REPORTABLE   

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.    9488­9489      OF 2019    (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.5581­5582 of 2019)

University of Delhi                 .…Appellant(s) Versus

Union of India & Ors.              ….  Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

A.S. Bopanna,J.         

Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been preferred by the

appellant­University of Delhi through its Registrar to

challenge the common judgment and order dated

29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined to

condone the delay of 916 days in filing the appeal to

challenge the judgment dated 27.04.2015 whereunder, the

learned Single Judge had dismissed the W.P (C)

No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi.  

3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to

the  decision  dated  12.5.2011  of the  Delhi  Development   

Page 1 of 34

Authority (hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short)

who had allowed respondent no.13­M/s Young Builders

(P) Ltd.  to construct a high­rise multistory group housing

society in the control zone  of  Zone­C in the  University

campus, without any height restriction. The construction

permission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi

Metro Rail Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the,

“DMRC” for short) by permitting segregation of 2 hectares

as  a separate entity from  the total  3  hectares  of land,

acquired for the metro station.   

4. The principal contentions of the appellant­

University on the merits of the challenge were as follows:   

a)  the permission sought by Respondent No. 13

(namely, M/s Young Builders Private Limited)

for the proposed construction of a group

housing society on the land originally owned by

the Ministry of Defence in the University

enclave is violative of the MPD­2021 and is

against the larger public interest, given the fact

that the project site in question and its vicinity

are within the North Campus of the University

and that it contains various historical and

archaeological buildings, apart from it being

 Page 2 of 34

the  centre  of  higher  education and advanced

learning; and  

b)   the change in the character of the subject land

is impermissible in law, since the land having

been acquired for public purpose for

construction of the metro rail project, has

suddenly been diverted to private commercial

use and auctioned to private builder for

building a group housing society in a manner

contrary to the purpose and charter of

incorporation of the Delhi Metro Rail

Corporation (DMRC)

c)    The restriction on certain  developments for

Metro Station prescribed under Master Plan of

Delhi – 2021 (‘MPD’ for short) was also a

contention raised by the writ petitioner which

imposed ban on construction of high­rise

buildings in the control zone of the Delhi

University.   The location of various ladies’

hostels of the University in close vicinity of the

proposed construction site was highlighted as

an important privacy concern. The impediment

to access of thousands of students, teachers at

the  entrance  of the  University  was  the  other

main contention raised in the writ petition.   

5.  On the other hand, the DMRC had projected that

after construction of the University Metro Station, 2

 Page 3 of 34

hectares of land remained surplus and the housing project

was intended to generate revenue for the DMRC as per the

policy of the Government.  The formal application made to

the authorities for change of land use and approval

secured for conversion of the land for residential use, was

also highlighted by the DMRC.

6. The learned Single Judge having noticed the entire

sequence refused to entertain the writ petition of the

University including on the ground of delay and laches.  In

the judgment dated 27.04.2015 the Court however

observed that DDA is the master of the formulation and

implementation of the Master Plan and, necessary

approvals have been taken from various statutory

authorities for the housing project.   It was also observed

that the change in the land use from “public” to

“residential” is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High

Court’s Division Bench Judgment in  Adil Singh vs.

Union of India  (2010) 171 DLT 748.   According to the

Writ  court,  since  it  was  a  policy  decision  taken by the

Government body and since the appellant­University has

 Page 4 of 34

failed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide

in the decision making by the authority, interference of the

Court with the policy decision, would not be justified.   

7. It is the case of the appellant that following  the

dismissal of the writ petition and being concerned about

the future use of the subject land, the University

Authorities constituted a  Committee to recommend the

appropriate course of action to be taken by the University.

The Committee’s report furnished on 11.11.2016 is stated

to have been laid before the Executive Council of the

University and after due consideration of the report and

the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Executive

Council  of the University through their  resolution dated

28.02.2017/07.03.2017  decided to prefer  an intra­Court

Appeal in the High Court.  

8. While the above deliberations were on, accessibility

concern to the University’s Metro Station area was raised

under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 by

persons with disabilities.   The University also received a

report on preventive measures to be taken in the accident­

prone  area of the  Metro  Station.  With these  and  other   

Page 5 of 34

projection, the appeal in LPA No.89/2018 came to be filed

on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days, together with the

C.M.No.8654/2018 for condonation of delay in filing the

appeal.

9.  The delay of 916  days caused in preferring the

Appeal was explained in the application seeking delay

condonation and the rejoinder to the reply to said

application to the following effect;

(i) Non­convening of Executive Council and delay

occasioned due to non­availability of Vice­

Chancellor. The case in the present LPA is

different from other routine litigation preferred or

contested by the  appellant.   It is the  only  case

where, the approval from the Executive Council of

the University of Delhi was required to be taken

and  before such  approval, various  deliberations

preceded so as to appraise the Executive Council

of the different shades of the subject matter.

Being a statutory body, an adherence to the just

method of decision making requires consultations

with affected departments of the University itself   

Page 6 of 34

and therefore, the final say in the  matter rests

with  the Executive  Council  which  is  constituted

under Section 21 of the Delhi University Act,

1922.   The Council includes the senior most

Deans, democratically elected representatives of

teachers, the Visitor’s nominee, the Registrar, and

the Vice­Chancellor.   

(ii)      The judgment of learned Single Judge was

sent  by  the Counsel representing  the University

quite late and it was, then, place before the Legal

Cell  of the  University for  examining the  matter.

After going through the voluminous paper book, it

was opined that the matter be referred to the Vice­

Chancellor for consideration and pursuant

thereto, a meeting was held, wherein it was

decided that the  matter  needs to  be  dealt  with

holistically, having regard to all the issues decided

and connotations thereof.   The issue could not be

taken  up  for  consideration  as the  post  of  Vice­

Chancellor had fallen vacant w.e.f. 28.10.2015

and could be considered only after the new Vice­   

Page 7 of 34

Chancellor had assumed office and taken stock of

things.   On 10.03.2016, the new Vice­Chancellor

joined the office and in order to ensure democratic

functioning of the University, he decided to

constitute a Committee comprising of senior

faculty persons representing different sections of

the University. The terms of reference of the Five­

member Committee were, to recommend the

course of action to the University in the light of

the dismissal of the Writ Petition filed by the

University in the DMRC matter.   

(iii)   On 11.11.2016, the above constituted

Committee gave its Report. Based  on the  Report

of the five­member Committee, it was decided by

the Competent Authority that the subject matter

of the present case be referred to the Executive

Council of the University for its final decision. In

the Executive Council meeting held on

28.02.2017, the matter was discussed. The item

was again discussed in the Executive Council

meeting held on 7.3.2017 (continued meeting),   

Page 8 of 34

where the members of the Council referred to the

earlier discussions and decisions of both the

Academic Council and the Executive Council with

respect to the same  matter  and it  was  decided

unanimously to prefer an Appeal against the

Order of the learned Single Judge dated

27.04.2015 after adequate preparation.

(iv)     In the meanwhile, reservation was strongly

put forth by the disabled students and faculty in

the light  of the  proposed  project  by the  private

builder at the very main entrance of the University

of Delhi.  Such representations were received from

individuals as well as groups which the University

had to consider and were therefore forwarded to

the Equal Opportunity Cell for consideration. The

Equal Opportunity Cell, University of Delhi, which

looks after the welfare of  disabled students and

others, in the light of the new enactment on the

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016,

analyzed the probable outcome. After detailed

deliberations, the Equal Opportunity Cell   

Page 9 of 34

submitted its  Report on  28.04.2017  which  was

brought to the notice of Competent Authorities for

their consideration. The Report was considered at

various levels of the University including the

Office of the Dean, Student Welfare, the

Department of legal affairs, the Office of the

Proctor, the Engineering Department, and the

Department of Environmental Studies. Holding

discussions and deliberations among these bodies

and considering their inputs involved further time

and it involved co­ordination and interaction with

various authorities and stake holders. All this

exercise involved  a further  period of five to six

months before a considered opinion could be

generated by  the University  of  Delhi.  Hence  the

representations and the Report of the Equal

Opportunity  Cell could  be finally considered  by

the  University of  Delhi around the end  of year

2017.  

(v)      In the interregnum, the accidents occurred

at  Chhatra  Marg in  December 2017 led to the   

Page 10 of 34

need for the preparation of a Report by the Office

of the Proctor of the University dated 05.02.2018

wherein the Proctor recommended the area to be

declared as accident prone.   Both the Reports ­

one by the Equal Opportunity Cell and the other

by the Office of Proctor ­­ were sent to the Counsel

concerned who was holding the brief for the

preparation of the Appeal memorandum.   

Subsequently legal opinion was sought and the

draft appeal and petition was prepared which was

thereafter got vetted and settled by the Senior

Counsel. The finalized Appeal was thereafter again

considered at the highest level at the University to

take the final decision, which entailed some time.

On 01.03.2018, the LPA was filed before the Delhi

High Court.

10. The above explanation  for the delayed  filing  was

however not accepted and the Division Bench of the High

Court on 29.10.2018 dismissed the LPA on the ground of

delay without considering the merits of the appeal. Thus,

 Page 11 of 34

aggrieved the appellant­University has filed this appeal.  

11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for

the appellant submits that the implication of the rejection

of the writ petition and the LPA without considering the

substantial contention raised by the University on merits

would cause grave injury to the public institution.   The

learned Senior Counsel submits that the University

Authorities have been pursuing the issue with due

diligence but decision had to be taken after consultation

with all the stakeholders and therefore, the delay in

preferring the LPA should not be attributed to any

inaction, much less a deliberate inaction.  The endeavor of

the Courts according to Shri Parasaran should be to do

substantial justice to the parties by deciding the matters

on  merits  but in the  present case,  neither the learned

Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court had

considered the merit of the contention raised by the

appellant­University.   Shri Parasaran argues that the

expression “sufficient cause”  is  elastic  enough to enable

the courts to apply the law of limitation in a meaningful

manner.  He also projects that since the builders are yet to   

Page 12 of 34

start their construction, the delayed filing of the LPA

should not have resulted in non­consideration of the

contention on merits, as major public interest issues have

been  raised  in the  present  matter.  The learned  Senior

Counsel argues that important questions effecting public

interest cannot be defeated on technical objection,

inasmuch as the proposed site for construction was

originally owned by the Defence Ministry and the land was

acquired for public purpose at public expense but is now

sought to be given over to a private builder, for a profit

oriented motive.   The said contentions are also

supplemented by Shri R. Venkataramani and Shri Ramji

Srinivasan, learned Senior Advocates.

12. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel

representing the applicants/intervenors submits that six

girl hostels are located near to the project site and if high

rise apartments are allowed to be constructed, the privacy

of the hostel residents would be compromised.  Ms. Arora

also refers to the letter dated 25.10.1943 of the Joint

Secretary, Government of India, Department of Education

addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi conveying   

Page 13 of 34

the decision of the Government of India to ensure that no

tall buildings are erected inside the Delhi University

Campus and  also the  necessity  of  protecting  University

area, as an enclave.  The Senior Counsel then refers to the

Zonal Development Plan for Zone­“C” (Civil Lines Zone) of

the DDA as approved by the Ministry of Urban

Development to point out that the authorities have

recognized the existence of number of old historical

buildings of the colonial period within the Delhi University

Campus and effort should be made to convert the Delhi

University into an integrated Campus with restriction on

tall buildings.  

13.   Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for

respondent No.13­ M/s Young Builders   would at the

outset contend that though the learned Senior Counsel for

the appellant has referred to the merits of the case,

keeping in view the position that the Division Bench of the

High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay

and laches, that aspect of the matter would require

consideration at the threshold.   He would assert that the

delay of 916 days is an inordinate delay of more than two   

Page 14 of 34

and a half years and in such event the principle of

applying  the usual test for “sufficient  cause”  would not

arise  as it is  not  merely the  number  of  days requiring

condonation but also amounts to laches in filing the writ

petition,  as  well  as the  LPA.  Mere  contention  that the

proceedings initiated by the appellant is in public interest

would not advance the case inasmuch as the learned

Single Judge having adverted to all these aspects has

arrived  at the  conclusion  that the  petition  suffers from

laches  in addition  to  there being no merit  and  in such

circumstance when the LPA was once again delayed by

916 days the Division Bench was justified in its

conclusion.   It is pointed out that the said delay of 916

days is as against the period of 30 days which is allowed

in law for filing the LPA.  It is contended that the cause of

action if any should be construed on 23.09.2005 when the

area was converted into residential, but the writ petition

was filed only on 07.05.2012 and despite the writ petition

having been disposed of on 27.04.2015 the LPA was filed

only on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916 days.  The reason

assigned that a decision to file the LPA could not be taken   

Page 15 of 34

as the office of Vice­Chancellor had fallen vacant also

cannot be accepted since such vacancy arose only on

28.10.2015 while the writ petition had already been

disposed of on 27.04.2015 and there was sufficient time to

file the LPA if they had the intention to do so.  The learned

Senior Counsel further refers to the large number of cases

that was filed on behalf of the University during the said

period.  It is contended that while considering condonation

of delay the prejudice that would be caused to the opposite

side is also one of the aspects to be considered.   If that

situation is kept in view, in the instant case the request

for proposal in favour of the respondent No.13 was notified

on 23.06.2008 and the Letter of Acceptance was issued on

13.08.2008 and the lease being for 90 years, already 11

years have passed and by such belated proceedings the

project is prejudicially hampered.   The respondent No.13

has already spent Rs.233 crores being the lease amount

paid to the DMRC and also for securing appropriate

approvals.  It is contended that the respondent No.13 had

to face earlier litigation as well which has been taken note

by the learned Single Judge and the respondent cannot be   

Page 16 of 34

exposed to such repeated litigations.

14. Shri Tushar Mehta,  the  learned Solicitor General

appearing on behalf of respondent No.11­DMRC, has

contended that the Ministry of Urban Development as a

matter of Policy of the Government of India had permitted

the DMRC to generate its   own resources through

property development and has accordingly permitted to

carry out property development on the land transferred to

it by the Government.  In such event when the DMRC has

taken such steps not only in the instant case but also in

several other projects, any interference at this stage more

particularly when there is belated challenge of the

present nature, it  would have a serious  impact on the

projects undertaken.   It was submitted that due to

certain changes affected in the manner in which the

Metro Rail Project was to be implemented there was some

excess land which has been put to use to generate

resources for the project and in that regard when there is

a contractual relationship with respondent No.13 if the

much belated petition is entertained at this stage, there

would be a great financial impact which is also a loss to   

Page 17 of 34

the public exchequer and in such event the public

interest  would be better served  by  not condoning the

delay in such matters.  Moreover, it is not a case of mere

delay in filing the LPA but is a serious case of laches. It is

also noticed by  the  learned Single  Judge  that  the writ

petition itself was filed after 7­8 years and in such event

if the discretionary orders passed in the writ jurisdiction

is interfered in the limited jurisdiction of this Court, it

would set a bad precedent.

15. Shri A.N.S. Nandkarni, learned Additional Solicitor

General would also refer to the aspect of delay and laches

and supplement the arguments advanced by the learned

Solicitor  General.  He  would further contend that the

Union of  India being the owner of the  land which was

acquired does not have objection for the project and in

such event interference at the instance of the appellant

herein would not be justified. Ms. Binu Tamta, learned

Counsel submitted in support of the contentions raised

by the respondents.

 Page 18 of 34

16. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel in

reply to the said contention would reiterate the

contentions put forth relating to the explanation of delay

and would  contend  that the  conclusion of the learned

Single Judge that the writ petition was hit by laches is

fallacious inasmuch as the respondent No.13 themselves

had filed a  writ petition raising certain disputes  with

regard to the limit of FAR through the Notification dated

20.01.2005 and such challenge by the respondent No.13

had come  to  an end on 18.05.2011 and the  NOC etc.

were obtained subsequently, after which the writ petition

was filed by the appellant herein in the year 2012.  Hence

the delay and laches has been explained and it is not a

case of negligence.  It is contended that the stand of the

DMRC that it would be put to financial  loss cannot be

accepted at this point since the question as to whether

they would be liable to pay interest or not are matters

which would have to be considered in appropriate

proceedings.  Hence,  he  contends  that the  High Court

ought to have condoned the delay and the matter should

have been considered on its merits.   

Page 19 of 34

17. Though we have exhaustively referred to the

pleadings and the contentions of  the parties, including

contentions  put forth on  merits, the same is only for

completeness and to put the matter in perspective before

considering the issue relating to delay and laches.  In the

instant case, considering that the Division Bench of the

High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay

of 916  days, that aspect of the  matter  would require

consideration at the  outset  and  the facts  on merits is

noted to the limited extent to  find out whether  in that

background the public interest would suffer.  The learned

Senior Counsel for the appellant in order to impress upon

this Court the principle relating to consideration of

“sufficient cause” for condonation of delay and the factors

that are required to be kept  in view, has relied on the

decision in the case of  Collector, Land  Acquisition,

Anantnag & Anr.vs. Katiji & Ors.,  1987(2) SCC 107

wherein it is held as hereunder:

“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone  delay  by  enacting  Section  5  [  Any appeal  or  any  application,  other  than  an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be

 Page 20 of 34

admitted  after  the  prescribed  period  if  the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he  had  sufficient  cause  for  not  preferring  the appeal  or  making  the  application  within  such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order  to  enable  the  courts  to  do  substantial justice  to  parties  by  disposing  of  matters  on ”merits”.  The  expression  “sufficient  cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to  enable  the  courts  to  apply  the  law  in  a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice  —  that  being  the  life-purpose  for  the existence  of  the  institution  of  courts.  It  is common  knowledge  that  this  Court  has  been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in  this  Court.  But  the message does not appear to have percolated down to all  the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

“1.  Ordinarily  a  litigant  does  not  stand  to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2.  Refusing to condone delay can result  in  a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that  can  happen  is  that  a  cause  would  be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not  mean that  a  pedantic  approach should  be made.  Why  not  every  hour's  delay,  every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common-sense pragmatic manner.

4.  When  substantial  justice  and  technical considerations  are  pitted  against  each  other, cause  of  substantial  justice  deserves  to  be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5.  There  is  no  presumption  that  delay  is occasioned  deliberately,  or  on  account  of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6.  It  must  be  grasped  that  judiciary  is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is

 Page 21 of 34

capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Making  a  justice-oriented  approach  from this perspective,  there  was  sufficient  cause  for condoning  the  delay  in  the  institution  of  the appeal.  The fact that it  was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was  altogether  irrelevant.  The  doctrine  of equality  before  law  demands  that  all  litigants, including  the  State  as  a  litigant,  are  accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for  according  a  step-motherly  treatment  when the  “State”  is  the  applicant  praying  for condonation of delay.  In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by  the  judgment  sought  to  be  subjected  to appeal)  and  the  inherited  bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file- pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its  part  is  less  difficult  to  understand  though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which  represents  the  collective  cause  of  the community,  does  not  deserve  a  litigant-non- grata  status.  The  courts  therefore  have  to  be informed with  the  spirit  and philosophy of  the provision in the course of  the interpretation of the  expression  “sufficient  cause”.  So  also  the same  approach  has  to  be  evidenced  in  its application to matters at hand with the end in view  to  do  even-handed  justice  on  merits  in preference  to  the  approach  which  scuttles  a decision  on merits.  Turning to  the facts  of  the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied  that  sufficient  cause  exists  for  the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside.  Delay  is  condoned.  And  the  matter  is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now  dispose  of  the  appeal  on  merits  after affording  reasonable  opportunity  of  hearing  to both the sides.”

 Page 22 of 34

18. Further the  decision in the case of  M/s  Dehri

Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. Vs. District

Board, Bhojpur & Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 598 is relied upon,

wherein this Court has indicated the real test to

determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to

Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse

of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence.

19.  The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.13, on

the other hand, has relied upon the decision in the case

of   Postmaster General & Ors. vs. Living Media India

Limited & Anr. 1992 (3) SCC 563 wherein it is held as

hereunder:

“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of  bona  fides,  a  liberal  concession  has  to  be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department  cannot  take  advantage  of  various earlier  decisions.  The  claim  on  account  of impersonal  machinery  and  inherited bureaucratic  methodology  of  making  several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of  limitation  undoubtedly  binds  everybody, including the Government.

 Page 23 of 34

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the  government  bodies,  their  agencies  and instrumentalities  that  unless  they  have reasonable  and  acceptable  explanation  for  the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the  process.  The  government  departments  are under  a  special  obligation  to  ensure  that  they perform  their  duties  with  diligence  and commitment.  Condonation  of  delay  is  an exception  and  should  not  be  used  as  an anticipated  benefit  for  the  government departments.  The law shelters  everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”

20. From a consideration of the view taken by this

Court through the decisions cited supra the position is

clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken

in the matter of condonation of delay.  The consideration

for condonation of delay would not depend on the status

of the party namely the Government or the public bodies

so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate

consideration should be to render even­ handed justice to

the parties. Even in such case the condonation of  long

delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or

the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to

be kept in perspective.   In that background while

considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation   

Page 24 of 34

would not be enough but it should be in the nature of

indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will

depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be

weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact

situation.   In the case of  Katiji  (Supra) the entire

conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been

kept in focus.  However, what cannot also be lost sight is

that the consideration therein was in the background of

dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay

in a case where there was delay of four days pitted

against the consideration that was required to be made

on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation

amounting to 800 per cent.  

21.  As against the same, the delay in the instant facts

in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the

consideration to  condone can be made only if there  is

reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be

merely because the appellant is public body. The entire

explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach

unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of

 Page 25 of 34

the position of law.   That apart when there is such a long

delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would

also come into play while noticing as to the manner in

which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal.   In

addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches

in filing the appeal is contended on behalf of the

respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but

it is also contended that there was delay and laches in

filing the  writ  petition itself at the first instance from

which the present appeal  had arisen.   In  that  view, it

would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of

the matter and notice the nature of consideration made

in the  writ  petition  as  well as the  LPA to arrive at a

conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified.

22. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of

916 days is twofold, i.e. the non­availability of the Vice­

Chancellor due to retirement and subsequent

appointment of new Vice­Chancellor, also that the matter

was placed before the Executive Council and a decision

was taken to  file the appeal  and the said process had

 Page 26 of 34

caused the delay.   The reasons as stated do not appear

very convincing since  the  situation was of  availing  the

appellate remedy and not the original proceedings

requiring such deliberation when it was a mere

continuation of the proceedings which had already been

filed on behalf of the appellant herein, after due

deliberation.   Significantly, the Vice­Chancellor who was

at the helm of  affairs when the writ  petition was  filed,

prosecuted and disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available

in the same office till 28.10.2015, for about six months

which was a long enough period as compared to 30 days

limitation period for filing appeal.   In that circumstance

when the said Vice­Chancellor who had prosecuted the

writ petition was available, the submission of the learned

Senior Counsel for the appellant that unseen hands are

likely to have prevented the filing of the appeal also

cannot be accepted.   Secondly, the reason sought to be

put forth about the decision required to be taken by the

Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just

the matter of filing the appeal.  In fact, in the writ petition

an affidavit was filed referring to Resolution No.56 and   

Page 27 of 34

173 of Academic Council and Executive Council

authorising for filing writ petition.  When the writ petition

was filed based on such authorisation and the stand of

the appellant,  as the writ  petitioner was put forth and

had failed in the writ petition, it cannot be accepted that

the appellant with all the wherewithal was unable to file

the appeal, that too when the same Vice­Chancellor was

available for six months after dismissal of the writ

petition.   Hence the reasons put forth cannot in our

opinion constitute sufficient cause.

23. That apart, as rightly noticed by the Division

Bench in the LPA, the approval from the Executive

Council was obtained on 28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the

appeal was ultimately filed on 01.03.2018 after an year

from the said date which only indicates the casual

approach which is now sought to be overcome with the

plea of public interest despite there being no explanation

for the delay at every stage.  It is true that as held in the

case of Mst. Katiji (supra) that every day’s delay need not

be  explained with such precision but the fact remains

 Page 28 of 34

that a reasonable and acceptable explanation is very

much necessary.  The Division Bench apart from noticing

these aspects had also noted that the learned Single

Judge too found the writ petition to be hit by delay and

laches.

24. In that backdrop, a perusal of the order dated

27.04.2015 passed by the learned  Single  Judge would

indicate that the learned Single Judge in para – 65 of the

order with reference to his earlier observation has arrived

at the categorical conclusion that the petition suffers

from laches and has been filed with delay of 7­8 years.

The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant while

seeking to dispel such conclusion by the learned Single

Judge contended that the respondent No. 13 themselves

had filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the restricted

FAR and the said  writ petition was disposed only on

18.05.2011 and the need for the appellant herein to file

the writ petition arose only thereafter.   The said

contention is also not acceptable if the entire sequence is

noticed.

 Page 29 of 34

25. In that regard there can be no dispute to the fact

that the Respondent No. 13 being aggrieved by the

decision of DDA had filed a petition bearing W.P.

No.3135/2010 assailing the letter dated 19.08.2009 and

the same was disposed of  only  on 18.05.2011 but  the

appellant cannot take shelter under the same to explain

the laches.  This is because much water had flown under

the bridge before the said development and those events

ought to have triggered action from the appellant in

challenging,  more  so  when  there  were  other litigations

relating to the same subject, as noticed in the order of

the learned Single Judge.

26. In the present matter, the land was converted to

residential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC

had invited bids and public auction was conducted on

28.07.2008 which ought to have awakened the appellant

herein for the first time since the fact of conversion of the

land into residential development was in public domain

even if is assumed that the earlier process of approval

etc.  by the DDA on the approval  request of  DMRC are

 Page 30 of 34

internal process and not be known to the appellant.   In

fact,  the  learned Single Judge while  taking note of the

challenge raised by the appellant herein has also taken

note of an earlier petition bearing W.P (C) No.8675/2011

filed by the Association of Metro Commuters wherein also

the residential development was an issue, which came to

be dismissed by order dated 14.02.2011.   Similarly,

another petition  in W.P(C) No.6624­6625/2012, though

challenging the acquisition was filed, the same was also

dismissed.   Thereafter the writ petition of the appellant

filed in the year 2012 was pending till it was disposed on

27.04.2015.  

27. Despite the writ petition having been filed

belatedly in respect of certain actions which had

commenced in the year 2005 and even though the writ

petition was filed after obtaining approval of the

Executive Council,  no steps were taken to  file  the writ

appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition.  In

such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay and

laches cannot be ignored.   The decisions referred by the

 Page 31 of 34

learned  Senior  Counsel for the appellant  noted  Supra

cannot, therefore,  be applied in the  present facts  and

circumstance inasmuch as the consideration hereunder

was not merely the explanation for the delay of few days

in filing the appeal.  Though contention is put forth that

the delay is required to be condoned since public interest

is involved, the nature of the proceedings that have taken

place thus far would indicate that the matter has been

examined at different stages in the earlier litigations and

if the grounds on which the appellant was assailing the

action of the respondents were to be examined on merits,

they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the

matter before the Court.   

28. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches,

the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of

the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with.   In that

regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that

would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended

by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be

taken note is the manner in which the respondent No.11

 Page 32 of 34

– DMRC has proceeded  in  the  matter.  The respondent

No.11­ DMRC is engaged in providing the public

transport and for the said purpose the Government

through policy decision has granted approval to generate

resources through property development and in that

regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up.

Pursuant thereto the  respondent  No.11 has  received a

sum of Rs.218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far

back as in the year 2008.  The said amount as indicated

is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the

commuting public.  In such circumstance, if at this stage

the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the

lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has

proceeded in the  matter, it  would  also  be contrary to

public interest.  

29. Therefore, taking into consideration all these

aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that not only

the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the

writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the

decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the  LPA on

 Page 33 of 34

the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the

orders do not call for interference.   

30. Accordingly, the appeals being devoid of merits

stand dismissed with no order as to costs.   All pending

applications shall stand disposed of.    

……………………….J. (R. BANUMATHI)

……………………….J.                                               (A.S. BOPANNA)

         ……………………….J.                                                   (HRISHIKESH ROY)  

New Delhi, December 17, 2019

 Page 34 of 34