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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO………………. OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.22035 of 2013)

Usha Bharti                       …Appellant  

VERSUS

State of U.P. & Ors.           ...Respondents

WITH CONTEMPT PETITION (C) No. 287 of 2013

IN CIVIL APPEAL NO………………. OF 2014

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.22035 of 2013)        

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO……………OF 2014

      (Arising out of SLP(C) No.29740 of 2013)   

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the judgment  

and order  passed by  the  High Court  of  Judicature at  

Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) in Review Petition No.103  

of 2013 on 4th July, 2013 dismissing the review petition  

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filed by the appellant.  

3. Since  the  issues  raised  in  these  appeals  are  

pristinely legal,  it  would not be necessary to make a  

detailed reference to the facts, leading to the filing of  

the present appeals.  Even otherwise, the High Court in  

the impugned judgment has made an elaborate survey  

of the facts. Therefore, it is unnecessary to repeat the  

same. However, the foundational facts for challenging  

the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court  are  

recapitulated for ready reference.  

4. The appellant successfully contested the election  

held in October, 2010 for becoming a Member of the  

Zila  Panchayat,  Sitapur,  U.P.  62  candidates  were  

elected as the Members of the Zila Panchayat including  

the  appellant  and  respondents  5  to  37.  On  12th  

December,  2010,  the  appellant  was  elected  as  

Adhyaksh  of  the  Zila  Panchayat,  Sitapur.  On  30th  

October,  2012,  a  notice  of  proposed  Motion  of  No  

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Confidence  was  given  to  the  Collector,  Sitapur  for  

calling a meeting under Section 28 of the U.P. Kshettra  

Panchayat & Zila Panchayat Act,  1961 (for  short ‘the  

Act’). The notice calling for a Motion of No Confidence  

was  signed  by  37  members.  The  legal  requirement  

under Section 28(2) is that a motion expressing want of  

confidence in the Adhyaksh must be signed by not less  

than half of the total number of elected members. On  

31st October,  2012,  the  Collector,  Sitapur  issued  a  

notice informing the elected members that a meeting  

for considering the Motion of No Confidence will be held  

on 23rd November, 2012.  

5. Aggrieved  by  the  issuance  of  said  notice,  the  

appellant filed Writ Petition No.9654 of 2012 on various  

grounds alleging that the motion for no confidence has  

been done with an ulterior motive to usurp the office of  

the  appellant.  It  was  alleged  that  atleast  three  

members whose names were mentioned in the Motion  

for  No  Confidence  had  not  signed  the  motion/notice  

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requesting  the  Collector  to  call  a  meeting.  The  

appellant  made  the  following  prayers  in  the  writ  

petition :-

“(i) Issue an appropriate writ,  order or direction  in  the  nature  of  certiorari  quashing  the  impugned  notice  of  intent  to  bring  no- confidence motion against the petitioner;

(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction or writ in the  nature of certiorari quashing the notice dated  31st October,  2012,  issued  by  respondent  No.3, as contained in Annexure No.1 to the  writ petition.    

(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction or writ in the  nature  of  mandamus  directing  the  respondent No.3 to verify the genuineness of  the signature of the member’s on the notice  to  bring  motion  against  the  petition  dated  30th October, 2012,

(iv)  Issue a writ, order or direction or writ in the  nature  of  mandamus  commanding  the  opposite  parties  to  let  the  petitioner  to  continue  on  the  office  of  Adhyaksha,  Zila  Panchayat Sitapur of Tehsil & District Sitapur.

(v) Issues an ad-interim mandamus to the above  effect.

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(vi) Issue  any  other  appropriate  writ,  order  or  direction  in  favour  of  the  petitioner  as  the  Hon’ble  Court  may  deem  fit  in  the  circumstances of the case.          And

(vii) Award  the  costs  of  the  petition  to  the  petitioner.”   

6. The High Court on 21st November, 2012 directed  

the  District  Judge  or  any  Additional  District  Judge  

nominated  by  him  to  hold  an  enquiry  to  ascertain  

genuineness  of  the  affidavits  and  signatures  of  

members  and to  submit  a  report  thereon before  the  

next date of hearing. It was also directed that further  

proceedings of “No Confidence Motion” shall remain in  

abeyance.  The  matter  was  to  be  listed  on  20th  

December, 2012. The report was duly submitted, which  

indicated  that  33  Members  had  admitted  their  

signatures appearing on the notice, and the affidavits,  

submitted  in  connection  with  the  motion  of  no  

confidence.  It  was  also  stated  that  “among  those  

members, in respect of whom signatures and affidavits  

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were doubted, the report of Deputy Director (Pralekh)  

mentions that Zila Panchayat Member Mr. Vijay Kumar  

has also proved to have been signed and submitted the  

notice and the affidavit. Accordingly, 34 Zila Panchayat  

Members are found to have applied for bringing in the  

motion of no confidence.” Taking note of the aforesaid  

report, the High Court dismissed the writ petition with  

the following observations:

“As  the  requirement  of  valid  signature  for  carrying out the No Confidence Motion is only  31, whereas in the enquiry report it has been  found to be 34, now nothing would survive in  this writ petition. Hence, it is dismissed.”  

7. On  6th February,  2013,  the  Collector,  Sitapur  

issued  notice  fixing  22nd February,  2013  for  

consideration of the Motion of No Confidence.  

8. Aggrieved  by  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  

dated  5th February,  2013,  the  appellant  moved  this  

Court through S.L.P.(C) No.8542 of 2013.  

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9. Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  the  High  

Court had wrongly relied upon the report submitted by  

the  Additional  District  Judge  without  giving  the  

appellant  any opportunity  to  submit  any objection to  

the  report.  This  apart,  in  view  of  the  provisions  

contained in Article 243C(2)of the Constitution of India,  

no provision has been made for No Confidence Motion  

in Panchayat elections. It was submitted by Mr. Shanti  

Bhushan that  the aforesaid issues with regard to the  

applicability of scope and ambit of Article 243 of the  

Constitution  of  India,  even  though  specifically  raised  

the writ petition and argued before the High Court have  

neither been noticed nor considered. Taking note of the  

aforesaid submissions, this Court passed the following  

order :-

“If that be so, in our opinion, the remedy of  the petitioner would be to seek review of the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  rather  than  to  challenge  the  same  by  way  of  this  special  leave petition.”

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10. The prayer made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the  

operation  of  the  impugned  order  be  stayed  for  two  

weeks  to  enable  the  appellant  to  approach the  High  

Court by way of review petition was declined. It was,  

however,  made clear  that  the  result  of  the  meeting,  

which was scheduled to be held on 22nd February, 2013,  

shall not be declared for a further period of two weeks.  

11. Thereafter,  the  petitioner  filed  Review  Petition  

No. 103 of 2013 before the High Court. The appellant  

stated  that  members  owning  allegiance  to  the  

Samajwadi  Party led by Smt.  Madhu Gupta,  W/o Shri  

Hari  Om Gupta –  Respondent No.5,  were not  able  to  

muster  any  signature  for  the  initiation  of  the  Motion  

and,  therefore,  appended forged signature  of  several  

Members on the notice of intent to move the Motion of  

No Confidence.  These forged signatures were used by  

the Samajwadi Party to induce other Members to join  

for  giving  the  notice  for  moving  the  Motion  of  No  

Confidence.  It was stated that the very initiation of the  

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Motion  was  a  fraud  on  the  system  and  against  the  

settled  democratic  principles.   The  act  of  forgery  of  

signatures  was  committed  on  the  instance  of  

Respondent No. 5 and her supporters.  Therefore, the  

initiation of Motion of  No Confidence was invalid  and  

illegal.  The appellant pointed out that in the earlier writ  

petition,  it  was  specifically  pleaded  that  in  terms  of  

Article  243N,  the  provision  of  Section  28  have  been  

rendered otiose.  The provision contained in Section 28  

of  the  Act,  being  inconsistent  with  the  constitutional  

scheme,  which  does not  comprehend the  removal  of  

Adhyaksh of Zila Panchayat, mid term and as such, the  

Motion  otherwise  also  could  not  be  permitted  to  be  

carried.   It  was  further  stated  that  “in  view  of  the  

provisions of Article 243C(ii) of the Constitution of India,  

there being no provision in the Panchayat election for  

Motion  of  No  Confidence  whether  Section  28  of  the  

Panchayatiraj Adhiniyam would continue to operate in  

view of Article 243N”.

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12. Upon completion of the pleadings, the High Court  

by  an  elaborate  judgment  has  dismissed  the  Review  

Petition by the impugned order dated 4th July, 2013.  On  

10th July, 2013, the District Magistrate, Sitapur fixed a  

meeting  for  counting  of  votes  on  12th July,  2013.  

Aggrieved  by  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  the  

appellant filed SLP in this Court on 11th July, 2013.  The  

matter was mentioned in Court at 10.30 A.M. before the  

Chief  Justice of India.   A direction was issued by the  

Chief Justice of India to the Registry to place the matter  

before  this  bench  at  the  end  of  the  list.   In  the  

meantime,  No Confidence Motion was passed against  

the  appellant  with  33  votes  in  favour  of  the  No  

Confidence Motion and 23 against with 6 votes being  

declared invalid.  The counting was supervised by the  

Civil  Judge,  Sitapur.   The  representative  of  the  

petitioner/appellant was present and had stated that he  

is satisfied with the counting of votes.  There has been  

no challenge to the result of the No Confidence Motion,  

with regard to the counting of votes.  On 12th July, 2013,  

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at  about  12.15  P.M.,  this  Court  issued  notice  and  

directed that “in the meanwhile, status quo, as it exists  

today,  shall  be maintained”.   Since Respondent  No.5  

had filed a caveat on 11th July, 2013 at about 11.00 A.M.  

and no notice had been given to her before hearing the  

Special Leave Petition, she filed an application seeking  

recall  of the aforesaid order dated 12th July, 2013.  It  

was claimed that Respondent No. 5 sought recall on the  

following grounds:-

(i) No  notice  was  given  to  Respondent  before  hearing and passing Order dated 12.07.2013.

(ii) Counting of votes was already done and the  no confidence Order was passed well before  passing the Order dated 12.07.2013 by this  Hon’ble Court.  

(iii) Present  SLP is  not  maintainable  as  per  the  settled law laid down by this Hon’ble Court  namely  that  an  SLP  is  not  maintainable  against  the  dismissal  of  review filed  before  the HC after dismissal of SLP.

(iv) In any case the SLP is also not maintainable  as  the  issue  raised  in  the  SLP  is  already  covered  by  the  judgment  of  this  Hon’ble  

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Court in Bhanumati and Ors. V. State of U.P.  & Ors. reported in 2010 (12)  SCC 1.

13. Whilst the matter was pending, on 23rd July, 2013,  

the petitioner filed Contempt Petition No. 287 of 2013  

for  violating  the  orders  of  this  Court  dated 12th July,  

2013.   It  is  stated  that  Respondent  No.5  admittedly  

made false statement in  the application to recall  the  

order dated   12th July, 2013.  The order of this Court  

was communicated whilst the meeting for counting of  

votes was still  in progress.  The appellant states that  

one of the newspapers “Amar Ujala” has reported that  

the result had been declared at 1.15 P.M.

14. Respondent No. 5 was impleaded as Respondent  

No.  4  in  the  aforesaid  Contempt  Petition.   However,  

notice  of  contempt  was  issued  only  against  official  

Respondent Nos. 1,  2 and 3.  I.A.  No. 8 was filed on  

18th November,  2013 pointing out that in spite of No  

Confidence Motion having been passed, the appellant  

has continued to take policy decisions which were not  

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only prejudicial to public interest but would also create  

several  problems  for  Zila  Panchayat,  in  case  the  

present appeal is dismissed.  The aforesaid application  

came up for hearing on 19th November, 2013.  It was  

pointed  out  on  behalf  of  Respondent  No.  5  that  the  

appellant  had  issued  a  Notice  of  Meeting  on  8th  

November, 2013 of the meeting of the Zila Panchayat,  

Sitapur to be held on      20th November, 2013 at 11.30  

A.M.  to  take  decision  on  Subject  Nos.  1  to  16  

enumerated  in  Annexure  A3  to  the  Interlocutory  

Application.   

15. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of  

the  appellant  that  the  notice  merely  indicates  the  

subjects on which decisions are required to be taken for  

the development work within the Zila Panchayat.  It was  

submitted that the appellant ought to be permitted to  

take necessary decisions.   However, during the course  

of  deliberations,  Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  had  very  fairly  

submitted that the appellant will voluntarily not preside  

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over the aforesaid meeting, rather the Collector may be  

requested  to  chair  the  meeting.   A  direction  was,  

therefore,  issued  that  the  District  Magistrate,  Sitapur  

would chair the meeting on 8th November, 2013.  It was  

made clear that the issuance of the aforesaid direction  

will not in any manner vary/alter the status quo order  

passed  by  this  Court  on  12th July,  2013,  which  was  

directed to continue.  Submissions of the parties in the  

appeal  were  heard  on  3rd December,  2013,  5th  

December,  2013 and 11th December,  2013 when the  

judgment was reserved.  

16. Very  detailed  and  elaborate  submissions  have  

been  made  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties,  

which can be briefly summed up as follows:-

(i) At  the  outset,  Dr.  Rajiv  Dhawan  submitted  

that  the  Special  Leave  Petition  is  not  

maintainable as it is directed only against the  

judgment  rendered  by  the  High  Court  in  

Review Petition No. 103 of 2013.  In support  

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of  the  submissions,  learned  senior  counsel  

relied on judgments of this Court in State of  

Assam Vs.  Ripa  Sarma  1   and  Suseel  

Finance  &  Leasing  Co. Vs.  M.  Lata  &  

Ors.2.  Dr. Dhawan also submitted that even  

otherwise, the SLP deserves to be dismissed  

as the matter is squarely covered against the  

petitioner/appellant  by the judgment of  this  

Court in Bhanumati & Ors. Vs.  State  of  

Uttar  Pradesh  through  its  Principal  

Secretary & Ors.  3    Relying on the aforesaid  

judgment,  it  was  submitted  by Dr.  Dhawan  

that the petitioner can not even be heard on  

the proposition that Section 28 of the Act is  

inconsistent with Part IX of the Constitution.  

Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel also  

submitted that in view of the law laid down in  

Bhanumati & Ors. (supra), the issue raised  

herein  is  no  longer res  integra.   Learned  1 (2013) 3 SCC 63 2 (2004) 13 SCC 675 3 (2010) 12 SCC 1

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senior  counsel  also  submitted  that  the  SLP  

against  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  

rendered in the Review Petition would not be  

maintainable  without  challenging  the  

judgment which was sought to be reviewed.   

(ii) Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan has  submitted  that  the  

issue raised in the present appeal is of vital  

importance,  i.e.,  whether  Section  28 of  the  

Act,  which  provides  for  bringing  No  

Confidence  Motion  against  the  Chairman of  

Zila  Panchayat  is  valid  in  so  far  as  it  is  

inconsistent with Part IX of the Constitution of  

India.   Therefore,  this  Court  will  have  to  

determine  whether  the  impugned  provision  

falls within the legislative competence of the  

State Legislature.  The Court will also have to  

decide as to whether the impugned provision  

is  inconsistent  with  Article  243N  of  the  

Constitution of India?  

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(iii) It is submitted by the learned senior counsel  

that  the  provision  of  No  Confidence Motion  

for removing the Chairman or Adhyaksha of  

Zila Panchayat is inconsistent with Part IX of  

the Constitution. He submits that Part  IX of  

the Constitution containing Articles 243A to  

243O  were  inserted  wide  the  Constitution  

(73rd Amendment Act, 1992) w.e.f. 24th April,  

1993.  The aforesaid articles have laid down  

exhaustive provisions for self-governance at  

Panchayat  level.   This  includes  election  of  

Panchayat Members and its Chairman as well  

as  their  disqualification.   However,  no  

provision  is  made  for  bringing  a  No  

Confidence Motion against the Chairperson of  

Panchayat.  Article 243C(v) provides that the  

Chairperson  of  a  Panchayat  at  the  village  

level shall be elected in such a manner as the  

Legislature of a State may, by law, provide.  

Article  243F  provides  that  Panchayat  can  

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make  law  for  disqualification  of  Panchayat  

Members.  Sections 18, 19 and 29 of the Act,  

which  provides  for  composition  of  Zila  

Panchayat,  election  of  Adhyaksha  and  

removal  of  Adhyaksha  respectively  are  in  

consonance with the aforesaid Articles of the  

Constitution  of  India.   Section  19  of  the  

aforesaid  Act  provides  for  election  of  

Adhyaksha by  elected members  of  the  Zila  

Panchayat  from  amongst  themselves.  

Section  29(1)  of  the  Act  enumerates  the  

grounds for removal of Adhyaksha but does  

not  include  the  provision  for  bringing  a  

Motion  of  No  Confidence  against  the  

Chairman.   

(iv) Learned  senior  counsel  further  submitted  

that the provision contained in Section 28(1)  

of  the  Act  is  repugnant  to  Part  IX  of  the  

Constitution.   Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  submits  

that in any event, the provisions contained in  

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Section  28  of  the  Act  could  not  have  

continued  after  expiry  of  one  year  of  the  

enactment  of  the  73rd  Amendment  of  the  

Constitution of India, which came into effect  

from  24th  April,  1993.   Such  continuance  

would  be  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  

contained in Article 243N of the Constitution  

of India.

(v) Learned  senior  counsel  further  submitted  

that Article 243D for the first time introduced  

reservation  of  seats  for  Scheduled  Castes,  

Scheduled Tribes as well as ladies both in the  

election of members of Panchayat as well as  

for the office of Chairperson.  It is submitted  

that  the  provision  of  “No  Confidence”  like  

Section  28  of  the  Act  can  frustrate  the  

provision for  such reservation.   SC,  ST  and  

ladies always being in minority in Panchayat,  

a  Chairperson  from  the  reserved  category  

can easily be removed from the said office by  

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majority  of  general  category  Panchayat  

members.  Such a result was not envisaged  

by the provisions contained in Article 243D.  

It  is  further  submitted  that  Part  IX  of  the  

Constitution  has  exhaustively  specified  the  

areas for which a State Legislature, as local  

self-governance  falls  in  the  State  List,  can  

make  laws  in  order  to  have  complete  

decentralization  of  the  governance.   This,  

according to the learned senior counsel was  

the  main  objective  of  the  73rd Amendment  

Act which does not provide for any law to be  

made by the State Legislature for bringing a  

No  Confidence  Motion  against  the  

Chairperson/Adhyaksha/Zila Panchayat.   

(vi) According to Mr. Bhushan, if there had been  

no existing provision for No Confidence like  

Section  28  in  the  Act,  then  after  73rd  

amendment  in  the  Constitution,  the  State  

Legislature  could  not  have  brought  such  a  

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provision as it is not competent to do so.  The  

provision, according to Mr. Bhushan, is likely  

to be struck down as the powers vested in  

the elected body are sought to be taken over  

and vested in the executive, which would be  

opposed  to  the  basic  structure  of  the  

Constitution  of  India.   Mr.  Bhushan  

emphasized that by permitting the provisions  

in  Section  28  to  continue,  the  State  

Legislature  and  Executive  are  trying  to  

deprive the elected representatives  of  their  

fundamental rights enshrined in Part III  and  

Part IX of the Constitution of India.  Relying  

on the judgment of this Court in I.R. Coelho  

Vs. Union of India  4  .    He has submitted that  

fundamental  rights  include  within  itself  the  

right  to  choose.   The  aforesaid  right  to  

choose would continue till the tenure of the  

representative of the people for which he has  

4 (2007) 2 SCC 1

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been elected is exhausted.  The provision in  

Section  28  permits  such  tenure  to  be  

curtailed,  which  would  infringe  the  

fundamental right of the voters that elected  

such a member.  Giving numerous examples  

from different Articles of the Constitution of  

India,  it  is  submitted  that  provision  of  No  

Confidence  Motion  has  been  specifically  

provided  wherever  it  was  intended.   As  

example, he points out Articles 67(b), 90(c),  

94(c) providing for No Confidence Motion for  

the  removal  of  Vice  President,  Deputy  

Chairman  of  the  Council  of  States  and  the  

Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the House of  

people respectively.  He also points out that  

there  are  offices/posts  in  the  Constitution,  

which  are  filled  up  through  a  process  of  

election but the persons so elected can not  

be removed by way of moving a Motion for  

No  Confidence.   For  example,  he  relies  on  

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Article  80(4),  81(1)(a)  and  Article  54.  

Therefore, Rajya Sabha Members, Lok Sabha  

Members and President of India can not be  

removed  by  moving  a  Motion  for  No  

Confidence.   Mr.  Bhushan  submits  that  the  

question  here  is  as  to  whether  the  No  

Confidence  provisions  contained  in  the  Act  

can  continue  after  the  amendment  of  the  

Constitution.  A provision for moving a Motion  

for No Confidence is in other words the right  

to recall of an elected member by the voters.  

The Constitution may or may not provide for  

moving  a  Motion  for  No  Confidence.   He  

submitted  that  provision  for  moving  the  

Motion for  No Confidence is  not necessarily  

part of democracy.  In fact, right to recall an  

elected  member  has  not  been  legally  

recognized.  In support of this submission, he  

makes a reference to Article 243N read with  

Article  243(c)(iv)  and  (v)  and  in  particular,  

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sub-clause 5(b).  He further submits that the  

reservation was introduced for the first time  

by  73rd amendment,  which  incorporated  

Article 243 in the Constitution of India w.e.f.  

24th April, 1993.  He, thereafter, outlined the  

various provisions for reservation of seats as  

contained in Article 243D.  It is emphasized  

that  the  provision  contained  in  Article  

243D(ii)  makes  it  mandatory  that  not  less  

than one third of the total number of seats  

reserved under Clause 1 shall be reserved for  

ladies belonging to the Scheduled Castes or  

as  the case may be,  the Scheduled Tribes.  

Articles  243F(1)(a)  and  Article  243F(1)(b)  

which  correspond  to  Article  102  and  103  

provides for disqualification for being chosen  

as, and for being a member of a Panchayat.  

Mr. Bhushan submitted that the Constitution  

provides  for  removal  and  consequential  

disqualification.   This  would  not  apply  to  a  

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vote  of  No  Confidence.   This  would  

tantamount  to  giving  the  voters  a  right  to  

recall which does not exist in law in so far as  

Panchayat Adhyaksha is concerned.  Learned  

senior counsel further submitted that Article  

243  makes  provision  for  reservation,  to  

advance the aim of our Constitution for the  

upliftment of the poor sections of the society.  

Therefore,  the  Parliament  has  taken  extra  

care  to  ensure  that  such  members  of  the  

weaker  society  once  elected  should  not  be  

removed  by  the  strongest  segment  of  the  

society  by  bringing  a  Motion  of  No  

Confidence.   He reiterated that  wherever  it  

was  felt  necessary,  the  Parliament  had  

provided  for  moving  a  Motion  of  No  

Confidence.   He  has  made  a  specific  

reference to Articles 89, 90, 93, 94(c), 80(iv),  

81, 54, 61, 66 and 67(b).   

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(vii) In support of the submission that Section 28  

of  the  Act  is  repugnant  to  Part  IX  of  the  

Constitution  of  India,  in  particular,  Article  

243N.  The learned senior counsel relied on a  

number of judgments of this Court:-

Deep Chand Vs. State of U.P.5, Zaverbhai  

Amaidas Vs.  State  of  Bombay6,  N.  

Bhargawan  Pillai Vs.  State  of  Kerala7,  

State  of  U.P. Vs.  Synthetics  and  

Chemicals Ltd.8, Babu Parasu Kaikadi Vs.  

Babu9,  Nirmaljeet  Kaur Vs.  State  of  

M.P.10,  Zee  Telefilms  Ltd. Vs.  Union  of  

India11,  Board  of  Control  for  Cricket  in  

India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club12

(viii) Learned senior  counsel  then submitted that  

the judgment in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra)  

is per incuriam as the issue with regard to the  5 (1959) Supp. 2 SCR 8 6 (1955) 1 SCR 799 7 (2004) 13 SCC 217 8 (1991) 4 SCC 139 9 (2004) 1 SCC 681 10 (2004) 7 SCC 558 11 (2005) 4 SCC 649 12 (2005) 4 SCC 741

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reservation had not  been considered at  all.  

The  judgment  also  does  not  consider  the  

provisions  where  specifically  Motion  for  No  

Confidence has not been provided.  It is also  

submitted  that  most  of  the  judgment  is  

obiter.  In fact, Mr.  Bhushan submitted that  

the judgment is a  treatise in law and should  

be given the same status.  

(ix) Mr. Bhushan then addressed us on the issue  

as to whether the SLP would be maintainable  

against  the  judgment  rendered  in  review  

without  challenging  the  judgment  of  which  

the review was sought.   The learned senior  

counsel  submitted that  firstly  the petitioner  

had challenged the main writ petition by way  

of  SLP  No.  8542  of  2013.   The  same  was  

disposed  of  with  opportunity  to  file  review  

petition before the High Court after noticing  

the objections raised by the petitioner, which  

were not considered by the High Court.  The  

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Page 28

earlier judgment of the High Court in the writ  

petition  clearly  merged  in  the  judgment  of  

the High Court dismissing the review petition.  

Therefore,  it  was  necessary  only,  in  the  

peculiar facts of this case, to challenge only  

the judgment of the High Court in the review  

petition.   It  is  submitted  by  Mr.  Shanti  

Bhushan that Section 114 of the CPC contains  

no limits on the circumstances under which  

the Court can review its own judgment.  The  

section  merely  states  that  the  person  

aggrieved  may  apply  for  a  review  of  

judgment  to  the  Court,  which  passed  the  

decree or made the order, and the Court may  

make such order on it as it thinks fit.  So far  

as the High Court is concerned, it would have  

inherent powers to review any decision.   

(x) Learned  senior  counsel  elaborated  that  

Section  114  CPC  gives  full  powers  to  the  

Court  to  pass  any  order  in  the  interest  of  

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justice.  It can not be curtailed by the Rules  

made  by  the  High  Court  or  the  Supreme  

Court.  These Rules can be amended by the  

High Court or the Supreme Court but Section  

114 can only be amended by the Parliament.  

He  points  out  that  Section  121  and  122,  

which permits the High Court to make their  

own rules on the procedure to be followed in  

the High Court as well as in the Civil  Court  

subject  to  their  superintendence.   Learned  

senior  counsel  further  submitted  that  even  

Order 47 Rule 1 does not curtail the power to  

review which is untrammeled.  According to  

Mr. Bhushan, Section 114 is incorporated in  

Order 47 Rule 1 as it provides that review can  

be made by the Courts either on facts as well  

as on law.  The Court has a power to rehear  

the  entire  matter  in  order  to  do  complete  

justice between the parties.              Mr.  

Bhushan further pointed out that Section 151  

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CPC is also part of the same scheme to do  

complete justice between the parties.   It  is  

emphasized  that  the  powers  of  the  Courts  

have not been curtailed by the Code of Civil  

Procedure.  In fact, it is well known that the  

provisions  of  Code of  Civil  Procedure  are a  

hand  maiden  to  justice.   He,  therefore,  

submitted that  full play should  be given to  

the  expression  “or  for  any  other  sufficient  

reason”  to  ensure  that  the  Court  can  do  

complete justice.   The principle of  Ejusdem  

Generis should not be applied for interpreting  

these  provisions.   Learned  senior  counsel  

relied on Board of Cricket Control (supra).  

He  relied  on  Paragraphs  89,  90  and  91.  

learned  senior  counsel  also  relied  on  S.  

Nagaraj & Ors. Vs.  State of Karnataka &  

Anr.13  He  submits  finally  that  all  these  

judgments  show  that  justice  is  above  all.  

13 (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595

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Therefore, no constraints can be put on the  

power to review of the Court.  Mr. Bhushan  

also  relied  on  Green  View  Tea  &  

Industries Vs. Collector, Golaghat, Assam  

& Anr.  14    

(xi) Mr. Bhushan has submitted that grounds for  

challenging  the  theories  of  the  Act  of  the  

anvil of  Article  243  or  will  be  read  into  

Prayers  1and  2(i)  wherein  a  specific  

declaration  is  sought  that  the  provision  is  

ultra vires to the Constitution of India.   Mr.  

Bhushan then referred to Article 243N.  He  

reiterated  that  the  provision  in  Section  28  

ceased to exist after one year.  Therefore, it  

was  not  necessary  to  plead  as  Section  28  

would  ipso  facto be  rendered  

unconstitutional.  He reiterated on the basis  

of  Paragraphs  20  and  21  that  necessary  

averments have been made that provision for  

14 (2004) 4 SCC 122

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No Confidence Motion is not provided for in  

Part  IX  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  

Therefore, if Paragraph 28 and Paragraph 31  

are  read  with  Ground  F,  it  would  clearly  

indicate that the removal under the Act can  

only  be  under  Section  29  which  does  not  

provide  for  moving  a  Motion  for  No  

Confidence.  

(xii) Coming back to the submission that Section  

28  is  inconsistent  with  Part  IX  of  the  

Constitution of India, he submits that Part IX  

is a complete code in relation to Panchayats.  

Therefore, State Legislature can not make a  

provision  inconsistent  to  Part  IX.   Similar  

power  has  been  reserved  for  the  Stated  

Legislature as exceptions as enumerated in  

Articles  243a,  243C(iv)  &  (v).   He  further  

submitted that Article 243f, 243G and 243H  

only  give  limited  powers  to  the  State  

Legislature.  This clearly show that Part IX is a  

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complete code.   Therefore,  unless  power  is  

specifically  conferred  on  the  State  

Legislature,  it  would  not  be  competent  to  

legislate  on  matters  which  are  specifically  

dealt with in Part IX.  He also refers to Articles  

243I (ii), (iii) & (iv), J(iv) and K to emphasise  

that  even  in  these  Articles  no  provision  

existed  for  moving  a  Motion  for  No  

Confidence.   Finally,  it  is  submitted  by  Mr.  

Shanti Bhushan that since the issues raised in  

the  appeal  entail  interpretation  of  the  

provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  the  

matter needs to be referred to at-least five  

judges.   

(xiii) Mr.  Ashok  Desai,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing  for  Respondent  No.  5  has  

submitted that admittedly the petitioner does  

not  enjoy the confidence of  the majority  of  

the members of the Panchayat.  She has not  

even  challenged  the  result  of  the  No  

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Confidence vote.  He has given an elaborate  

explanation of all the proceedings, which we  

have recounted earlier.  

(xiv) Countering  the  submissions  of  Mr.  Shanti  

Bhushan  that  the  Petitioner  belongs  to  the  

Scheduled Casts, therefore, she is entitled to  

special  protection,  Mr.  Ashok  Desai  has  

submitted that  this  issue was not  raised in  

the writ petition or even in the review petition  

and is sought to be raised for the first time  

before this Court.  He further pointed out that  

the petitioner did not contest the election of  

Adhyaksha as a member of Scheduled Castes  

but as a lady candidate for  whom the seat  

was reserved.  He further submitted that the  

present  case  is,  in  any  event,  squarely  

covered  by  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Bhanumati  &  Ors.  (supra).   Therefore,  

there  is  no  need for  embarking  on  a  fresh  

reconsideration  of  all  the  issues.   He  has  

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submitted that the submission of Mr. Shanti  

Bhushan  that  the  earlier  judgment  was  

confined to the amendment of Section 28 and  

not  the  original  statute  is  a  result  of  

misreading  of  judgment.   The  judgment  of  

this  Court  in  Bhanumati  &  Ors.  (supra)  

clearly applies in the facts and circumstances  

of this case and, therefore, the Special Leave  

Petition deserves to be dismissed.  Learned  

senior  counsel  elaborated  that  the  

submission with regard to Section 28 of the  

Act  being  inconsistent  with  Part  IX  of  the  

Constitution deserves to be rejected outright.  

This  submission  can  only  be  considered  on  

the basis of precise pleadings in the present  

case.  Except for making a statement that the  

provision in the act is inconsistent with Part  

IX of the Constitution, no other reasons are  

given.  

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(xv)   This apart, Section 28 can not be said to be  

contrary  to  the  foundational  principles  of  

democracy.  These provisions are referring to  

Sections 17, 18, 21 and 28 of the Act.  The  

learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  the  

aforesaid  provisions  are  to  ensure  that  the  

Adhyaksha always enjoys  confidence of  the  

constituency while in power during the term  

for which such a person is elected.

(xvi) Mr.  P.N.  Mishra  appearing  for  Respondent  

No.1 to 4 submitted that the Special  Leave  

Petition  deserves  to  be  dismissed  on  the  

short ground that it is filed only against the  

judgment  rendered  by  the  High  Court  in  

review petition.  He has relied on judgment of  

this  Court  in  Shanker  Motiram  Nale Vs.  

Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput  15  .   He also  

relied  on  an  unreported  judgment  in  

Sandhya Educational Society & Anr. Vs.  

15 (1994) 2 SCC 753

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Union of India & Ors. [SLP(C) No. 2429 of  

2012] to the same effect.  He submitted that  

the powers of review would not permit  this  

Court  to  reopen  the  entire  issue  and  to  

rehear  the  entire  matter  on  merits.   The  

review is limited to the provision contained in  

Section 114 CPC read with Order 47 Rule 1.  

He submits that under this provision, review  

is limited only to circumstances where review  

is sought on discovery of new and important  

matter;  or  where  evidence  could  not  be  

produced in spite of exercise of due diligence  

or  on  account  of  some  mistake  or  error  

apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record.   He  

submits that the expression “or for any other  

sufficient reason” would not permit the Court  

to reopen the entire issue, which has already  

been  judicially  determined.   This  apart,  

according  to  the  learned  counsel,  the  

petitioner  has  failed  to  show  that  injustice  

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has been done to her in the face of the fact  

that  majority  of  the  members  of  her  

constituency have voted in favour of the No  

Confidence Motion.   Learned senior  counsel  

further submitted that it is a matter of record  

that  the  No  Confidence  Motion  was  not  

challenged  on  merits.   Therefore,  the  SLP  

deserves to be dismissed.  

(xvii)Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan in  reply  submitted that  

these  submissions  of  Mr.  Ashok  Desai  and  

Mr.  Mishra  are  fallacious  as  no  Act  of  

Parliament can interfere with the powers of  

this Court  under Article 136.   In the event,  

this Court holds that SLP is only against the  

judgment of review and is not maintainable,  

it would tantamount to amending Article 136  

of  the  Constitution  of  India.   The  learned  

senior counsel submitted that the discretion  

of  this  Court  cannot  be  whittled  down  let  

alone  taken  away  as  suggested  by  the  

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learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondents.  Even  on  facts,  Mr.  Bhushan  

submitted  that  the  main  judgment  was  

challenged.  In  the judgment relied upon by  

Mr.  Mishra  in  State  of  Assam Vs.  Ripa  

Sarma (supra), the impugned judgment had  

not  been  challenged.  Therefore,  this  Court  

said that no SLP would be maintainable only  

against  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  

rendered  in  a  review  petition,  without  

challenging the main judgment. He reiterated  

that  the  judgment  in  Bhanumati  &  Ors.  

(supra) is  mostly  “obiter”.  It  is  also  per  

incuriam as reservation for Scheduled Castes  

and  Scheduled  Tribes  had  not  been  taken  

into consideration.  

17. We have considered the submissions made by the  

learned counsel for the parties.  

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18. We  are  not  able  to  accept  the  submission  of  

Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  that  the  provision  contained  in  

Section 28 of the Act are, in any manner, inconsistent  

with the provisions contained in Part IX, in particular,  

Article 243N of the Constitution of India.  

19. Section 19 of the Act provides that in every Zila  

Panchayat,  an  Adhyaksha  shall  be  elected  by  the  

elected  members  of  the  Zila  Panchayat  through  

amongst themselves.  Section 19-A was introduced by  

U. P. Act No.9 of 1994 providing for reservation of the  

offices  of  Adhyaksha,  for  persons  belonging  to  

Scheduled  Casts  and  Scheduled  Tribes  and  the  

Backward  Classes.  It  is,  however,  provided  that  the  

number of offices of Adhyaksha, so reserved, shall bear,  

as nearly as may be the same proportion to the total  

number of such offices in the State as the population of  

the  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and  the  

Backward  Classes  in  the  State,  bears  to  the  total  

population of the State. The Section even provides that  

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the offices so reserved shall be allotted by rotation to  

different Zila Panchayats in the State in such manner as  

may be prescribed by the State Government. But the  

reservation for the Backward Classes shall not exceed  

27% of the total number of offices of the Adhyakshas in  

the State. Section 19-A(2) is important in the present  

context which provides that “not less than one-third of  

the offices shall be reserved for the ladies belonging to  

the  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  or  the  

Backward  Classes  as  the  case  may  be.”  Under  this  

Section, on a seat reserved for the aforesaid categories  

of  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and  the  

Backward Classes, a person belonging to that category  

would be elected from a particular Panchayat in which  

reservation is made on the basis of the roster provided  

in Section 19-A(3). Section 20 of the Act provides that a  

Zila  Panchayat shall  continue for  five years  from the  

date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. It is  

also provided that Section 20(2) that the term of office  

of a member of a Zila Panchayat shall expire with the  

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term  of  Zila  Panchayat  unless  otherwise  determined  

under  the  provisions  of  the  Act.  Section  21  provides  

that save as otherwise provided in this Act, the term of  

office of the Adhyaksha shall commence on his election  

and  with  the  term  of  Zila  Panchayat.  Section  23  

provides for disqualification for corrupt practices, which  

is  not  applicable  in  the  present  case.  Section  24  

provides  for  resignation  of  Adhyaksha,  again  not  

applicable  in  the  present  case.  Section  25 relates  to  

filing  of  casual  vacancy,  again  not  applicable  in  this  

case. Section 26 provides for disqualification for being a  

member or an Adhyaksha in case a person has incurred  

any disqualification for being elected as a member of  

the Panchayat.  

20. The  whole  debate  in  this  case  centres  around  

Section  28,  which  provides  for  a  Motion  of  No  

Confidence in Adhyaksha. The section provides detailed  

procedure with regard to the issuance of written notice  

of intent to make the motion, in such form as may be  

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prescribed, signed by not less than one-half of the total  

number of the elected members of the Zila Panchayat  

for the time being. Such notice together with the copy  

of  the  proposed  motion  has  to  be  delivered  to  the  

Collector  having  jurisdiction  over  the  Zila  Panchayat.  

Therefore, the Collector shall convene a meeting of the  

Zila  Panchayat  for  consideration  of  the  motion  on  a  

date appointed by him which shall not be later than 30  

days the date from which the notice was delivered to  

him. The Collector is required to give a notice to the  

elected  members  of  not  less  than  15  days  of  such  

meeting in the manner prescribed. The meeting has to  

be presided over by the District Judge or a Civil Judicial  

Officer not below the rank of a Civil Judge. Interestingly,  

the  debate  on  the  motion  cannot  be  adjourned  by  

virtue  of  provisions  contained  in  Section  28(7).  Sub-

section (8) further provides that the debate on the No  

Confidence Motion shall automatically terminate on the  

expiration of 2 hours from the time appointed for the  

commencement of the meeting, if it  is not concluded  

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earlier.  Either  at  the  end  of  2  hours  or  earlier,  the  

motion  has  to  be  put  to  vote.  Further  more,  the  

Presiding  Officer  would  be  either  District  Judge  or  a  

Judicial Officer is not permitted to speak on the merits  

of the motion, and also not entitled to vote. Sub-section  

(11)  provides  that  “if  the  motion  is  carried  with  the  

support  of  (more  than  half)  of  the  total  number  of  

(elected members) of the Zila Panchayat for the time  

being”. In our opinion, the aforesaid provision contained  

in  Section 28 is,  in  no manner,  inconsistent  with the  

provisions  contained  in  Article  243N.  To  accept  the  

submission of Mr.  Bhushan of inconsistency would be  

contrary  to  the  fundamental  right  of  democracy  that  

those  who  elect  can  also  remove  elected  person  by  

expressing  No  Confidence  Motion  for  the  elected  

person.  Undoubtedly,  such No Confidence Motion can  

only  be  passed  upon  observing  the  procedure  

prescribed under  the relevant  statute,  in  the present  

case the Act.

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21. We  are  unable  to  accept  the  submission  of  

Mr. Bhushan that removal of Adhyaksha can only be on  

the grounds of misconduct as provided under Section  

29 of  the  Act.  The aforesaid  Section  provides that  a  

procedure  for  removing  an  Adhyaksha  who  is  found  

guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his/her duties.  

This  Section,  in  no  manner,  either  overrides  the  

provisions contained in Section 28 or is in conflict with  

the same.  

22. We also do not agree with the submission of Mr.  

Bhushan that Section 28 could not have continued after  

expiry of one year of the enactment of 73rd Amendment  

of  the  Constitution  of  India,  which  came  into  effect  

on  24th April,  1993.  Such  an  eventuality  would  have  

arisen  only  in  case  it  was  found  that  Section  28  is  

inconsistent  with  any  provision  of  Part  IX  of  the  

Constitution. Merely because Article 243F is silent with  

regard to the removal of an Adhyaksha on the basis of  

a  Motion  of  No  Confidence  would  not  render  the  

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provision  inconsistent  with  the  Article  243  of  the  

Constitution of India.  

23. We also do not find any merit in the submission of  

Mr.  Bhushan  that  the  petitioner  being  a  Scheduled  

Caste Lady cannot be removed through a vote of No  

Confidence.  We  do  not  find  any  merit  that  the  

provisions contained in Section 28 would frustrate the  

provisions for reservation for Scheduled Caste Ladies.  

Even if an Adhyaksha belonging to one of the reserved  

categories,  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and  

other Backward Classes is removed on the basis of the  

vote of No Confidence, she can only be replaced by a  

candidate belonging to one of the reserved categories.  

Therefore, the submission of      Mr. Shanti Bhushan  

seems  to  be  focused  only  on  the  petitioner,  in  

particular, and not on the candidates elected from the  

reserved  categories,  in  general.  The  submission  is  

wholly devoid of any merit and is hereby rejected.  

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24. We  are  entirely  in  agreement  with  Mr.  Shanti  

Bhushan  that  Part  IX  of  the  Constitution  has  made  

provisions  for  self-governance  at  Panchayat  level,  

including  the  election  of  Panchayat  Members  and its  

Chairman. Thus, ushering in complete decentralization  

of the Government and transferring the power to the  

grass roots level bodies; such as the Panchayats at the  

village,  intermediate and District  level,  in  accordance  

with Article 243C of the Constitution. Article 243C is as  

under:  

“243C. Composition of Panchayats. -   (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the  Legislature  of  a  State  may,  by  law,  make  provisions with respect to the composition of  Panchayats:

Provided  that  the  ratio  between  the  population  of  the  territorial  area  of  a  Panchayat  at  any  level  and  the  number  of  seats  in  such  Panchayat  to  be  filled  by  election shall,  so  far  as  practicable,  be the  same throughout the State. (2) All the seats in a Panchayat shall be filled  by  persons  chosen  by  direct  election  from  

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territorial  constituencies  in  the  Panchayat  area and,  for  this  purpose,  each Panchayat  area  shall  be  divided  into  territorial  constituencies in such manner that the ratio  between the population of each constituency  and the number of seats allotted to it shall,  so far as practicable, be the same throughout  the Panchayat area. (3) The Legislature of a State may, by law,  provide for the representation— (a) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at  

the  village  level,  in  the  Panchayats  at  the intermediate level or, in the case of  a  State  not  having  Panchayats  at  the  intermediate level, in the Panchayats at  the district level;

(b) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at  the  intermediate  level,  in  the  Panchayats at the district level;

(c) of  the  members  of  the  House  of  the  People  and  the  members  of  the  Legislative  Assembly  of  the  State  representing  constituencies  which  comprise  wholly  or  partly  a  Panchayat  area  at  a  level  other  than  the  village  level, in such Panchayat;

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(d) of the members of the Council of States  and  the  members  of  the  Legislative  Council  of  the  State,  where  they  are  registered as electors within— (i)  a  Panchayat  area  at  the  

intermediate level, in Panchayat at  the intermediate level;

(ii) a  Panchayat  area  at  the  district  level,  in  Panchayat  at  the  district  level.

(4) The  Chairperson  of  a  Panchayat  and  other  members  of  a  Panchayat  whether  or  not chosen by direct election from territorial  constituencies  in  the  Panchayat  area  shall  have the right to vote in the meetings of the  Panchayats. (5) The Chairperson of—

(a) a  panchayat  at  the  village  level  shall be elected in such manner as  the Legislature of a State may, by  law, provide; and

(b) a  Panchayat  at  the  intermediate  level  or  district  level  shall  be  elected by, and from amongst, the  elected members thereof.”

This  Article  as  well  as  some  others,  such  as  

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Articles 243-A, 243-C(5), 243-D(4), 243-D(6), 243-F(1),  

(6), 243-G, 243-H, 243-I(2), 243-J, 243-K(2), (4) of the  

Constitution etc make provision for the State to enact  

necessary  legislation  to  implement  the  provisions  in  

Part IX of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we are  

not able to agree with the submission of Mr. Bhushan  

that  State  Legislature  will  have  no  power  to  make  

provision  for  no-confidence  motion  against  the  

Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat.

25. We are also unable to agree with the submission  

of                      Mr. Bhushan that a person once elected   

to  the  position  of  Adhyaksha  would  be  permitted  to  

continue in office till the expiry of the five years terms,  

even though he/she no longer enjoys the confidence of  

the electorate. To avoid such  catastrophe, a provision  

for no-confidence, as observed earlier, has been made  

in Section 28 of the Act. The extreme submission made  

by  Mr.  Bhushan,  if  accepted,  would  destroy  the  

foundational precepts of democracy that a person who  

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is elected by the members of the Zila Panchayat can  

only remain in power so long as the majority support is  

with such person.  

26. We also do not find any merit in the submission of  

Mr. Bhushan that permitting the provision contained in  

Section 28 of  the Act  to  remain on the statute book  

would  enable  the  executive  to  deprive  the  elected  

representatives of their fundamental rights enshrined in  

Part III and Part IX of the Constitution of India. In our  

opinion,  the  ratio  of  the  judgment  in  I.R.Coelho  

(supra) relied  upon  by  Mr.  Bhushan  is  wholly  

inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.  

There is no interference whatsoever in the right of the  

electorate to choose. Rather Section 28 ensures that an  

elected representative can only stay in power so long  

as such person enjoys the support of the majority of the  

elected members of the Zila Panchayat. In the present  

case,  at  the  time of  election,  the  petitioner  was  the  

chosen one, but,  at  the time when the Motion of  No  

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Confidence in the petitioner was passed,  she was not  

wanted. Therefore, the right to chose of the electorate,  

is very much alive as a consequence of the provision  

contained in Section 28.  

27. We  are  unable  to  accept  the  submission  of  

Mr. Bhushan that the provisions contained in Section 28  

of the Act cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as it  

fails to satisfy the twin test of reasonable classification  

and  rational  nexus  with  the  object  sought  to  be  

achieved.  In  support  of  this  submission,  Mr.  Bhushan  

has relied on the judgment of this Court in D.S. Nakara  

vs. Union of India16. We fail to see how the provisions  

contained in Section 28 of the Act would take away the  

autonomy  of  the  Panchayati  Raj  Institutions.  In  our  

opinion, the judgments relied upon by Mr. Bhushan in  

support  of  the  submissions  that  provisions  of  No  

Confidence Motion in Section 28 of the Act would put  

the  executive  authorities  in  the  State  in  control  of  

16 (1983) 1 SCC 305

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Village Panchayats or  District  Panchayats.  Apart  from  

the use of superlatives, that the party now in power is  

trying to remove all the office holders of Panchayats in  

U.P. belonging to the opposite party, no other material  

has been placed on the record.  

28. It  is  true  that  in  the  Constitution,  Article  67B  

provides  for  removal  of  the  Vice-President  by  a  

resolution of the Council of States as provided therein  

passed by the majority of all the then members of the  

Council and agreed to by the House of People. It is also  

correct that under Article 90C, the Deputy Chairman of  

the Council of States can be removed from his office on  

a resolution of the Council  passed by all  the majority  

members  of  the  then  Council.  Similarly,  Article  94  

provides that a member of holding office as Speaker or  

Deputy  Speakers  of  the  House  of  People  may  be  

removed from his office by a resolution of the House of  

People passed by a majority of all the then members of  

the House.  

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29. It is also true that there are certain positions in the  

Constitution,  which are filled up through election but  

individuals so elected cannot be removed by way of No  

Confidence  Motion,  e.g.  Rajya  Sabha  Members,  Lok  

Sabha  Members  and  the  President  of  India.  We  are,  

however,  unable  to  accept  the  submission  of  Mr.  

Bhushan that Part  IX of  the Constitution of India has  

placed office of an Adhyaksha of a Zila Panchayat on  

the  same  pedestal  as  the  President  of  India.  Article  

243F  empowers  the  States  to  enact  any  law  for  a  

person who shall be disqualified for being chosen as a  

member  of  a  Panchayat.  This  would  also  include  a  

member of a Panchayat, who is subsequently appointed  

as  Adhyaksha  of  a  Zila  Panchayat.  There  is  no  

prohibition  under  Article  243F  disenabling  any  State  

Legislature  for  enacting  that  an  elected  Adhyaksha  

shall  remain  in  office  only  so  long  as  such  elected  

person  enjoys  the  majority  support  of  the  elected  

members of the Zila Panchayat. Therefore, we have no  

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hesitation in rejecting the aforesaid submissions of Mr.  

Shanti Bhushan.  

30. The  submissions  of  Mr.  Bhushan  on  depriving  a  

candidate  belonging  to  the  reserved  category  of  a  

position to which he or she has been elected on the  

basis of reservation are wholly fallacious. The seat for  

the office  of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat was reserved  

for  women candidates,  i.e.,  all  women  candidates.  It  

was not specifically reserved for Ladies belonging to the  

reserved  categories  of  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  

Tribes  and  the  Backward  Classes.  The  petitioner  

contested as a Lady Candidate and not as a candidate  

belonging to any reserved category and was elected on  

a seat reserved for   Ladies generally.

31. Having said all this, we would like to point out that  

in  normal  circumstances  the  present  SLP  would  not  

have been entertained. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan and Mr. Ashok  

Desai had pointed out at the very initial hearing that  

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the SLP would not be maintainable as it challenges only  

the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  rendered  in  review  

petition. The main judgment dated 5th February, 2013  

rendered in W.P.(C) No.9654 of 2012 which has been  

reviewed by the High Court in the impugned order has  

not been challenged. As a pure statement of law, the  

aforesaid  proposition  is  unexceptionable.  However,  in  

the present case, we have been persuaded to entertain  

the  present  SLP  in  view of  the  order  passed by  this  

Court on            19th February, 2013. In Ripa Sarma  

case (supra), it was not disputed before this Court that  

the  judgment  and  order  dated  20th November,  2007  

passed in Ripa Sarma (supra) was not challenged by  

way of an SLP before this Court. Relying on Order 47  

Rule  7 of  the Code of  Civil  Procedure,  1908 and the  

earlier judgments of this Court it was held that :     

“In view of the above, the law seems to be  well  settled  that  in  the  absence  of  a  challenge to the main judgment, the special  leave  petition  filed  challenging  only  the  subsequent  order  rejecting  the  review  petition, would not be maintainable.”  

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32. With  regard  to  the  second  submission  of  

Dr. Dhawan and Mr. Ashok Desai that the issue raised  

in the present proceeding is  no longer  res integra in  

view of the law laid down by this Court in Bhanumati  

(supra), we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  submission  

deserves  to  be  accepted,  in  so  far  as  the  matter  is  

covered by the ratio laid down in Bhanumati (supra).  

33. A careful perusal of the judgment of this Court in  

Bhanumati  (supra)  would show that  this  Court  had  

considered the provisions contained in all  the Articles  

Part IX of the Constitution, in all its hues and colours.  

However, it appears that the issue with regard to the  

adverse impact of the provision in Section 28 of the Act  

on  the  reservation  for  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  

Tribes and other Backward Classes was neither argued  

nor considered. We have, therefore, examined the issue  

raised by Mr. Bhushan.  

34. In our opinion, the provision under Section 28A of  

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the Act in no manner dilutes or nullifies the protection  

given to the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes,  

Scheduled  Tribes  and  Backward  Classes  in  the  73rd  

Amendment of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we  

accept  the submission of  Dr.  Dhawan and Mr.  Ashok  

Desai that in view of the law laid down in Bhanumati’s  

case (supra), the issue is no longer res integra.  

35. As  noticed  earlier,  we  have  been  persuaded  to  

entertain the Special Leave Petition as Mr. Bhushan had  

highlighted that permitting the Vote of No Confidence  

as a ground for disqualifying an elected Zila Panchayat  

Adhyaksha,  Zila  Panchayat  would  leave  a  candidate,  

elected  from  the  reserved  categories  of  Scheduled  

Castes/  Scheduled  Tribes,  vulnerable to  unjustified  

attacks  from  the  elected  members  of  the  general  

category.   This  issue was not  raised before the High  

Court either in original writ petition being W.P. No. 9654  

of 2012 nor was it raised before the High Court in the  

Review  Petition.   However,  in  view  of  the  seminal  

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importance of the issue raised, we had entertained the  

Special  Leave Petition.   Having said  that,  it  must  be  

pointed out that the raising of such an issue is neither  

justified nor relevant in the facts of the present case.  

As  pointed  out  earlier,  the  petitioner  herein  had  

contested the election as an Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat  

from a seat reserved for  Ladies.  Merely because she  

happens to belong to the reserved category, it can not  

be  permitted  to  be  argued,  that  the  provision  with  

regard  to  the  reservation  for  the  members  of  the  

Scheduled  Castes/Scheduled  Tribes/Backward  Classes  

has been in any manner diluted, let alone nullified.  It  

has been specifically noted in the Statement of Objects  

and Reasons of the            73rd Amendment as follows:-

“Though the Panchayati Raj institutions have  been in existence for a long time, it has been  observed  that  these  institutions  have  not  been able to acquire the status and dignity of  viable and responsive people’s bodies due to  a  number  of  reasons  including  absence  of  regular  elections,  prolonged  supersessions,  insufficient representation of weaker sections  like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  Women, inadequate devolution of powers and  lack of financial resources.

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2.  Article  40  of  the  Constitution  which  enshrines  one  of  the  directive  principles  of  State  Policy  lays  down that  the  State  shall  take steps to organise Village Panchayats and  endow them with such powers and authority  as  may  be  necessary  to  enable  them  to  function as units  of  self-government.  In  the  light of the experience in the last forty years  and in view of the shortcomings which have  been observed, it is considered that there is  an  imperative  need  to  enshrine  in  the  Constitution  certain  basic  and  essential  features  of  Panchayati  Raj  institutions  to  impart  certainty,  continuity  and strength to  them.”

36. The  provisions  of  the  73rd Constitutional  

amendment  are  to  ensure  that  Panchayati  Raj  

Institutions acquire “the status and dignity of viable and  

responsive  people’s  bodies”.  The  provisions  are  not  

meant to provide an all pervasive protective shield to  

an Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat, even in cases of loss of  

confidence of the constituents. Provision in Section 28,  

therefore, cannot be said to be repugnant to Part IX of  

the Constitution of India.    

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37.  In  our  opinion,  the  amendment  as  well  as  the  

main provision in Section 28 is in absolute accord with  

the vision explicitly enunciated in the Preamble of the  

Constitution of  India.   In  fact,  the spirit  which led to  

ultimately encoding the goals of “WE THE PEOPLE” in  

the Preamble of the Constitution of India, permeates all  

other  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  The  

fundamental aim of the Constitution of India is to give  

power to the People.  Guiding spirit of the Constitution  

is “WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA”.  In India, the People are  

supreme, through the Constitution of India, and not the  

elected Representatives. Therefore, in our opinion, the  

provision  for  right  to  recall  through  the  Vote  of  No  

Confidence is  in  no manner  repugnant  to  any of  the  

provisions of the Constitution of India.  

38. Upon  examination  of  the  entire  Scheme  of  the  

73rd Amendment,  in  the  context  of  framing  of  the  

Constitution of India, this Court in  Bhanumati & Ors.  

(supra), observed as follows:-

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“54. The argument  that  as  a  result  of  the  impugned amendment stability and dignity of  the  Panchayati  Raj  institutions  has  been  undermined,  is  also  not  well  founded.  As  a  result  of  no-confidence  motion  the  Chairperson of a panchayat loses his position  as a Chairperson but he remains a member,  and  the  continuance  of  panchayat  as  an  institution is not affected in the least.”

We  are  in  respectful  agreement  with  aforesaid  

conclusion.

39. We  reiterate  the  view  earlier  expressed  by  this  

Court  in  Bhanumati  &  Ors.  (supra),  wherein  this  

Court observed as follows:-

“57. It has already been pointed out that the  object and the reasons of Part IX are to lend  status  and  dignity  to  Panchayati  Raj  institutions and to impart certainty, continuity  and strength  to  them.  The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  unfortunately,  in  his  argument, missed the distinction between an  individual  and  an  institution.  If  a  no- confidence  motion  is  passed  against  the  Chairperson of a panchayat, he/she ceases to  be  a  Chairperson,  but  continues  to  be  a  member of the panchayat and the panchayat  continues with a newly-elected Chairperson.  Therefore, there is no institutional setback or  impediment  to  the  continuity  or  stability  of  the Panchayati Raj institutions.

58. These  institutions  must  run  on  democratic  principles.  In  democracy  all  

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persons heading public bodies can continue  provided  they  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  persons  who  comprise  such  bodies.  This  is  the  essence  of  democratic  republicanism.  This  explains  why  this  provision  of  no- confidence  motion  was  there  in  the  Act  of  1961  even  prior  to  the  Seventy-third  Constitution  Amendment  and  has  been  continued even thereafter. Similar provisions  are there in different States in India.”

40. The  whole  edifice  of  the  challenge  to  the  

constitutionality of Section 28 is built on the status of  

the petitioner as a member belonging to the reserved  

category.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  continuance,  

stability,  dignity  and  the  status  of  the  Panchayat  

Institutions.  In our opinion, the personal desire, of the  

petitioner  to  cling  on  to  the  office  of  Adhyaksha  is  

camouflaged as a constitutional issue.  The provision of  

No  Confidence  Motion,  in  our  opinion,  is  not  only  

consistent with Part IX of the Constitution, but is also  

foundational  for  ensuring  transparency  and  

accountability of the elected representatives, including  

Panchayat Adhyakshas.  The provision sends out a clear  

message  that  an  elected  Panchayat  Adhyaksha  can  

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continue  to  function  as  such  only  so  long  as  he/she  

enjoys the confidence of the constituents.  

Is Bhanumati & Ors. per incuriam ?  

41.  This submission again, in our opinion, is not well  

founded.  The  only  ground  urged  in  support  of  the  

submission by Mr. Shanti Bhushan was that this Court  

in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra) had not considered the  

provision with regard to special protection to be given  

to  the  members  of  the  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  

Tribes  and  the  Backward  Classes.  Firstly,  such  a  

submission  was  never  made  before  this  Court  in  

Bhanumati  &  Ors.  (supra).  Secondly,  as  we  have  

already  pointed  out  earlier,  the  issue  with  regard  to  

reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  

the Backward Classes, does not arise in the facts of this  

case as the petitioner had not been elected to the office  

of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat reserved for Scheduled  

Castes  and Scheduled  Tribes.    Mr.  Ashok Desai  has  

placed  before  us  enclosure  to  Government  Order  

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No.2746/33-1-2010-37G/2000  dated  15th September,  

2010 indicating reservation for the year 2010 for the  

office of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat, District wise in  

the State of Uttar Pradesh. The order is divided into two  

columns:  Districts’  reserved  for  Schedule  Caste  Lady  

and  Districts’  reserved  for  Ladies.  Extract  of  the  

aforesaid order is as follows:-     

Districts’ reserved for  Schedule Caste Lady

Districts’ reserved for  Ladies

S.No. District S.No .

District

1 Chatrapati  Sahuji  Maharajnagar

1 Allahabad

2 Sant Ravidas Nagar  (Bhadohi)

2 Sitapur

3 Jaunpur 3 Hardoi 4 Ghajipur 4 Lakhimpur Khiri 5 Sant Kabir Nagar 5 Azamgadh

42. It  is  a  matter  of  record  that  the  petitioner  was  

elected  as  Panchayat  Adhyaksha  of  Sitapur  District  

Reserved for Ladies, it is not reserved for a Schedule  

Caste Lady. Therefore, we are not able to accept the  

submission of Mr. Bhushan.  

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43.  We  also  do  not  accept  the  submission  of  

Mr.  Bhushan  that  the  aforesaid  judgment  needs  

reconsideration. A perusal of the judgment would show  

that  this  Court  traced  the  history  leading  upto  the  

insertion of Article 40 of the Constitution of India. The  

Court  examined  the  relevant  commentaries  of  many  

learned authors, Indian as well as Foreign; Constituent  

Assembly Debates; and concluded as follows :

“13. The Constitution’s quest for an inclusive  governance  voiced  in  the  Preamble  is  not  consistent  with  panchayat  being  treated  merely as a unit of self-government and only  as part of directive principle. If the relevant  Constituent  Assembly  Debates  are  perused  one  finds  that  even  that  constitutional  provision about panchayat was inducted after  strenuous efforts by some of the members.  From the debates we do not fail to discern a  substantial difference of opinion between one  set  of  members who wanted to finalise the  Constitution  solely  on  the  parliamentary  model by totally ignoring the importance of  panchayat  principles  and  another  group  of  members  who  wanted  to  mould  our  Constitution on Gandhian principles of Village  Panchayat.”

44. The  Court  emphasized  that  Dr.  Rajendra  Prasad  

was the strongest critic of the Draft Constitution, who  

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had opined that  “the  village has  been and will  even  

continue to be our unit in this country.” (Para 15). The  

Court further notices the opinion of Mr. M.A. Ayangar  

and  Mr.  N.G.  Ranga,  both  of  whom suggested  some  

amendments to the Draft Constitution. The Court also  

notices  that  a  similar  opinion  was  expressed  by  

Mr. S.C. Mazumdar, who had struck a balance between  

Gandhian Principles and the Parliamentary model of the  

Constitution. The insertion of Article 40 was accepted  

by Dr. Ambedkar. This Court further notices the opinion  

of  Seth  Govind  Das  from  the  Central  Provinces  and  

Berar (Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VII, PP.523-

24) (See Paras 12 to 20).  

45. Thereafter,  the  Court  notices  that  “in  other  

representative democracies of the world committed to  

a written Constitution and Rule of Law, the principles of  

self-Government  are  also  part  of  the  Constitutional  

doctrine.”  The  Court  emphasized  that  under  

the  73rd Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  Panchayats  

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become  “Institution  of  self-governance,  which  was  

previously  a  mere  unit  under  Article  40”.  It  was  

emphasized that the 73rd Amendment heralded a new  

era, which is a turning point in the history of local self-

governance (Para 22). It was also emphasized that the  

73rd Amendment  is  very  powerful  “tool  of  social  

engineering” (Para 24). We reiterate the opinion of this  

Court  that  as  74%  of  the  Indian  population  live  in  

villages,  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  power  of  

governance  should  vest  in  the  smallest  units  of  the  

Panchayat  having  its  hierarchy  as  provided  under  

various  Panchayat  Acts  throughout  the  country.  The  

judgment analyses the changes introduced by the 73rd  

Amendment and concludes as follows :

“34. The changes introduced by the Seventy- third  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  have  given  Panchayati  Raj  institutions  a  constitutional  status  as  a  result  of  which  it  has become permanent in the Indian political  system as a third Government. On a careful  reading of  this  amendment,  it  appears that  under Article 243-B of the Constitution, it has  been mandated that there shall be panchayat  at the village, intermediate and district levels  

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in accordance with the provisions of Part IX of  the Constitution.”

46.   This  Court concluded upon examination of  the  

Constitutional  scheme  introduced  by  

the 73rd Amendment as follows:

“39. Thus, the composition of the panchayat,  its  function,  its  election  and  various  other  aspects  of  its  administration  are  now  provided  in  great  detail  under  the  Constitution  with  provisions  enabling  the  State Legislature to enact laws to implement  the constitutional  mandate.  Thus,  formation  of panchayat and its functioning is now a vital  part of the constitutional scheme under Part  IX  of  the  Constitution.  Obviously,  such  a  system can only thrive on the confidence of  the  people,  on  those  who  comprise  the  system.”

47. In  our  opinion,  the  provision  for  removing  an  

elected representative such as Panchayat Adhyaksha is  

of  fundamental  importance to  ensure  the  democratic  

functioning of the Institution as well as to ensure the  

transparency  and  accountability  in  the  functions  

performed by the elected representatives.   

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48. We also do not agree with Mr. Bhushan that the  

issue with regard to the constitutionality of Section 28  

of  the  Act  was  not  considered  by  this  Court  in  

Bhanumati & Ors. (supra). The submission made by  

the  counsel  for  the  petitioner  therein  is  noticed  as  

follows:

“40. In the background of these provisions,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  argued  that the provision of no-confidence, being not  in Part IX of the Constitution is contrary to the  constitutional  scheme  of  things  and  would  run contrary  to  the avowed purpose of  the  constitutional amendment which is meant to  lend stability  and dignity  to  Panchayati  Raj  institutions.  It  was  further  argued  that  reducing the period from “two years” to “one  year” before a no-confidence motion can be  brought, further unsettles the running of the  panchayat.  It  was  further  urged that  under  the  impugned  amendment  that  such  a  no- confidence  motion  can  be  carried  on  the  basis  of  a  simple  majority  instead  of  two- thirds  majority  dilutes  the  concept  of  stability.”

From this  it  is  evident  that  the  provision  of  No  

Confidence  Motion  in  Section  28  was  challenged  on  

three grounds:  

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(a) It would be repugnant to the Scheme of the 73rd  

Amendment. (b) It would unsettle the running of the Panchayat. (c) It would dilute the concept of stability.      

49. Upon  consideration  of  the  relevant  provisions  

contained in various sub-articles of Article 243 and in  

particular,  Article  243C(v),  this  Court  concludes  as  

under:

“41. This  Court  is  not  at  all  persuaded  to  accept  this  argument  on  various  grounds  discussed below. A Constitution is not to give  all  details  of  the  provisions  contemplated  under the scheme of amendment. In the said  amendment,  under  various  articles,  like  Articles 243-A, 243-C(1),  (5),  243-D(4),  243- D(6),  243-F(1),  (6),  243-G,  243-H,  243-I(2),  243-J,  243-K(2),  (4)  of  the  Constitution,  the  legislature of the State has been empowered  to make law to implement the constitutional  provisions.

43. Therefore,  the  argument  that  the  provision of no-confidence motion against the  Chairman,  being  not  in  the  Constitution,  cannot be provided in the statute, is wholly  unacceptable  when  the  Constitution  specifically  enables the State Legislature to  provide  the  details  of  election  of  the  Chairperson.”

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The  Court  also  mentions  that  the  statutory  

provision  of  No  Confidence  Motion  against  the  

Chairperson  is  a  pre-constitutional  provision  and was  

there in Section 15 of the 1961 Act (Para 44).   After  

taking  into  consideration  Article  243N  of  the  

Constitution of India, it is observed as follows:-

“45. It  is  clear  that  the  provision  for  no- confidence  motion  against  the  Chairperson  was  never  repealed  by  any  competent  legislature as being inconsistent with any of  the provisions of Part IX. On the other hand  by subsequent statutory provisions the said  provision  of  no-confidence  has  been  confirmed  with  some  ancillary  changes  but  the  essence  of  the  no-confidence  provision  was  continued.  This  Court  is  clearly  of  the  opinion that the provision of no-confidence is  not  inconsistent  with  Part  IX  of  the  Constitution.”

50. In  the  face  of  these  findings,  it  would  not  be  

possible to accept the submission of Mr. Bhushan that  

the judgment in  Bhanumati & Ors. (supra) is either  

per incuriam or requires reconsideration.

51. Under Article 243N, any provision of law relating to  

Panchayats  in  force  immediately  before  the  73rd  

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Amendment,  which  is  inconsistent  with  Part  IX  

continues to be enforced until amended or repealed.  In  

the  absence  of  such  amendment  or  repeal,  the  

inconsistent provision will continue until the expiration  

of  one  year  from  the  commencement  of  the  

Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1993.  It is a matter  

of record that the State of Uttar Pradesh enacted U.P.  

Panchayat Law (Amendment) Act,  1994 on 22nd April,  

1994 to give effect to the provisions of Part IX of the  

Constitution.   The  pre-existing  provision  of  No  

Confidence  was  not  repealed.   It  was  amended  

subsequently by the Amendment Act of 1998 (U.P. Act  

No. 20 of 1998).  There was a further amendment by  

the Amendment Act of 2007 (U.P. Act No. 4 of 2007).  

By  this  amendment,  the  period  for  moving  a  No  

Confidence Motion was reduced from two years to one  

year.  Furthermore the requirement that for a Motion of  

No Confidence to be carried, it had to be supported by  

a majority of “not less than two third” was reduced to  

“more than half”.   It  was these amendment changes  

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brought about by the Amendment Act of 2007, which  

was  challenged  by  the  petitioners  in  the  case  of  

Bhanumati  & Ors.  (supra).   The continuous of  the  

provision  of  No  Confidence  Motion  was  not  even  

challenged.  In spite of the fact that the challenge was  

limited  only  to  the  amendment,  this  Court  examined  

the  question  as  to  whether  provision  for  bringing  a  

Motion of No Confidence in Section 28 of the 1961 Act  

was  repugnant  or  inconsistent  with  Part  IX  of  the  

Constitution of India.  Ultimately, in Paragraph 51, this  

Court records the following opinion:-

“51. Many  issues  in  our  constitutional  jurisprudence evolved out of this doctrine of  silence. The basic structure doctrine vis-à-vis  Article 368 of the Constitution emerged out of  this concept of silence in the Constitution. A  Constitution  which  professes  to  be  democratic and republican in character and  which brings about a revolutionary change by  the Seventy-third Constitutional Amendment  by making detailed provision for democratic  decentralisation and self-government on the  principle of grass-root democracy cannot be  interpreted  to  exclude  the  provision  of  no- confidence motion in respect of the office of  the  Chairperson  of  the  panchayat  just  because of its silence on that aspect.”

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We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid  

opinion.  

52. The Court thereafter notices the submission that  

the  position  of  Panchayat  Adhyaksha  is  comparable  

with that of the President of India. On this analogy, it  

was  submitted  that  the  office  of  Chairperson,  i.e.  

Panchayat Adhyaksha should have the same immunity.  

This Court rejected the submission with the observation  

that “this is an argument of desperation and has been  

advanced, with respect, without any regard to the vast  

difference in constitutional status and position between  

the  two  posts.”   Mr.  Bhushan  has  made  the  same  

submission before us.  We would like to add here, that  

even  by  stretching  the  imagination  beyond  all  

reasonable  bounds,  we  are  unable  to  accept  the  

submission of Mr. Bhushan that Chairman of a District  

Panchayat should be put on the same pedestal as the  

President of India.  

53. Mr. Shanti Bhushan had also submitted that since  

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the issues raised herein pertained to the interpretation  

of  the  Constitution  of  India,  the  matter  needs  to  be  

referred to the five Judges as provided in Article 145(3)  

of the Constitution of India read with Order VII Rule 2 of  

the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.  

54. We are of the opinion that no substantial question  

of law arises as envisaged under Article 145(3) of the  

Constitution  of  India  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the  

Constitution of India, in the facts and circumstances of  

this case.  The entire issue has been elaborately,  and  

with erudition, dilated upon by this Court in Bhanumati  

& Ors. (supra). We also do not find any force in the  

submission of Mr. Bhushan that there is any occasion  

for  reconsideration  of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Bhanumati & Ors. (supra).  

55. Mr. Bhushan has relied on numerous judgments of  

this Court in support of his submissions.  Let us now  

consider the same.  

56. On the issue of repugnancy, Mr. Bhushan has cited  

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following judgments:  

(1) I.R.Coelho vs. Union of India (supra) –

In  our  opinion,  the  reliance  on  the  aforesaid  

judgment is wholly misplaced as the right to choose of  

the constituents is not curtailed by Section 28 of the  

Act.  It  is  only  the  right  of  an  elected  

Chairman/Adhyaksha  to  continue,  who  has  lost  the  

confidence of the electorate that has been curtailed.     

(2) Deep Chand vs. State of U.P. (supra) –

In  this  case,  this  Court  culled  out  the  law  

pertaining to the rule of repugnancy. The three tests of  

inconsistency or repugnancy as formulated by Nicholas  

in  his  Australian  Constitution  2nd Edition  have  been  

noticed which are as under:

“(1)  There  may  be  inconsistency  in  the  actual terms of the competing statutes;

(2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a  State  law  may  be  inoperative  because  the  Commonwealth  law,  or  the  award  of  the  Commonwealth  Court,  is  intended  to  be  a  complete exhaustive code; and

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(3)  Even  in  the  absence  of  intention,  a  conflict  may  arise  when  both  State  and  Commonwealth seek to exercise their powers  over the same subject-matter.”

57. The aforesaid three rules have been accepted by  

this  Court  in  Ch.  Tika  Ramji Vs.  State  of  U.P.  17    

Similar test was laid down by this Court in, Zaverbhai  

Amaidas Vs. State of Bombay (supra)  as follows:

“(1) Whether there is direct conflict between  the two provisions;

(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down  an exhaustive code in respect of the subject- matter  replacing  the  Act  of  the  State  Legislature and

(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and  the law made by the State Legislature occupy  the same field.

58. In  our  opinion,  the  provision  contained  in  

Section  28  can  not  be  said  to  be  repugnant  to  

the 73rd Amendment on the basis of the aforesaid tests  

laid down by this Court.    

59. On  the  issue  of  per  incuriam,  Mr.  Bhushan  has  

17 (1956) SCR 393

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cited following judgments:  

(1) N. Bhargawan Pillai Vs. State of Kerala (supra)  

–

Mr. Bhushan had relied on observations made by  

this Court in Paragraph 14 of the judgment.  It was held  

that  the  judgment  in  the  case  of  Bore  Gowda Vs.  

State of Karnataka  18   was  per incuriam  as it did not  

consider the impact of Section 18 of the Probation of  

Offenders Act, 1958.   

In Bhanumati & Ors. (supra), it can not be said  

that any relevant provision of the Constitution or the  

Act had not been taken into consideration.   

(2) State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.  

(supra)

The  observations  made  in  Paragraph  86  in  the  

earlier judgment of Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. &  

Ors.  Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.  19   were found to be per  

18 (2000) 10 SCC 620 19 (1990 1 SCC  109

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incuriam.   The  aforesaid  observations  would  not  be  

applicable  in  the present  case  as  no  such legitimate  

criticism  can  be  made  against  the  judgment  of  this  

Court in Bhanumati & Ors. (supra).   

(3) Babu Parasu Kaikadi Vs. Babu (supra)

This  judgment  also  reiterated  the  well  known  

principle of per incuriam.  It was held that the judgment  

in  Dhondiram  Tatoba  Kadam Vs.  Ramchandra  

Balwantrao Dubal (since deceased) by His LRs. &  

Anr.  20   was per incuriam as it had not noticed the earlier  

binding  precedent  of  a  coordinate  Bench  and  also  

having  not  considered  the  mandatory  provisions  as  

contained  in  Sections  15  and  29  of  the  Bombay  

Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (67 of 1948).  

The well known principle with regard to a judgment not  

being a binding precedent as stated in Halsbury’s Laws  

of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 26 is as under:-

“A decision is given  per incuriam when the  court  has  acted  in  ignorance  of  a  previous  

20 (1994) 3 SCC 366

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decision of its own or of a court of coordinate  jurisdiction which covered the case before it,  in which case it  must decide which case to  follow; or when it has acted in ignorance of a  House of Lords decision, in which case it must  follow that decision; or when the decision is  given in ignorance of the terms of a statute  or rule having statutory force.”

The  same  principle  has  been  reiterated  by  this  

Court in State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals  

Ltd. (supra):-

“40. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In  practice  per incuriam appears  to  mean  per  ignoratium.  English  courts  have  developed  this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare  decisis. The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and  ignored if it is rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a  statute or other binding authority’. (Young v.  Bristol  Aeroplane  Co.  Ltd.)  Same  has  been  accepted,  approved  and  adopted  by  this  Court  while  interpreting  Article  141  of  the  Constitution which embodies the doctrine of  precedents as a matter of law.”

(emphasis supplied)

In  our  opinion,  the  judgment  in  Bhanumati  &  

Ors.  (supra) can  not  be  said  per  incuriam  on  the  

applicability of the aforesaid tests.   

(4) Zee Telefilms Ltd. Vs. Union of India (supra)

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In  this  case,  again  this  Court  reiterated  that  a  

decision  is  an  authority  for  the  question  of  law  

determined by it and that it should not be read as a  

statute.   A  decision  is  not  an  authority  for  the  

proposition  which  did  not  call  for  its  consideration.  

These observations again are of no assistance to the  

petitioner.  

(5) Nirmaljeet Kaur Vs. State of M.P.

In  this  case  also,  this  Court  has  reiterated  the  

principles  earlier  enunciated.  Thus,  this  judgment  is  

again of no help to the petitioner.   

60. On  the  submission  with  regard  to  the  

Validity/Legality  of  a  Legislative  Act,  reliance  was  

placed upon:

D.S.Nakara  vs.  Union  of  India21;  Union  of  

India vs. G.Ganayutham22;  Bharat Petroleum  

Corporation Ltd. vs. Maddula Ratnavalli23 and  

21 (1983) 1 SCC 305 22 (1997) 7 SCC 463 23 (2007) 6 SCC 81

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State  of  A.P.  v/s  McDowell  &  Co.  24  .  In  our  

opinion,  all  these  judgments  are  inapplicable  to  

the facts of this case.  

61. On  the  submission  with  regard  to  

Arbitrary/discretionary/unguided  power  to  executive  

authority, Mr. Bhushan relied upon following judgments:

Senior  Superintendent  of  Post  Offices  vs.  Izhar  

Hussain  25  ,  Khoday  Distilleries  Ltd.  vs.  State  of  

Karnataka  26  ,  Maganlal  Chhagalal  (P)  Ltd.  vs.  

Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay  27    

Director of Industries vs. Deep Chand Agarwal  28  .  

In  our  opinion,  these  judgments  have  no  application  

whatsoever either to the legal issue or to the facts of  

this case.    

62. We have no hesitation in accepting the submission  

of  Mr.  Bhushan that  the  High  Court  or  this  Court,  in  24 (1996) 3 SCC 709 25 (1989) 4 SCC 318 26 (1996) 10 SCC 304 27 (1974) 2 SCC 402 28 (1980) 2 SCC 332

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exercise of its powers of review can reopen the case  

and rehear the entire matter. But we must hasten to  

add that whilst exercising such power the court cannot  

be  oblivious  of  the  provisions  contained  in  Order  47  

Rule 1 of CPC as well as the rules framed by the High  

Courts  and  this  Court.  The  limits  within  which  the  

Courts  can exercise the powers of  review have been  

well  settled  in  a  catena  of  judgments.   All  the  

judgments have in  fact  been considered by the High  

Court  in  Pages  16  to  23.   The  High  Court  has  also  

considered the judgment in             S. Nagaraj & Ors.  

Vs.  State  of  Karnataka  &  Anr.  (supra),  which  

reiterates the principle that  

“19. Review  literally  and  even  judicially  means  re-examination  or  re-consideration.  Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal  acceptance  of  human  fallibility.  Yet  in  the  realm of law the courts and even the statutes  lean strongly in favour of finality of decision  legally  and properly  made.  Exceptions both  statutorily  and  judicially  have  been  carved  out  to  correct  accidental  mistakes  or  miscarriage of justice. Even when there was  no  statutory  provision  and  no  rules  were  framed  by  the  highest  court  indicating  the  circumstances  in  which  it  could  rectify  its  

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order  the  courts  culled  out  such  power  to  avoid  abuse  of  process  or  miscarriage  of  justice……………..”

63. These principles are far too well entrenched in the  

Indian jurisprudence, to warrant reiteration.  However,  

for  the  sake  of  completion,  we  may  notice  that  Mr.  

Bhushan  had  relied  upon  Board  of  Control  for  

Cricket in India v/s Netaji Cricket Club (supra), and  

Green View Tea & Industries (supra).  It  would  be  

useful to reiterate the following excerpts:

In the case of  Board of Control for Cricket in  

India (supra), it was observed that:

“90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court  which would include a mistake in the nature  of the undertaking may also call for a review  of the order. An application for review would  also be maintainable if there exists sufficient  reason  therefore.  What  would  constitute  sufficient reason would depend on the facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  The  words  “sufficient reason” in Order 47 Rule 1 of the  Code  are  wide  enough  to  include  a  misconception  of  fact  or  law by  a  court  or  even an advocate. An application for review  may be necessitated by way of invoking the  doctrine “actus curiae neminem gravabit”.

This  court  in  Green  View  Tea  &  Industries  

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(supra) reiterated  the  view  adopted  by  it  in  S.  

Nagaraj & Ors (supra). Therefore, the ratio of Green  

View Tea is not applicable in this case.  

64. In view of the observations made in the aforesaid  

judgments, this Court would not be justified in holding  

that the High Court has erred in law in not reviewing its  

earlier judgment.

65. This  apart,  we  have  examined  the  entire  issue  

threadbare ourselves as the issue with regard to the  

adverse  impact  on  the  candidates  belonging  to  the  

reserves categories has not been raised before the High  

Court nor considered by it.   In the earlier  round,  the  

issue  was  also  neither  raised  nor  considered  by  this  

Court. When the order dated 19th February, 2013 was  

passed, the issue with regard to reservation was also  

not canvassed.  But now that the issue had been raised,  

we thought it appropriate to examine the issue to put  

an end to the litigation between the parties.   

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66. In  view of  the  above,  the  appeal  is  accordingly  

dismissed.  

Contempt  Petition  No.287  of  2013  in  CIVIL  APPEAL  NO……………….  OF  2014 (Arising  out  of  SLP (C) No.22035 of 2013)

67.  This Petition was filed by the Petitioner/Appellant,  

seeking  initiation  of  contempt  proceedings  against  

alleged  contemnors/respondent  for  disobeying  the  

order of status quo dated 12th July, 2013 passed by this  

Court in the aforesaid Civil Appeal.  

68. In view of the judgment passed by this Court in  

Civil Appeal No……………… of 2014 (Arising out of SLP  

(C)  No.22035  of  2013),  this  Petition  is  dismissed  as  

having become infructuous.

CIVIL APPEAL NO……………OF 2014 (Arising out of  SLP(C) No.29740 of 2013   

69. This Civil Appeal was filed by Smt. Rukmini Devi,  

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challenging final order and judgment dated 19th August,  

2013  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Allahabad,  Lucknow  Bench  in  Writ  Petition  No.  (MB)  

5999 of 2013.

70. The issues raised in this civil appeal are identical  

to  those  that  we  have  examined  in  Civil  Appeal  

No……………… of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.22035  

of 2013). Therefore, in view of the judgment in the Civil  

Appeal No……………… of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C)  

No.22035 of 2013), this appeal is also dismissed.  

……………………………….J.          [Surinder  Singh  

Nijjar]    

………………………………………….…..J.                                   [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim  

Kalifulla]

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New Delhi; March 28, 2014.  

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