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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL     APPEAL     NO.3501     OF     2003   

Usha Mehta ..Appellant

versus

Government of Andhra Pradesh and others    ..Re-

spondents

J U D G M E N T

This appeal is directed against the judgment of  

the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court whereby  

the writ appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed and the  

order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to inter-

fere with the decision taken by the State Government not to  

regularize the lease deed executed in her favour in respect  

of land measuring 413 sq. yards was upheld.

On an application made by the appellant, the land in  

question is said to have been leased out to her vide deed  

dated 10.1.1972 prepared by Venkat Rao, the then Inspector  

employed in the office of the Estate Officer, Secunderabad in  

the name of the Revenue Secretary of the State.  After get-

ting the lease deed, the appellant applied for permission to  

raise construction. The Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad

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CIVIL APPEAL NO.3501 OF 2003

refused to grant permission on the ground that the land was  

earmarked for road and the lease deed executed in favour of  

the appellant appeared to be fictitious.  Thereupon, the ap-

pellant approached District Collector and other functionaries  

of the Government, who recommended regularization of the  

lease. However, vide memo dated 16.11.1988, the State Govern-

ment finally rejected the representation of the appellant.  

That memo reads as under:

“GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH REVENUE (0) DEPARTMENT

       Memo     No.2405/01/86-7   Dated     :     16.11.1988  .

Sub:- Land - Hyderabad District - Secunderabad Area  Sardar Patel Road - Lease of land measuring 413 Sq.  yards in favour of Dr.Mrs.Usha Mehta - Reg.

Ref :- 1. From Dr.(Mrs.) Usha Mehta rep. dt. NIL  received on 13.9.1986.

2. Govt. Memo No.2405/01/86-1 dt. 30.9.86.

3. From the Incharge Jt. Collector, Hyderabad letter  No. /6/151 Dt. 7.2.87.

4. From the E.O., Secunderabad and Collector,     Hyderabad, Lr.No.DRO/17/87   dt. 13.4.1987.

   5. From the C.L.R., Lr.No.BB4/688/87 dt.19.5.87.

Government have carefully examined the representa- tion of Dr.(Mrs.) Usha Mehta 1st cited in consultation  with the Collector, Hyderabad and Commissioner of Land  Revenue. They consider that the original lease deed it- self was not issued by an authority competent to issue  and the said document is reported to be a forged one,  and that the mere fact that the lease amount and prop- erty tax were paid would not make a forged lease docu- ment a valid one, and hence, any claim based on such a  document cannot and should not be accepted, much less  acted upon. Therefore her request for restoration of  the above said land is rejected accordingly.

The stay granted in the Government memo 2nd cited is  hereby vacated.    

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CIVIL APPEAL NO.3501 OF 2003

Sathi Nair,      Secretary to Government.”

The appellant challenged the decision of the State  

Government in Writ Petition No. 17494 of 1988 which was  

disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court  

vide order dated 12.03.1991 with a direction to the State  

Government to pass appropriate order after hearing the  

appellant and respondent Nos. 4 to 6. The relevant portions  

of that order are reproduced below:  

“A reading of the impugned memo which has been ex- tracted above, does not show whether the Govern- ment has considered the regularisation of the  lease on the altered circumstances and conditions  as suggested by the two authorities. When the com- petent authorities after enquiry found that regu- larisation can be made, it is the duty of the con- cerned authorities, at the time of passing the im- pugned Memo to take note of the recommendations  made by the competent authorities. Without taking  note of the recommendations of the authorities and  without discussing the pros and cons of the mat- ter, the Government simply issued the impugned  Memo. The contention of the petitioner that the  Government has passed the order without applying  its mind and without taking note of the recommend- ations of the competent authorities, has some  force. On that simple ground only, the impugned  Memo is quashed and the authorities are directed  to consider the case of the petitioner in the  light of the recommendations made by the Collect- or, Hyderabad District, in the letter dated  13.4.1987 and the letter of the Commissioner of  Land Revenue dated 19.5.1987.

Respondents 4 and 5 who claims portion of the land  contended that they made be given an opportunity  to represent their case before passing the final  order. Since respondents 4 and 5 are claim rights  over the property, this court is not prepared to  investigate into these facts. As the impugned Memo  is set aside on the technical ground, this court  feels that opportunity be given to the respondents  4 and 5 to represent their case. The Government is  directed to pass appropriate orders after giving  due opportunity to respondents 4 and 5 as well as  

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the 6th respondent who has been impleaded during  the pendency of the writ petition and after con- sidering their respective contention.”

Writ Appeal No.491 of 1991 filed by R.D. Bhoopal  

and K.P. Rao (respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in the writ petition)  

against the order of the learned Single Judge was dismissed  

by the Division Bench of the High Court and the State  

Government was directed to pass appropriate order by the end  

of January, 1992.

In compliance of the direction given by the High  

Court, the State Government re-considered the appellant's  

plea for regularization of lease, gave opportunity of hearing  

to the parties and passed order dated 31.1.1992, paragraphs  

13 and 14 of which read as under:

“13. As regards the claim of Dr.(Mrs.) Usha Mehta,  the Government observe that the grant of lease in  favour of her is unauthorised; that the entire  transaction is the result of fraud and collusion  between her and Sri Venkata Rao, the then Inspecor  of Estate Officer, Secunderabad; that any claim  based on forged document should not be accepted  much less acted upon; and that Sri R.D. Bhoopal,  Sri K.P.Rao and Dr. Usha Mehta have no locus  standi to claim the land.  Therefore the  Government hold that the parties have no claim of  any kind of land in question and that it is a  Government land.  Accordingly their claim  petitions are dismissed.

14. The Government further direct that, as the  piece of land in question firstly allotted to  Mandal Revenue Officer's Office is subsequently  allotted to A.P. Women's Cooperative Finance  Corporation which has spent money in protecting  the land, the land in question be allotted to  A.P.Women's Coop. Finance Corporation permanently  after excluding the area for road widening,  required in public interest as requested by the  Collector in his letter 10th read above, is  cancellation of the orders issued in the  

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Government Memo 9th read above.”

Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of her prayer  

for regularization of the lease, the appellant filed Writ  

Petition No. 1947 of 1992.  The learned Single Judge held  

that the appellant's claim was founded on a forged document  

and no direction can be issued under Article 226 of the  

Constitution for regularisation of the lease deed merely  

because in other cases lease had been regularised on payment  

of the current market value.

The Division Bench of the High Court examined the  

record produced by the parties, referred to Article 299 of  

the Constitution and some of the judgments of this Court and  

held:  

“It is now well settled that the provisions of  Article 299 of the Constitution which are  mandatory in character require that a contract  made in the exercise of the executive power of  the Union or of a State mush satisfy three  conditions viz., i) it must be expressed to be  made by the President or by the Governor of the  State, as the case may be; ii) it must be  executed on behalf of the President or the  Governor as the case may be; and iii) its  execution must be by such person and in such  manner as the President or Governor may direct  or authorize. Failure to comply with these  conditions nullifies the contract and renders it  void and unenforceable.”

Shri D. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned counsel for the  

appellant vehemently argued that even if lease deed dated  

10.1.1972 was forged, the High Court should have issued a  

direction to the respondents to regularize the same because  

in 100 similar cases, the lease deeds executed by Venkat Rao  

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was regularized by the State Government on payment of market  

value. Learned counsel further argued that the impugned  

judgment is liable to be set aside because neither the  

learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench adverted to and  

decided the plea of discrimination raised by the appellant.   

Smt. C.K. Sucharita, learned counsel for the State  

argued that the High Court did not commit any error by  

refusing to entertain the appellant’s plea for regularization  

of the lease because the initial document prepared in her  

favour was forged.  She emphasized that even though Venkat  

Rao was not authorised by the State Government to execute  

lease in favour of any person, he created a fabricated  

documents purporting to transfer public land and after taking  

cognizance of this fact, the State Government had declined to  

regularize the deed allegedly executed in favour of the  

appellant on 10.1.1972.   

Shri P.V. Shetty, learned senior counsel appearing  

for respondent No.2 submitted that his client’s land has  

nothing to do with the plot in question and that the  

appellant has no right to seek regularization of the lease  

deed executed in her favour by Venkat Rao.  He also discloses  

that Venkat Rao has been convicted by the competent Court for  

the offence of forgery.

We have considered the arguments of the learned  

counsel and carefully perused the record including additional  

affidavit dated 22.3.2012 filed by K.V. Suresh Babu in  

compliance of orders dated 3.8.2011 and 12.1.2012 passed by  

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this Court.  Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of that affidavit are  

extracted hereunder:  

“2(a). That upon hearing the above appeal, this  Hon'ble. Court (Coram Hon'ble Justice V.S. Sir- purkar and Hon'ble Justice T.S.Thakur) was pleased  to pass the following order on 3.8.2011:-

"During the course of arguments, the question  arose as to whether the allotments, which were  regularized by the Government were in pursuance of  any definite policy of the State Government. Fur- ther the question arose as to whether what was the  consideration of the State Government in regular- izing nine plots as mentioned in Memo No.6/151  dated 20.3.2003. Similarly, the question arose  about the other regularizations made by the State  Government.

Mr. Venkatanarayana,   learned   senior coun- sel appearing for the State seeks time to clarify  all these, issues by filing an additional affi- davit, List these matters after four weeks".    

(b) That thereafter upon hearing the matter on  12.1.2012, this Hon'ble Court (Coram: Hon'ble  Justice Deepak Varma and Hon'ble Justice Chan- dramauli Kumar Prasad) was pleased to pass the  following order-

“Pursuant to the order passed by this Court on  3.8.2011, additional Affidavit dated 29/11/2011  has been filed by State/Respondent on 30.11.2011.  Along with additional Affidavit, documents have  also been filed. The question involved in this Ap- peal is whether in the disputed piece of land ad- measuring 413 sq.yds. in TSL.R-2, Block-B, Ward  -101, Secunderabad, road   has been widened and  remaining part of land is being used for paid  parking or not or it is yet to be widened.

Learned counsel for Appellant has seriously re- futed the said averment and according to him, it  is only a proposal for road widening, pending  since 1975. But till date, no road has been  widened and no area has been earmarked for paid  parking.

In view of this disputed position, we direct the  Respondent/State to file  documents  to  show and  substantiate when the road was widened through  

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which Contractor and since when the paid  parking is being used.

Mr.Anoop Choudhary, learned senior counsel for Re- spondent/State, prayed for four weeks' time to  clarify the position by filing further Affidavit  and documents in this regard. While doing so, the  previous order passed by this Court may also be  complied with.

List these matters after four weeks.

3. That it is submitted that out of the total ex- tent of 413 square yards of land in issue in the  present case, an extent of 299 square yards is  covered by road being part of 150 feet wide heavy  traffic road- S.P. Road in Hyderabad city. As is  evident from the letter dated 2.2,2012 of the Ex- ecutive Engineer, PD-II, GHMC the said road was  laid long back. Hence no records are available in  the office. A true photocopy of the said letter  dated 2.2.2012 of the executive Engineer, PD-II,  GHMC, Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation is  annexed hereto as Annexure-VII. Further, as is  evident from the tender notifications/circulars  issued' for the purpose, the remaining extent of  114 square yards of land is used by the Greater  Hyderabad Municipal Corporation since the  year,.1999 as paid parking site for vehicles.

The photographs of the suit land showing the  portion of the land in issue (299 square yards)  which is covered by road and the parking lot are  annexed hereto as Annexure-VIII (Colly).

The map of the area clearly showing that the  land in issue is covered by road and parking lot  is annexed hereto as Annexure IX.

A true photocopy of the tender notification  dated 13.3.2000 by the Municipal Corporation of  Hyderabad calling for applications for leasing out  the right to collect parking fee from two wheelers  and 4-wheelers on identified roads at road margin  including the land in issue (mentioned at S.No.97  of the Annexure there as Scooter Parking on road  side from Ashok Bhoopal Chambers to May Fair Com- plex on SP Road) is annexed hereto as Annexure X.

A true photocopy of circular dated  13/14.5.2010 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal  Corporation directing all the Zonal Commissioners  to complete the sealed tender-cum-open auction by  1.6.2010 for parking lots mentioned in the Annex-

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ure thereto including the land in issue (at  S.No.22-Ashok Bhupal Chamber to Reliance Web  World, S.P. Road, Secunderabad- is annexed hereto  as Annexure XI.

4. That it is submitted that the status of the  102 illegal, bogus and forged lease-deeds is as  follows:-

I. 51) cases were founds to be not fit for filing  land grabbing cases. The details of action in  these cases are as follows:

i)Assigned  (Sold)  by Government on 9 payment of  market value as the lessees had put up construc- tion and were in possession thereof (Annexure  XII)

ii)Bogus renewal lease deeds cancelled 29 and fresh  lease deeds issued in lieu thereof to the same  persons since they were in possession thereof and  had constructed residential houses, (original  leases prior to Bogus renewal leases were genuine  in these cases) -Annexure XIII.

iii)Lease deeds after expiry of (30) years 13 period  bogus renewal deeds issued but families of origin- al lessees are residing in old buildings existing  thereon and fresh renewal deeds issued as the ori- ginal leases were genuine Annexure XIV.

TOTAL 51

(II) In (45) cases Land Grabbing cases were filed  by Mandal Revenue Officer, Secunderabad.

i)Certain  cases  disposed  off by  Civil 4 Courts  with a direction to the lessees (Respondents) to  pay the market value as fixed by the Government  -lessees were in possession (Annexure XV)

ii)Cases   pending   in   the   Civil   Courts 30  (Annexure XVI)

iii)Cases   with   drawn   and   conveyance 10 deeds  were issued since the lease deeds were found to be  genuine (Annexure XVII)

iv)Free Hold orders issued by the Special 1 Chief  Secretary. & Chief Commissioner of Land Adminis- tration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad as the original  lease was genuine and Conveyance Deed not yet ex- ecuted due to pendency of Civil Dispute in Court  

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(Annexure –XVIII)  TOTAL 45

(III)Leases not covered by encroachments and kept 3 va- cant-required for road widening etc and not regularized.  (Annexure XIX)

(IV)Under the possession of religious institutions.

(i)Church of South India (Civil Suit is pending)

(ii) Mosque New Bhoiguda 1 (Annexure XX)

V)    The land in issue in the present case ad- measuring 1 413 square yards which already covered  by a 150' wide road and paid parking lot.

Total (I, II, III, IV and V)    102

In our opinion, the appeal is wholly meritless and  

liable to be dismissed for more than one reasons, which are  

enumerated below:

1. The finding recorded by the State Government that the  

lease deed allegedly executed on behalf of the Estate Officer  

was a forged document and no right much less a vested right  

was created in favour of the appellant on the basis of such  

document is based on the correct analysis of the documents  

produced by the parties and the High Court did not commit any  

error by refusing to interfere with that finding.  Learned  

counsel for the appellant could not produce any document to  

show that Venkat Rao was authorised by the State Government  

to execute lease on its behalf in favour of the appellant.  

Therefore, it is not possible to find any fault with  

G.O.Ms.No.130 dated 31.1.1992.  

2. The plea of discrimination raised by the appellant was  

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wholly misconceived and the High Court rightly declined to  

entertain the same. Article 14 of the Constitution declares  

that:

“14. Equality before law.—The State shall not  deny to any person equality before the law or  the equal protection of the laws within the ter- ritory of India.”

The concept of equality enshrined in that art-

icle is a positive concept. The Court can command the State  

to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but  

cannot issue a mandate that the State should commit illegal-

ity or pass wrong order because in another case such an il-

legality has been committed or wrong order has been passed.  

If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in fa-

vour of an individual or a group of individuals, others can-

not invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this  

Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or il-

legality be committed in their favour by the State or its  

agencies/instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot  

be invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities.

The question whether Article 14 can be invoked  

for compelling public authorities to pass an illegal order or  

commit an illegality on the ground that in other cases,  

similar order has been passed or illegality has been  

committed is no longer res integra and has to be answered  

against the appellant. In Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit  

Singh (1995) 1 SCC 745, this Court considered the question  

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whether the High Court was right in invoking Article 14 of  

the Constitution for compelling the appellant to pass an  

order contrary to law merely because in another case such an  

order was passed and answered the same in negative by making  

the following observations:

“ … We are of the opinion that the basis or the  principle, if it can be called one, on which the  writ petition has been allowed by the High Court  is unsustainable in law and indefensible in prin- ciple. Since we have come across many such in- stances, we think it necessary to deal with such  pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the  mere fact that the respondent Authority has passed  a particular order in the case of another person  similarly situated can never be the ground for is- suing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the  plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the  other person might be legal and valid or it might  not be. That has to be investigated first before  it can be directed to be followed in the case of  the petitioner. If the order in favour of the oth- er person is found to be contrary to law or not  warranted in the facts and circumstances of his  case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarran- ted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a  writ compelling the respondent Authority to repeat  the illegality or to pass another unwarranted or- der. (emphasis in original) The extraordinary and  discretionary power of the High Court cannot be  exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the  respondent Authority has passed one illegal/unwar- ranted order, it does not entitle the High Court  to compel the authority to repeat that illegality  over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted ac- tion must be corrected, if it can be done accord- ing to law—indeed, wherever it is possible, the  court should direct the appropriate authority to  correct such wrong orders in accordance with law— but even if it cannot be corrected, it is diffi- cult to see how it can be made a basis for its re- petition. (emphasis supplied) By refusing to dir- ect the respondent Authority to repeat the illeg- ality, the court is not condoning the earlier il- legal act/order nor can such illegal order consti- tute the basis for a legitimate complaint of dis- crimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be  prejudicial to the interests of law and will do  incalculable mischief to public interest. It will  

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be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of  course, if in case the order in favour of the oth- er person is found to be a lawful and justified  one it can be followed and a similar relief can be  given to the petitioner if it is found that the  petitioner's case is similar to the other person's  case. But then why examine another person's case  in his absence rather than examining the case of  the petitioner who is present before the court and  seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and  convenient to examine the entitlement of the peti- tioner before the court to the relief asked for in  the facts and circumstances of his case than to  enquire into the correctness of the order made or  action taken in another person's case, which other  person is not before the case (sic court) nor is  his case. In our considered opinion, such a course —barring exceptional situations—would neither be  advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High  Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted  norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that  because in one case a particular order has been  passed or a particular action has been taken, the  same must be repeated irrespective of the fact  whether such an order or action is contrary to law  or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own  merits, factual and legal, in accordance with rel- evant legal principles. The orders and actions of  the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments  of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they  be elevated to the level of the precedents, as un- derstood in the judicial world.”

Similar is the ratio of the judgments of this  

Court in Narain Das v. Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2  

SCC 265; Gursharan Singh v. NDMC (1996) 2 SCC 459, Jaipur De-

velopment Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain (1997) 1 SCC 37, Yadu  

Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 1 SCC 334, State of  

Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann (1997) 3 SCC 321 , Faridabad CT  

Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services (1997) 7 SCC 752, Style  

(Dress land) v. UT, Chandigarh (1999) 7 SCC 752, State of Bi-

har v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC 94, Union of India  

v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta Shakti  

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Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 10 SCC 337, Sanjay  

Kumar Manjul v. UPSC (2006) 8 SCC 42, K.K. Bhalla v. State of  

M.P. (2006) 3 SCC 581, National Institute of Technology v.  

Chandra Shekhar Chaudhary (2007) 1 SCC 93, Vice-Chancellor,  

M.D. University v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77, State of Ker-

ala v. K. Prasad (2007) 7 SCC 140, Punjab SEB v. Gurmail  

Singh (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan  

(2009) 2 SCC 589 and Shanti Sports Club v. Union of  

India(2009) 15 SCC 705.  

It is also apposite to note that even though the  

appellant had raised the plea of discrimination, she did not  

produce any evidence to prove that other cases were identical  

to her case.  In the absence of such evidence, the High Court  

could not have relied upon the bald statement contained in  

the writ petition filed by the appellant and quashed the well  

reasoned decision taken by the State Government not to regu-

larise the lease in her favour.

3. The lease deed executed in favour of the appellant  

was ex-facie contrary to the doctrine of equality enshrined  

in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is neither the pleaded  

case of the appellant nor any material has been produced by  

her to show that lease deed dated 10.1.1972 was executed  

after issuing an advertisement so as to enable other eligible  

persons to compete for allotment of public land.  In  Akhil  

Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh and  

others (2011) 5 SCC 29, this Court considered the question  

whether the State Government had the power to allot a piece  

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of land in the name of a political-cum-social leader for the  

purpose of establishing a training institute albeit without  

issuing any advertisement.  After considering the scope of  

Article 14 of the Constitution in the matter of grant of li-

cence, allotment of land, distribution of largesse etc. and  

noticing the judgments in S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India  

AIR 1967 SC 1427, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Air-

port Authority of India and others (1979) 3 SCC 489, Kasturi  

Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K (1980) 4 SCC 1, Common  

Cause (petrol pumps matter) v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC  

530, Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others V. State of U.P.  

and others (1991) 1 SCC 212, LIC v. Consumer Education and  

Research Centre (1995) 5 SCC 482 and New India Public School  

and others v. HUDA and others (1996) 5 SCC 510, this Court  

observed:   

“What needs to be emphasised is that the State  and/or its agencies/instrumentalities cannot give  largesse to any person according to the sweet will  and whims of the political entities and/or  officers of the State.  Every action/decision of  the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to  give largesse or confer benefit must be founded on  a sound, transparent, discernible and well-defined  policy, which shall be made known to the public by  publication in the Official Gazette and other  recognised modes of publicity and such policy must  be implemented/executed by adopting a non- discriminatory and non-arbitrary method  irrespective of the class or category of persons  proposed to be benefited by the policy.  The  distribution of largesse like allotment of land,  grant of quota, permit licence, etc. by the State  and its agencies/instrumentalities should always  be done in a fair and equitable manner and the  element of favouritism or nepotism shall not  influence the exercise of discretion.  If any,  conferred upon the particular functionary or  officer  of the State.

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We may add that there cannot be any policy, much  less, a rational policy of allotting land on the  basis of applications made by individuals,  bodies, organizations or institutions dehors an  invitation or advertisement by the State or its  agency/instrumentality. By entertaining  applications made by individuals, organisations  or institutions for allotment of land or for  grant of any other type of largesse the State  cannot exclude other eligible persons from  lodging competing claim.  Any allotment of land  or grant of other form of largesse by the State  or its agencies/instrumentalities by treating  the exercise as a private venture is liable to  be treated as arbitrary, discriminatory and an  act of favouritism and/or nepotism violating the  soul of the equality clause embodied in Article  14 of the Constitution.”

In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the  

following directions are given:

(i) Within two months from today, the State  

Government shall take possession of the land and, if  

necessary, by demolishing the illegal structures  

which may have been raised by the appellant or any  

other person.  

(ii) Within next four weeks, a report showing  

compliance of the aforesaid direction be submitted in  

the Registry of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.  

(iii) The Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court  

shall take orders from the Chief Justice and list the  

case before an appropriate Bench.  If it is found  

that the State functionaries have failed to comply  

with the aforesaid direction, then the High Court  

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shall initiate proceedings against the defaulting  

officers under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The Registry is directed to send a copy of this  

judgment to the Registrar (Judicial), Andhra Pradesh High  

Court by Fax.  

.............................J. [G.S. SINGHVI]

NEW DELHI; .............................J. OCTOBER 16, 2012 [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]   

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CIVIL APPEAL NO.3501 OF 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT     PETITION(C)     NO.360     OF     2002   

IN

CIVIL     APPEAL     NO.3501     OF     2003   

Usha Mehta ..Petitioner

versus

Krishna Paratpar Rao and others    ..Re-

spondents

          O     R     D     E     R   

In this petition filed under Article 129 of the Constitution  

read with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and Rule-3  

(C) of the Rules to regulate proceedings for contempt of the Supreme  

Court, 1975, the petitioner has prayed for punishing the respondents  

for violating order dated 1.10.2001 passed in SLP (C)No.16383/2001.

Today, we have dismissed the appeal (Civil Appeal  

NO.3501/2003 arising out of SLP (C) No.16383/2001).  Therefore, the  

Contempt Petition is also dismissed.

.............................J. [G.S. SINGHVI]

NEW DELHI; .............................J. OCTOBER 16, 2012 [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]   

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CIVIL APPEAL NO.3501 OF 2003

ITEM NO.102               COURT NO.4             SECTION XIIA

           S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3501 OF 2003

USHA MEHTA                                       Appellant (s)

                VERSUS

GOVERNMENT OF A.P. & ORS.                         Respondent(s)

(With appln(s) for permission to file additional documents and  office report) WITH CONTEMPT PETITION(C) NO. 360 OF 2002 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3501/2003 (with appln(s) for exemption from filing OT and with office report)

Date: 16/10/2012  This Appeal and Petition were called on for      hearing today.

CORAM :         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

For Appellant(s) Mr. D. Ramakrishna Reddy, Adv. Mr. M.H. Prasad, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Ms. C.K. Sucharita,Adv. (State)

Mr. P.V. Shetty, Sr. Adv. Mr. P. Venkat Reddy, Adv. Mr. Vijay Kumar Pardesi, Adv.

          UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following                                O R D E R  

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the Non- Reportable Judgement.

As a sequel to this, the contempt petition filed  

by the appellant is also dismissed.

(Parveen Kr.Chawla) Court Master

(Phoolan Wati Arora) Court Master

  [signed Non-Reportable Judgment and order are placed on the file]

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