REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3618 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.896/2006)

Urviben Chiragbhai Sheth    ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Vijaybhai Shambhubhai Joranputra & Ors. ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. On  18.5.1990,  the  appellant  and  others  were  

going in a Fiat car (No. GGG 792), owned by the  

second  respondent, from  Surat to  Ubhrat. The  

said car was driven by the first respondent,  

who lost control of the car and dashed the car  

with  full  force  against  a  milestone,  after  1

which  the  car  turned  turtle  thrice.  As  a  

result,  the  occupants  of  the  car  sustained  

serious injuries.

4. The appellant filed a claim petition before the  

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) claiming  

compensation of Rs.15,00,000/-. At the time of  

the accident, she was aged 30 years and she  

claimed to be earning Rs.1,500/- to Rs.1,600/-  

per month from running a business in the name  

of Contessa Beauty Parlour at Ahmedabad.

5. Before  the  MACT  it  was  established  that  the  

first respondent was absolutely liable for the  

accident  in  view  of  his  careless,  rash  and  

negligent driving. Thus, the first respondent  

(driver), second respondent (owner of the car)  

and  the  third  respondent  (insurance  company  

with  which  the  car  was  insured)  were  held  

jointly  and  severally  liable  to  pay  

compensation to the appellant. In the accident,  

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the spinal cord of the appellant was damaged,  

as a result of which she was unable to walk and  

was  bedridden.  In  computing  the  compensation  

payable to the appellant, the MACT, by order  

dated  23.3.2001,  reached  a  finding  that  the  

compensation had been computed with the consent  

of the parties.  

6. MACT  awarded  Rs.50,000/-  towards  pain  and  

suffering,  Rs.3,50,000/-  towards  treatment  

charges, Rs.10,000/- towards attendant charges  

and  Rs.5,000/-  towards  nutritious  food.  The  

appellant had contended that she was running a  

beauty  parlour, but  no reliable  evidence was  

produced  to  substantiate  the  same.  Thus,  

appellant being a housewife, monthly income was  

assessed at Rs.1000/- and applying a multiplier  

of 16, the future loss of income was assessed  

at Rs.1,92,000/- (Rs.1000 X 12 X 16). Thus, the  

appellant  was  held  entitled  to  total  

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compensation of Rs.6,07,000/- with interest at  

the rate of 9%.

7. Aggrieved  by the  compensation awarded  by the  

MACT, the appellant appealed to the High Court  

for  enhancement  of  compensation.  The  High  

Court, vide order dated 6.7.2005, dismissed the  

appeal on the following ground:

“Through these appeals judgment of the MACT  Valsad  at  Navsari  dated  23.3.2001  is  assailed  on  the  ground  that  proper  compensation  has  not  been  awarded,  therefore, it be enhanced. However, after  hearing the counsel for both the sides, it  is  found  that  the  compensation  has  been  settled as per the consent of the counsel  for the parties. This fact is recorded in  para  10  of  the  award.  That  being  so,  interference  is  not  called  for.  Shri  Parikh, learned counsel for the appellants  want to place on record affidavit of Shri  K.Z. Rifai, Advocate dated August 5, 2002  to  point  out  that  neither  any  pursis  in  writing was passed to the Claims Tribunal  nor while arguing, such consent was given,  fact  appears  to  have  been  recorded  erroneously. Placement of affidavit at this  stage  is  after  thought,  therefore,  declined. In such case no such agreement  was  there  with  regard  to  the  amount  of  compensation as mentioned in the judgment,  averment to that effect ought to have found  place in the memorandum of appeal dated 20th  June, 2001. Judgment record is conclusive.  

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Neither lawyer nor litigant can claim to  contradict  it,  except  before  the  judge  himself but nowhere else. Court is bound to  accept the statement of the judge recorded  in the judgment as what transpired in the  court  and  cannot  allow  statement  of  the  Judge to be contradicted by statement by  affidavit  and  other  evidence  (See:  Daman  Singh and others etc. v.  State of Punjab  and others (AIR 1985 SC 973). Accordingly,  claim for enhancement cannot be considered  in light of the agreement by counsel for  parties before the Claims Tribunal.”

8. This appeal is directed against the aforesaid  

judgment of the High Court.  

9. The  appellant  contends  that  there  was  no  

consent  before  the  MACT,  and  the  same  was  

wrongly recorded by the Tribunal. However, we  

notice that no application appears to have been  

made before the Tribunal to rectify the error,  

if there was one. Instead, the parties filed an  

appeal before the High Court being aggrieved by  

the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.  

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10. This court finds that in the impugned judgment,  

the High Court has taken a rather narrow view  

of  the  entire  controversy.  In  its  rather  

cryptic  judgment,  the  High  Court  refused  to  

take into consideration the affidavit filed by  

Sri  K.Z.  Rifai,  the  learned  advocate  who  

appeared for the appellant before the MACT. The  

said affidavit is on record. A perusal of the  

said affidavit which was filed before the High  

Court shows that the advocate who appeared on  

behalf  of  the  appellant  before  the  MACT  

averred:

“2)……The learned Tribunal in paragraph 10  of the judgment has recorded that both the  parties agree qua the amount that was to be  paid to the claimant. I say that neither  any  pursis  in  writing  was  passed  to  the  Tribunal to such effect nor while arguing  was any such consent given. The said fact  appears to have been recorded erroneously.”

11. The  High  Court  ignored  the  said  stand  taken  

before it on the ground that such an affidavit  

being  placed  before  the  High  Court  was  an  

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afterthought and no ground had been taken in  

the  memorandum  of  appeal  dated  21.6.2001  to  

that effect.  

12. The other ground which weighed with the High  

Court  is  that  statement  recorded  in  the  

judgment of the Court cannot be contradicted by  

any  affidavit  or  any  other  evidence  and  in  

coming to said conclusion the High Court relied  

on the judgment of this Court in  Daman Singh  

and others etc. v. State of Punjab and others,  

reported in AIR 1985 SC 973.

13. This  Court fails  to appreciate  the aforesaid  

stand  of  the  High  Court  for  various  reasons  

which are discussed hereunder.

14. From a perusal of the judgment of the Tribunal,  

it does not appear that it was based solely on  

the consent of the parties. Apart from consent,  

if any, of the parties, the MACT also held that  

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the  amount  of  compensation  awarded  by  it  

“appears  to  be  proper,  just  and  reasonable  

taking  into  consideration  the  aforesaid  

evidence.”

15. In fact, the exact finding of the MACT is set  

out below:

“……With consent of both the parties, it has  been decided to make payment of the under  mentioned  amount  which  appears  to  be  proper,  just  and  reasonable  taking  into  consideration the aforesaid evidence.”

16. Therefore, it appears to be a mixed bag. MACT  

curiously held that in the facts of the case,  

the amount granted by it is just proper and  

reasonable and also held that the same is based  

on the consent of the parties. The High Court,  

as the last court of fact and law should have  

examined  whether  the  Tribunal’s  finding  that  

the  compensation granted  is proper,  just and  

reasonable in the facts of the case. The High  

Court has admittedly failed to do so.  8

17. Coming to the question of so-called consent of  

the  parties,  the  approach  of  the  High  Court  

also  cannot  be  appreciated.  It  is  true  that  

while  acting  as  a  Claims  Tribunal,  its  

proceedings  are  summary  in  nature  but  in  

exercising  its  summary  jurisdiction  the  

Tribunal  must  follow  principles  of  justice,  

equity and good conscience and must be aware  

that its summary enquiry is in connection with  

a  legislation  which  is  meant  for  social  

welfare.  Therefore,  when  a  representation  is  

made before the Tribunal that a claim of Rs.15  

lacs by way of consent is reduced to Rs.6 lacs  

and odd, the Tribunal must insist on production  

of some material either, an affidavit of the  

claimant  or  the  statement  of  the  claimant  

before  the  MACT  in  support  of  such  lowering  

down of claim. The MACT cannot accept the said  

representation  on the  mere oral  statement of  

counsel  since  such  settlement  is  purely  a  

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question of fact. In fact no leave was obtained  

from the Tribunal to enter into a compromise  

between  the  parties  in  respect  of  the  

settlement.  

18. In the absence of all these materials, when an  

affidavit was filed by the learned advocate who  

appeared before the Tribunal, contending that  

no such settlement was ever entered into by the  

consent of parties, the High Court fell into an  

error by discarding the same only on the ground  

that this was filed belatedly before the High  

Court and is an afterthought.  

19. It may be true that in the grounds of appeal  

before the High Court, this should have been  

mentioned, but on a mere defect of pleading of  

the parties, justice cannot be denied if in the  

facts  of  the  case,  the  stand  taken  on  the  

affidavit of the advocate appears probable.

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20. To our mind, the stand taken in the affidavit  

of  the  advocate  referred  to  above  appears  

probable  specially  when  there  is  nothing  on  

record to show that the appellant ever filed  

any  petition  or  affidavit  for  settlement  or  

compromise before the MACT.  

21. The reliance placed by the High Court on the  

judgment of this court in the case of  Daman  

Singh (supra) is  rather misconceived.  In the  

said  case,  what  this  court  held  was  when  

several points were raised in a writ petition  

before the High Court, and argument is confined  

to some grounds or points, as other grounds are  

considered  by  the  counsel  unworthy  of  

canvassing, thereafter the counsel cannot make  

a  grievance  that  other  grounds  were  not  

considered by the court (see para 13).

22. The situation in this case is not similar to  

the one pointed out in Daman Singh (supra).

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23. Here the High Court relied on the principle of  

sanctity of a record entered by a Court and  

held that what is recited in the Court record  

is sacrosanct. The High Court, in the process,  

fell into an error by equating the record of  

proceedings in a Tribunal with proceedings in a  

court of record. Under our hierarchy of Courts,  

a  High  Court  (under  Article  215)  and  the  

Supreme  Court  (under  Article  129)  are  

recognized  as  Courts  of  Record.  A  Motor  

Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the  

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a Civil Court of  

limited  jurisdiction, and  is certainly  not a  

Court  of  Record.  The  infallibility  of  its  

formal record is one of the earliest marks of a  

Court  of  Record,  but  it  has  developed  other  

characteristics too (See  A History of English  

Law by W.S. Holdsworth, Vol 5, p. 158).

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24. In  Reg v. Aaron Mellor, reported in (1858) 7  

Cox’s Criminal Law Cases 454, it was held “We  

must  consider  the  statement  of  the  learned  

judge as absolute verity and we ought to take  

his statement precisely as a record and act on  

it in the same manner as on a record of Court  

which of itself implies an absolute verity.”

25. This has been followed by this Court in  State  

of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak & Anr.,  

reported in AIR 1982 SC 1249.

26. Therefore,  the  principle  of  sanctity  of  

recitals in Court proceedings is available to a  

Court  of  Record.   This  principle  cannot  be  

stretched  to  the  proceedings  of  a  tribunal.  

Unfortunately  the  High  Court  failed  to  

appreciate this.

27. Now the question which arises is whether the  

matter  should  be  remanded  by  this  Court?  

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Having regard to the materials on record, this  

Court is of the opinion that the matter should  

not  be  remanded,  keeping  in  mind  the  period  

which has elapsed in between since the accident  

took  place  in  1990,  and  the  fact  that  the  

appellant had been bedridden since then.  

28. Admitted  evidence  about  her  medical  

disabilities  is that  she has  100% disability  

which is permanent in nature with no sign of  

recovery.  

29. It is of course true that the appellant’s case  

that she was running a beauty parlour prior to  

the accident could not be proved, specially her  

income  from  the  said  parlour  has  not  been  

proved. The existence of the beauty parlour is  

however not in dispute.  

30. Assuming  the  appellant  is  not  running  the  

parlour,  the  fact  remains  that  she  has  two  

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children  and  her  husband  died  prior  to  the  

incident.   Therefore,  the  dependence  of  the  

children and the running of the family is to be  

shouldered by her even though she is infirm and  

bedridden. She also needs someone to help her  

in her daily life. She has to have recurring  

medical expenses.

31. Just because she is a homemaker is no reason  

why  the  courts  should  be  miserly  in  fixing  

compensation for her. A Bench of this Court in  

Arun  Kumar  Agrarwal  &  Anr. v. National  

Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2010 (9)  

SCC 218, had occasion to consider this question  

and  held  that  the  work  of  homemakers  and  

housewives should be properly assessed and in  

making  assessment  of  compensation  payable  to  

them,  they  should  not  suffer  from  a  gender  

bias.  

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32. It is an accepted principle that compensation  

may be so assessed that the interest accruing  

therefrom  will  be  sufficient  for  the  

maintenance of the family of the victim and the  

concept  of  compensation  is  wider  than  mere  

damages.  

33. Considering all this, we grant compensation of  

Rs.15 lacs (Rupees Fifteen Lacs) with interest  

at the rate of 8% on the enhanced compensation  

from  the  date  of  filing  the  claim  petition  

before MACT till date of realization.  

34. Compensation  on  the  aforesaid  basis  must  be  

paid to the concerned MACT by the respondents  

within six weeks by a demand draft.  Thereupon  

the MACT shall forthwith deposit the same in  

the bank account of the appellant.   

35. The appeal is thus allowed.  

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36. No order as to costs.

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) April 26, 2011

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