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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.836-851  OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos.10023-10038 of 2011

V.K. Bansal …Appellants

Versus

State of Haryana and Ors. etc. etc. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The short question that falls for determination in these  

appeals by special leave is whether the High Court was right  

in declining the prayer made by the appellant for a direction  

in terms of Section 427 read with Section 482 of the Code of  

Criminal  Procedure  for  the  sentences  awarded  to  the  

appellant in connection with the cases under Section 138 of  

the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act  filed  against  him  to  run  

concurrently.

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3. The material facts are not in dispute. The appellant is a  

Director  in  a  group of  companies  including  Arawali  Tubes  

Ltd.,  Arawali  Alloys Ltd.,  Arawali  Pipes  Ltd.  and Sabhyata  

Plastics Pvt. Ltd.  The appellant’s case before us in that in  

connection with his business conducted in the name of the  

above  companies,  he  had  approached  the  respondent,  

Haryana  Financial  Corporation  for  financial  assistance  and  

facilities. The Corporation had accepted the requests made  

by the  Companies and granted financial  assistance to  the  

first three of the four companies mentioned above.  Several  

cheques towards repayment of the amount borrowed by the  

appellant in the name of the above companies were issued in  

favour  of  the  Haryana  Financial  Corporation  which  on  

presentation were dishonoured by the banks concerned for  

insufficiency  of  funds.  Consequently,  the  Corporation  

instituted  complaints  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  

Instruments Act against the appellant in his capacity as the  

Director of the borrowing companies. These complaints were  

tried  by  Judicial  Magistrates  at  Hissar  culminating  in  the  

conviction  of  the  appellant  and  sentence  of  imprisonment  

which ranged between 6 months in some cases to one year

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in  some others  besides imposition of  different  amounts of  

fine levied in each complaint case and a default sentence in  

the event of non payment of amount awarded in each one of  

those cases.    

4. Aggrieved  by  his  conviction  and the  sentence  in  the  

cases filed against him the appellant preferred appeals which  

were heard and dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge,  

Hissar in terms of separate orders passed in each case. In  

some of the cases the Appellate Court reduced the sentence  

from one year to nine months.   

5. The appellant then approached the High Court by way  

of revision petitions.  The High Court dismissed 15 out of 17  

revisions petitions in which the appellant was convicted.  The  

remaining two revision petitions are still pending before the  

High Court.  The High Court noticed that the appellant had  

not questioned the correctness of the conviction before the  

appellate Court which disentitled him to do so in revision.  

That  position  was,  it  appears,  not  disputed  even  by  the  

appellant, the only contention urged before the High Court  

being that instead of the sentences awarded to him running  

consecutively  they  ought  to  run  concurrently.   That

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contention was turned down by the High Court holding that  

the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant was  

not excessive so as to warrant its reduction or a direction for  

concurrent running of the same. The High Court noted:  

“As regards sentence, keeping in view the amount of   cheques,  sentence  of  simple  imprisonment  for  six   months in each case cannot be said to be excessive   so as warrant reduction or direction for concurrent   running of the sentences in all the 8 cases.  Even   sentence  in  default  of  payment  of  fine,  which  is   huge amount, also cannot be said to be excessive”.

6. The revision petitions filed by the appellant along with  

the criminal miscellaneous applications moved under Section  

482 of the Cr.P.C. were accordingly dismissed. The present  

appeals assail the correctness of the orders passed by the  

High Court which are no doubt separate but in similar terms.  

7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously  

argued  that  the  High  Court  has  committed  an  error  in  

declining  the  prayer  made  by  the  appellant  for  an  

appropriate  direction  to  the  effect  that  the  sentences  

awarded to the appellant in the cases in which he was found  

guilty ought to run concurrently and not consecutively.  It  

was urged that the trial Court and so also the appellate and

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the  revisional  Courts  were  competent  to  direct  that  the  

sentences awarded to the appellant should run concurrently.  

The power vested in them to issue such a direction has not  

been  properly  exercised,  contended  the  learned  counsel.  

Reliance  in  support  was  placed  upon  the  decision  of  this  

Court  in  State of  Punjab v.  Madan Lal  (2009) 5 SCC  

238.

8. Section 427 of  the  Code of  Criminal  Procedure  deals  

with situations where an offender who is already undergoing  

a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent  

conviction  to  imprisonment  or  imprisonment  for  life.  It  

provides  that  such  imprisonment  or  imprisonment  for  life  

shall  commence  at  the  expiration  of  the  imprisonment  to  

which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court  

directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently  

with such previous sentence.  Section 427 may at this stage  

be extracted:  

“427. Sentence on offender already sentenced  for another offence -  (1) when an person already   undergoing sentence of imprisonment is sentenced   on  a  subsequent  conviction  to  imprisonment  or   imprisonment  for  life,  such  imprisonment  or   imprisonment  for  life  shall  commence  at  the   expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been  

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previously sentenced unless the Court  directs  that   the  subsequent  sentence  shall  run  concurrently   with such previous sentence.

Provided that  where a person who has been  sentenced  to  imprisonment  by  an  order  under   Section  122  in  default  of  furnishing  security  is,   whilst  undergoing  such  sentence,  sentenced  to   imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the   making  of  such  order,  the  latter  sentence  shall   commence immediately.

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence   of  imprisonment  for  life  is  sentenced  on  a  subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or  imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall   run concurrently with such previous sentence.”  

9. That upon a subsequent conviction the imprisonment or  

imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the  

imprisonment which has been previously awarded is manifest  

from a plain reading of the above. The only contingency in  

which  this  position  will  not  hold  good is  where  the  Court  

directs otherwise. Proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427 is  

not for the present relevant as the same deals with cases  

where the person concerned is sentenced to imprisonment  

by  an  order  under  Section  122  in  default  of  furnishing  

security  which  is  not  the  position  in  the  case  at  hand.  

Similarly sub-section (2) to Section 427 deals with situations  

where  a  person  already  undergoing  a  sentence  of

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imprisonment  for  life  is  sentenced  on  a  subsequent  

conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for  

life. Sub-section (2) provides that the subsequent sentence  

shall  in  such  a  case  run  concurrently  with  such  previous  

sentence.   

10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the  

nature of power available to the Court under Section 427(1)  

of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a general rule to  

be followed except in three situations, one falling under the  

proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427, the second falling  

under sub-section (2) thereof and the third where the Court  

directs  that  the  sentences  shall  run  concurrently.  It  is  

manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power  

and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature  

of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary  

power shall have to be exercised along judicial lines and not  

in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner.  It is difficult to  

lay down any strait jacket approach in the matter of exercise  

of such discretion by the Courts. There is no cut and dried  

formula  for  the  Court  to  follow in  the  matter  of  issue  or  

refusal  of  a  direction  within  the  contemplation  of  Section

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427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a  

given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or  

offences  committed,  and  the  fact  situation  in  which  the  

question of concurrent running of the sentences arises.  High  

Courts in this country have, therefore, invoked and exercised  

their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of  

sentence as much as they have declined such benefit to the  

prisoners. For instance a direction for concurrent running of  

the sentence has been declined by the Gujarat High Court in  

Sumlo  @ Sumla Himla  Bhuriya  and Ors.  v.  State  of   

Gujarat  and  Ors.  2007  Crl.L.J.  612  that  related  to  

commission of offences at three different places resulting in  

three  different  prosecutions  before  three  different  Courts.  

The High Court observed:

“The rule of 'single transaction' even if stretched to   any extent will not bring the cases aforesaid under   the  umbrella  of  'single  transaction'  rule  and   therefore,  this  application  fails.  The  application  is   rejected.”

11. Similarly a direction for concurrent running of sentence  

has  been  declined  by  the  same  High  Court  in  State  of  

Gujarat v. Zaverbhai Kababhai 1996 Crl.L.J. 1296 which

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related to an offence of rape committed at different places  

resulting  in  conviction  in  each  one  of  those  offences  in  

different prosecutions. The High Court observed:

“….It is true that it  is left  to the discretion of the   Court  while  ordering  the  sentence  to  run  either   consecutively  or  concurrently.  However,  such   discretion  has  to  be  exercised  judicially,  having   regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.   As observed by the  Supreme Court,  the  rule  with   regard  to  sentencing  concurrently  will  have  no  application, if  the transaction relating to offence is   not  the  same  and  the  facts  constituting  the  two   offences are quite different. The respondent-accused   is  found  to  be  guilty  for  the  offence  punishable   under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code in two  different  and distinct  occurrences  on two different   dates,  and  the  transactions  relating  to  the   commission of the offences have no nexus with each   other…

12. There  are  also  cases  where  the  High  Courts  have  

depending  upon  whether  facts  forming  the  basis  of  

prosecution arise out of a single transaction or transactions  

that  are  akin  to  each  other  directed  that  the  sentences  

awarded should run concurrently.  As for instance the High  

Court of Allahabad has in Mulaim Singh v. State 1974 Crl.   

L.J. 1397 directed the sentence to run concurrently since  

the nature of the offence and the transactions thereto were  

akin to each other. Suffice it to say that the discretion vested  

in the Court for a direction in terms of Section 427 can and

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ought to be exercised having regard to the nature of the  

offence  committed  and  the  facts  situation,  in  which  the  

question arises.  

13. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court  

in Mohd.  Akhtar  Hussain  v.  Assistant  Collector  of   

Customs (1988) 4 SCC 183 in which this Court recognised  

the basic rule of convictions arising out of a single transaction  

justifying concurrent running of the sentences. The following  

passage is in this regard apposite:

“The basic rule of thumb over the years has been   the so called single transaction rule for concurrent   sentences.  If  a  given  transaction  constitutes  two   offences  under  two  enactments  generally,  it  is   wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is  proper   and  legitimate  to  have  concurrent  sentences.  But   this rule has no application if the transaction relating   to offences is not the same or the facts constituting   the two offences are quite different.”

14. In. Madan Lal’s case (supra) this Court relied upon the  

decision in Akhtar Hussain’s case (supra) and affirmed the  

direction  of  the  High  Court  for  the  sentences  to  run  

concurrently. That too was a case under Section 138 of the  

Negotiable Instruments Act.  The State was aggrieved of the  

direction that the sentences shall run concurrently and had  

appealed  to  this  Court  against  the  same.  This  Court,

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however, declined interference with the order passed by the  

High  Court  and  upheld  the  direction  issued  by  the  High  

Court.   

15. In  conclusion,  we  may  say  that  the  legal  position  

favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in  

cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction  

no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have  

been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of  

cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan  

to the creditor.   

16. Applying the above test to the 15 cases at hand we find  

that  the  cases  against  the  appellant  fall  in  three  distinct  

categories.  The  transactions  forming  the  basis  of  the  

prosecution relate to three different corporate entities who  

had  either  entered  into  loan  transactions  with  the  State  

Financial Corporation or taken some other financial benefit  

like purchase of a cheque from the appellant that was on  

presentation  dishonoured.  The  15  cases  that  have  

culminated in the conviction of the appellant and the award  

of sentences  of  imprisonment  and fine imposed upon him  

may be categorised as under:

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1) Cases  in  which  complainant-Haryana  State  Financial  Corporation  advanced  a  loan/banking  facility  to  M/s  Arawali Tubes Ltd.   acting through the appellant as its  Director viz. No.269-II/97; No.549-II/97; No.393-II/97;  No.371-II/97;  No.372-II/97;  No.373-II/97;  No.877- II/96;  No.880-II/96;  No.878-II/96;  No.876-II/96;  No.879-II/96; No.485-II/96

2) Cases  in  which  complainant-Haryana  State  Financial  Corporation  advanced  a  loan/banking  facility  to  the  appellant to M/s Arawali Alloys Ltd.   acting through the  appellant  as  its  Director  viz.  No.156-II/1997  and  No.396-II/1998

3) Criminal complaint No. 331-II/97 in which complainant-  State Bank of Patiala purchased/discounted the cheque  offered  by  Sabhyata  Plastics  acting  through  the  appellant as its Director.

17. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to  

above to the above fact situations we are of the view that  

each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements was  

a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant  

on the one hand and the borrowing company/appellant on  

the  other.   If  different  cheques  which  are  subsequently  

dishonoured on presentation,  are  issued by the  borrowing  

company acting through the appellant,  the same could be  

said to be arising out of a single loan transaction so as to  

justify a direction for concurrent  running of the sentences

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awarded in relation to dishonour of cheques relevant to each  

such transaction. That being so, the                substantive  

sentence awarded to the appellant in each case relevant to  

the transactions with each company referred to above ought  

to run concurrently. We, however, see no reason to extend  

that  concession  to  transactions  in  which  the  borrowing  

company is different no matter the appellant before us is the  

promoter/Director of the said other companies also. Similarly  

we  see  no  reason  to  direct  running  of  the  sentence  

concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala  

against M/s Sabhyata Plastics and M/s Rahul Plastics which  

transaction  is  also  independent  of  any  loan  or  financial  

assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the  

borrowing companies.  We make it  clear  that  the  direction  

regarding concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to  

the  substantive  sentence  only.  The  sentence  which  the  

appellant has been directed to undergo in default of payment  

of fine/compensation shall not be affected by this direction.  

We  do  so  because  the  provisions  of  Section  427  of  the  

Cr.P.C.  do  not,  in  our  opinion,  permit  a  direction  for  the  

concurrent  running  of  the  substantive  sentences  with

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sentences  awarded  in  default  of  payment  of  

fine/compensation.   

18. In the result,  these appeals succeed but only in part  

and to the following extent:

1) Substantive  sentences  awarded to  the  appellant  by the  

Courts  of  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,  Hissar  and  

Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Hissar,  in  Criminal  

complaint  cases  No.269-II/97;  No.549-II/97;  No.393-

II/97; No.371-II/97; No.372-II/97; No.373-II/97; No.877-

II/96; No.880-II/96; No.878-II/96; No.876-II/96; No.879-

II/96;  No.485-II/96 relevant  to  the  loan  transaction  

between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Tubes  

shall run concurrently.

2)  Substantive sentences awarded to the appellant by the  

Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in Criminal  

complaint  cases  No.156-II/1997  and   No.396-II/1998  

between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Alloys  

relevant to the transactions shall also run concurrently;

3) Substantive  sentences  inter  se by  the  Court  of  Judicial  

Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in the above two categories

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and that awarded in complaint case No.331-II/97 shall run  

consecutively  in  terms  of  Section  427  of  the  Code  of  

Criminal Procedure.

4) No costs.   

………………...…………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

…………………...………J. (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)

New Delhi July 5, 2013