge arrears and converting this Court into an ordinary appellate court which was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they enacted Article 136 and empowered the Supreme Court to intervene by granting special leave to appeal to an aggrieved litigant. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss (2007) 9 SCC 196, Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees

AIR 1959 SC 633, Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359, State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry AIR 1960 SC 391, Municipal  Board,  Pratabgarh  v.  Mahendra  Singh  Chawla

(1982) 3 SCC 331, Ram Saran Das and Bros. v. CTO AIR 1962 SC 1326, Pritam Singh v. State AIR 1950 SC 169, Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 1, Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Port of Mumbai (2004) 3 SCC 214, Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority (2002) 4  SCC  666,  Ashok  Nagar  Welfare  Assn.  v.  R.K.  Sharma (2002) 1 SCC 749, this Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution by the

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Supreme Court was discretionary and that the provision did not confer a vested right of appeal to a party in litigation.

 9. This  Court  further  held  that  the  extraordinary jurisdiction vested by the Constitution implied that the Court ought to exercise extraordinary care and caution while making use of that power. Having said that this Court  lamented  the  filing  of  special  leave  petitions against all kind of orders of the High Court or other authorities without realising the true scope of Article 136  of  the  Constitution  thereby  giving  rise  to  an alarming  situation  whereby  this  Court  had  converted itself  into  a  mere  court  of  appeal  as  though  it  was obliged  to  correct  every  error  which  it  found  in  any judgment delivered by any Court or Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under any statute.   

10. On a conspectus of the dimensions of the question this  Court  held  that  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under Article  136  of  the  Constitution  should  be  limited  to certain  specific  category  of  cases  and  referred  the question  of  interpretation  of  Article  136  to  a

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Constitution Bench in the light of Article 145(3) of the Constitution.  

11. The  Constitution  Bench,  however,  declined  to  look into the question of interpretation of Article 136 of the Constitution or to enumerate the circumstances in which the extraordinary power vested in this Court under the said provision could or ought to be exercised. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Pritam Singh v. The State 1950 SCR 453 at page 457  Penu Balakrishna Iyer & Ors v. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer & Ors. (1964) 7 SCR 49 at Page 53 and Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 584, the Constitution Bench held that power under Article 136 had to be exercised with  circumspection  but  considered  it  unnecessary  to limit  the  use  thereof  forever  by  a  process  of interpretation.   The  Court  was  of  the  view  that  the question  referred  to  the  Constitution  Bench  stood answered by the three decisions mentioned above.

12. It is in the above backdrop that the petitioner who is a practicing Advocate has filed the present petition in  which  he  has  sought  a  mandamus  directing  the respondents to consider his representation and to take

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steps  for  implementation  of  the  suggestion  of  the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bihar Legal Support Society’s case  (supra)  by  establishing  a National/Regional Courts of Appeal.

13. When  the  writ  petition  came  up  for  preliminary hearing before us on 26th February, 2016, while issuing notice, we requested Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General  for  India  to  assist  us  in  the  matter.  In addition,  we  requested  Shri  K.K.  Venugopal  and  Shri Salman  Khurshid,  learned  Senior  Counsel  to  appear  and assist the Court as Amicus Curiae.

14. We  have,  accordingly,  heard  at  some  length  the petitioner, the learned Attorney General and the learned Amicus Curiae.  We have also heard at some length Shri Andhyarujina who intervened to make his submissions in support of the prayer made in the writ petition. Relying upon a report prepared by Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy on “the need for efficient and effective Supreme Court” by reference in particular to the issues of backlog and regional disparities in access to justice, Mr. Venugopal argued  that  the  statistics  quoted  by  Vidhi  and  the analysis thereof based on round table discussions with

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several eminent lawyers and jurists, clearly established that  the  Supreme  Court  had  strayed  from  its  original character  as  a  Constitutional  Court  and  gradually converted itself into a mere court of appeal to correct every error it found in the decisions of the 24 High Courts and numerous Tribunals subordinate to it.   

15. The  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  argued  Mr. Venugopal, was now being invoked in relation to matters falling within 45 categories listed in the Practice and Procedure Handbook. It was submitted that there was an urgent need for a comprehensive re-appraisal of the role of  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  need  for  restoring  its exclusivity  as  suggested  by  Shri  Andhyarujina  in  his article “Studying US Supreme Court Working” 1994 (4) SCC Journal 1.  It was urged that filing of cases in the Supreme Court since 1950 had increased exponentially for as against 1215 cases filed in total in the Supreme Court in the year 1950 the total number of cases filed in the year 2014 (Upto November) were no less than 81,853.  This argued Mr. Venugopal showed a cumulative annual growth rate of 6.8 per cent per year.  It also suggested that the number of cases filed in the Supreme Court doubled

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every year or so and the trend continued. The Supreme Court was by that standard likely to be facing a burden of nearly 1.5 lakh cases by the year 2025.

16. Shri Venugopal, further argued that on account of the distance at which the Supreme Court is located from other parts  of  the  country,  access  to  justice  before  the Supreme Court had been adversely effected in as much as litigants from far off places were unable to reach the Supreme Court as against those from High Courts that are closer  in  proximity.   This  according  to  the  learned Counsel denied equal justice to citizens from these far off places in breach of the Constitutional mandate of equal access of justice to all. According to the learned counsel  the  lack  of  access  had  led  to  a  demand  for Regional Benches of the Supreme Court in different parts of the country or for setting up of National/Regional Courts of Appeal. Shri Venugopal drew our attention to the position in other countries, where too, because of the huge backlog of cases, the systems had been reformed to  provide  Courts  of  Appeal  as  an  intermediary  Court between  the  High  Courts  and  the  Supreme  Court.  He referred to a speech delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice

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Susan  Delham,  Chief  Justice  of  Ireland  to  argue  that despite several initiatives like case management, use of information technology, mediation for amicable settlement encouraged by the Courts, the burden that came to fall upon the Irish Supreme Court was making it difficult for that Court to cope up with the situation. The solution which a working Group suggested was referred to by the Chief Justice of Ireland in the following passage of his speech:

“Solution The solution advocated by the Working

Group on a Court of Appeal in the report published in 2009 was the establishment of a  Court  of  Appeal.   This  would  be  a permanent court which would have several divisions, to hear appeals in civil cases and  to  hear  appeals  in  criminal  cases. Thus, there would be a permanent Court of Appeal,  with  permanent  judges  on  that Court,  which  would  sit  in  several divisions – civil and criminal.

All  the  other  common  law  countries have  a  Court  of  Appeal  in  their  legal system,  placed  between  the  Courts equivalent  to  our  High  Court,  and  the Supreme Court.”   

17. The  Indian  story  was  no  different  contended Mr.Venugopal. The working of the Supreme Court and the

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ever  increasing  burden  which  has  grown  to  almost unmanageable limits has made it extremely difficult for the Judges of this Court to contain the piling arrears to a reasonable limit making it necessary for this Court to examine the possibility of structural reforms and to make suitable  recommendations  to  the  Government  for  taking corrective measures including a possible amendment of the Constitution.  

18. Shri Andhyarujina while adopting the submissions made by  Shri  Venugopal  submitted  that  because  of  increased awareness,  legal  literacy,  development  and  resultant prosperity in the country, the number of cases is bound to  increase.  Experience  shows  that  these  cases  leave little  time  for  the  Court  to  take  up  important constitutional  matters  which  ought  to  engage  the attention of this Court as its primary duty. He urged that  it  is  time  to  give  a  thought  to  the  formidable challenge that judiciary is facing at the highest level and  to  push  reforms  that  would  not  only  restore  this Court to the glory it was meant to enjoy but also make access  to  justice  a  reality  by  setting  up  Courts  of

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Appeal which can be approached by every litigant without having to travel long distances to Delhi.

19. Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General, on the other hand argued that the Writ Petition was not maintainable as the petitioner has suppressed certain important facts which disentitle him to relief. It was also contended that the proposed National Court of Appeal or Regional Courts  of  Appeal  were  neither  constitutionally permissible nor otherwise feasible.  He contended that Article 136 of the Constitution gives to the citizens of this country an inalienable right to invoke the appellate power of this Court.  That power being a basic feature of the Constitution, it could not be taken away or conferred upon another Court or forum.  Mr. Rohatgi submitted that what  was  perhaps  required  was  self  restraint  by  this Court  in  the  matter  of  entertaining  special  leave petitions  as  it  was  not  necessary  for  this  Court  to correct every error committed by the High Court or the statutory  Tribunals  set  up  to  decide  cases  involving different subjects and dimensions.

20. We  have  given  our  anxious  consideration  to  the submissions made at the Bar. Certain facts are beyond

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dispute.  It is not in dispute that the Supreme Court was never meant to be a regular court of appeal. It was meant to  exercise  its  powers  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution  only  in  cases  which  raised  important questions involving interpretation of the Constitution or questions of general public importance or questions of constitutionality  of  State  or  Central  legislations  or those  raising  important  issues  touching  Centre-State relationship etc.  The jurisdiction may also have been available to the Court where it found gross miscarriage of justice or an error so outrageous as no reasonable person would countenance. The power to interfere was not meant to be exercisable just because prolonged argument would eventually reveal some error or irregularity or a possible alternative view on a subject that did not cause any miscarriage of justice of a kind that would shock the conscience of the court on the subject.  The long line of decisions of the Court to which we have made reference earlier  supports  that  view.  The  fact,  however  remains that the filing of cases in the Supreme Court over the past  six  decades  has  grown  so  sharply  that  the  Judge strength in the Supreme Court is proving inadequate to deal with the same.  Statistics show that more than 3/4th

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of  the  total  number  of  cases  filed  are  dismissed  in limine.  Even so, the dismissal is only after the court has applied its mind and heard arguments which consume considerable  time  of  the  Judges.  Dismissal  of  an overwhelming  number  of  cases  has  not  and  does  not discourage the litigants or the member of the Bar from filing cases. That is why the number of cases filed is on the rise every year.   

21. It is common knowledge that the huge backlog of cases in the Supreme Court not only attracts criticism from the litigant public but also from independent observers of the judicial systems. To add to the woes of the Court there are a number of new legislations which provide for a first appeal to the Supreme Court, a role which the Supreme  Court  was  never  intended  to  play  in  the Constitutional  scheme.   Suffice  it  to  say  that  the pronouncement  of  this  Court  sounding  notes  of  caution against  liberal  grant  of  special  leave  to  appeal  or exercise of restraint in the matter of entertaining cases have lead to no meaningful improvement in the situation.  

22. What  then  is  the  way  forward?  M/s.  Venugopal  and Andhyarujina argue that the way forward is setting up of

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Regional  Courts  of  Appeal,  firstly,  because  the  same would  take  justice  closer  to  the  doorsteps  of  the litigants, especially those living at distant places and secondly, because an intermediary court would reduce the burden  of  the  Supreme  Court  without  denying  to  the litigants an opportunity to agitate his case before a court higher than the High Court.  The only difference in that situation will be that in place of the Supreme Court the  Court  of  Appeal  would  look  into  the  matter  and correct whatever needs to be corrected in the judgment impugned before it. It is in that backdrop that following questions arise for our consideration:  

1.With access to justice being a fundamental right, would the said right stand denied to litigants, due to the unduly long delay in the disposal of cases in the Supreme Court?

2.Would the mere increase in the number of judges be an answer to the problem of undue delay in disposal of cases and to what extent would such increase be feasible?

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3.Would  the  division  of  the  Supreme  Court  into  a Constitutional wing and an appellate wing be an answer to the problem?

4.Would the fact that the Supreme Court of India is situate  in  the  far  North,  in  Delhi,  rendering travel  from  the  Southern  states  and  some  other states in India, unduly long and expensive, be a deterrent to real access to justice?

5.Would  the  Supreme  Court  sitting  in  benches  in different parts of India be an answer to the last mentioned problem?

6.Has  the  Supreme  Court  of  India  been  exercising jurisdiction  as  an  ordinary  court  of  appeal  on facts and law, in regard to routine cases of every description?

7.Is the huge pendency of cases in the Supreme Court, caused  by  the  Court  not  restricting  its consideration, as in the case of the Apex Courts of other  countries,  to  Constitutional  issues, questions  of  national  importance,  differences  of opinion  between  different  High  Courts,  death

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sentence cases and matters entrusted to the Supreme Court by express provisions of the Constitution?

8.Is there a need for having Courts of Appeal, with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and finally decide the vast proportion of the routine cases, as well as Article 32 petitions now being decided by the Supreme  Court  of  India,  especially  when  a considerable proportion of the four million cases pending before the High Court may require review by a higher intermediate court, as these judgments of the High Courts may fail to satisfy the standards of justice and competence expected from a superior court?

9.If four regional Courts of Appeal are established, in  the  Northern,  Southern,  Eastern  and  Western regions  of  the  Country,  each  manned  by,  say, fifteen judges, elevated or appointed to each Court by  the  Collegium,  would  this  not  satisfy  the requirement of ‘access to justice’ to all litigants from every part of the country?

10. As any such proposal would need an amendment to the  Constitution,  would  the  theory  of  ‘basic

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structure’ of the Constitution be violated, if in fact,  such  division  of  exclusive  jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal, enhances  the  efficacy  of  the  justice  delivery system without affecting the independence of the judicial wing of the State?

11. In view of cases pending in the Supreme Court of India on average for about 5 years, in the High Courts  again  for  about  8  years,  and  anywhere between  5-10  years  in  the  Trial  Courts  on  the average, would it not be part of the responsibility and duty of the Supreme Court of India to examine through  a  Constitution  Bench,  the  issue  of divesting the Supreme Court of about 80% of the pendency of cases of a routine nature, to recommend to  Government,  its  opinion  on  the  proposal  for establishing four Courts of Appeal, so that the Supreme Court with about 2500 cases a year instead of about 60000, may regain its true status as a Constitutional Court?

23. Keeping in view the importance of the above questions and the need for reforms which have been long felt, we

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deem  it  proper  to  refer  the  same  to  a  Constitutional Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. The Registry shall, accordingly, place the record before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate bench.

     .................CJI.        (T.S. THAKUR)

...................J.        (R. BANUMATHI)

...................J.        (UDAY UMESH LALIT)

NEW DELHI; JULY 13, 2016.