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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.                                   /2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 23631 of 2008]

Union of India and others …  Appellant (s)   

Versus

P. Gunasekaran … Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T  

KURIAN, J.:

Leave granted.    

2.  Respondent,  while  working  as  Deputy  Office  

Superintendent,  Central  Excise Third Division,  Coimbatore was  

arrested  by  Police  in  a  criminal  case  involving  cheating  and  

extortion of money. The police registered a criminal case under  

Sections 143, 319 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘IPC’)  against  the  respondent.  

Separate departmental proceedings were also initiated against  

him  under  Central  Civil  Services  (Classification,  Control  and  

Appeal) Rules, 1965.

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3. Following are the three articles of charge:

“ARTICLE-I

That the said Shri P. Gunasekaran, Deputy Office  Superintendent  (Level-II)  (under  suspension  of  Central  Excise,  Headquarters  Office,  Coimbatore  while working in the Valuation Cell,  Hqrs.  Office,  Coimbatore came to the office on 23.11.1992, in  the morning and signed the attendance register, in  token of having come to the office and left office  without permission and came to the office the next  day,  i.e.,  on  the  morning  of  24.11.1992,  and  affixed his initials in the departure column against  the  dated  23.11.1992  and  willfully  falsified  the  official register. He has thereby committed gross  misconduct  and  failed  to  maintain  absolute  integrity and devotion to duty and has behaved in  a manner unbecoming of a Government servant,  in contravention of the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i),  3(1)(ii), 3(1)(iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct)  Rules, 1964.

ARTICLE-II

That  the  said  Shri  P.  Gunasekaran,  being  a  ministerial  Officer  impersonated  himself  as  a  Central  Excise  Executive  Officer  and  on  23.11.1992  about  2.30  p.m.  unauthorizedly  conducted passenger checks in a public transport  bus  at  Ukkadam  Bus  Stand,  by  usurping  the  powers  of  Executive  Officer  and  thereby  committed  gross  misconduct  and  failed  to  maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty  and  behaved  in  a  manner  unbecoming  of  a  Government  servant  in  contravention  of  the  provisions  of  Rule  3(1)(i),  3(1)(ii)  and 3(1)(iii)  of  CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

ARTICLE-III

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That  the  said  Shri  P.  Gunasekaran,  on  23.11.1992 at about 2.30 P.M., abused his position  unauthorisedly  conducted  passenger  check,  by  usurping  the  powers  of  Executive  Officer,  threatened  a  passenger  bound  for  Kerala  and  thereby committed gross misconduct and failed to  maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty  and  behaved  in  a  manner  unbecoming  of  a  Government  servant  in  contravention  of  the  provisions  of  Rule  3(1)(i),  3(1)(ii)  and 3(1)(iii)  of  CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”  

4. In the disciplinary inquiry,  all  the charges were proved  

and,  on  due  procedure,  the  respondent  was  dismissed  from  

service by order dated 10.06.1997.  The said order of dismissal  

dated  10.06.1997  was  challenged  before  the  Central  

Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench in O.A. No. 805 of 1997.  

During  the  pendency  of  the  original  application  before  the  

Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  in  criminal  appeal,  the  First  

Additional District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore acquitted the  

respondent.  

5. The  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  vide  order  dated  

27.10.1999,  took  the  view  that  the  respondent  having  been  

acquitted on identical set of charges, he could not be proceeded  

against in respect of second and third articles of charge in the  

disciplinary  proceedings.  However,  on  the  first  Charge,  the  

Tribunal held as follows:

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“11. …  There  is  one  another  charge  on  which,  the  applicant  has  been  punished  by  the  disciplinary  authority, i.e., Article I which has been extracted above.  It cannot be said this charge is also part of the criminal  prosecution.  On  the  evidence  adduced,  the  inquiring  authority has come to the conclusion that Article I has  been proved taking note of the applicant’s letter dated  11.11.1992 addressed to the Collector of Central Excise  when he was kept under remand. This finding given by  the  enquiry  officer  has  been  accepted  by  the  disciplinary authority. Considering all the three charges  as proved, the order of dismissal has been passed, but  since we have arrived at a conclusion that charges 2  and  3  cannot  stand  in  view  of  the  acquittal  by  the  criminal court, in our view, the quantum of punishment  has to be considered by the disciplinary authority.  … …  … So the impugned order is  set aside,  the matter is  remitted back to the disciplinary authority to consider  the quantum punishment taking note of our conclusions  and  observations  made  above.  The  disciplinary  authority  shall  consider  the  quantum  of  punishment  and pass orders within a period of 8 weeks from the  date of receipt of a copy of this order. …”

6. The  appellants  herein  challenged  the  order  of  the  

Administrative Tribunal in Writ Petition No. 355 of 2000 before  

the Madras High Court. The said writ petition was disposed of by  

judgment dated 12.01.2000. The High Court declined to interfere  

with the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal. However,  

in respect of Articles of Charge no.I  which does not have any  

relation  to  the  criminal  case,  it  was  held  at  paragraph-6  as  

follows:

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“6. …  Charge  No.  1  relates  to  the  unauthorized  absence of the respondent from the office. The tribunal  was of  the  view that  dismissal  from service was  not  warranted for the said charge. We do not think that the  view  taken  by  the  Tribunal  either  unreasonable  or  irrational which could be interfered with by this court  under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.  …”

7. The  disciplinary  authority,  accordingly,  passed  order  

dated 28.02.2000 which reads as follows:

“Whereas  on  consideration  of  the  facts  and  records  of  the  case  with  regard  to  Article-I  of  the  disciplinary  proceedings  against  Shri  P.  Gunasekaran  and the observation made in Hon’ble Tribunal’s order,  the  undersigned  is  satisfied  that  good  and  sufficient  reason exists for imposing upon him the penalty herein  after specified, in modification of penalty of ‘dismissal  from  service’  ordered  vide  C.No.II/10A/92-Vig.  Dated  10.6.97.

Now, therefore, I order under clause (vii) of Rule  11 of Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965 that Shri  P.  Gunasekaran,  dismissed  as  Deputy  Office  Superintendent, be compulsorily retired from the date  from which he was dismissed from service.”  

8. Respondent  challenged  the  order  dated  28.02.2000  

whereby  he  was  compulsorily  retired  from  service  from  the  

original  date of  dismissal  in  O.A.  No.  521 of  2001 before  the  

Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench. Dismissing the  

O.A., it was held as follows:

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“10. … It is for the disciplinary authority to decide in  what  way the punishment  is  to  be imposed and this  Tribunal cannot act as an appellate court in such cases.  With this in mind, if we read the Article-I of the charge  extracted above, it is clear that the applicant does not  deserve  any  sympathy  because  he  manipulated  the  records. It is not a case of unauthorized absence. The  applicant after signing the attendance register left the  office and yet he made attempts to show that he was  present in the office for the whole day. It amounts to  falsification  of  the  records  and  the  conduct  of  the  applicant shows that he was dishonest or he has not  maintained  the  integrity  as  a  government  officer.  Falsification of records is a criminal offence. Taking into  consideration the gravity of charges, we hold that the  punishment imposed on the applicant is proper and the  same is not outrageous nor it shocks our conscience.  The O.A. is dismissed. …”

9. The said order dated 08.02.2001 was challenged by the  

respondent before the High Court of Judicature at Madras which  

has lead to the impugned judgment dated 18.09.2007 in Writ  

Petition No. 29757 of 2002.

10. The  High  Court  set  aside  the  order  of  the  Central  

Administrative Tribunal, interfered with even the finding of the  

enquiry  officer,  set  aside  the  punishment  and  directed  

reinstatement with backwages and all service benefits. To quote:

“2. We  have  gone  through  the  materials  placed  on  record and also gone through the letter of the petitioner  dated  11.12.1992  on  which  the  enquiry  officer  has  

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given his findings whereby he brought to the notice of  the Collector what was transpired on 23.11.1992, and  there  is  no  admission  made  by  the  petitioner.  Therefore,  we  hold  that  the  enquiry  officer  has  not  considered the letter in the proper perspective to arrive  at  the  right  conclusion.  Therefore,  the  letter  dated  11.12.1992 cannot be taken as the basis, on which, the  punishment was imposed and therefore the impugned  order  is  liable  to  be  set  aside.  Further,  as  rightly  contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for  the  petitioner  while  modifying  the  order,  the  respondents should have fixed the date of compulsory  retirement from the date of issue of the order, instead  of  fixing the compulsory retirement  from the date of  order  of  dismissal.  Further,  after  going  through  the  contents of the letter, it seems the petitioner has not  admitted the charge. Therefore, as rightly contended by  the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner  except  the  letter  of  the  petitioner,  there  is  no  other  evidence  and  whatever  evidence  is  required  with  regard to charges 2 and 3, which were framed on the  basis of the registration of the criminal case against the  petitioner,  which  ultimately  ended  in  acquittal,  the  punishment  imposed  on  the  basis  of  the  above  said  criminal  case  has  to  go.  Therefore,  the  disciplinary  authority has not properly understood the order passed  by the tribunal to reconsider the punishment as per the  charge memo. The enquiry officer’s report is not based  on  any  evidence  except  based  on  the  letter  by  the  petitioner, which the petitioner has not admitted of the  charges. The petitioner was acquitted from the charges  2 and 3. Therefore, the only charge, which we find is  not based on any material or evidence. Therefore, the  punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the  petitioner is unsustainable and the petitioner is to be  reinstated. It is brought to the notice of this court that  the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation.  Therefore, the salary payable to the petitioner from the  date of his compulsory retirement till  the date of his  superannuation  has  to  be  treated  the  reinstatement  with all backwages and monetary benefits which shall  be calculated and paid to  him.  The terminal  benefits  

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and  pension  as  applicable  under  the  Rules  shall  be  calculated and paid to the petitioner.”

11. Thus aggrieved, the Union of India and others are before  

this Court.

12. Heard  Shri  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  Solicitor  General  

appearing  for  the  appellants  and  Shri  Sumeer  Kumar  

Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.  

13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing  

to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in  

the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence  

before  the  enquiry  officer.  The  finding  on  Charge  no.  I  was  

accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by  

the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings,  

the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first  

appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article  

226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall  not venture into re-

appreciation  of  the  evidence.  The  High  Court  can  only  see  

whether:

a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

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b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in  

that behalf;

c. there  is  violation  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice  in  

conducting the proceedings;

d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a  

fair  conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the  

evidence and merits of the case;

e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by  

irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary  

and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have  

arrived at such conclusion;  

g. the disciplinary authority  had erroneously failed to admit  

the admissible and material evidence;

h. the  disciplinary  authority  had  erroneously  admitted  

inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

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Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High  

Court shall not:

(i). re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry,  in case the  

same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings  

can be based.  

(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks  

its conscience.

14. In  one  of  the  earliest  decisions  in  State  of  Andhra  

Pradesh and others v.  S.  Sree Rama Rao1, many  of  the  

above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded  

thus:  

1 AIR 1963 SC 1723

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“7. …  The  High  Court  is  not  constituted  in  a  proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court  of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a  departmental  enquiry  against  a  public  servant:  it  is  concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by  an authority competent in that behalf, and according to  the procedure prescribed in that behalf,  and whether  the  rules  of  natural  justice  are  not  violated.  Where  there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted  with  the  duty  to  hold  the  enquiry  has  accepted  and  which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion  that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is  not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ  under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive  at an independent finding on the evidence.  The High  Court  may  undoubtedly  interfere  where  the  departmental  authorities  have  held  the  proceedings  against  the delinquent  in  a manner  inconsistent  with  the  rules  of  natural  justice  or  in  violation  of  the  statutory  rules  prescribing  the  mode  of  enquiry  or  where the authorities have disabled themselves from  reaching  a  fair  decision  by  some  considerations  extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case  or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant  considerations or where the conclusion on the very face  of  it  is  so  wholly  arbitrary  and  capricious  that  no  reasonable  person  could  ever  have  arrived  at  that  conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental  authorities  are,  if  the  enquiry  is  otherwise  properly  held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal  evidence  on  which  their  findings  can  be  based,  the  adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter  which  can  be  permitted  to  be  canvassed  before  the  High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226  of the Constitution.”

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15. In  State of  Andhra Pradesh and others v.  Chitra  

Venkata Rao2,  the principles have been further  discussed at  

paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows:  

“21. The  scope  of  Article  226  in  dealing  with  departmental  inquiries  has  come  up  before  this  Court.  Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of  A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the  view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty  of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in  criminal  trials  thatan  offence  is  not  established  unless  proved  by  evidence  beyond  reasonable  doubt  to  the  satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be  not  applied  by  a  domestic  tribunal  of  inquiry  the  High  Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is  not  competent  to  declare  the  order  of  the  authorities  holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is  not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision  of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against  a  public  servant.  The  Court  is  concerned  to  determine  whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in  that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in  that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are  not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which  the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry  has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support  the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the  charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review  the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on  the  evidence.  The  High  Court  may  interfere  where  the  departmental  authorities  have  held  the  proceedings  against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the  rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules  prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities  have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by  some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the  merits  of  the  case  or  by  allowing  themselves  to  be  influenced  by  irrelevant  considerations  or  where  the  conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and  

2 (1975) 2 SCC 557

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capricious  that  no  reasonable  person  could  ever  have  arrived at that conclusion.  The departmental  authorities  are,  if  the  enquiry  is  otherwise  properly  held,  the  sole  judges  of  facts  and  if  there  is  some legal  evidence on  which  their  findings  can  be  based,  the  adequacy  or  reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be  permitted  to  be  canvassed  before  the  High  Court  in  a  proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the  Union of India, New Delhi v.  Niranjan Singh said that the  High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the  disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported  by  any  evidence  or  it  can  be  said  that  no  reasonable  person  could  have  reached  such  a  finding.  In  Niranjan  Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded  its  powers  in  interfering  with  the  findings  of  the  disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent  was instrumental  in  compelling the shut-down of an air  compressor  at  about  8.15  a.m.  on  May  31,  1956.  This  Court  said  that  the  Enquiry  Committee  felt  that  the  evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group  of  strikers  and  compelled  them  to  close  down  their  compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The  General  Manager  did  not  agree  with  the  Enquiry  Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted  the  evidence.  This  Court  said  that  it  was  open  to  the  General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the  conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that  the  conclusion  reached  by  the  disciplinary  authority  should  prevail  and  the  High  Court  should  not  have  interfered with the conclusion.

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under  Article  226  is  a  supervisory  jurisdiction.  The  Court  exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact  reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the  appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned  in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on  the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not  an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In  regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ  can  be  issued  if  it  is  shown that  in  recording  the  said  

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finding,  the  tribunal  had  erroneously  refused  to  admit  admissible  and  material  evidence,  or  had  erroneously  admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the  impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no  evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which  can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact  recorded  by  the  Tribunal  cannot  be  challenged  on  the  ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced  before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain  a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a  point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said  finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the  entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High  Court was not justified to do so.  Apart from the aspect  that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on  the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate,  the evidence in the present case which was considered by  the  Tribunal  cannot  be  scanned  by  the  High  Court  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  evidence  which  would  justify  the  finding  of  the  Tribunal  that  the  respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave  reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High  Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived  at  these  conclusions.  The  High  Court  reviewed  the  evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the  evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High  Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari  should not do.”

These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the  

living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State  

of  Haryana  and  another v.  Rattan  Singh3.  To  quote  the  

unparalled and inimitable expressions:

3 (1977) 2 SCC 491

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“4.  ….  in  a  domestic  enquiry  the  strict  and  sophisticated  rules  of  evidence  under  the  Indian  Evidence Act  may not  apply.  All  materials  which  are  logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible.  There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has  reasonable  nexus  and  credibility.  It  is  true  that  departmental  authorities  and Administrative Tribunals  must be careful in evaluating such material and should  not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant  under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is  not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although  we  have  been  taken  through  case-law  and  other  authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a  judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous  materials or considerations and observance of rules of  natural  justice.  Of  course,  fairplay is  the basis  and if  perversity  or  arbitrariness,  bias  or  surrender  of  independence  of  judgment  vitiate  the  conclusions  reached,  such  finding,  even  though  of  a  domestic  tribunal, cannot be held good. …”

16. In  all  the  subsequent  decisions  of  this  Court  upto  the  

latest in  Chennai Water Supply and Sewarage Board v.  T.  

T.  Murali  Babu4,  these  principles  have  been  consistently  

followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything.

17. On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the  

punishment  of  compulsory  retirement  in  the  impugned  order  

dated 28.02.2000, had arrived at the following findings:

“Article-I  was held as proved by the Inquiry authority  after  evaluating  the  evidence  adduced  in  the  case.  Under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  evidence  relied on viz., letter dated 11.12.92 written by Shri P.  

4 (2014) 4 SCC 108

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Gunasekaran,  provides  a  reasonable  nexus  to  the  charge framed against him and he did not controvert  the contents of the said letter  dated 11.12.92 during  the time of  inquiry.  Nor  did he produce any defence  witness  during  the  inquiry  to  support  his  claims  including  that  on  23.11.92  he  left  the  office  on  permission.  There  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  he  was  handicapped in producing his defence witness. …”

18. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report  

and  having  accepted  it,  after  discussing  the  available  and  

admissible  evidence  on  the  charge,  and  the  Central  

Administrative  Tribunal  having  endorsed  the  view  of  the  

disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to  

re-appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under  

Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

19. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of  

its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,  

to  go  into  the  proportionality  of  punishment  so  long  as  the  

punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the  

instant  case,  the  disciplinary  authority  has  come  to  the  

conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there  

are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service  

jurisprudence  but  certainly  there  are  indicators  for  such  

assessment.  Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is  “moral  

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uprightness; honesty”. It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence,  

trustfulness,  openness,  sincerity,  blamelessness,  immaculacy,  

rectitude,  uprightness,  virtuousness,  righteousness,  goodness,  

cleanness,  decency,  honour,  reputation,  nobility,  

irreproachability,  purity,  respectability,  genuineness,  moral  

excellence etc.  In short,  it  depicts sterling character with firm  

adherence to a code of moral values.

20. The  impugned  conduct  of  the  respondent  working  as  

Deputy  Office  Superintendent  in  a  sensitive  department  of  

Central Excise, according to the disciplinary authority, reflected  

lack of integrity warranting discontinuance in service. That view  

has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also.  

Thereafter,  it  is  not  open  to  the  High  Court  to  go  into  the  

proportionality  of  punishment  or  substitute  the  same  with  a  

lesser  or  different  punishment.  These  aspects  have  been  

discussed  at  quite  length  by  this  Court  in  several  decisions  

including  B.C.  Chaturvedi v.  Union  of  India  and others5,  

Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham6, Om Kumar  

and others v. Union of India7, Coimbatore District Central  

Cooperative  Bank v.  Coimbatore  District  Central  5 (1995) 6 SCC 749 6 (1997) 7 SCC 463 7 (2001) 2 SCC 386

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Cooperative  Bank  Employees  Association  and  another8,  

Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and  

another v.  Mukul Kumar Choudhuri  and others9 and the  

recent  one  in Chennai  Metropolitan  Water  

Supply (supra).

21.  All that apart, on the facts of the present case, it has to  

be seen that in the first  round of litigation before the Central  

Administrative Tribunal  in  order  dated 27.10.1999 in  O.A.  No.  

805 of  1997,  the Tribunal  had entered a finding that “on the  

evidence  adduced,  the  inquiring  authority  has  come  to  the  

conclusion  that  Article  I  has  been  proved  taking  note  of  the  

appellant’s letter dated 11.11.92 addressed to the Collector of  

Central  Excise  when he was  kept  under  remand.  This  finding  

given by the inquiry officer has been accepted by the disciplinary  

authority”.  

22. That  order  of  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal  was  

challenged by the respondent in Writ Petition No. 226 of 2000  

which was disposed of by judgment dated 12.01.2000 wherein  

the High Court had also endorsed the said finding which we have  

already referred to herein before.  

8 (2007) 4 SCC 669 9 (2009) 15 SCC 620

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23. Thus, the finding on Charge no. I has attained finality. It  

is  the  punishment  of  dismissal  on  Charge  no.  I  which  was  

directed  to  be  reconsidered  by  the  Central  Administrative  

Tribunal  and which view was endorsed by the High Court.  On  

that  basis  only,  the  dismissal  was  converted  to  compulsory  

retirement. Such findings cannot be reopened in the subsequent  

round of litigation at the instance of the respondent. It was only  

the punishment aspect that was opened to challenge.  

24. The Central Administrative Tribunal, in the order dated  

01.02.2001 in O.A. No. 521 of 2000, after elaborately discussing  

the  factual  as  well  as  the  legal  position,  has  come  to  the  

conclusion that the punishment of compulsory retirement is not  

outrageous or shocking to its conscience, it was not open to the  

High Court  to  interfere with the disciplinary proceedings from  

stage  one  and  direct  reinstatement  of  the  respondent  with  

backwages.

25. The last contention is with regard to date of effect of the  

punishment. According to the respondent, even assuming that  

compulsory retirement is to be imposed, it could be only with  

effect from the date of order, viz., 28.02.2000.  We are unable to  

appreciate the contention. The respondent stood dismissed from  

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service as per order dated 10.06.1997. It was that punishment  

which  was  directed  to  be  reconsidered.  Consequent  thereon  

only,  the  punishment  was  altered/substituted  to  compulsory  

retirement. Necessarily, it has to be from the date of dismissal  

from service, viz., 10.06.1997.  

26. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.  

The order dated 28.02.2000 passed by the disciplinary authority  

and confirmed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai  

Bench vide order dated 01.02.2001 in O.A. No. 521 of 2000 is  

restored.  

27. The appeal is allowed as above. No costs.

                                                   .....…..…..………… J.                                                   (ANIL R.  DAVE)

                                                           ..………..……………J.                              (KURIAN  JOSEPH)

New Delhi; November 19, 2014.  

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