Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6177 OF 2004

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.         … Appellant

  Versus

Dilbahar Singh           … Respondent

WITH

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.2162 OF 2004

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.2901 OF 2006

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.6954 OF 2005

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.7520 OF 2005

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.5212 OF 2006

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.2859 OF 2006

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.3313 OF 2007

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.1224 OF 2006

SLP (C) NO.34303 of 2009

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.7491 OF 2004

1

Page 2

SLP (C) No.11931 of 2011

SLP (C) No.22248 OF 2007

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.7066 OF 2005

JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, CJI.  

This group of eleven appeals and three special leave petitions  

has been referred to the 5-Judge Bench to resolve the conflict into the two  

3-Judge Bench decisions one, Rukmini 1 and the other, Ram Dass2.  Ram  

Dass2 has followed  Moti  Ram3.   At  the time of  hearing  of  Civil  Appeal  

No.6177 of 2004, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh,  

the 2-Judge Bench, while dealing with the meaning, ambit and scope of  

the  words  “legality  and  propriety”  under  Section  15(6)  of  the  Haryana  

Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short, ‘the Haryana Rent  

Control Act’), was confronted with the question whether the High Court (as  

revisional authority) under Section 15(6) could interfere with the findings of  

fact  of  the  first  appellate  Court/first  appellate  authority.   The  appellant  

relied  upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Rukmini1 in  support  of  its  

contention  that  the  revisional  Court  is  not  entitled  to  re-appreciate  

1 Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499] 2 Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander and others; [AIR 1988 SC 1422] 3 Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and others; [AIR 1960 SC 655]  

2

Page 3

evidence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  respondent  pressed  into  service  the  

decision of  this  Court  in  Ram Dass2 wherein  it  has been held  that  the  

expression  “legality  and  propriety”  enables  the  revisional  Court  to  

reappraise the evidence while considering the findings of the first appellate  

Court. The 2-Judge Bench felt that there was conflict in the two decisions  

and  for  its  resolution  referred  the  matter  to  the  larger  Bench.   In  the  

Reference Order (dated August 27, 2009), the 2-Judge Bench observed,  

thus:  

“Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  placed  reliance on a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the  case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs. Kallyani Sulochana  And Others (1993) 1 SCC 499 wherein   Section   20     of  the   Kerala   Rent   Control      Act   was    in question.   It   was held in the said decision that though Section 20 of the  said Act provided that the revisional court can go into the  'propriety'   of     the    order   but   it   does    not    entitle   the revisional court to re-appreciate evidence. A similar view  was taken by a two Judge bench of this Court in the case of  Ubaiba Vs. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC, 645.

          On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent  has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ram  Dass Vs. Ishwar Chander and Others AIR 1988 SC 1422  which was also a three Judge Bench decision. It has been  held in that case that the expression "legality and propriety"  enables the High Court in revisional     jurisdiction    to    re- appraise    the     evidence     while considering the findings  of  the  first  appellate  Court.  A  similar  view  was  taken  by  another three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Moti  Ram Vs. Suraj Bhan and others AIR 1960 SC 655.

          From the above it is clear that there are conflicting  views of coordinate three Judge Benches of this Court as to  the meaning,  ambit   and   scope    of   the   expression  'legality and propriety' and whether in revisional jurisdiction  the High Court can re-appreciate the evidence.  Hence, we  are of the view that the matter needs to be considered by a  

3

Page 4

larger bench since this question arises in a large number of  cases  as  similar  provisions  conferring  power  of  revision  exists  in  various  rent  control  and  other  legislations,  e.g.  Section  397  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.  Accordingly,  we  direct  that  the  papers  be  placed  before  Hon'ble The Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench.”

2. There are other appeals/SLPs in this group of matters, some  

of which arise from the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)  Act,  

1965 (for short, ‘the Kerala Rent Control Act’) and the few appeals/SLPs  

arise from the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960  

(for  short,  ‘the  Tamil  Nadu  Rent  Control  Act’).   These  appeals/SLPs  

following the Reference Order in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation have  

also been referred to the 5-Judge Bench.  This is how these matters have  

come up before us.   

3. It  is  appropriate  to  first  notice  the  statutory  provisions  

pertaining to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the above three  

Rent Control Acts.  These provisions are not similar to Section 115 of the  

Code of Civil Procedure which confers revisional jurisdiction upon the High  

Court in the matters arising from the Courts governed by the Code.  

4. Section  15  of  the  Haryana  Rent  Control  Act  provides  for  

appellate and revisional authorities.  This provision in the Haryana Rent  

Control Act reads as under:

“15.  Appellate  and  revisional  authorities.—(1)  The  State  Government  may,  by  a  general  or  special  order,  by  notification,  confer  on  such  officers  and  authorities  as  it  may  think  fit,  the  powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such  

4

Page 5

area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.    (2) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller  may, within thirty days from the date of such order or such longer  period  as  the  appellate  authority  may  allow  for  reasons  to  be  recorded  in  writing,  prefer  an  appeal  in  writing  to  the  appellate  authority having jurisdiction. In computing the period of thirty days  the  time  taken  to  obtain  a  certified  copy  of  the  order  appealed  against shall be excluded.  

(3) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may  order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on  the appeal.  

(4) The appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending  for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the  parties  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  and,  if  necessary,  after  making  such  further  inquiry  as  it  thinks  fit  either  personally  or  through the Controller.  

(5) The decisions of the appellate authority and subject to such  decision, the order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be  liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided  in sub-section (6) of this section.   (6) The High Court as revisional authority, may at any time, on  its own motion or on the application of any aggrieved party, made  within  a  period  of  ninety  days,  call  for  and  examine  the  record  relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for  the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such  order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto  as it may deem fit. In computing the period of ninety days the time  taken to obtain a certified copy of the order shall be excluded.”

5. In the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, Section 23 and Section  

25 provide for appeal and revision, respectively.  Since we are concerned  

with the scope of revisional power, it  is not necessary to reproduce the  

appellate provision.  Section 25, which deals with revisional power, reads  

as under:

5

Page 6

“25.  Revision.—(1)  The  High  Court  may,  on  the  application of any person aggrieved by an order of the  Appellate Authority, call for and examine the record of  the  Appellate  Authority,  to  satisfy  itself  as  to  the  regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality  or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and  if,  in any case, it  appears to the High Court  that any  such  decision  or  order  should  be  modified,  annulled,  reversed  or  remitted  for  reconsideration,  it  may  pass  orders accordingly.

(2) Every  application  to  the  High  Court  for  the  exercise  of  its  power  under  sub-section  (1)  shall  be  preferred within one month from the date on which the  order or proceeding to which the application relates is  communicated to the applicant:

Provided  that  the  High  Court  may,  in  its  discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month  for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that  the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the  application within the time specified in this sub-section.”  

6. The  provision  for  appeal  is  contained  in  the  Kerala  Rent  

Control  Act  in  Section  18  while  Section  20  of  that  Act  deals  with  the  

revisional jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act reads as  

under:

“20.  (1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered  under section 18 is a Subordinate judge, the District Court,  and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the  application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the  records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken  under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying  itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or  proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto  as it thinks fit.

(2) The costs of  and incident  to all  proceedings before  the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall  

6

Page 7

be in its discretion.“

7. A careful reading of the text of the above three provisions will  

show that under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Rent Control Act, the High  

Court  as revisional  authority,  may  suo motu or on the application of an  

aggrieved  party,  call  for  and  examine  the  record  relating  to  any  order  

passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying  

itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may  

pass such order as it may deem fit.   The Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act  

provides that the High Court  on the application of  an aggrieved person  

may call for and examine the record of the appellate authority to satisfy  

itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or  

propriety  of  any  decision  or  order  passed  therein.   The  High  Court  in  

exercise of its revisional power may modify, annul or reverse the order or  

decision impugned before it or remit the matter for re-consideration.  In the  

Tamil  Nadu Rent Control  Act,  the High Court  has no power to act  suo  

motu.  The Kerala Rent Control  Act provides that the High Court on the  

application  of  an aggrieved party  may call  for  and examine  the record  

relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the  

purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such  

order or proceedings and pass any order that it deems fit.  Like the Tamil  

Nadu  Rent  Control  Act,  the  Kerala  Rent  Control  Act  also  does  not  

empower the High Court to act suo motu. Though, there is some difference  

7

Page 8

in the language of the revisional provision in the above three statutes but,  

in our opinion, the revisional power of the High Court under the above Rent  

Control Acts is substantially similar and not significantly different.  

8. Before we embark upon an inquiry to find out the ambit and  

scope of the revisional power of the High Court under these Rent Control  

Acts,  we may quickly  observe  that  in  this  reference,  we have to  really  

determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or  

propriety”,  “regularity,  correctness,  legality  or  propriety”  and  “legality,  

regularity  or  propriety”.  Obviously,  this  will  determine  the  extent  of  the  

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the respective Rent Control  

statutes and will also include the consideration of the question whether the  

High Court in exercise of its revisional  jurisdiction can re-appreciate the  

evidence in order to find out the correctness, legality or propriety of the  

impugned order or decision.

9. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under various Rent Control  

Acts has fallen for consideration in many cases before this Court.  One of  

the earlier decisions in the long line of such cases is Moti Ram3.  The 3-

Judge Bench of this Court in  Moti Ram3 had an occasion to consider the  

extent of revisional  power of the High Court  under Section 15(5) of the  

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949) which reads: “…

The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party   

or on its own motion, call for and examine the records relating to any order   

8

Page 9

passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying   

itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may   

pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.”  Having regard to  

this provision, the Court noted the revisional power of the High Court in the  

following words:

“…the revisional power conferred upon the High Court under  Section 15(5) is wider than that conferred by Section 115 of  the Code of Civil  Procedure. Under Section 15(5) the High  Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of  the  order  under  revision  and  that  would  clearly  justify  the  examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made  by the authorities...”   

10. Before we refer to the other cases of this Court, we feel that  

the weighty observations made by the 2-Judge Bench in Dattonpant4 may  

be noted.  The Court while dealing with findings of fact recorded by the  

appellate  court  under  the  Mysore  Rent  Control  Act,  1961  referred  to  

Section  50  of  that  Act  which  conferred  upon  the  High  Court  revisional  

power. The Court observed:

“It  is true that the power conferred on the High  Court under Section 50 is not as narrow as the revisional  power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code  of Civil Procedure.  But at the same time it is not wide  enough to make the High Court a second court of first  appeal.”    

(emphasis supplied by us)

11. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works5, the 2-Judge Bench of this  4 Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval; [(1975) 2 SCC 246] 5 M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar; [(1980) 4 SCC 259]

9

Page 10

Court  while  considering  the  scope  of  Section  25  of  Tamil  Nadu  Rent  

Control  Act  followed  Dattonpant4 and  while  doing  so,  the  Court  also  

articulated the distinction between “appellate jurisdiction”  and “revisional  

jurisdiction”.  In paragraph 2 (page 261 of the Report), the Court stated as  

follows:

“2.  ‘Appeal’  and  ‘revision’  are  expressions  of  common  usage  in  Indian  statute  and  the  distinction  between  ‘appellate  jurisdiction’  and  ‘revisional  jurisdiction’  is  well  known  though  not  well  defined.  Ordinarily,  appellate  jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as  fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction  may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has  been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of  Civil Procedure, and under some Rent Acts in some States.  Ordinarily,  again,  revisional  jurisdiction  is  analogous  to  a  power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised  even  without  its  being  invoked  by  a  party.  The  extent  of  revisional  jurisdiction  is  defined  by  the  statute  conferring  such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is  generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to  the revising Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to  make them act according to law, according to the procedure  established by law and according to well defined principles  of  justice.  Revisional  jurisdiction  as  ordinarily  understood  with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate  jurisdiction  but  not  vice  versa.  These  are  general  observations.  The  question  of  the  extent  of  appellate  or  revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with  reference to the language employed by the statute.”

While dealing with revisional power under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu  

Rent Control Act, the Court said in paragraph 3 (page 262 of the Report)  

as under:  

“The language of Section 25 is indeed very wide. But  we must attach some significance to the circumstance that  both the expressions ‘appeal’ and ‘revision’ are employed in  

10

Page 11

the  statute.  Quite  obviously,  the  expression  ‘revision’  is  meant to convey the idea of  a much narrower jurisdiction  than that conveyed by the expression ‘appeal’. In fact it has  to be noticed that under Section 25 the High Court calls for  and examines the record of the appellate authority in order  to  satisfy  itself.  The  dominant  idea  conveyed  by  the  incorporation of the words ‘to satisfy itself’ under Section 25  appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court  under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence.  Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section  25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with  findings of fact merely because it  does not agree with the  finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on  the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the  revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the  Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of Untwalia, J., in  Dattonpant  Gopalvarao  Devakate v.  Vithalrao  Maruthirao  Janagaval; “it is not wide enough to make the High Court a  second Court of first appeal”.

Pertinently,  in  Sri  Raja  Lakshmi  Dyeing  Works5,  the  Court  said  in  

unequivocal words that concurrent findings, based on evidence, cannot be  

touched upon by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of  

the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act.

12. In  Krishnamachari6,  the  Court  followed  Sri  Raja  Lakshmi   

Dyeing  Works5 while  considering  the  scope  of  revisional  power  under  

Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act.

13. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Dass2 was concerned  

with the revisional power of the High Court under Section 15(5) of the East  

Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.  Inter alia, the Court noted the  

earlier judgments of this Court in Dattonpant4 and Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing   

6 P.R Krishnamachari v. Lalitha Ammal; [1987 (Supp) SCC 250]  

11

Page 12

Works5 and observed as under:  

“On the first contention that the revisional powers do  not extend to interference with and upsetting of findings of  fact, it needs to be observed that, subject to the well known  limitations inherent in all  revisional jurisdictions, the matter  essentially turns on the language of the statute investing the  jurisdiction. The decisions relied upon by Shri Harbans Lal,  deal, in the first case, with the limitations on the scope of  interference with findings of fact in second appeals and in  the  second,  with  the  limitation  on  the  revisional  powers  where  the  words in  the  statute  limit  it  to  the  examination  whether or not the order under revision is “according to law”.  The scope of the revisional powers of the High Court, where  the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is  “according to law” is considered by Beaumont, C.J. in Bell &  Co.  Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj  (AIR  1938  Bom 223) a  case  referred to  with approval  by this Court  in  Hari  Shankar v.  Girdhari Lal Chowdhury (AIR 1963 SC 698)

But here, Section 15(5) of the Act enables the High  Court to satisfy itself as to the “legality and propriety” of the  order under revision, which is, quite obviously, a much wider  jurisdiction. That jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in  appropriate  cases,  to  examine  the  correctness  of  the  findings of facts also, though the revisional court is not “a  second court of first appeal”  

(emphasis supplied by us)

14. In Rukmini1, the scope of revisional power under Section 20 of  

the Kerala Rent Control Act fell for consideration before a 3-Judge Bench.  

The Bench considered the provision of Section 20 of that Act, vis-à-vis,  

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held as under:

“As far as the present Act is concerned Section 20  contains the word “propriety” also. As to the meaning of the  word  “propriety”  in  Raman  and  Raman  Ltd. v.  State  of   Madras (1956 SCR 256) at page 264 it was held thus:

12

Page 13

“The  word  ‘propriety’  has  nowhere  been  defined  in  the  Act  and  is  capable  of  a  variety  of  meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. VIII),  it has been stated to mean ‘fitness; appropriateness;  aptitude;  suitability;  appropriateness  to  the  circumstances  or  conditions;  conformity  with  requirements, rule or principle; rightness, correctness,  justness, accuracy’.”

Therefore,  the  question  would  be  whether  in  the  context  of  this  provision  the  High  Court  was  right  in  re- appreciating  the  evidence  and  coming  to  a  different  conclusion? In the impugned judgment in paragraph 7 the  High Court observed:

“Under Section 20 of the Act though re-appreciation of  the evidence as such is not called for, the pleadings  and  evidence  have  to  be  examined  to  satisfy  the  legality,  regularity  of  the  order  of  the  lower  authorities.”

We  are  afraid  this  approach  of  the  High  Court  is  wrong.  Even the wider language of  Section 20 of  the Act  cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second  court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate  and  revisional  jurisdiction  will  get  obliterated.  Hence,  the  High  Court  was  not  right  in  re-appreciating  the  entire  evidence  both  oral  or  documentary  in  the  light  of  the  Commissioner’s report (Exts. C-1 and C-2 mahazar). In our  considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the  revisional  jurisdiction.  Even  by  the  presence  of  the  word  “propriety”  it  cannot  mean  that  there  could  be  a  re- appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can  come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of  evidence;  on  the  contrary,  by  confining  itself  to  legality,  regularity  and  propriety  of  the  order  impugned  before  it.  Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the  High  Court  with  reference  to  the  exercise  of  revisional  jurisdiction.”

While holding as above, the 3-Judge Bench also referred to the decisions  

of this Court in  H.V. Mathai7  and Rai Chand Jain8.  In  H.V. Mathai7, this  7 H.V. Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, Kottayam; [(1969) 2 SCC 194] 8  Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla; [(1991) 1 SCC 422]  

13

Page 14

Court observed that the words of Section 20 are much wider than those in  

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  It was also observed that on  

the words of Section 20, it could not be held that the revision was limited to  

a mere question of  jurisdiction.   In  Rai Chand Jain8,  relying upon  Ram  

Dass2, the Court observed:

“…  The High Court in exercising its power under Section  15(5) of the said Act is within its jurisdiction to reverse the  findings of fact as the same were improper and also illegal. It  is appropriate to refer in this connection to the decision in the  case of Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander where it has been held  that  Section  15(5)  of  the  Act  enables  the  High  Court  to  satisfy itself as to the “legality or propriety” of the order under  revision, which is, quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction.  That jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate  cases, to  examine the correctness of the findings of facts  also, though the revisional court is not ‘a second court of first  appeal...”  

15. In Sankaranarayanan9, the Court had an occasion to consider  

the scope of  powers  of  revisional  Court  under  Section 25 of  the Tamil  

Nadu  Rent  Control  Act.  The  2-Judge  Bench  which  heard  the  matter  

observed that it was improper for the High Court to consider the revision  

petition under Section 25 as if it were a second appeal.  The Court firmly  

stated that the findings of the first appellate Court could not be reversed  

upon a reassessment of the evidence.  

16. In  Shiv  Sarup  Gupta10,  this  Court  with  reference  to  the  

9 Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank; [1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675] 10 Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta; [(1999) 6 SCC 222]

14

Page 15

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi  

Rent Control Act, 1958, though reiterated that the High Court cannot enter  

into  appreciation  or  re-appreciation  of  evidence  merely  because  it  is  

inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts, but  

also  held  that  the  High  Court  is  obliged  to  test  the  order  of  the  Rent  

Controller on the touchstone of “whether it is according to law” and, for that  

limited  purpose,  may  enter  into  reappraisal  of  evidence,  i.e.,  for  the  

purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  Rent  

Controller  is  wholly  unreasonable  or  is  one  that  no  reasonable  person  

acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. The  

Court  observed  that  ignoring  the  weight  of  evidence,  proceeding  on  a  

wrong premise of  law or  deriving such conclusion  from the established  

facts as betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding  

of the Controller “not according to law” calling for an interference under the  

proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

17. Again in Ram Narain Arora11, a 2-Judge Bench with reference  

to revisional power under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958  

observed as follows:

“It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition  under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act  is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or  propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the  High Court could examine the facts available in order to find  

11 Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and Ors.; [(1999) 1 SCC 141]

15

Page 16

out  whether  he  had  correctly  or  on  a  firm  legal  basis  approached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure  findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but  (sic if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong  premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional  court to interfere with such a matter. In this case, the Rent  Controller  proceeded  to  analyse  the  matter  that  non- disclosure  of  a  particular  information  was  fatal  and,  therefore, dismissed the claim made by the landlord. It is in  these circumstances that it became necessary for the High  Court to re-examine the matter and then decide the entire  question. We do not think that any of the decisions referred  to by the learned counsel decides the question of the same  nature  with  which  we  are  concerned.  Therefore,  detailed  reference to them is not required.”

18. The scope of the High Court’s revisional power under Section  

50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 came to be considered by a  

2-Judge Bench of this Court in  M.S. Zahed12. The provision (Section 50)  

under consideration reads, “The High Court may, at any time call for and  

examine any order passed or  proceeding taken by (the Court  of  Small   

Causes or the Court of the Civil Judge) under this Act or any order passed   

by  the  Controller  under  Sections  14,  15,  16  or  17  for  the  purpose  of   

satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding  

and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.” The Court,  

while observing that revisional power cannot be equated with the power of  

reconsideration of all questions of fact as a Court of first appeal, held that  

still the nature of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section  

50  of  the  Act  will  have  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  express  

provisions of the statute concerning such power. On the express language  12 M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan; [(1999) 1 SCC 439]

16

Page 17

of Section 50(1) of the Act, the Court observed that it cannot be said that  

the High Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of correctness of  

findings  of  fact  reached  by  the  Court  of  Small  Causes  on  relevant  

evidence. The Court  considered a couple of decisions of this Court,  (1)  

Central  Tobacco  Company13 and (2) Bhoolchand14 and  ultimately  

concluded that the High Court in revision under Section 50 of the Act was  

entitled to re-appreciate the evidence with a view to finding out whether the  

order of the Court of Small Causes was legal or correct.  

19. In Ubaiba15, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court, while dealing with  

revisional  jurisdiction of  the High Court  under  Section 20 of  the Kerala  

Rent  Control  Act,  considered the meaning of  the expression ‘propriety’.  

The Court held that in re-appreciating the evidence, the High Court had  

exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. This is what the 2-Judge Bench said:

“Mr.  K.  Sukumaran,  the  learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing for the appellant contended that however wide the  jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question  may be, but it  cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the  evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding  arrived  at  by  the  appellate  authority  and  therefore  the  impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In  support  of  this  contention  reliance has been  placed  on a  decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Rukmini  Amma  Saradamma v.  Kallyani  Sulochana (1993)  1  SCC  499  whereunder  the selfsame provision of  the Kerala Act  was  under  consideration.  This  Court  after  noticing  the  word  “propriety” used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that  the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and even  

13 Central Tobacco Company v. Chandra Prakash; [1969 UJ 432] 14 Bhoolchand and Anr. v. Kay Pee Cee Investments and Anr.; [(1991) 1 SCC 343] 15 Ubaiba v. Damodaran; [(1999) 5 SCC 645]

17

Page 18

the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable  the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal.  Otherwise the distinction between appellate  and revisional  jurisdiction  will  get  obliterated.  The  Court  also  further  observed “even by the  presence of  the word ‘propriety’  it  cannot  mean  that  there  could  be  any  reappreciation  of  evidence”.  The learned counsel  for  the respondent on the  other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have  no  application  to  the  case  in  hand  where  the  dispute  involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the  learned  counsel  where  the  dispute  is  in  relation  to  a  jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power  of the revisional court even to reappreciate the evidence and  come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the  aforesaid proposition no authority could be placed though on  first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as  aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having  gone through the decision of this Court referred to earlier we  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  though  the  revisional  power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of  the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with  the  second  appellate  power  conferred  on  the  civil  court  under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use  of  the  expression  “propriety”  in  Section  20,  the  revisional  court  therefore  will  not  be  entitled  to  reappreciate  the  evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the  conclusion  of  the  appellate  authority.  On  examining  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court  in  the  light  of  the  aforesaid ratio of this Court it is crystal clear that the High  Court  exceeded  its  jurisdiction  by  reappreciating  the  evidence  and  in  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  the  relationship  of  landlord-tenant  did  not  exist.  In  the  circumstances,  the  impugned  revisional  order  of  the  High  Court  is wholly unsustainable and we set  aside the same  and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed.”

20. The scope of power of revision under Section 25 of the Tamil  

Nadu Rent Control Act also fell for consideration before a 2-Judge Bench  

of this Court in T. Sivasubramaniam16. The Court in paragraph 5 (page 279  

of the Report) held as follows:

16 T. Sivasubramaniam and Ors. v. Kasinath Pujari and Ors.; [(1999) 7 SCC 275]

18

Page 19

“5.  So  far  as  the  second  submission  is  concerned,  the  language employed in Section 25 of the Act, which confers  revisional jurisdiction on the High Court, is very wide. Under  Section  25  of  the  Act,  the  High  Court  can  call  for  and  examine  the  record  of  the  appellate  authority  in  order  to  satisfy  itself  as  to  regularity  of  such  proceedings  or  the  correctness, legality or propriety of  any decision or orders  passed  therein.  The  words  “to  satisfy  itself”  employed  in  Section  25  of  the  Act  no  doubt  is  a  power  of  superintendence,  and  the  High  Court  is  not  required  to  interfere with  the finding of  fact  merely  because the  High  Court  is  not  in  agreement  with  the  findings  of  the  courts  below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High  Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power  to  reappraise  or  reassess  the  evidence  for  coming  to  a  different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts  below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is  based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in  interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below.  In  the  present  case  what  we  find  is  that  neither  has  the  landlord set out his need or requirement for the premises for  his occupation in his petition nor has he led any evidence to  show that  his  need is  bona fide.  In  the  absence of  such  evidence, the Rent Controller and the first appellate authority  acted contrary to law in allowing the petition of the landlord  by  directing  the  eviction  of  the  tenants.  In  such  circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in interfering  with the findings of the courts below. We, therefore, reject  the second submission of learned counsel.”

21. In  Ramdoss17, this Court again had an occasion to consider  

the scope of Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act. Relying upon  

Sankaranarayanan9, the Court held that the revisional power of the High  

Court  under  Section  25  of  the  Act  not  being  an  appellate  power,  it  is  

impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision  

petition filed under Section 25 of the Act. The Court did not accept the  

argument that in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can  17 Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu; [(2000) 2 SCC 135]

19

Page 20

interfere with incorrect finding of fact recorded by the Courts below.

22. In Shaw Wallace18, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court relied upon  

M.S. Zahed12 decision of this Court and held in paragraph 13 of the Report  

as follows:

“13. On a plain reading of Section 25 of the Act, it is clear  that the revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court under  that section is wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil  Procedure. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to  the regularity of the proceeding, of the correctness, legality  or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if,  on examination, it appears to the High Court that any such  decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or  remitted  for  reconsideration,  it  may  pass  such  orders  accordingly.”

23. The scope of revisional power under Section 20 of the Kerala  

Rent Control Act fell for consideration in  V.M. Mohan19. The Court while  

allowing the appeal set aside the order of the High Court as it found that  

the High Court had re-appreciated the evidence to come to the conclusion  

different  from the trial  Court  as  well  as the appellate  Court.  The Court  

observed  that  as  the  revision  application  was concluded  by  concurrent  

finding of fact recorded by the original authority as well as the appellate  

authority, no interference by the High Court was called for.

24. In  Olympic  Industries20,  this  Court,  while  dealing  with  

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu  

Rent  Control  Act,  observed  that  the  High  Court  could  interfere  with  

18 Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Govindas Purushothamdas and Anr.; [(2001) 3 SCC 445] 19 V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka and Ors.; [(2006) 9 SCC 606] 20 Olympic Industries v. Mulla Hussainy Bhai Mulla Akberally and Ors.; [(2009) 15 SCC 528]

20

Page 21

concurrent  orders  of  the  tribunals  in  revisional  jurisdiction  only  if  their  

findings are perverse or arbitrary and irregular or improper.

25. Before we consider the matter  further to find out the scope  

and extent  of  revisional  jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control  

Acts, a quick observation about the ‘appellate jurisdiction’ and ‘revisional  

jurisdiction’ is necessary.  Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of  

appellate jurisdiction but it  is not vice-versa.  Both, appellate jurisdiction  

and  revisional  jurisdiction  are  creatures  of  statutes.   No  party  to  the  

proceeding  has  an  inherent  right  of  appeal  or  revision.   An  appeal  is  

continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be.  The power  

of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court.  Ordinarily,  

appellate  jurisdiction  involves  re-hearing  on  facts  and  law  but  such  

jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate  

jurisdiction.  On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of  

appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-

fledged appeal.  In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of  

original  proceeding.  When the aid of revisional  court is invoked on the  

revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided  

in the statute.  It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against  

an  order  passed by  the tribunal/appellate  authority,  the  decision  of  the  

revisional court is the operative decision in law.  In our view, as regards the  

extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend  

21

Page 22

on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction  

and revisional jurisdiction.  

26. With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour  

to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or  

propriety”,  “regularity,  correctness,  legality  or  propriety”  and  “legality,  

regularity or propriety” which are used in three Rent Control Acts under  

consideration.   

27. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘legality’ is lawfulness.  It  

refers to strict  adherence to law, prescription,  or doctrine; the quality of  

being legal.

28. The term ‘propriety’ means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude;  

suitability;  appropriateness  to  the circumstances  or  condition  conformity  

with  requirement;  rules  or  principle,  rightness,  correctness,  justness,  

accuracy.

29. The terms ‘correctness’  and ‘propriety’  ordinarily convey the  

same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary  

meaning  and  substance,  ‘correctness’  is  compounded  of  ‘legality’  and  

‘propriety’ and that which is legal and proper is ‘correct’.   

30. The  expression  “regularity”  with  reference  to  an  order  

ordinarily  relates  to  the  procedure  being  followed  in  accord  with  the  

principles of natural justice and fair play.

22

Page 23

31. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that  

although there is some difference in the language employed by the three  

Rent  Control  Acts  under  consideration  which  provide  for  revisional  

jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under  

these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same  

scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu  

unless so provided expressly.  None of these statutes confers on revisional  

authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority  

despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the  

Code  of  Civil  Procedure.   The  provision  under  consideration  does  not  

permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an  

appeal in disguise.  Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring  

the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate  

Authority for re-hearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings.  

32. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja  

Lakshmi  Dyeing  Works5 that  where  both  expressions  “appeal”  and  

“revision” are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression “revision” is  

meant  to  convey  the  idea  of  a  much  narrower  jurisdiction  than  that  

conveyed  by  the  expression  “appeal”.   The  use  of  two  expressions  

“appeal”  and  “revision”  when  used  in  one  statute  conferring  appellate  

power  and  revisional  power,  we  think,  is  not  without  purpose  and  

significance.  Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing while it  

23

Page 24

is  not  so  in  the  case  of  revisional  jurisdiction  when  the  same  statute  

provides the remedy by way of an ‘appeal’ and so also of a ‘revision’.  If  

that were so, the revisional power would become co-extensive with that of  

the trial Court or the subordinate Tribunal which is never the case.  The  

classic  statement  in  Dattonpant4   that  revisional  power  under  the  Rent  

Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section  

115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the  

High  Court  a  second  Court  of  first  appeal,  commends  to  us  and  we  

approve the same.   We are  of  the view that  in  the garb  of  revisional  

jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is  

not conferred a status of second Court of first appeal and the High Court  

should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.  

33. Insofar as the 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in  Ram  

Dass2 is concerned, it rightly observes that revisional power is subject to  

well-known limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions and the matter  

essentially turns on the language of the statute investing the jurisdiction.  

We do not think that there can ever be objection to the above statement.  

The controversy centers round the following observation in  Ram Dass2,  

“...that jurisdiction enables the Court of revision, in appropriate cases, to   

examine the correctness of the findings of facts also...”.  It is suggested  

that by observing so, the 3-Judge Bench in  Ram Dass2 has enabled the  

High  Court  to  interfere  with  the  findings  of  fact  by  re-appreciating  the  

24

Page 25

evidence.  We do not think that the 3-Judge Bench has gone to that extent  

in Ram Dass2.  The observation in Ram Dass2 that as the expression used  

conferring revisional jurisdiction is “legality and propriety”, the High Court  

has wider jurisdiction obviously means that the power of revision vested in  

the High Court in the statute is wider than the power conferred on it under  

Section  115  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure;  it  is  not  confined  to  the  

jurisdictional error alone.  However, in dealing with the findings of fact, the  

examination of findings of fact by the High Court is limited to satisfy itself  

that the decision is “according to law”.  This is expressly stated in  Ram  

Dass2.  Whether  or  not  a  finding  of  fact  recorded  by  the  subordinate  

court/tribunal is according to law, is required to be seen on the touchstone  

whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers  

from  any  illegality  like  misreading  of  the  evidence  or  overlooking  and  

ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers from perversity or any  

such illegality or such finding has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice.  

Ram Dass2  does not lay down as a proposition of law that the revisional  

power of the High Court under the Rent Control Act is as wide as that of  

the  Appellate  Court  or  the  Appellate  Authority  or  such  power  is  co-

extensive with that of the Appellate Authority or that the concluded finding  

of fact recorded by the original Authority or the Appellate Authority can be  

interfered  with  by  the  High  Court  by  re-appreciating  evidence  because  

revisional  court/authority  is  not  in  agreement  with  the  finding  of  fact  

25

Page 26

recorded by the Court/Authority below.    Ram Dass2 does not exposit that  

the  revisional  power  conferred  upon  the  High  Court  is  as  wide  as  an  

appellate power to re-appraise or re-assess the evidence for coming to a  

different  finding  contrary  to  the  finding  recorded  by  the  Court/Authority  

below.   Rather,  it  emphasises  that  while  examining  the  correctness  of  

findings of fact, the revisional Court is not the second Court of first appeal.  

Ram Dass2 does not cross the limits of revisional  court as explained in  

Dattonpant4.  

34. Rai  Chand Jain8 that  follows  Ram Dass2 also does not  lay  

down that the High Court in exercise of its power under the Rent Control  

Act may reverse the findings of fact merely because on re-appreciation of  

the  evidence  it  has  a  different  view  on  the  findings  of  fact.   The  

observations made by this Court in Rai Chand Jain8 must also be read in  

the context we have explained Ram Dass2.

35. In Shiv Sarup Gupta10,   the observations of  this  Court  with  

reference to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Delhi Rent  

Control  Act  that  the  High  Court,  on  the  touchstone  of  “whether  it  is  

according to law” and for that limited purpose, may enter into reappraisal of  

evidence  must  be  understood  in  the  context  of  its  observations  made  

preceding  such  observation  that  the  High  Court  cannot  enter  into  

appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to  

26

Page 27

take a different  view of the facts as if  it  were a Court  of  facts and the  

observations following such observation that the evidence is examined by  

the High Court to find out whether Court/Authority below has ignored the  

evidence  or  proceeded  on  a  wrong  premise  of  law  or  derived  such  

conclusion from the established facts which betray lack of reasons and/or  

objectivity which renders the finding not according to law.   Shiv Sarup  

Gupta10 also does not lay down the proposition of law that in its revisional  

jurisdiction under the Rent Control Act, the High Court can rehear on facts  

or re-appreciate the evidence to come to the conclusion different from that  

of the trial Court or the appellate Court because it has a different view on  

appreciation of evidence.  Shiv Sarup Gupta10 must also be understood in  

the context we have explained  Ram Dass2.

36. The observations in Ram Narain Arora11  that in examining the  

‘legality’ or ‘propriety’  of the proceedings before the Rent Controller,  the  

High Court could examine the facts available must be understood for the  

purpose stated therein, namely, in order to find out that the finding of facts  

are based on firm legal basis and are not given on a wrong premise of law.  

Ram Narain Arora11 also lays down that pure findings of fact are not for  

interference in revisional jurisdiction.   

37. The statement in  M.S. Zahed12 that under Section 50 of the  

Karnataka Rent Control Act, the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the  

27

Page 28

evidence with a view to find out whether the order of Small Causes Court  

is legal and correct must be understood in light of the observations made  

therein, namely, that revisional power cannot be equated with the power of  

re-consideration of all questions of fact as a Court of first appeal.   

38. Shaw Wallace18  has relied upon M.S. Zahed12   and observed  

that  the  High Court  is  entitled to satisfy itself  as to the regularity  of  the  

proceeding, of the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order  

passed therein and if, on examination, it appears to the High Court that  

any  such  decision  or  order  should  be  modified,  annulled,  reversed  or  

remitted for reconsideration, it may pass such order accordingly. In Shaw  

Wallace18,  this  Court  does  not  lay  down  that  the  High  Court  can  re-

appreciate  the  evidence  to  come  to  conclusion  different  from  the  

court/authority below  as the appellate Court.

39. Rukmini1 holds,  and in our view, rightly that even the wider  

language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the  

High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal.  We are in full   

agreement with the view of the 3-Judge Bench in Rukmini1 that the word  

“propriety”  does not confer  power upon the High Court  to re-appreciate  

evidence  to  come  to  a  different  conclusion  but  its  consideration  of  

evidence  is  confined  to  find  out  legality,  regularity  and propriety  of  the  

order impugned before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini1.

28

Page 29

40. The  observation  in  Sankaranarayanan9 that  the  revisional  

Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act cannot reverse  

the findings of the first appellate Court upon a reassessment of evidence is  

in line with Rukmini1 and we approve the same.

41. Similarly, the view in  Ubaiba15,  which has followed  Rukmini1  

that, under  Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the revisional court  

will  not  be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own  

conclusion  in  place  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Appellate  Authority  is  the  

correct view and gets our nod.

42. In  T.  Sivasubramaniam16 this  Court  has  held  that  under  

Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the High Court does not  

enjoy  an  appellate  power  to  reappraise  or  reassess  the  evidence  for  

coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts  

below. This view is the correct view and we approve the same.  

43. The observation in Ramdoss17 that the High Court in exercise  

of its revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate court/authority and it  

is impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision  

petition filed under Section 25 of the Act is in accord with  Rukmini1  and  

Sankaranarayanan9. Its observation that the High Court can interfere with  

incorrect  finding of  fact  must  be understood in  the context  where  such  

finding is perverse, based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or  

29

Page 30

such finding has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the material  

evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous that if allowed to stand,  

will occasion in miscarriage of justice.  Ramdoss17 does not hold that the  

High  Court  may  interfere  with  the  findings  of  fact  because  on  re-

appreciation  of  the  evidence  its  view  is  different  from  that  of  the  first  

Appellate Court or Authority.  

44. The decision of this Court in V.M. Mohan19 is again in line with  

the judgment of this Court in Rukmini1.

45. We hold, as we must,  that none of the above Rent Control  

Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by  

the  First  Appellate  Court/First  Appellate  Authority  because  on  re-

appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority  

below.   The consideration  or  examination  of  the  evidence by the High  

Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that  

finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law  

and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by  

Court/Authority  below,  if  perverse  or  has  been  arrived  at  without  

consideration of the material evidence or such  finding  is  based on no  

evidence or  misreading  of  the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if  

allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to  

correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law.  In that  

30

Page 31

event,  the High Court  in  exercise of  its  revisional  jurisdiction under  the  

above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order  

as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the  

correctness  or  legality  or  propriety  of  any  decision  or  order  impugned  

before it as indicated above.  However, to satisfy itself to the regularity,  

correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the  

High  Court  shall  not  exercise  its  power  as  an  appellate  power  to  re-

appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on  

facts.  Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of  

reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal.  Where the  

High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law,  

it  may  examine  whether  the  order  impugned  before  it  suffers  from  

procedural illegality or irregularity.  

46. We, thus, approve the view of this Court in Rukmini1  as noted  

by us.  The decision of this Court in Ram Dass2 must be read as explained  

above.  The reference is answered accordingly.     

47. Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions shall now be posted  

before the regular Benches for decision in light of the above.

     ….………..……………………CJI.  (R.M. Lodha)

31

Page 32

      …….………..……………………J.  (Dipak Misra)

      …….………..……………………J.        (Madan B. Lokur)

      …….………..……………………J.  (Kurian Joseph)

NEW DELHI;        …….………..……………………J. AUGUST 27, 2014. (S.A. Bobde)

32