29 November 2019
Supreme Court
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UNION OF INDIA Vs RAMESH BISHNOI

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINEET SARAN
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINEET SARAN
Case number: C.A. No.-009109-009109 / 2019
Diary number: 31973 / 2018
Advocates: B. V. BALARAM DAS Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9109 OF 2019 [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.26395 OF 2018]

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS             …..APPELLANTS

VERSUS

RAMESH BISHNOI        ……RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Vineet Saran, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal pertains to the appellants (Union of India)

denying appointment to the respondent, (even though selected) on

the post of Sub­Inspector, on the ground of a criminal case having

been registered in the past against the respondent.   

3. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of this case are that

in response to an advertisement dated 28.03.2015, for recruitment

on  the  post  of  Sub­Inspector in the  Central Industrial  Security

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Force (for short ‘CISF’) issued by the Staff Selection Commission

(SSC), the respondent had appeared  in  the written examination

and physical  endurance test and was thus selected and offered

appointment on 15.09.2016.  The respondent was then required to

submit a form, wherein there was a column relating to whether

any First Information Report (for short ‘FIR’) had been lodged

against the respondent in the past.  The respondent had given the

details of the FIR (No.70/2009) under Sections 354, 447 and 509

of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) having been lodged

against the respondent and in the further column of the

questionnaire form, the respondent had clearly mentioned that on

the  matter  having  been compromised,  he  was  acquitted of the

aforesaid offence on 24.11.2011, as there was no evidence

adduced against the respondent.   The respondent had thus

rendered all necessary information regarding the criminal case

lodged against him and did not conceal  any material  fact.  The

case was then referred to the Standing Screening Committee,

which found the respondent unsuitable for appointment in CISF

on  the  aforesaid  ground that  a criminal case  had  been lodged

against him in the past.   Consequently, on 03.06.2017 the

National Industrial Security Academy cancelled the appointment of

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the respondent, on the ground of registration of a criminal case in

the past.

4. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed  Writ

Petition No.7522 of 2017, which was allowed by a learned Single

Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur vide judgment

dated 06.12.2017, and the case of the respondent was directed to

be decided afresh within 15 days  in the light  of the guidelines

issued by this Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India

(2016) 8 SCC 471.  The case of the respondent was then re­

examined by the Standing Screening Committee on 02.01.2018,

which by an order dated 16.01.2018, again rejected the claim of

the respondent, holding that the respondent was acquitted merely

for due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise, and that the

offence in the charge sheet falls in the category of serious offence,

and thus the respondent was not considered suitable for

appointment on the post of Sub­Inspector in CISF.  

5. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed  Writ

Petition No.1310 of 2018, which was allowed by an order dated

08.03.2018 with the following directions:

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“……….. the impugned Order dated  16.1.2018 (communicated vide letter dated 17.01.2018) (Annex.1) is recashed and set aside; the respondents are directed to activate offer of appointment of the petitioner earlier made to the Petitioner for the post of Sub­Inspector in Central Industrial Security Force. The order may be operated upon within a period of thirty days from today and all notional benefits shall be prospectively given.”  

6. The appellants herein, challenged the order of the

learned Single Judge dated 08.03.2018 before the Division Bench

of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Special Appeal Writ

No.702 of 2018, which was dismissed by the Division Bench by

judgment dated 08.05.2018.   Aggrieved by the said orders dated

08.03.2018 and 08.05.2018, passed by the learned Single Judge

and Division Bench respectively of the High Court of Rajasthan at

Jodhpur, this appeal has been filed by way of Special Leave

Petition.

7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length

and have perused the material on record.

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8. In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against

the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had

teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of

her hand.   However,  the girl  and her parents finally  decided to

pardon the respondent by not  giving any evidence against  him,

resulting in the acquittal of the respondent.  In the aforesaid facts,

even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the

respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered

under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the

respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he

was a minor.

9. From the facts, it is  clear that  at the time when the

charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the

respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth

is 05.09.1991.  Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were

never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents

did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal

on 24.11.2011.  Even if the allegations were found to be true, then

too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job

on the basis of  such charges as the same had been committed

while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.

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The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as

well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,

2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be

obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime

committed by such person as a juvenile.   This is with the clear

object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal

person, without any stigma.   Section 3 of  the Juvenile Justice

(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down guidelines

for the Central Government,  State Governments, the Board and

other agencies while implementing the provisions of the said Act.

In clause (xiv) of Section 3, it is clearly provided as follows:  

“…………….. (xiv) Principle of fresh start:  All past  records of  any child under the Juvenile Justice system should be erased except in special circumstances. ………………”

In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the respondent

was a minor when the charges had been framed against him of

offences under Sections 354, 447 and 509 of IPC. It  is also not

disputed that he was acquitted of the charges. However, even if he

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had been convicted, the same could not have been held against

him  for  getting  a job,  as  admittedly  he  was a  minor  when  the

alleged offences were committed and the charges had been framed

against him. Section 3(xiv) provides for the same and the exception

of special circumstances does not apply to the facts of the present

case.  

10. Further, the case  against the respondent is  not  with

regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been

framed  against  him.   The respondent  had very fairly  disclosed

about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the

basis of  no evidence  having  been  adduced  by the complainant

against the respondent.  In our considered view, the same can also

not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of

which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected

after following the due process and appointment having been

offered to him.  

11. For the reasons given hereinabove, we do not find any

ground for interference  with the orders passed  by the learned

Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court of

Rajasthan at  Jodhpur.  Consequently, this  appeal is  dismissed.

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The respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits of the judgment

of the writ Court within 30 days from today.

No orders as to cost.  

………………………………..J                                           (UDAY UMESH LALIT)

   

...…………………………….J      (VINEET SARAN)

New Delhi Dated: November 29, 2019