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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5478-5483 OF 2014                                             (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 24297-24302 of 2007)

Union of India & Ors.                `                                  …. Appellants Versus  

Shiv Raj & Ors.                                   …. Respondents   

JUDGMENT DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. These  appeals  have arisen  from the  impugned judgment  and  

order  dated  11.5.2007 passed  by the  High Court  of  Delhi  in  Writ  

Petition (Civil) Nos. 2529 of 1985; 889 of 1986; 988 of 1986; 2155  

of 1987; 2645 of 1987; and 2747 of 1987, by which and whereunder,  

the High Court has quashed the land acquisition proceedings in view  

of the fact that the objections filed by the respondents-tenure holders  

under Section 5A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred  

to  as  `the  Act  1894’),  had  not  been  considered  by  the  statutory  

authorities  in  strict  compliance  of  principles  of  natural  justice  and  

thus, the subsequent proceedings stood vitiated, relying on the main  

judgment and order of the same date passed in Writ Petition (Civil)  

No.424 of 1987 titled Chatro Devi v. Union of India.  

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2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

A. The land of  the  respondents-tenure holders  being survey no.  

619/70,  etc.  admeasuring 50,000 bighas situated in revenue village  

Chhatarpur,  stood  notified  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  1894  on  

25.11.1980 for public purposes, namely, the “planned development of  

Delhi” and objections under Section 5A were invited from the persons  

interested within 30 days of the said Notification.   

B. Respondents -  persons interested,  filed their objections under  

Section  5A  of  the  Act  1894.   However,  without  considering  and  

disposing of the same, declaration under Section 6 of the Act 1894  

was made on 7.6.1985. Notices under Sections 9 of the Act 1894 were  

also issued on 30.12.1986 to the persons interested. It was at this stage  

that  the  tenure  holders  filed  writ  petitions  before  the  High  Court  

challenging the acquisition proceedings contending that proceedings  

could not be continued without disposing of the objections filed by  

them under Section 5A of the Act 1894. Admittedly, the Award No.  

15/1987-88 was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 5.6.1987.  

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C. In respect of the land covered by the same notification under  

Section 4 of the Act 1894, a very large number of writ petitions had  

been  filed.  The  said  writ  petitions  filed  on different  grounds  were  

decided by different Benches at different points of time. So far as the  

present group of cases is concerned, the matter was heard at length  

and  a  Division  Bench  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  examined  the  

contentions raised on behalf of the tenure holders/persons interested  

which  vide  judgment  and  order  dated  3.3.2005  held  that  the  

notification under Section 6 of the Act 1894 was within the period  

stipulated for the purpose after excluding the period during which the  

interim stay order passed by the High Court remained into operation  

and  where  the  objections  have  not  been  filed,  the  impugned  

declaration under Section 6 of the Act 1894 could not be assailed on  

the ground of invalidity of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act 1894.  

However, on the said issue in the cases where the objections had been  

filed by the tenure holders and they had been given personal hearing  

by one Collector but the report was submitted by his successor i.e.  

another Collector, the Division Bench differed in opinion whether the  

report  could  be  held  to  be  legal  or  not,  mainly  relying  upon  the  

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Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Gullapalli Nageswara  

Rao  &  Ors.  v.  Andhra  Pradesh  State  Road  Transport  

Corporation & Anr.,  AIR 1959 SC 308 wherein it has categorically  

been held that the Authority which hears the objectors must pass the  

order.  In case an Authority hears the objectors and demits  the office  

or stands transferred, his successor should hear the parties afresh and  

not giving the opportunity of fresh hearing by the successor officer  

would amount to failure of principles of natural justice and his order  

would stand vitiated.  

D. In view thereof, the matter was referred to the third Judge vide  

order dated 3.3.2005 and vide judgment and order dated 20.12.2006,  

the Hon’ble third Judge held that in such a situation where objections  

had been filed and had been heard by one Collector and the report had  

been submitted by another Collector, the proceedings stood vitiated  

being in violation of principles of natural justice.  

E. In view of the majority opinion, as is evident from the order  

dated 11.5.2007, the proceedings in such an eventuality stood quashed  

by the impugned judgment and order.  

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Hence, these appeals.  

3. Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General, Ms.  

Geeta Luthra and Shri Sanjay Poddar, learned Senior Counsel, have  

addressed  a  large  number  of  legal  and  factual  issues  and  also  

submitted  that  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  High  Court  are  not  

sustainable in the eyes of law.  Therefore, the question quashing the  

land  acquisition  proceedings  in  such  circumstances  did  not  arise.  

More so, the commencement of the Right to Fair Compensation and  

Transparency in Land Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and Resettlement  

Act,  2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 2013) would not take  

away the proceedings initiated under the Act 1894 by operation of law  

as provided under Section 24 of the Act 2013.  In the instant case, in  

case,  the  appeals  succeed  on  the  main  ground  as  to  whether  the  

successor officer could submit the report on 5A objections there could  

be  no  prohibition  for  the  appellants  to  proceed  with  the  land  

acquisition proceedings initiated in 1980.  The objections raised were  

vague and had been in respect of limitation and were not specific in  

nature.  None  of  the  writ  petitioners  had  raised  the  issue  about  

violation of principles of  natural justice in the writ petitions, though  

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some of them amended their writ petitions but at a subsequent stage.  

Some of the writ petitions had been filed by persons who came into  

possession of the land subsequent to Section 4 notification.   

4. On the contrary, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Shri Shyam Diwan and  

Shri Vinay Bhasin,  learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  

respondents, have vehemently opposed the appeals contending that in  

view of the fact that the acquisition proceedings stood quashed finally  

by the impugned judgment dated 11.5.2007 and a period of 7 years  

has lapsed and the possession is still with the tenure holders.  In view  

of the Act 2013 coming into force, the proceedings have lapsed by  

virtue of the provisions contained in Section 24 of the said Act.  The  

issues  raised herein on behalf  of  the  Union of  India had not  been  

raised before the High Court. Amendments were allowed by the High  

Court  in  a  very  large  number  of  writ  petitions  about  violation  of  

principles of natural justice i.e. the objections under Section 5-A were  

not disposed of in accordance with law.  

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

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6. Section  5-A  of  the  Act  1894  was  not  there  in  the  original  

statute.  

In J.E.D. Ezra v. Secy. of State for India (1902-1903) 7 CWN  

249, the Calcutta High Court expressed its inability to grant relief to  

the  owner  of  the  property  whose  land  was  sought  to  be  acquired  

without giving any opportunity of hearing observing that there was no  

provision in the Act requiring observance of the principles of natural  

justice.  It  was  subsequent  to  the  said  judgment  that  the  Act  was  

amended incorporating Section 5-A w.e.f. 1.1.1924. The Statement of  

Objects  and  Reasons  for  the  said  amendment  provided  that  the  

original  Act  did  not  oblige  the  Government  to  enquire  into  and  

consider any objection of the persons interested nor the Act provided  

for  right  of  hearing  to  the  person  whose  interest  stands  adversely  

affected.  

7. In  Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Government,  AIR 1964 SC  

1217, this Court dealt with the nature of objections under Section 5-A  

of the Act 1894 observing as under:

“13.   The right to file objections under Section 5- A is a substantial right when a person’s property is being   

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threatened with acquisition and we cannot  accept  that   that right can be taken away as if by a side wind…”

8. The rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme  

of Section 5-A of the Act 1894 with a view to ensure that before any  

person is deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he  

must  get  an  opportunity  to  oppose  the  decision  of  the  State  

Government  and/or  its  agencies/instrumentalities  to  acquire  the  

particular parcel of land.

Section  5-A(2)  of  the  Act  1894,  which  represents  statutory  

embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem, gives an opportunity  

to the objector to make an endeavour to convince the Collector that  

his  land  is  not  required  for  the  public  purpose  specified  in  the  

notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act 1894 or that there are  

other valid reasons for not acquiring the same. Thus, section 5-A of  

the Act 1894 embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a  

person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should  

have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities  

concerned that  acquisition of  the property belonging to that person  

should not be made.

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On  the  consideration  of  the  said  objection,  the  Collector  is  

required to make a report. The State Government is then required to  

apply mind to the report of the Collector and take final decision on the  

objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons. Then  

and then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1) of the Act  

1894.

9. Therefore, Section 5-A of the Act 1894 confers a valuable right  

in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired.  It is trite  

that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere  

formality. Formation of opinion as regard the public purpose as also  

suitability thereof must  be preceded by application of mind having  

due regard to the relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The  

State in its decision making process must not commit any misdirection  

in law. It  is  also not  in dispute  that  Section 5-A of the Act,  1894  

confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions,  

contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India has been held to  

be akin to a fundamental right.

10. Thus,  the  limited  right  given  to  an  owner/person  interested  

under  Section  5-A  of  the  Act,  1894  to  object  to  the  acquisition  

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proceedings  is  not  an  empty  formality  and  is  a  substantive  right,  

which can be taken away only for good and valid reason and within  

the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894.

11. The Land Acquisition  Collector  is  duty-bound to objectively  

consider  the  arguments  advanced  by  the  objector  and  make  

recommendations,  duly  supported  by  brief  reasons,  as  to  why  the  

particular piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether  

the  plea  put  forward  by  the  objector  merits  acceptance.  In  other  

words, the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector  

should  reflect  objective  application  of  mind  to  the  entire  record  

including the objections filed by the interested persons.

(See : Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150;  

Union of  India  & Ors.  v.  Mukesh  Hans,   AIR 2004  SC 4307;  

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. Darius Shahpur Chenai  

and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3520; Anand Singh & Anr v. State of U.P.  

& Ors.,  (2010) 11 SCC 242; Dev Sharan v. State of U.P., (2011) 4  

SCC 769;  Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana,  (2012) 1  

SCC 792;  Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of  

Haryana,   (2013) 4 SCC 210;  and  Women’s Education Trust v.  

State of Haryana, (2013) 8 SCC 99).

12. This Court in  Gullapalli Nageswara Rao (supra), held:  

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“Personal  hearing  enables  the  authority  concerned  to   watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his   doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party   appearing  to  persuade  the  authority  by  reasoned   argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears   and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an   empty  formality.  We  therefore  hold  that  the  said   procedure  followed  in  this  case  also  offends  another   basic principle of judicial procedure.”

                                                                                    (Emphasis added)

13. This Court in  Rasid Javed & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.,  

AIR 2010 SC 2275 following  the judgment in  Gullapalli (supra),  

supra  held  that  a  person  who  hears  must  decide  and  that  divided  

responsibility  is  destructive  of  the  concept  of  hearing  is  too  

fundamental a proposition to be doubted.  

14. A  similar  view  has  been  re-iterated  by  this  Court  in  

Automotive  Tyre  Manufacturers  Association  v.  Designated  

Authority & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 258, wherein this Court dealt with a  

case  wherein  the  Designated  Authority  (DA)  under  the  relevant  

Statute  passed  the  final  order  on  the  material  collected  by  his  

predecessor in office who had also accorded the hearing to the parties  

concerned. This court held that the order stood vitiated as it offended  

the basic principles of natural justice.  

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15. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to  

the effect that the very person/officer, who accords the hearing to the  

objector must also submit the report/ take decision on the objection  

and in case his  successor   decides the case without  giving a  fresh  

hearing,  the  order  would  stand  vitiated  having  been  passed  in  

violation of the principles of natural justice.  

16. Before proceeding further, it is desirable to refer to the relevant  

statutory provisions of the Act 2013 which reads as :  

“24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,  in  any  case  of  land  acquisition  proceedings  initiated  under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -  

(a) Where no award under Section 11 of the said Land  Acquisition Act has been made, then, all  provisions of  this  Act  relating  to  the  determination  of  compensation  shall apply or  

(b)  Where  an  award  under  said  Section  11  has  been  made,  then  such  proceedings  shall  continue  under  the  provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said  Act has not been repealed.  

(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-section  (1),  in  case  of  land  acquisition  proceedings  initiated  under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where an award  under the said section 11 has been made five years or  more  prior  to  the  commencement  of  this  Act  but  the  physical possession of the land has not been taken or the  compensation  has  not  been  paid  the  said  proceedings  shall  be  deemed  to  have  lapsed  and  the  appropriate  

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Government,  if  it  so  chooses,  shall  initiate  the  proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance  with the provisions of this Act.  

Provided  that  where  an  award  has  been  made  and  compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has  not  been deposited in  the account  of  the beneficiaries,  then,  all  beneficiaries  specified  in  the  notification  for  acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition  Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with  the provisions of this Act"  

17. The provisions of the Act 2013 referred to hereinabove have  

been  considered  by  a  three  judge  bench  of  this  court  in  

Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal  

Solanki and Ors.,  (2014) 3 SCC 183. In the said case, the tenure-

holders  had  challenged  the  acquisition  proceedings  before  the  

Bombay High Court  by filing nine writ petitions, although two of  

such writ petitions had been filed before making the award and seven  

had been filed after the award. The land acquisition proceedings had  

been challenged on various grounds.  The High Court allowed the writ  

petitions  and  quashed  the  land  acquisition  proceedings  and  issued  

certain directions including restoration of  possession as in  the said  

case  the  possession  had been taken from the  tenure-holders.   This  

Court in the appeal filed by the authority for whose benefit the land  

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had been sought to be acquired, and who had been handed over the  

possession as the land vested in the State, approached this Court but  

the Court did not enter into the merit regarding the correctness of the  

judgment impugned therein rather held that it was not so necessary to  

deal with the correctness of the judgment in view of the provisions of  

the  Act  2013 which provide  for  re-compulsory  acquisition  of  land  

from the very beginning.  The Court held as under:

“11. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause.   This provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1).   Section 24(2) enacts  that  in  relation  to  the  land   acquisition proceedings initiated under 1894 Act, where   an award has been made five years or more prior to the   commencement  of  the 2013 Act  and either of  the two  contingencies is satisfied, viz.; (i) physical possession of   the land has not been taken or (ii) the compensation has   not  been  paid,  such  acquisition  proceedings  shall  be   deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition   proceedings, if the appropriate government still chooses   to  acquire  the  land  which  was  the  subject  matter  of   acquisition under the 1894 Act then it has to initiate the   proceedings  afresh  under  the  2013  Act.  The  proviso   appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where   in respect of the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act   an award has been made and compensation in respect of   a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the   account  of  the  beneficiaries  then  all  the  beneficiaries   specified  in  Section 4 notification  become  entitled  to   compensation under 2013 Act.

X        X X

19. Now, this is admitted position that award was made   on 31.01.2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to   

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18. The judgment of Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors,  

2014 (3) SCALE 393 was a reverse case wherein the land owner had  

lost before the High Court. The Court held:

“Sub-section (2) of Section 24 commences with a non- obstante clause. It is a beneficial provision.  In view of  this provision, if the physical possession of the land has  not  been taken by the Acquiring Authority  though the  award is  passed and if  the compensation has not  been  paid to the land owners or has not been deposited before  the appropriate forum, the proceedings initiated under the  Act, 1894 is deemed to have been lapsed.”  

(See also:  Bimla Devi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., Civil  

Appeal Nos. 3871-3876 of 2014 decided on 14.3.2014)

19. In order to clarify the statutory provisions of the Act 2013 with  

respect to such lapsing, the Government of India, Ministry of Urban  

Development,  Delhi  Division,  came  up  with  a  circular  dated  

14.3.2014 wherein on the basis of the legal opinion of the Solicitor  

General of India, it has been clarified as under:   

“3.   Interpretation of five years period:

“With regard to this issue viz., interpretation  of five years period two situations have been envisaged  in cases where the acquisition has been initiated under  the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 viz.,  (1) parties whose  lands  have  been  acquired  have  refused  to  accept  the  compensation  and  (2)  parties  whose  lands  have  been  acquired having just parted with physical possession of  the land.  However,  in both the above situations,  as on  

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1.1.2014, the period of 5 years would not have ended and  in such cases, the advisory seeks to clarify that the new  law  shall  apply  only  if  the  situation  of  pendency  continues  unchanged  for  a  period  that  equals  to  or  exceeds  five  years.  In  my  view,  it  should  be  further  clarified that in none of the cases the period of five years  would  have  elapsed pursuant  to  an  award made under  Section 11 from the date of commencement of the Act  and that the benefit of Section 24(2) will be available to  those  cases  which  are  pending  and  where  during  pendency,  the  situation  has  remained  unchanged  with  physical  possession  not  being  handed  over  or  compensation not having been accepted and the period  equals to or exceeds five years.  

4.   Limitation:  

As regards this  item relating to  the period spent  during litigation would also be accounted for the purpose  of determining whether the period of five years has to be  counted or  not,  it  should be clarified that it  will  apply  only to cases where awards were passed under Section 11  of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 5 years or more prior  to 1.1.2014 as specified in Section 24(2) of the Act, to  avoid  any  ambiguity.  Since  this  legislation  has  been  passed with the objective of  benefiting the land-losers,  this  interpretation  is  consistent  with  that  objective  and  also added as a matter of abundant caution that the period  spent  in  litigation  challenging  an  award  cannot  be  excluded  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  the  period of five years has elapsed or not. If the possession  has not been taken or  compensation has not  been paid  due to the challenge to the land acquisition proceedings,  the pendente lite period will be included to determine the  five year period and including such period if the award  was made five years or more prior to the commencement  of the Act, then the said acquisition proceedings will be  deemed  to  have  elapsed  and  fresh  proceedings,  if  so  desired, will have to be initiated in accordance with the  new Act.”

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The objects and reasons of the Act 2013 and particularly clause  

18  thereof  fortify  the  view  taken  by  this  court  in  the  judgments  

referred to hereinabove.  Clause 18 thereof reads as under:

“The benefits under the new law would be available in all  the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition  Act,  1894  where  award  has  not  been  made  or  possession of land has not been taken.”  

(Emphasis added)

20. However, the aforesaid appeals have to be decided in the light  

of  above settled  legal  propositions.  The admitted facts  of  the case  

remains  that  the  Respondents-Tenure  Holders  had  filed  objections  

under Section 5A of the Act 1894  as admitted in the affidavit filed by  

Smt.  Usha  Chaturvedi,  Deputy  Secretary  (Land Acquisition),  Land  

and Building Department, Vikas Bhawan, New Delhi, filed in January  

2014 before this court.  The award no. 15/87-88 had been made on  

5.6.1987  and  possession  has  not  been  taken  till  date  though  

compensation  has  been  deposited  with  the  Revenue  Department,  

which cannot be termed as `deemed payment` as has been held in case  

of Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. (Supra).  

21. Therefore, the appeals are liable to be dismissed in terms of the  

judgments referred to hereinabove.  

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However, Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned ASG, has insisted that the  

matters should also be decided on merit by examining the correctness  

of the judgment and order impugned.  

22. The facts are not in dispute.  A huge chunk of land covering 11  

villages was notified under Section 4 of the Act 1894 in 1980.  A  

large number of people had filed objections under Section 5-A of the  

Act  1894  and  it  has  been  admitted  on  oath  by  the  officer  of  the  

appellant  department  that  in  almost  all  these  appeals,  the  tenure  

holders  or  their  processor  in  interest  had  filed  objections  under  

Section 5-A of the Act 1894.  This is also not in dispute that most of  

the objections were heard by one land acquisition collector and after  

his transfer, the report had been submitted by his successor.  In Balak  

Ram Gupta v. Union of India, (117) 2005 DLT 753 (FB), full Bench  

of High Court of Delhi quashed the land acquisition proceedings in  

the said case exclusively on the ground that objections filed by the  

petitioner therein had been heard by one Land Acquisition Collector,  

however, the report was submitted by another.  The land covered in  

these  instant  appeals  stand  covered  by  the  same  

notification/declaration, same award and the objections had been dealt  

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with by the same land acquisition collector and the report had been  

submitted by the same successor.  

23. Admittedly, the appellants accepted that judgment and the same  

attained finality as the said judgment was never challenged by filing  

any S.L.P.  before this court.   In the light of aforesaid judgment, a  

large  number  of  writ  petitions  had  been  allowed  and  the  land  

acquisition  proceedings  arising  out  of  the  same  

notification/declaration had been quashed.   Subsequently, in  Abhey  

Ram & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2564, this  

Court dealt with the same issue arising out of the same acquisition  

proceedings and held that the judgment of quashing the acquisition  

proceedings would apply only to the land of those persons who had  

challenged acquisition proceedings and not to all the land covered by  

the said notification/declaration.  The appellants had been under the  

impression that  the judgment delivered by the full  bench in  Balak  

Ram Gupta (Supra), laid down the law applicable to other persons  

also whose land stood covered by the said notification/declaration.  

24.  In  Delhi  Administration  v.  Gurdip  Singh  Uban & Ors.,  

(2000) 7 SCC 296, this court again dealt with the same acquisition  

proceedings  and  observed  that  if  a  tenure  holder  had  not  filed  

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objections under Section 5-A of the Act 1894, he cannot challenge the  

acquisition proceedings on the ground that objections had not been  

disposed of in accordance with law.  

25. In Om Parkash v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1068,  

this  Court  dealt  with the cases  arising out  of  the same acquisition  

proceedings,  however,  this  batch  of  matters  had  expressly  been  

separated  from  that  batch  and  in  those  cases,  the  acquisition  

proceedings  were  not  quashed  on  the  ground  that  the  acquisition  

proceedings had been challenged at a belated stage.   

26. In  the  present  batch  of  writ  petitions  filed  before  the  High  

Court, the matter came to be heard by a Division Bench. One of the  

Hon’ble Judges vide his separate judgment was of the opinion that the  

proceedings would not lapse on the ground that the declaration under  

Section 6 of the Act 1894 had been made after a period of more than  

three years for the reason that it was covered by sub-section (2) i.e. on  

account of various stay orders passed by different courts at different  

times in relations to the said proceedings. Further, though principles  

of  natural  justice  is  an  inbuilt  element  of  procedure  but  per  se  

violation  of  these  principles  would  not  ipso  facto  vitiate  the  

proceedings unless any prejudice is shown to have been caused to the  

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parties, which was not the pleaded case  of the objectors. Also judicial  

review  of  administrative  decision  was  impressible  except  on  very  

limited  grounds  i.e.  absence  of  any  material  forming  the  basis  of  

decision making and the courts could not go into the question as to  

what material weighed before the authority.    

The  other  Hon’ble  Judge  comprising  the  Bench  vide  his  

separate and dissenting judgment was of the opinion that the decision  

in Balak Ram Gupta (Supra)  was still a good law. On the issue as to  

validity  of  the  inquiry  under  Section  5-A  of  the  Act  1894,  His  

Lordship was of the opinion that inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act  

1894 was a substantial right and could not be taken away as a side  

wind. Relying on earlier judgments of the High Court of Delhi, the  

Hon’ble Judge was of the opinion that a report on objections should  

be made by the same collector who had the opportunity to hear such  

objections and any deviation would vitiate the further proceedings. As  

the Hon’ble Judges differed, the matter was referred to a third Hon’ble  

Judge.   

27. In pursuance to the above reference, the matter came up before  

the  third Hon’ble  Judge,  who delivered  the  judgment  cited  as  137  

(2007) DLT 14.  Relying on the decision in  Gullapalli Nageswara  

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Rao (Supra), the Court was of the opinion that where the objections  

were heard by one collector but the report was made by another,  such  

procedure was not in strict compliance of requirements of Section 5-A  

of the Act 1894.  The issue of prejudice caused to a party in case of  

violation of principles of natural justice arises in cases dealing with  

un-codified procedure.  The mandatory language of Section 5-A of the  

Act 1894 made it essential that the collector who hears the land owner  

must submit the report and, hence, no question of prejudice could be  

said  to  be  applicable  in  determining  the  violation  of  principles  of  

natural justice.   

28. In the instant cases, there had been challenge to the acquisition  

proceedings  on  various  grounds  including  the  manner  in  which  

objections under Section 5-A of the Act 1894 had been decided. In  

some cases, the High Court allowed amendment to the writ petitions  

and such order had never been challenged by the appellants. In a case  

where on the basis of submissions advanced in the court on behalf of  

the parties, the court summons the original record to find out the truth,  

pleadings remain insignificant.  In the instant cases,  the High Court  

was satisfied after examining the original record that objections had  

been  dealt  with  in  flagrant  violation  of  law  and  in  such  a  fact-

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situation, the prejudice doctrine for non-observation thereof would not  

be attracted.  

We do not see any cogent reason to differ from such a view. No  

judgment had been brought to our notice on the basis of which it can  

be held that the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in  

Gullapalli Nageswara Rao (Supra) is not a good law.

29. It is evident from the record that in respect of a major chunk of  

land which stood covered under the same Section 4 notification, the  

land acquisition proceedings had been quashed in a batch of 74 Writ  

Petitions  having  been  filed  before  the  Delhi  High  Court  and  the  

appellants, for the reasons best known to it, did not challenge the same  

and resultantly,  the  same has  attained finality.  For  about  a  decade  

following the said judgment in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India  

& Ors., 37 (1989) DLT 150, proceedings in other cases have also  

been quashed and those decisions have not been challenged and have  

thus, also attained finality. A large number of cases filed before this  

court and particularly SLP (C) Nos. 208, 211 & 212 of 2008 stood  

dismissed vide order dated 10.12.2008, as the petitioners did not take  

steps to serve the respondents therein as is evident from the Office  

Report dated 25.6.2013. In such a fact scenario, where in respect of  

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major  chunk  of  land,  the  land  acquisition  proceedings  had  been  

quashed long back and which has attained finality, it is beyond our  

comprehension as to whether the scheme of planned development of  

Delhi can be executed at such a belated stage in view of the fact that  

vacant land in continuous stretch may not be available.  

30. In view of above, we do not see any force in these appeals even  

on merit  and the same are  liable to  be dismissed.   In  view of  the  

findings  and  particularly  in  view  of  the  interpretations  given  to  

Section 24(2)  of  the  Act  2013 in the judgments  referred to  herein  

above, it is not necessary to entertain any other ground whatsoever at  

the behest of the appellants.  Thus, the appeals are devoid of any merit  

and are dismissed.  No order as to costs.  

                                  ...….....…….……………………..J.               (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

.......……………………………J.  (J. CHELAMESWAR)   

.......……………………………J.  (M.Y. EQBAL)   

New Delhi,

May 7, 2014

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1831-1836 OF 2009

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

Chatro Devi &  Ors.                        …. Respondents   

With  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 903 OF 2010

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

Ram Singh Tyagi & Ors.                        …. Respondents   

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7439 OF 2009

Union of India & Anr.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

R.D. Bhanot & Anr.                        …. Respondents   

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8483 OF 2003

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

Hari Ram Kakkar                           …. Respondent

26

Page 27

2   

With

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5484-88 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 24305-24309 OF 2007)

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

K.S. Bakshi & Ors.                         …. Respondents  

With

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5489-94 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 208-213 of 2008)

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

Pt. Jai Ram Singh & Anr.                                   …. Respondents   

With

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5495-98 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 1085-1088 OF 2008)

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

Ranbir Singh & Ors.                                          …. Respondents   

With

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5499-501 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 2533-2535 OF 2008)

27

Page 28

 3

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants    

Versus  

Moti Lal Bhatia & Anr.                                 …. Respondents   

O R D E R

1. The  facts  and  issue  involved  in  the  abovesaid  appeals  are  

identical  and have to  be  decided in  terms of  our  judgment  passed  

today in  Civil Appeal Nos. 5478-5483 of 2014.   

2. The  appeals  are  dismissed  in  terms  thereof.  No  order  as  to  

costs.  

...….....…….……………………..J.     (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

.......……………………………J.  (J. CHELAMESWAR)   

.......……………………………J.  (M.Y. EQBAL)   

28

Page 29

New Delhi,

May 7, 2014

29

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4374 OF 2009

Union of India & Ors.                                                   …. Appellants

  Versus  

Geeta Devi                                             …. Respondent   

O R D E R  

Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.

In this case the facts are the same as contained in Civil Appeal  

Nos. 5478-5483 of 2014, however, it may be mentioned herein that  

Shrimati Geeta Devi, the respondent, is the subsequent purchaser of  

the  land  sought  to  be  acquired  under  Section  4  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Act,  1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act 1894’) and  

the original tenure holder had filed objections under Section 5A of the  

Act 1894, which have not been considered.  The proceedings in this  

respect also had been quashed and admittedly, the actual and physical

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2

possession of the land is with the respondent and as the proceedings  

had been quashed, the award had been made in 1987-1988.  Thus, in  

substance the result would be the same as in Civil Appeal Nos. 5478-

5483 of 2014.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of Civil Appeal Nos. 5478-

5483 of 2014. No order as to costs.  

….....…….……………………..J

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

.......……………………………J.  (J. CHELAMESWAR)   

.......……………………………J.  (M.Y. EQBAL)   

New Delhi,

May 7, 2014

31

Page 32

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1579 OF 2010

Vinod Kapur & Ors.                                              …. Appellants

Versus

Union of India & Ors.                             …. Respondents   

O R D E R  

Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.

1. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  impugned  

judgment and order dated 17.12.2004 passed by the High Court  

of Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No. 745 of 1987 and impugned  

judgment and order dated 27.7.2007 passed in Review Petition  

No.328 of 2005 filed by the appellant wherein the court held  

that the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition

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2

Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act 1894’) was made  

within the limitation prescribed under the Act.

2. The facts  and circumstances  which have  arisen in  this  

appeal are that the land, the subject matter of the appeal, stood  

notified under Section 4 of the Act 1894 on 25.11.1980.  The  

other persons whose land had also been acquired by the same  

notification had challenged the validity of the notification under  

Section 4 of Act 1894 by filing the writ petitions and its validity  

was upheld by the judgment and order dated 15.11.1983.  It was  

during  the  pendency  of  the  acquisition  proceedings  that  the  

present  appellant  had purchased the land vide registered sale  

deeds dated 6.5.1985 and 24.5.1985.   In respect of the same  

land,  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  submitted  a  report  on  

4.6.1985 on the objections made under Section 5A of the Act  

1894 by the predecessor-in-interest and the same was accepted  

by the Lt. Governor of Delhi and the declaration under Section  

6 of the Act 1894 was issued on 7.6.1985.  In the year

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3

1987-1988, the Land Acquisition Officer  made an award in  

respect of the land.   

3. In  respect  of  the  same  land  covered  by  the  same  

notification, various orders in various litigations pending before  

the High Court had been passed.  The writ petition filed by the  

present appellant was dismissed vide impugned judgment and  

order dated 17.12.2004.

4. In view of the fact  that  the other  land covered by the  

same notification and declaration had been the subject matter of  

various other writ petitions and particularly, the land belonging  

to one Geeta Devi, the respondent in Civil Appeal No.  4374 of  

2009, the matter remained pending, thus, Review Petition etc.  

had been filed,  which was dismissed on 27.7.2007.   

5. It is evident from the orders passed by the High Court  

that it had granted stay of dispossession during the pendency of  

the  writ  petition  as  well  as  the  review  petition,  though  no  

interim order has been passed by this court.  The respondent did  

not take possession of the land in dispute though award had

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4

been made in  the year  1987-1988,  and the  High Court  had  

decided against the appellant in the year 2007.  Thus, a period  

of 7 years has lapsed without any stay of proceedings and yet  

no action has been taken by the respondents in pursuance to the  

award.   

6. However, keeping in view the decision rendered in C.A.  

Nos.  5478-5483  of  2014,  this  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  

thereof. No order as to costs.  

….....…….…………………J.  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

.......……………………….J.  (J. CHELAMESWAR)   

.......………………………J.  (M.Y. EQBAL)   

New Delhi,

May 7, 2014

35