REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2602  OF 2006

Union of India & Ors.                       .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Vikrambhai Maganbhai Chaudhari     .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) This appeal by Union of India is directed against the  

final judgment and order dated 12.08.2005 passed by the  

High  Court  of  Gujarat  at  Ahmedabad  in  Special  Civil  

Application No.  16575 of  2005 whereby the High Court  

dismissed  the  application  of  the  appellants  herein  

upholding the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal  

(in short ‘the Tribunal’) in O.A. No. 333 of 2004 wherein  

the Tribunal by its order dated 20.04.2005 had quashed  

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and set aside Notification No. C-11011/1/2001-VP dated  

29.05.2001.

2) Brief facts:

(a) On 08.06.2000,  Vikrambhai  Maganbhai  Chaudhari,  

the  respondent  herein,  while  working  as  M.O.  Postal  

Assistant,  Bardoli,  refused  to  accept  M.O.  forms  along  

with the amounts tendered by Shri P.N. Singh, Shri H.K.  

Tiwari and Shri R.C. Pande for booking of money orders.  

Later, Mr. K.H. Gamit, Assistant Post Master, Bardoli and  

his  immediate  supervisor  instructed  him  to  accept  the  

above said Money Orders in writing through office order  

book  but  the  respondent  did  not  obey  the  orders.  

Accordingly,  departmental  action  was  initiated  against  

him and he was suspended by order of Superintendent of  

Post Office, Bardoli vide Memo No. B-1/PF/VMC/2000.   

(b) However, on 23.06.2000, the suspension order of the  

respondent  was  revoked  and  disciplinary  action  was  

initiated against the respondent under Rule 16 of Central  

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Civil  Services (Classification,  Control  and Appeal)  Rules,  

1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”).  Vide Memo  

No. P1/4(2)/05/01-02 dated 17.10.2001, the disciplinary  

authority  awarded  punishment  of  ‘Censure’  to  the  

respondent.   

(c) Thereafter, the case was taken up for review by the  

Chief Post Master General, Ahmedabad under Rule 29 of  

the  Rules  and  he  directed  the  Superintendent  of  Post  

Office, Bardoli to initiate disciplinary proceedings against  

the  respondent  under  Rule  14  of  the  Rules  and  on  

completion  send  the  matter  to  him  for  further  action.  

Accordingly, a notice was issued to the respondent.   

(d) Challenging  the  proceedings,  the  respondent  filed  

Original Application No. 333 of 2004 before the Tribunal,  

Ahmedabad  Bench,  Ahmedabad.   By  order  dated  

20.04.2005, the Tribunal allowed the application filed by  

the  respondent.   Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the  

appellants herein filed Special Civil Application being No.  

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16575  of  2005  before  the  High  Court  of  Gujarat  at  

Ahmedabad.   The  High  Court,  by  impugned  order,  

dismissed the application filed by the appellants herein.  

Aggrieved by the said order and judgment, the appellants  

herein  have  filed  this  appeal  by  way  of  special  leave  

petition before this Court.

3) Heard  Mr.  A.S.  Chandhiok,  learned  ASG  for  the  

appellants.   Mr.  Vishwajit  Singh,  learned  counsel  filed  

appearance  on  behalf  of  the  respondent  but  none  

appeared at the time of hearing.  

4)  Mr.  Chandhiok,  learned  ASG  after  taking  us  through  

Rule  29  of  the  Rules  submitted  that  the  Tribunal  was  not  

justified  in  quashing  the  Notification  dated  29.05.2001 and  

the High Court has also committed an error in confirming the  

same.   He  further  submitted  that  the  High  Court  and  the  

Tribunal  ought  to  have  appreciated  that  the  Notification  in  

question does not become bad merely because the time limit  

has not been provided and according to him, even though Rule  

29(1)(vi)  provides that such order shall also specify the time  

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within which this power should be exercised in view of Clause  

(v)  which provides  six  months’  outer  limit  for  reviewing the  

order, the ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal and the High  

Court cannot be sustained.   

5) Inasmuch as the Tribunal and the High Court granted  

relief  in  favour  of  the  respondent  on  the  basis  of  the  

interpretation  of  Rule  29(1)(vi)  and  the  Notification  dated  

29.05.2001, it is desirable to refer the same.  The Notification  

reads as under:-

  “Ministry of Communications [Department of Posts]

      New Delhi, the 29th May, 2001                     NOTIFICATION

No. So….. In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (VI)  of  Sub  Rule  (1)  of  Rule  29  of  the  Central  Civil  Services  (Classification,  Control  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1965,  the  President hereby specifies that in the case of a government  servant serving in the Department of  Posts,  for whom the  appellate  authority  is  subordinate  to  the  authority  designated as the Principal Chief Postmaster General or the  Chief Postmaster General (other than the Chief Postmaster  General of Senior Administrative Grade) of a Circle, the said  Principal  Chief  Postmaster  General  or  the  said  Chief  Postmaster General, as the case may be, shall be the revising  authority for the purpose of exercising the powers under the  said Rule 29.  

[No. C-11011/1/2001-VP] Sd/-

[B.P. Sharma]  Director (VP)”

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The relevant clauses of Rule 29 are as under:-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules.

(i) the President; or  

(ii) The Comptroller and Auditor-General, in the case of a  Government servant serving in the India Audit and Accounts  Department; or  

(iii) the Member (Personnel)  Postal Services Board in the  case of a Government Servant serving in or under the Postal  Services  Board  and  (Adviser  (Human  Resources  Development),  Department  of  Telecommunication)  in  the  case  of  Government  Servant  serving  in  or  under  the  Telecommunication Board); or

(iv) the Head of a Department directly under the Central  Government in the case of a Government Servant serving in  a department or office (not being the Secretariat or the Posts  and Telegraphs Board) under the control of such head of a  Department; or  

(v) the appellant authority, within six months of the date  of order proposed to be (revised); or  

(vi) any  other  authority  specified  in  this  behalf  by  the  President by a general or special order, and within such time  as may be specified in such general or special order; may at any time either on his or its own motion or otherwise  call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made  under these rules…..

(2) No proceeding for revision shall be commenced until after  

(i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or  (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has  

been preferred.”

6) As rightly observed by the Tribunal, the above sub-Rule  

(1) of Rule 29 indicates 6 categories of revisional authorities.  

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If we go further it shows that while no period is mentioned in  

sub-clauses (i) to (iv), sub-Clause (v) refers to a period of six  

months from the date of order proposed to be revised.  Since  

order was passed by exercising power under sub-Clause (vi),  

we  have  to  see  whether  in  the  Notification  specifying  an  

authority  a  time  limit  has  been  mentioned  or  even  in  the  

absence  of  the  same,  the  outer  limit  can  be  availed  by  

exercising power under sub-Clause (v).  According to learned  

ASG, there is no need to specify the period in the Notification  

authorizing concerned authority to call for the record for any  

enquiry and revise any order made under the Rules.  We are  

unable to accept the said claim for the following reasons.  

7)  It  is  to  be  noted  that  in  cases  where  the  appellate  

authority  seeks  to  review  the  order  of  the  disciplinary  

authority, the period fixed for the purpose is six months of the  

date of the order proposed to be revised.  This is clear from  

sub-Clause (v) of sub-Rule 1 of Rule 29.  On the other hand,  

Clause (vi)  confers similar powers on such other authorities  

which may be specified in that behalf by the President by a  

general  or  special  order  and  the  said  authority  has  to  

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commence the proceedings within the time prescribed therein.  

Even though Rule 29(1)(vi) provides that such order shall also  

specify the time within which the power should be exercised,  

the fact remains that no time limit has been prescribed in the  

Notification.  We have already pointed out that no period has  

been mentioned in the Notification.  The argument that even in  

the  absence  of  specific  period in  the  Notification  in  view of  

Clause (v), the other authority can also exercise such power  

cannot be accepted. To put it clear, sub-Clause (v) applies to  

appellate  authority  and  Clause  (vi)  to  any  other  authority  

specified  by the  President  by a  general  or  special  order  for  

exercising power by the said authority under sub-Clause (vi).  

There must be specified period and the power can be exercised  

only within the period so prescribed.   

8) Inasmuch as the Notification dated 29.05.2001 has not  

specified  any  time  limit  within  which  power  under  Rule  

29(1)(vi) is exercisable by the authority specified, we are of the  

view that such Notification is not in terms with Rule 29 and  

the Tribunal is fully justified in quashing the same.  The High  

Court  has  also  rightly  confirmed  the  said  conclusion  by  

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dismissing  the  Special  Application  of  the  appellants  and  

quashing the Notification on the ground that it did not specify  

the time limit.  Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is  

dismissed.  No order as to costs.

...…………………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)  

...…………………………………J.           (A.K. PATNAIK)  

NEW DELHI; JULY 1, 2011.    

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