Page 1

REPORTABALE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO. 747  OF 2008

V. SEJAPPA                ...Appellant Versus

THE STATE BY POLICE INSPECTOR       LOKAYUKTA, CHITRADURGA               ...Respondent

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

This appeal impugns the order dated 05.02.2008 passed  

by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  Bangalore  in  Criminal  Appeal  

No.851 of 2002, allowing the appeal filed by the State, thereby setting  

aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial court.  The High Court  

held the appellant-accused guilty  of  the offences punishable  under  

Sections  7,  13(1)(d)  read  with  Section  13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of  

Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Complainant-N.Ramakrishnappa  (PW-1)  retired  as  

Special  Grade  Junior  Engineer,  Well  Boring  Sub-Division  of  

Department  of  Public  Health  Engineering  at  Chitradurga.  The  

complainant  received  his  service  benefits  such  as  group  insurance  

1

Page 2

amount, medical reimbursement, GPF on 10.11.1997 and 14.11.1997  

except  D.C.R.G.  and leave encashment benefits.   The accused was  

then the Assistant Executive Engineer of the same Well Boring Sub-

Division of Public Health Engineering at Chitradurga. On 16.12.1997,  

PW-1-complainant made an oral complaint before Police Inspector of  

Lokayukta,  Chitradurga  alleging  that  on  09.12.1997,  the  accused  

demanded a sum of Rs.5,000/- as illegal gratification from him for  

handing over ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) to process his pension  

papers and other retiral benefits.  Based on the said complaint, PW-

12-Police  Inspector  of  Lokayukta  registered  FIR  in  Crime  No.6/97  

against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7,  

13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  

1988.   PW-12 made  arrangement  to  lay  a  trap  of  the  accused on  

17.12.1997.  On 17.12.1997 at about 10.15-10.25 a.m., the raiding  

party consisting of the complainant-N.Ramakrishnappa (PW-1) along  

with Obaiah (PW-2) and R. V. Srinivasa (PW-3) went to the office of the  

accused.  The raiding party and PW-3 were waiting outside the office.  

PW-1 and PW-2 went to the office and the accused is alleged to have  

demanded  Rs.5,000/-  from PW-1  and  PW-1  gave  tainted  currency  

note of Rs.5,000/- and the accused received the money and kept it in  

a diary and the diary was kept inside his table.  On receiving signal  

from PW-1, the raiding party went to the office of the accused and  

2

Page 3

questioned the accused and recovered the amount of Rs.5,000/- from  

the accused. The accused also tested positive when his right hand was  

immersed  in  the  sodium  carbonate  solution.   After  obtaining  

necessary  sanction  from  the  government  and  on  completion  of  

investigation,  a  chargesheet  was  filed  against  the  accused  for  the  

offences as above mentioned.

3. In order to establish the guilt of the accused, prosecution  

examined twelve witnesses and exhibited documents Ex.P1 to Ex.P34  

and marked material  objects-M.Os.1 to 18.  Appellant-accused was  

questioned about the incriminating evidence and circumstances under  

Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused denied the demand and pleaded that  

on 09.12.1997, he was at Bangalore on official duty and a false case  

was  foisted  against  him.  The  accused  has  produced  documents  

Exs.D1 to D8. Upon consideration of the evidence, the trial court held  

that the prosecution has failed to prove the demand and acceptance of  

illegal gratification of Rs.5,000/- by the accused from PW-1 for issuing  

‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) for settlement of  his retiral benefits.  

The trial court also held that in Ex.P31-Sanction Order issued by PW-

8-S.Sampath,  Under  Secretary  to  Government,  Public  Works  

Department, there is no reference to the documents referred to by the  

authority  for  the  purpose  of  granting  sanction  to  prosecute  the  

accused and held that there was no valid sanction to prosecute the  

3

Page 4

accused and thus acquitted the accused of all the charges.

4. Being  aggrieved  by  the  order  of  acquittal,  the  State  

preferred appeal before the High Court under Section 378 Cr.P.C.  The  

High Court reversed the findings of the trial court and held that valid  

sanction  order  was  obtained  by  the  prosecution  to  prosecute  the  

accused.   The  High  Court  allowed  the  appeal  holding  that  the  

prosecution  has  proved  the  appellant’s  demand and  acceptance  of  

illegal gratification of Rs.5,000/- to do an official act in connection  

with  issuance  of  ‘No  Objection  Certificate’  to  PW-1  and  held  the  

accused guilty of offences. The High Court sentenced the accused to  

undergo  imprisonment  for  six  months  under   Section  7  of  the  

Prevention of Corruption Act and further sentenced him to undergo  

two years imprisonment under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  

of the Act and both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.  

Being aggrieved, the appellant-accused has preferred this appeal.    

5. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Tara Chand Sharma  

contended that there could not have been any demand of  bribe on  

09.12.1997 and the High Court failed to appreciate the defence plea  

that the appellant had not attended the office in Chitradurga from  

07.12.1997 to 10.12.1997 on account of his official duty in attending  

a seminar in Bangalore and that on the evening of 10.12.1997, the  

appellant  alongwith  PW-7  had  taken  delivery  of  a  van  allotted  to  

4

Page 5

Chitradurga  PHE,  Sub-Division  at  Bangalore.   It  was  further  

contended that the High Court erred in ignoring the testimony of PW-2  

who has specifically stated that  PW-1 gave a sum of Rs.5,000/- to the  

appellant stating that he was returning the money which was taken by  

PW-1 for purchasing diesel.  It was further contended that the High  

Court  failed to  properly  appreciate  the defence plea in the light  of  

evidence adduced by the  prosecution and the High Court  was  not  

justified in interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial  

court.  

6. Per  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  State  Mr.  V.N.  

Raghupathy submitted that upon appreciation of evidence, the High  

Court  had  rightly  held  that  the  prosecution  has  proved  its  case  

against the appellant by establishing demand and acceptance of illegal  

gratification of a sum of Rs.5,000/- by the appellant to perform an  

official act in connection with the issuance of ‘No Objection Certificate’  

(NOC).

7. We  have  carefully  considered  the  rival  contentions  and  

perused the impugned judgment and also the judgment of the trial  

court and the material on record.

8. Before we proceed to consider the evidence adduced by the  

prosecution  regarding  proof  of  demand  and  acceptance  of  illegal  

gratification by the appellant, we may refer to the findings of courts  

5

Page 6

below regarding Ex.P31-sanction order. Sanction Order was obtained  

from PW-8-S.Sampath, Under Secretary to Government, Public Works  

Department.   Trial  court  took  the  view  that  there  was  no  valid  

sanction since in the sanction order there was no reference to the  

authority  which  took  decision  to  grant  sanction  to  prosecute  the  

appellant also there was no reference to the documents referred to by  

the authority to satisfy itself about the  prima facie  case against the  

appellant while granting sanction to prosecute the appellant.  The trial  

court  noted  that  the  prosecution  failed  to  produce  any  document  

which  could  suggest  that  the  powers  vested  in  the  competent  

authority by virtue of Section 19 of the Act was delegated to PW-8 and  

therefore  held  that  prosecution  has  not  obtained  a  valid  sanction  

order to prosecute the appellant.   

9. Per  contra,  referring  to  the  evidence  of  PW-8-Sampath,  

High Court  held that  there  was a valid  sanction and PW-8,  Under  

Secretary was only carrying out the decision of the Government by  

issuing  Ex.P31-sanction  order.  As  per  the  evidence  of  PW-8-

S.Sampath, Under Secretary to Government, PWD, the file regarding  

the  sanction  for  prosecuting  the  appellant  was  submitted  to  the  

Secretary, Public Works Department and the same was forwarded to  

PWD Minister and upon being satisfied,  PWD Minister  granted the  

sanction. After sanction so was granted, PW-8 issued Ex.P31-Sanction  

6

Page 7

Order  and  thus  PW-8-Under  Secretary  was  only  carrying  out  the  

decision  of  the  Government  by  issuing  Ex.P31-sanction  order.  

Considering the evidence of PW-8, in our view, the High Court was  

right  in  holding  that  there  was  a  valid  sanction  to  prosecute  the  

appellant.   We concur  with  the  view taken by the  High Court.  As  

elaborated infra,  as the prosecution failed to establish the demand  

and acceptance of the illegal gratification by the appellant, we do not  

propose to delve further on the aspect of ‘sanction’.  

10. In order to  constitute an offence under Section 7 of  the  

Prevention of Corruption Act, ‘proof of demand’ is a sine quo non. This  

has been affirmed in several judgments including a recent judgment of  

this Court in B. Jayaraj  v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC 55,  

wherein this Court held as under:-

“7.   Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it  is a  settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine  qua  non  to  constitute  the  said  offence  and  mere  recovery  of  currency  notes  cannot  constitute  the  offence  under  Section  7  unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused  voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above  position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this  Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision  in  C.M. Sharma v.  State of A.P.(2010) 15 SCC 1 and  C.M. Girish  Babu v. CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779.”

The same view was reiterated  in  P.Satyanarayana Murthy  v.  District   

Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.  (2015) 10 SCC  

152.  

11. It is the case of the prosecution that on 09.12.1997, the  

7

Page 8

appellant demanded a sum of Rs.5,000/- as illegal gratification from  

PW-1 to discharge the official act of forwarding PW-1’s application for  

pension and for release of retiral benefits.  PW-1-Ramakrishnappa has  

deposed  that  on  09.12.1997,  the  appellant  demanded  a  sum  of  

Rs.5,000/- as illegal gratification for sending ‘No Objection Certificate’  

to the office of Accountant General at Bangalore for processing the  

appellant’s pension papers.  On the contrary, the appellant has taken  

the plea of  alibi.  The appellant contended that on 09.12.1997, when  

he is  alleged to  have demanded illegal  gratification in  his  office  at  

Chitradurga,  he  was  actually  on  official  tour  in  Bangalore  from  

07.12.1997  to  10.12.1997  for  attending  a  seminar  and  that  after  

attending  the  seminar,  on  10.12.1997,  he  along  with  PW-7  took  

delivery of a van allotted to Chitradurga PHE, Sub-Division.

12. To appreciate the rival contentions, the evidence of PWs 4  

and  5  becomes  relevant.  PW-4-Mohd.  Shaffiulla,  First  Division  

Assistant,  Well  Boring  Sub-Division,  Public  Health  Engineering  

Department, Chitradurga has stated in his cross-examination that as  

per the contents of attendance register (Ex.P16), the column relating  

to  the  attendance  of  the  appellant  was  blank  from 03.12.1997  to  

11.12.1997. PW-4 had admitted that about one week prior to the trap  

on 17.12.1997,  a  new van was  allotted  to  Chitradurga  PHE,  Sub-

Division and that the appellant and Pampanna-PW-7, Junior Engineer  

8

Page 9

had  taken  the  delivery  of  the  van  at  Bangalore  and  brought  it  to  

Chitraduga. It was stated that Chitradurga is at a distance of about  

250 kms. from Bangalore.  Though PW-4 has not specifically spoken  

about  the  official  tour  of  the  appellant,  the  fact  remains  that  on  

10.12.1997, the appellant had taken the delivery of the van allotted to  

Chitradurga PHE, Sub-Division from Bangalore.

13. PW-5-A.M.Prabhakara  who  was  working  as  Executive  

Engineer, Well Boring Division, PHE at Bangalore from 01.06.1996 to  

18.12.1999 has  stated  in  his  cross-examination that  the  appellant  

had come to  Bangalore  on 08.12.1997 for  attending  a  seminar  on  

09.12.1997. PW-5 has further stated that on 10.12.1997 after taking  

delivery of the van allotted to the Chitradurga PHE, Sub-Division, the  

appellant left  Bangalore in the evening.   Much credence has to be  

attached  to  the  evidence  of    PW-5-A.M.Prabhakara,  working  as  

Executive Engineer, Well Boring Division PHE at Bangalore as he is  

the competent witness to speak about the appellant’s attendance in a  

seminar in Bangalore on 09.12.1997. Moreover, PW-7-Pampanna, who  

was working as a Junior Engineer in the Well Boring Sub-Division at  

Chitradurga  has  deposed  in  his  cross-examination  that  he  had  

accompanied  the  appellant  to  attend  a  seminar  on  09.12.1997  at  

Bangalore.  PW-7 further stated that on 10.12.1997, the appellant and  

he took the delivery of a van allotted to PHE Well Boring Sub-Division,  

9

Page 10

Chitradurga and they left Bangalore around 3.00 p.m. and travelled in  

the said van and reached Chitradurga at 7.30 p.m. on 10.12.1997.   

14. Considering the evidence of PWs 4, 5 and 7 coupled with  

the attendance register marked as Ex.P16, the defence version that  

the  appellant  was  not  present  in  the  office  at  Chitradurga  from  

08.12.1997 to 10.12.1997and that he was attending the seminar in  

Bangalore  on  09.12.1997  is  highly  probablised.   In  his  cross-

examination,  PW-1  denied  the  suggestion  that  on  09.12.1997,  the  

appellant was not working in his office and that he had not met the  

appellant.  However, the appellant has not disputed the fact that in a  

diary  marked  as  Ex.P19,  the  appellant  has  mentioned  that  on  

08.12.1997  he  had  attended  the  meeting  at  division  office  in  

Bangalore and that he had taken delivery of  a van on 10.12.1997.  

Upon appreciation of evidence, trial court recorded a finding that the  

prosecution failed to prove that on 09.12.1997 appellant had made a  

demand of  Rs.5,000/-  from PW-1.  The finding of  the trial  court  is  

borne out by evidence on record and as a reasonable possible view, in  

our  opinion,  the  High  Court  ought  not  have  interfered  with  the  

findings of the trial court.   

15. Let  us now consider the claim of  PW-1,  the purpose for  

which he is said to have paid the bribe amount.  As noticed earlier,  

PW-1 retired on 31.10.1997 as Special Grade Junior Engineer PHE at  

10

Page 11

Chitradurga.  A perusal of Ex.D1 shows that the service register of  

PW-1  was  sent  to  Borewell  Sub-Division  at  Chitradurga  on  

22.11.1997.  PW-1 has deposed that he submitted an application for  

leave encashment benefit (Ex.P3) on 04.11.1997 and since PW-1 had  

not given a covering letter for the same, it could not be processed.  On  

04.12.1997,  PW-1  had  given  a  covering  letter  for  encashment  of  

earned  leave.  During  course  of  cross-examination,  PW-4-Mohd.  

Shafiulla  has  admitted  that  as  instructed  by  the  appellant  as  per  

Ex.D2 (04.12.1997),  on 07.12.1997 PW-4 prepared a detailed note.  

PW-4 further stated that due to the absence of appellant in the office  

from 07.12.1997 to  10.12.1997,  he could not  place  the office  note  

(Ex.D2)  before  the  appellant  and  PW-4  has  placed  the  office  note  

(Ex.D2) before the appellant on 11.12.1997.  It is also the evidence of  

PW-1  that  the  documents  (Ex.  P6  to  P15)  submitted  by  him  for  

processing  his  pension  papers  were  not  attested  as  they  were  

supposed to be.   PW-1 was aware that he was expected to submit  

these documents after proper attestation.  Referring to Ex. P6 to P15,  

trial court held thus:-

“…from the contents of the documents marked as Ex.P3 to P15, it  is not possible to hold that PW-1 had submitted declarations for  payment of pension and gratuity on 02.12.97.  On the other hand  a perusal of these documents would give an indication that these  documents were brought into existence on 17.12.97...”

Considering the evidence of PW-4 and documents and circumstances,  

11

Page 12

it  appears  that  the  papers  for  settling  the  retiral  benefits  were  

processed in the normal course.

16. Viewed in the above background coupled with absence of  

proof of demand, case of the prosecution and the evidence of PWs 1  

and  2  regarding  acceptance  of  money  calls  for  close  scrutiny.  On  

17.12.1997, PW-1-Ramakrishnappa went to the office of the appellant  

accompanied  by  PW-2-Obaiah  and  the  raiding  party  and  PW-3-

Srinivasa were waiting outside the office.  PW-2-Obaiah was standing  

near the door of the chamber of the appellant and inside the room  

PW-1 had handed over  the  tainted  currency to  the  appellant.   On  

receiving the signal from PW-1, the raiding party and PW-3 entered  

into  the  office  of  the  appellant  and  tainted  currency  notes  were  

recovered from the appellant.   

17. PW-2-Obaiah  in  his  testimony  has  stated  that  he  was  

standing near the door of the chamber of the appellant and he saw  

PW-1-Ramakrishnappa giving a sum of Rs.5,000/- to the appellant  

stating that ‘he is returning the amount which he had taken from the   

accused for purchasing the diesel’.  PW-2 further stated that PW-3 and  

Lokayukta police entered the office of the appellant and the currency  

notes were recovered from the appellant and when the right hand of  

the appellant was dipped in the sodium carbonate solution, it turned  

pink.  In his cross-examination, PW-2-Obaiah denied the suggestion  

12

Page 13

that the appellant demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.5,000/- from  

PW-1 as a bribe for  forwarding his pension papers.   PW-2 did not  

support  the  prosecution version  that  PW-1 gave  Rs.5,000/-  to  the  

appellant as a bribe; rather, PW-2 stated that while giving the amount  

to the appellant, PW-1 stated that it is in lieu of amount due for the  

diesel purchased.  PW-2-Obaiah has been declared hostile as he failed  

to support the prosecution version with regard to payment of money  

as illegal gratification to the appellant.  Evidence of PW-2 thus raises  

serious doubts about the acceptance of  illegal  gratification and the  

prosecution case.

18. It is well settled that the initial burden of proving that the  

accused  accepted  or  obtained  the  amount  other  than  legal  

remuneration is  upon the prosecution.   It  is  only when this initial  

burden  regarding  demand and  acceptance  of  illegal  gratification  is  

successfully  discharged  by  the  prosecution,  then  the  burden  of  

proving the defence shifts upon the accused and a presumption would  

arise under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.  In the  

case  at  hand,  all  that  is  established  by  the  prosecution  was  the  

recovery of money from the appellant and mere recovery of money was  

not enough to draw the presumption under Section 20 of the Act.   

19. After  referring to  Surajmal  v.  State  (Delhi  Administration)   

(1979) 4 SCC 725,  in  C.M. Girish Babu v.  CBI, Cochin, High Court of   

13

Page 14

Kerala (2009) 3 SCC 779, it was held as under:-

“18. In  Suraj  Mal v.  State (Delhi  Admn.)  (1979)  4 SCC 725, this  Court took the view that (at SCC p. 727, para 2) mere recovery of  tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is  paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive  evidence in the case is not  reliable.  The mere recovery by itself  cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in  the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show  that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be  bribe.”

In State of Kerala and Anr. v. C.P. Rao (2011) 6 SCC 450, it was held  

that mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the  

accused and there has to be corroboration of  the testimony of  the  

complainant regarding the demand of bribe.

20. While dealing with the contention that it is not enough that  

some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make  

it illegal gratification and that the prosecution has a further duty to  

prove that what was paid was an illegal gratification, reference can be  

made to following observation in  Mukut Bihari  and Anr.  v.  State of  

Rajasthan (2012) 11 SCC 642, wherein it was held as under:-

“11. The law on the issue is well  settled that demand of  illegal  gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the  1988  Act.  Mere  recovery  of  tainted  money  is  not  sufficient  to  convict the accused, when the substantive evidence in the case is  not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or  to  show  that  the  money  was  taken  voluntarily  as  bribe.  Mere  receipt of amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten the  guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and  acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, but the burden  rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raised  under Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record evidence,  either  direct  or  circumstantial,  to  establish  with  reasonable  probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a  motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While  

14

Page 15

invoking  the  provisions  of  Section  20  of  the  Act,  the  court  is  required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any,  only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on  the  touchstone  of  proof  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt.  However,  before the accused is called upon to explain as to how the amount  in question was found in his  possession,  the foundational  facts  must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is  an  interested and partisan witness concerned with the success of the  trap and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of  any other interested witness and in a proper case the court may  look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused  person.”  

21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded  

by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and  

the grounds on which the trial  court  has based its  conclusion are  

reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order  

of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate  

court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined  

to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is  

not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view.  In  

State through Inspector of Police, A.P.  v.  K. Narasimhachary  (2005) 8  

SCC 364, this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if  two  

views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the  

acquittal  by  the  lower  court  and  that  only  where  the  material  on  

record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the  

judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court.  

The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006)  

1 SCC 401.   

15

Page 16

22. In  Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr.  v.  State of Karnataka  

(2014) 5 SCC 730, this Court noted the principles which are required  

to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of  

acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:-

“12. The  approach of  the  appellate  court  in  the  appeal  against  acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR  1954 SC 1, Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637, Atley AIR 1955  SC 807, Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217, Balbir Singh AIR 1957  SC 216,  M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200,  Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC  286,  Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450,  Shivaji  Sahabrao Bobade  (1973) 2 SCC 793,  Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424,  Khem Karan  (1974)  4  SCC  603,  Bishan  Singh  (1974)  3  SCC  288,  Umedbhai  Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228,  K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355,  Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529, Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248,  Madan  Lal  (1997)  7  SCC  677,  Sambasivan  (1998)  5  SCC  412,  Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85, Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC  470, C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1, K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291,  Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC  415.  It  is  not  necessary  to  deal  with  these  cases  individually.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  this  Court  has  consistently  held  that  in  dealing with appeals against  acquittal,  the appellate court must  bear in mind the following:

(i)  There  is  presumption  of  innocence  in  favour  of  an  accused person and such presumption is strengthened by  the order  of  acquittal  passed in his  favour by the trial  court; (ii)  The  accused  person  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  reasonable  doubt  when  it  deals  with  the  merit  of  the  appeal against acquittal; (iii)  Though,  the  powers  of  the  appellate  court  in  considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive  as  its  powers  in  appeals  against  convictions  but  the  appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding  of fact recorded by the trial  court. It  is so because the  trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of  the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of  the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court  with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the  conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong  or  based  on  erroneous  view  of  the  law  or  if  such  conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result  in  grave  injustice,  the  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  appellate  court  in  interfering  with  such  conclusions  is  

16

Page 17

fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation  and re-evaluation of  the evidence  is  inclined to  take  a  different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal  is not justified if  the view taken by the trial court is a  possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence  must not result in the interference by the appellate court  in the judgment of the trial court.”

23. In  the  present  case,  trial  court  recorded  an  order  of  

acquittal on the evidence and circumstances:-(i) delay in lodging the  

complaint; (ii) even though the appellant is alleged to have made the  

demand on 09.12.1997 at Chitradurga, absence of the appellant in  

Chitradurga from 07.12.1997 to 10.12.1997 and absence of proof of  

demand;  (iii)  doubts  raised  regarding  the  submission  of  the  

documents Ex. P6 to P15 by PW-1 for processing the pension papers  

and settling the retiral benefits and (iv) inconsistency in the evidence  

of prosecution witnesses in establishing the acceptance of the amount  

by the appellant.

24. Absence of proof of demand on 09.12.1997, coupled with  

PW-2’s evidence that the amount was paid by PW-1 to the appellant  

towards purchase of diesel raises serious doubts about the amount  

being  paid  by  PW-1  as  illegal  gratification.  High  Court  neither  

considered the defence plea of alibi nor it held that the decision of the  

trial court was erroneous or perverse.  In our view, evaluation of the  

evidence made by the trial court while recording an order of acquittal  

does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality or manifest error and  

17

Page 18

the grounds on which the order of acquittal is based cannot be said to  

be unreasonable.  While so, High Court was not justified in interfering  

with the  order  of  acquittal  and the impugned judgment  cannot  be  

sustained.   

25. In  the  result,  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  impugned  

judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of trial court  

acquitting the appellant of the charges is restored.  The appellant is  

on bail, his bail bonds stand discharged.   

    ...……………………J.        (DIPAK MISRA)   

                                                                    ...……………………J.        (R. BANUMATHI)   

       New Delhi; April 12, 2016

18