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    Reportable  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.6717 OF 2008      

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                            .......APPELLANTS

VERSUS

R.P.SINGH                                          ......RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Calling  in  question  the  legal  defensibility  of  the  

judgment and order dated 19.01.2007 passed by the High  

Court of Delhi in W.P.(C)No.16104 of 2004 whereby it  has  

annulled the judgment and order dated 28.06.2004 passed  

by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New  

Delhi (for short “the tribunal”) in O.A.No.1977 of 2003 and  

the  order  dated  19.08.2004  declining  to  entertain  the  

review,  the  present  appeal  has  been preferred  by  special  

leave.

2. The respondent while serving as an Assistant Engineer

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(Civil) in the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) was  

proceeded in a departmental proceeding in respect of two  

charges which read as follows:

"(a) 540 bags of cement were got issued for the  above  stated  work  from  the  Central  Stores  on  31.3.97.   The  said  Shri  R.P.Singh  allowed  Shri  N.K.Sarin,  Junior  Engineer  to  issue  89  bags  of  cement within 24 hours of receipt of the cement  from the Central Stores without giving any written  permission  to  the  Junior  Engineer  and  without  authenticating the said issue of cement,  thereby  violating the instructions contained in Para 3(d) of  memorandum No.DGW/CON/67 dated 6.5.94.

(b)  Out  of  the  above  stated  lot  of  540  bags  of  cement of "Superplus Jaypee" brand,  82 bags of  cement were found short, which had been pilfered  with  connivance  of  the  said  Shri  R.P.Singh,  Assistant Engineer."

3. As the delinquent officer refuted the charges, an Inquiry  

Officer  was  appointed  to  conduct  the  inquiry  and  in  the  

inquiry, he found the charges levelled against the delinquent  

officer were not proven and, accordingly, he submitted the  

Inquiry  Report.  The  disciplinary  authority  after  expressing  

the  disagreement,  called  for  a  representation  from  the  

respondent communicating the Inquiry Report as well as the  

opinion  for  disagreement  requiring  him  to  submit  his  

explanation.  The respondent submitted his explanation and  

thereafter the disciplinary authority sought advice from the

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Union  Public  Service  Commission  (UPSC)  by  proposing  to  

impose penalty of reduction of pay by two stages in the time  

scale of pay of the charged officer for a period of two years  

without  cumulative  effect.   The  UPSC  vide  letter  No.  

F.3/144/2002-SI dated 20.11.02 gave the advice to impose  

penalty of reduction of pay by two stages in the time scale of  

pay of the charged officer for a period of two years without  

cumulative effect.  After obtaining the advice from the UPSC,  

the  disciplinary  authority  accepted  the  same,  passed  an  

order  of  punishment  and  communicated  the  same to  the  

respondent along with the advice of UPSC.

4. The  said  order  of  punishment  was  assailed  by  the  

respondent before the tribunal on many a ground and the  

principal  ground  propounded  was  that  the  advice  of  the  

UPSC was not furnished to him before imposing the penalty  

and,  therefore,  there  had  been  violation  of  principles  of  

natural justice. The tribunal negatived the said stand on the  

ground that no prejudice was caused to him.

5. Being dissatisfied with the said order, the respondent  

preferred  the  writ  petition  and  the  High  Court  placing  

reliance mainly on the decision in State Bank of India and

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others vs. D.C.Aggarwal and another1 came to hold that  

non-supply  of  the  copy  of  advice  of  UPSC  at  the  pre-

decisional stage did tantamount to violation of principles of  

natural justice for making effective representation.  It further  

observed that non-supply of such material could amount to  

denial  of  fair  opportunity  of  being  heard.  Being  of  this  

opinion, the High Court directed as follows:-

"We direct the respondents to allow the petitioner  to make his representation in respect of the UPSC  advice,  which  was  made  available  to  him along  with  the  order  dated  28.1.2003  imposing  punishment.  The representation of the petitioner  be duly considered and the Disciplinary Authority  to take a decision afresh, taking into account the  representation  with  regard  to  the  disciplinary  proceedings within a period of two months."  

6. We  have  heard  Mr.K.Radhakrishnan,  learned  counsel  

assisted  by  Mr.W.A.Qadri  and  Ms.Rekha  Pandey  for  the  

appellant and Mr.Vasudevan Raghavan, learned counsel for  

the respondent.  

7. At the very outset, we may state that the facts relating  

to seeking of advice from UPSC and the stage of furnishing  

the  same to  the  delinquent  employee are  not  in  dispute.  

Thus, the singular question that emanates for determination  

1AIR 1993 SC 1197

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is whether the High Court is justified in issuing the directions  

which  have  been  reproduced  hereinabove  solely  on  the  

ground  that  non-supply  of  the  advice  obtained  by  the  

disciplinary authority from the UPSC and acting on the same  

amounts to violation of principles of natural justice.  Learned  

counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on Rule 32 of  

the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)  

Rules,  1965 (for  brevity “the CCS Rules”).   The said Rule  

reads as under:

"32.Supply  of  copy  of  Commission's  advice.-  Whenever  the  Commission  is  consulted  as  provided in these rules, a copy of the advice by  the Commission and where such advice has not  been  accepted,  also  a  brief  statement  of  the  reasons  for  such  non-acceptance,  shall  be  furnished  to  the  Government  servant  concerned  along with a copy of the order passed in the case,  by the authority making the order."

8. Relying upon the aforesaid Rule,  it  is  contended that  

when the only prescription in the Rule is that a copy of the  

advice is to be furnished at the time of making of the order,  

it is not obligatory in law to supply it prior to imposition of  

punishment  requiring  a  representation  or  providing  an  

opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer. In support of  

the said submission,  our attention has been drawn to the

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decision  in  Union of  India  and another vs.  T.V.Patel2  

wherein a two-Judge Bench, appreciating the Rule position,  

has held as follows:

"Rule 32 of the Rules deals with the supply of a  copy of Commission's advice.  Rules as read as it is  mandatory in character.   Rule contemplates that  whenever a Commission is consulted, as provided  under  the  Rules,  a  copy  of  the  advice  of  the  Commission and where such advice has not been  accepted, also a brief statement of the reasons for  such  non-acceptance  shall  be  furnished  to  the  Government servant along with a copy of the order  passed in the case, by the authority making the  order.   Reading  of  the  Rule  would  show  that  it  contemplates two situations; if a copy of advice is  tendered by the Commission,  the same shall  be  furnished to the government servant along with a  copy  of  the  order  passed  in  the  case  by  the  authority making the order.  The second situation  is  that  if  a  copy  of  the  advice  tendered  by  the  Commission  has  not  been  accepted,  a  copy  of  which along with a brief statement of the reasons  for such non-acceptance shall also be furnished to  the government servant along with a copy of the  order passed in the case, by the authority making  the order.   In our view, the language employed in  Rule 32, namely "along with a copy of the order  passed in the case, by the authority making the  order" would mean the final order passed by the  authority  imposing  penalty  on  the  delinquent  government servant."

9. Be it noted, in the said case, interpretation placed by  

this  Court  under  Article  320(3)(c)  of  the  Constitution  in  

State of U.P.  v.  Manbodhan Lal Srivastava3 has been  

2(2007) 4 SCC 785

3 AIR 1957 SC 912

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placed reliance upon and, in that context, it has been opined  

thus: -

"In  view  of  the  law  settled  by  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Srivastava  (supra)  we  hold  that  the  provisions  of  Article  320(3)(c)  of  the  Constitution  of  India  are  not  mandatory and they do not confer any rights on  the  public  servant  so  that  the  absence  of  consultation  or  any  irregularity  in  consultation  process  or  furnishing  a  copy  of  the  advice  tendered by the UPSC, if any, does not afford the  delinquent government servant a cause of action  in a court of law."  

10. It  is also necessary to mention here that the learned  

Judges distinguished the pronouncements in D.C.Aggarwal  

and another (supra) and MD, ECIL vs. B.Karunakar4.

11. Mr.Vasudevan  Raghavan,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent has submitted that the said decision has been  

treated as a per incuriam in Union of India and others vs.   

S.K.Kapoor5 in one aspect as it has not taken note of the  

earlier  decision  in  S.N.Narula  vs.  Union  of  India  and  

others6.  Learned counsel while clarifying the position has  

submitted  that  the  decision  in  Narulas's case  has  been  

rendered  on  30.01.2004  which  is  prior  to  the  decision  in  

T.V.Patel's case though it has been reported later on.

4(1993) 4 SCC 727 5(2011) 4 SCC 589 6(2011) 4 SCC 591

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12. In the case of  S.N.Narula, the Court took note of the  

fact that the proceedings therein were sent for information  

of the UPSC and the UPSC had given the advice indicating  

certain punishment and the said advice was accepted by the  

disciplinary  authority  who,  on  that  basis,  had  imposed  

punishment.  Thereafter the Court took note of the factual  

score how the disciplinary authority had acted.  We think it  

seemly to reproduce the same: -

“3. It is to be noticed that the advisory opinion of  the  Union  Public  Service  Commission  was  not  communicated  to  the  appellant  before  he  was  heard by the disciplinary authority.  The same was  communicated  to  the  appellant  along  with  final  order  passed  in  the  matter  by  the  disciplinary  authority.”

After  so  stating,  the  two-Judge  Bench  proceeded  to  

opine thus: -

"6. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant  and the learned counsel for the respondent. It is  submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the  report of the Union Public Service Commission was  not communicated to the appellant before the final  order  was  passed.  Therefore,  the  appellant  was  unable to make an effective representation before  the  disciplinary  authority  as  regards  the  punishment imposed.  

7. We find that the stand taken by the Central  Administrative Tribunal was correct and the High  Court  was  not  justified  in  interfering  with  the  order.   Therefore, we set aside the judgment of  the Division Bench of  the High Court  and direct  that  the  disciplinary  proceedings  against  the

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appellant be finally disposed of in accordance with  the direction given by the Tribunal in Paragraph 6  of  the  order.    The  appellant  may  submit  a  representation within two weeks to the disciplinary  authority  and  we make  it  clear  that  the  matter  shall  be  finally  disposed  of  by  the  disciplinary  authority within a period of 3 months thereafter."

13. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of  

the submission of Mr.W.A.Qadri that the decision is not an  

authority because the tribunal had set aside the order of the  

disciplinary  authority  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  non-

speaking  order.   Be  that  as  it  may,  when  the  issue  was  

raised before this Court and there has been an advertence to  

the same,  we are unable to accept the submission of  Mr.  

Qadri.  The said decision is an authority for the proposition  

that the advice of UPSC, if sought and accepted, the same,  

regard being had to the principles of natural justice, is to be  

communicated before imposition of punishment.

14. In the case of S.K.Kapoor, the Court accepted the ratio  

laid  down  in  the  case  of  T.V.Patel as  far  as  the  

interpretation of Article 320(3)(c) is concerned and, in that  

context, it opined that the provisions contained in the said  

Article  320(3)(c)  of  the  Constitution  of  India  are  not  

mandatory.  While distinguishing certain aspects,  the Court  

observed as follows:

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"7. We are of the opinion that although Article  320(3)(c)  is  not  mandatory,  if  the authorities do  consult the Union Public Service Commission and  rely  on  the  report  of  the  commission  for  taking  disciplinary action,  then the principles of  natural  justice require that a copy of the report must be  supplied in advance to the employee concerned so  that he may have an opportunity of rebuttal. Thus,  in  our  view,  the aforesaid  decision in  T.V.Patel's  case is clearly distinguishable."  

15. After so stating the two-Judge Bench opined that when  

the disciplinary authority does not rely on the report of the  

UPSC then it  is  not  necessary  to  supply  the  same to  the  

employee concerned. However, when it is relied upon then  

the copy of the same may be supplied in advance to the  

employee concerned, otherwise, there would be violation of  

the  principles  of  natural  justice.   To  arrive  at  the  said  

conclusion,  reliance  was  placed  upon  the  decision  in  

S.N.Narula's case.  Proceeding further, the Court held:

"9. It  may  be  noted  that  the  decision  in  S.N.Narula's case (supra) was prior to the decision  in T.V.Patel's case(supra).  It is well settled that if a  subsequent  co-ordinate  bench  of  equal  strength  wants to take a different view, it can only refer the  matter  to  a  larger  bench,  otherwise  the  prior  decision of a co-ordinate bench is binding on the  subsequent bench of equal  strength.   Since,  the  decision  in  S.N.Narula's  case  (supra)  was  not  noticed  in  T.V.Patel's  case(supra),  the  latter  decision is a judgment per incuriam.  The decision  in  S.N.Narula's  case  (supra)  was  binding  on  the  subsequent bench of equal strength and hence, it  could not take a contrary view, as is settled by a

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series of judgments of this Court."

16. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that  

the two-Judge Bench in  S.K. Kapoor’s case could not  

have opined that the decision in  T.V. Patel’s case is  

per  incuriam.  We  have  already  noticed  two  facts  

pertaining to S.N. Narula (supra), (i) it ws rendered on  

31.1.2004 and (ii) it squarely dealt with the issue and  

expressed an opinion.  It seems to us that the judgment  

in S.N. Narula’s case was not brought to the notice of  

their Lordships deciding the lis in  T.V. Patel (supra).  

There cannot be a shadow of doubt that the judgment  

in  S.N. Narula (supra)  is  a  binding precedent  to  be  

followed by the later Division Bench. In this context, we  

may fruitfully refer to the decision in Union of India v.  

Raghubir  Singh  (dead)  by  L.  Rs.  And  Others 7,  

wherein the Constitution Bench has held as follows: -

“We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law  by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a  Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of  Judges, and in order that such decision be binding,  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  should  be  a  decision  rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench  of the Court”

17. In  Indian  Oil  Corporation Ltd.,  v.  Municipal  

Corporation and Another8, it has been observed that  7  (1989) 2 SCC 754 8  AIR 1995 SC 1480

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the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  Municipal  

Corpn.,  Indore  v.  Ratnaprabha  Dhandha9 was  

clearly in error in taking the view that the decision of  

this  Court  in  Municipal  Corporation,  Indore  v.  

Ratna Prabha10 was not binding on it.  In doing so, the  

Division Bench of the High Court did something which  

even a later co-equal Bench of this Court did not and  

could not do.

18. In  Chandra Prakash and others v.  State of U.P.  

and another11, the Constitution Bench has reiterated  

the principle that has already been stated in Raghubir  

Singh (supra).

19. Thus  perceived,  it  can  be  stated  with  certitude  that  

S.N. Narula (supra) was a binding precedent and when  

the  subsequent  decision  in  T.V.  Patel (supra)  is  

rendered in  ignorance or forgetfulness of the binding  

authority, the concept of per incurium comes into play.

20. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from  

A.R.  Antulay  v.  R.S.  Nayak12,  wherein  Sabyasachi  

9  1989 MPLJ 20 10  (1976) 4 SCC 622 11  (2002) 4 SCC 234 12  (1988) 2 SCC 602

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Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed thus: -

“....‘Per  incuriam’ are  those  decisions  given  in  ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  some  inconsistent  statutory provision or  of  some authority  binding  on  the  court  concerned,  so  that  in  such  cases  some part  of  the  decision  or  some step  in  the  reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that  account to be demonstrably wrong.”  

At a subsequent stage of the said decision it has been  

observed as follows: -

“.... It is a settled rule that if a decision has been  given per incuriam the court can ignore it.”

21. In  Siddharam  Satlingappa  Mhetre  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra and Ors. 13, while dealing with the issue of  

‘per incuriam’, a two-Judge Bench, after referring to the  

dictum  in  Bristol  Aeroplane  Co.  Ltd. (supra)  and  

certain  passages  from  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England and  

Raghubir Singh (supra), has ruled thus:-

“The  analysis  of  English  and Indian  Law clearly  leads to the irresistible conclusion that  not  only  the judgment of a larger strength is binding on a  judgment of smaller strength but the judgment of  a co-equal strength is also binding on a Bench of  Judges of co-equal strength.  In the instant case,  judgments mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136  are by two or three judges of this Court.  These  judgments  have  clearly  ignored  a  Constitution  Bench  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Sibbia’s  case  (supra) which has comprehensively dealt with all  the facets of anticipatory bail enumerated under  Section  438  of  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  

13   AIR 2011 SC 312 : ( 2011) 1 SCC 694

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Consequently,  judgments  mentioned  in  paragraphs 135 and 136 of this judgment are per  incuriam.”

22. Testing  on  the  aforesaid  principles  it  can  safely  be  

concluded that  the judgment in  T.V. Patel’s case is  

per incuriam.

23. At this juncture, we would like to give our reasons for  

our respectful concurrence with  S.K. Kapoor (supra).  

There is no cavil over the proposition that the language  

engrafted in Article 320(3)(c) does not make the said  

Article mandatory.  As we find, in the T.V.Patel's case,  

the  Court  has  based  its  finding  on  the  language  

employed in Rule 32 of the Rules. It is not in dispute  

that the said Rule from the very inception is a part of  

the 1965 Rules.  With the efflux of time, there has been  

a change of perception as regards the applicability of  

the principles of natural justice.  An Inquiry Report in a  

disciplinary proceeding is  required to be furnished to  

the  delinquent  employee  so  that  he  can  make  an  

adequate  representation  explaining  his  own  

stand/stance. That is what precisely has been laid down  

in  the  B.Karnukara's case.  We  may  reproduce  the

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relevant passage with profit: -

“Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry of- ficer  is  not  the  disciplinary  authority,  the  delin- quent employee has a right to receive a copy of  the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary  authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to  the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard  to the charges levelled against him. That right is a  part  of  the  employee’s  right  to  defend  himself  against the charges levelled against him. A denial  of  the  enquiry  officer’s  report  before  the  disci- plinary authority takes its decision on the charges,  is  a denial  of reasonable opportunity to the em- ployee to prove his innocence and is a breach of  the principles of natural justice.”

24. We  will  be  failing  in  our  duty  if  we  do  not  refer  to  

another  passage  which  deals  with  the  effect  of  non-

supply of the enquiry report on the punishment. It reads  

as follows: -

“[v] The next question to be answered is what is  the effect on the order of punishment when the re- port of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the  employee  and  what  relief  should  be  granted  to  him in such cases. The answer to this question has  to be relative to the punishment awarded. When  the employee is dismissed or removed from ser- vice and the inquiry is set aside because the re- port  is  not  furnished to  him,  in  some cases the  non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced  him gravely while in other cases it may have made  no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded  to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the em- ployee with back-wages in all  cases is to reduce  the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The the- ory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of  natural  justice have been evolved to uphold the  rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate  his just rights. They are not incantations to be in-

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voked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry  occasions.  Whether  in  fact,  prejudice  has  been  caused to the employee or not on account of the  denial to him of the report, has to be considered  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the  report, no different consequence would have fol- lowed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit  the employee to resume duty and to get all  the  consequential  benefits.  It  amounts  to  rewarding  the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching  the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating  limits.  It  amounts to an “unnatural  expansion of  natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to jus- tice.”

25. After so stating,  the larger Bench proceeded to state  

that  the  court/tribunal  should  not  mechanically  set  

aside the order of punishment on the ground that the  

report  was not furnished.   The courts/tribunals would  

apply their judicial mind to the question and give their  

reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order  

of punishment. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that  

the furnishing of report could have made a difference to  

the result in the case then it should set aside the order  

of  punishment.   Where  after  following  the  said  

procedure  the  court/tribunal  sets  aside  the  order  of  

punishment, the proper relief that should be granted to  

direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the  

authority/ management to proceed with the enquiry, by

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placing the employee under suspension and continuing  

the  enquiry  from  that  stage  of  furnishing  with  the  

report.  The question whether the employee would be  

entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the  

date  of  dismissal  to  the  date  of  reinstatement,  if  

ultimately ordered, should invariably left to be decided  

by the authority concerned according to law, after the  

culmination of the proceedings and depending on the  

final outcome.

26. We have referred to the aforesaid decision in extenso  

as we find that in the said case it has been opined by  

the Constitution Bench that non-supply of the enquiry  

report  is  a  breach of  the  principle  of  natural  justice.  

Advice from the UPSC, needless to say, when utilized as  

a material against the delinquent officer, it should be  

supplied  in  advance.   As  it  seems  to  us,  Rule  32  

provides for supply of copy of advice to the government  

servant at the time of making an order.  The said stage  

was  in  prevalence  before  the  decision  of  the  

Constitution  Bench.  After  the  said  decision,  in  our  

considered opinion, the authority should have clarified  

the  Rule  regarding  development  in  the  service

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jurisprudence.   We  have  been  apprised  by  

Mr.Raghavan, learned counsel for the respondent, that  

after  the  decision  in  S.K.Kapoor's case,  the  

Government  of  India,  Ministry  of  Personnel,  PG  &  

Pensions,  Department  of  Personnel  &  Training  vide  

Office Memorandum dated 06.01.2014 has issued the  

following directions:

"4. Accordingly,  it  has  been decided that  in  all  disciplinary cases where the Commission is to be  consulted, the following procedure may be adopted  :-

(i) On receipt of the Inquiry Report, the DA may  examine  the  same  and  forward  it  to  the  Commission with his observations;

(ii) On receipt of the Commission's report, the DA  will examine the same and forward the same to the  Charged Officer along with the Inquiry Report and  his  tentative  reasons  for  disagreement  with  the  Inquiry Report and/or the advice of the UPSC;

(iii)  The  Charged  Officer  shall  be  required  to  submit, if he so desires, his written representation  or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within  fifteen  days,  irrespective  of  whether  the  Inquiry  report/advice of UPSC is in his favour or not.   

(iv)   The Disciplinary Authority shall  consider the  representation  of  the  Charged  Officer  and  take  further action as prescribed in sub-rules 2(A) to (4)  of Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.  

27. After  the  said  Office  Memorandum,  a  further  Office  

Memorandum has  been  issued  on  05.03.2014,  which  

pertains  to  supply  of  copy  of  UPSC  advice  to  the

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Charged Officer.  We think it appropriate to reproduce  

the same:

"The  undersigned  is  directed  to  refer  to  this  Department's  O.M.  of  even  number  dated  06.01.2014 and to say that it has been decided, in  partial modification of the above O.M. that a copy  of  the  inquiry  report  may  be  given  to  the  Government servant as provided in Rule 15(2) of  Central  Secretariat  Services  (Classification,  Control  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1965.   The  inquiry  report together with the representation, if any, of  the Government servant may be forwarded to the  Commission  for  advice.   On  receipt  of  the  Commission's advice, a copy of the advice may be  provided to the Government servant who may be  allowed to  submit  his  representation,  if  any,  on  the Commission's advice within fifteen days.  The  Disciplinary  Authority  will  consider  the  inquiry  report,  advice  of  the  Commission  and  the  representation(s)  of  the  Government  servant  before arriving at a final decision."    

28. In our considered opinion, both the Office Memoranda  

are not only in consonance with the S.K.Kapoor's case  

but  also  in  accordance with  the  principles  of  natural  

justice which has been stated in B.Karunakar's case.

29. In view of the aforesaid, we respectfully agree with the  

decision rendered in S.K.Kapoor's case and resultantly  

decline to interfere with the judgment and order of the  

High Court.   As a result,  the appeal,  being devoid of  

merit, is dismissed without any order as to costs.    

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               ..............................J                    (DIPAK MISRA)  

.............................J.  (N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI; MAY 22, 2014.