10 November 2017
Supreme Court
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UTTARAKHAND TRANSPORT CORPORATION (EARLIER KNOWN AS U.P.S.R.T.C.) Vs SUKHVEER SINGH

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
Case number: C.A. No.-018448-018448 / 2017
Diary number: 2630 / 2017
Advocates: PRADEEP MISRA Vs


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Non-Reportable  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.  18448  of  2017

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil ) No.4012 of 2017)

Uttarakhand Transport Corporation        (Earlier known as U.P.S.R.T.C.) & Ors.         .... Appellants

Versus

Sukhveer Singh                           ….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

 Leave granted.  

This  Appeal  is  filed  by  the  employer  against  the

judgment of the High Court by which the order of dismissal

of the Respondent- driver from service was set aside by the

High Court.   

2. The  Respondent  was  appointed  as  a  driver  with  the

Appellants- Road Transport Corporation in the year 1989.

On  27th October,  1995  while  driving  a  vehicle  on

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Karnal-Haridwar route, the Respondent did not stop the

vehicle  when  the  inspection  team  signalled.   The

inspection  team  had  to  follow  the  vehicle  which  was

stopped six kilometres away from where it was signalled

to stop.  On verification, it was found that 61 passengers

were  travelling  without  a  ticket.   The  Respondent  was

placed  under  suspension  on  31st October,  1995  and

disciplinary proceedings were initiated by issuance of a

charge sheet on 3rd November,  1995.   The Respondent

submitted  his  explanation  after  which  an  inquiry  was

conducted by the Assistant Regional Manager, Haridwar.

After  considering  the  material  on  record,  the  inquiry

officer  found  that  the  charges  against  the  Respondent

were  proved.  The  inquiry  officer  relied  upon  the

admission  of  the  Respondent  that  though  there  was  a

signal  by  the  inspecting  team  to  stop  the  vehicle  at

Bidouli, he stopped the vehicle only after driving for two

kilometres.   The  explanation  given  by  the  Respondent

that  he  drove  the  vehicle  due  to  a  call  given  by  the

conductor was not accepted by the inquiry officer.  It was

held  that  the  Respondent  was  duty  bound to  stop  the

vehicle when a signal was given by the inspecting team.

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The  inquiry  officer  further  held  that  the  Respondent

colluded with the conductor and did not stop the vehicle

as there were a number of ticketless passengers in the

bus.   The  disciplinary  authority  issued  a  show  cause

notice  on  26th December,  1996  along  with  which  the

inquiry  report  was  supplied  to  the  Respondent.   Not

satisfied  with  the  explanation  submitted  by  the

Respondent  to  the  show  cause  notice,  the  disciplinary

authority dismissed him from service by an order dated

23rd April,  1997.  The appellate authority dismissed the

appeal filed by the Respondent on 25th July, 2000.   

3. A  reference  was  made  to  the  labour  court  which  was

answered in favour of the Respondent on 15th November,

2007.   The  writ  petition  filed  by  the  Respondent

challenging the award of the labour court was allowed by

the  High  Court  and  the  labour  court  was  directed  to

reconsider the matter. After remand, the labour court by

an award dated 12th September, 2011 upheld the order of

dismissal  of  the  Respondent  from  service.   The

Respondent challenged the award of the labour court by

filing a writ petition in the High Court of Uttarakhand at

Nainital.  The High Court while relying upon a judgment of

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this  Court  in  Managing Director ECIL Hyderabad &

Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors.1  allowed the writ petition

and  set  aside  the  dismissal  order.   The  High  Court

directed that the Respondent should be deemed to be in

service  with  all  consequential  benefits.  Assailing  the

legality  of  the  said  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  the

Appellants have approached this Court.   

4. It  is  contended  on  behalf  of  the  Appellants  that  the

impugned judgment is contrary to the law laid down in

Managing  Director  ECIL  Hyderabad  &  Ors. v.  B.

Karunakar & Ors. (supra).    It is further submitted that

a copy of the inquiry report was in fact supplied to the

Respondent.  The other point that was canvassed by the

Appellants  is  that  the  Respondent  neither  pleaded  nor

proved  that  any  prejudice  was  caused  to  him  by  the

non-supply of the inquiry report prior to the issuance of

show  cause  notice.   The  counsel  for  the  Respondent

supported the judgment of the High Court by submitting

that it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to

supply the inquiry report prior to the issuance of the show

cause  notice  as  per  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in

1  (1993) 4 SCC 727

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Managing  Director  ECIL  Hyderabad  &  Ors. v.  B.

Karunakar & Ors.  (supra). He also relied upon certain

findings in the inquiry report which were in favour of the

Respondent.  He finally submitted that the punishment of

dismissal  from  service  is  disproportionate  to  the

delinquency.    

5. The award of the labour court was set aside by the High

Court on the sole ground that non-supply of the inquiry

report  prior  to  the  show  cause  notice  vitiated  the

disciplinary proceedings.  The High Court, in our opinion,

committed an error in its interpretation of the judgment

in  Managing Director ECIL Hyderabad & Ors. v.  B.

Karunakar & Ors. (supra).  It is no doubt true that this

Court  in  the  said  judgment  held  that  a  delinquent

employee has a right to receive the report of the inquiry

officer before the disciplinary authority takes a decision

regarding his guilt or innocence.  Denial of a reasonable

opportunity to the employee by not furnishing the inquiry

report before such decision on the charges was found to

be  in  violation  of  principles  of  natural  justice.   In  the

instant case, the disciplinary authority communicated the

report of the inquiry officer to the Respondent along with

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the  show  cause  notice.   There  is  no  dispute  that  the

Respondent submitted his reply to the show cause notice

after  receiving  the  report  of  the  inquiry  officer.   On

considering  the  explanation  submitted  by  the

Respondent, the disciplinary authority passed an order of

dismissal. Though, it was necessary for the Appellants to

have  supplied  the  report  of  the  inquiry  officer  before

issuance of the show cause notice proposing penalty, we

find  no  reason  to  hold  that  the  Respondent  was

prejudiced by supply of the inquiry officer’s report along

with the show cause notice.  This is not a case where the

delinquent was handicapped due to the inquiry officer’s

report not being furnished to him at all.   In  Managing

Director ECIL Hyderabad & Ors. v.  B. Karunakar &

Ors.  (supra)  this Court, while considering the effect on

the order of punishment when the report of the inquiry

officer was not furnished to the employee and the relief

to  which  the  delinquent  employee  is  entitled,  held  as

under:  

[v]  ……..When  the  employee  is  dismissed  or removed from service and the inquiry is  set  aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases  the  non-furnishing  of  the  report  may  have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may

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have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of  reasonable  opportunity  and  the  principles  of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of  law and to assist  the individual  to  vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor  rites  to  be  performed  on  all  and  sundry occasions.  Whether  in  fact,  prejudice  has  been caused to  the  employee or  not  on  account  of  the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts  and circumstances  of  each  case.  Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume  duty  and  to  get  all  the  consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the  guilty  and  thus  to  stretching  the  concept  of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.         

6. The question of the relief to be granted in cases where

the report of the inquiry officer was not supplied to the

delinquent  employee came up for  consideration of  this

Court  in  Haryana  Financial  Corpn. v. Kailash

Chandra Ahuja2 in which it was held as follows:  21.    From  the  ratio  laid  down  in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727] it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of  a  copy  of  the  inquiry  officer's  report  to  the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary  authority.  It  is  also  clear  that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null  and void and

2  (2008) 9 SCC 31

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the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that  non-supply  of  such  report  had  caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order  of  punishment  cannot automatically be  set aside.

After a detailed examination of the law on the subject,

this Court concluded as follows:  

44.    From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that though supply of report of the inquiry officer is part and parcel of natural justice and must be furnished to the delinquent employee, failure to do so would not automatically result in quashing or setting aside of the order or the order being declared null  and void. For that, the delinquent employee has to show “prejudice”.  Unless  he  is  able  to  show  that non-supply  of  report  of  the  inquiry  officer  has resulted in prejudice or  miscarriage of  justice,  an order of punishment cannot be held to be vitiated. And  whether  prejudice  had  been  caused  to  the delinquent employee depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down.

7. It  is  clear from the above that mere non-supply of the

inquiry  report  does  not  automatically  warrant

re-instatement  of  the  delinquent  employee.   It  is

incumbent upon on the delinquent employee to plead and

prove  that  he  suffered  a  serious  prejudice  due  to  the

non-supply of the inquiry report.  We have examined the

writ  petition  filed  by  the  Respondent  and  we  find  no

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pleading  regarding  any  prejudice  caused  to  the

Respondent by the non-supply of the inquiry report prior

to  the  issuance  of  the  show  cause  notice.   The

Respondent had ample opportunity to submit his version

after  perusing  the  report  of  the  inquiry  officer.   The

Respondent  utilised  the  opportunity  of  placing  his

response  to  the  inquiry  report  before  the  disciplinary

authority.  The High Court committed an error in allowing

the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  Respondent  without

examining  whether  any  prejudice  was  caused  to  the

delinquent employee by the supply of the inquiry officer’s

report along with the show cause notice.  We are satisfied

that there was no prejudice caused to the respondent by

the supply of the report of the inquiry officer along with

the show cause notice.  Hence, no useful purpose will be

served by a remand to the court below to examine the

point of prejudice.  8. The  Respondent  contended  that  the  punishment  of

dismissal  is  disproportionate  to  the  delinquency.   It  is

submitted  that  he  was  working  as  a  driver  and  the

irregularity in issuance of tickets was committed by the

conductor.  We are in agreement with the findings of the

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inquiry  officer  which were  accepted by  the  disciplinary

authority  and approved by  the appellate  authority  and

the labour court that the Respondent had committed the

misconduct in collusion with the conductor.  It is no more

res  integra  that  acts  of  corruption/misappropriation

cannot  be condoned,  even in  cases where the amount

involved is meagre.  (See -   U.P.SRTC  v. Suresh Chand

Sharma3). 9.  For the aforementioned reasons, we allow the appeal and

set aside the judgment of the High Court.  No order as to

costs.                               

                ........................................J.

               [ARUN MISHRA]

                .. ……................................J.

                                                        [L. NAGESWARA RAO] New Delhi, November 10,  2017.  

3  (2010) 6 SCC 555 at Para 21-23