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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.2951-2957 OF 2001

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS          …  

APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MAJOR S.P. SHARMA AND OTHERS       … RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

M.Y. EQBAL, J.:

1.   These  appeals  have  been  filed  against  the  common  

judgment and order dated 21.12.2000 passed by Delhi  

High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 4, 43, 139, 148 of 1987, 21 of  

1988,  77  of  1993  and  86  of  1994.    By  the  said  

judgment, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred  

by  the  respondents  and  quashed  not  only  their  

termination orders but also the General Court Martial  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘GCM’)  proceedings  held

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against  Captain  Ashok Kumar  Rana and Captain  R.S.  

Rathaur.  

2.   Before  we  proceed  with  the  matter,  it  would  be  

appropriate  to  highlight  the  factual  background  and  

brief history of the case.

          In  February  1971,  Gunner  Sarwan Dass  was  

cultivated  by  Pakistan  Intelligence.  In  1972  Captain  

Ghalwat  and  Gunner  Sarwan  Dass  crossed  the  

international  border.  In  1973  Captain  Ghalwat  and  

Gunner Sarwan Dass were posted in Babina (M.P.). In  

1974  Gunner  Aya  Singh  was  cultivated  by  Gunner  

Sarwan Dass for  Pak Intelligence.  Captain Nagial  was  

then  cultivated  by  Aya  Singh  for  Pak  Intelligence.  In  

1975 for the first time the espionage racket came to be  

noticed. Aya Singh and Sarwan Dass were arrested. In  

1976-77  pursuant  to  the  investigation,  three  more  

jawans  were  arrested.  They  corroborated  the  

involvement  of  Sarwan  Dass.  Sarwan  Dass  and  Aya  

Singh on further interrogation disclosed the names of  

Captain  Ghalwat  and  Captain  Nagial.  In  1976-77  

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Captain Ghalwat and Captain Nagial were tried by GCM  

and were convicted. Ghalwat was cashiered and given  

14 years’ RI. Nagial was given 7 years’ RI and was also  

cashiered. In addition, 12 jawans were tried and they  

were  given  RI  of  various  descriptions  and  were  

dismissed from services.  Aya Singh and Sarwan Dass  

were also among the 12 jawans tried and held guilty.  

Later  in  1978  it  was  discovered  that  Aya  Singh  was  

holding  back  certain  relevant  information  relating  to  

espionage  activities  under  certain  alleged threat  and  

pressure.  Wife  of  Aya  Singh  claimed  to  be  killed.  

Reeling under the shock of the circumstances, he made  

further disclosures wherein he named Captain Rathaur  

and  Captain  A.K.  Rana;  disclosed  that  he  had  been  

receiving threats that if he disclosed anything his wife  

would be killed. Accordingly, in 1978 Captain Rathaur  

and Captain A.K. Rana were interrogated.  As a result,  

42  army  personnel  i.e.  19  officers,  4  junior  

commissioned officers (JCOs) and 19 other ranks (ORs),  

were arrested.

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         Out of the 19 officers, 3 officers were tried by GCM,  

two  were  convicted,  namely,  Captain  Ranbir  Singh  

Rathaur and Captain A.K. Rana, and one was acquitted.  

Captain  Ranbir  Singh Rathaur  and Captain  A.K.  Rana  

were  sentenced  to  RI  for  14  years  each  and  were  

cashiered. Against 13 officers, disciplinary actions were  

initiated. However, a decision was taken not to try them  

and an  administrative  order  under  Section  18 of  the  

Army Act, 1950 (in short “the Army Act”) was passed  

terminating their services.

3.  The present appeals arise out of the order passed way  

back  in  1980  terminating  the  services  of  the  

respondents  herein  which  were  brought  invoking  the  

doctrine of pleasure as enshrined under Article 310 of  

the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to  

as  the  ‘Constitution’)  coupled  with  the  powers  to  be  

exercised under Section 18 of the Army Act.  Initially,  

the  orders  of  dismissal  were  passed  on  11.1.1980,  

which  were  assailed  in  nine  writ  petitions  that  were  

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dismissed by the High Court of Delhi on 21.4.1980.  The  

special leave petitions against these writ petitions came  

to be dismissed by this Court on 1.9.1980.

4.  In the meanwhile, a corrigendum came to be issued, as  

a result whereof, the orders of dismissal were described  

as orders of termination. On account of the substituted  

termination order, a decision for deducting 5% of the  

gratuity amount was taken, which was communicated  

afresh.  These orders made a fresh ground of challenge  

before a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court.  

The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition by a  

detailed  judgment  dated  22.3.1985.   Simultaneously,  

one  Captain  R.S.  Rathaur  had  filed  a  Writ  Petition  

No.1577 of  1985 under Article 32 of  the Constitution  

before this Court, which stood dismissed refusing to re-

open the issues already decided.

5.   Against  the  order  of  the  learned Single  Judge  dated  

22.3.1985,  several  Letters  Patent  Appeals  were  filed.  

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One of the appeals, being LPA No.116 of 1985, filed by  

one  N.D.  Sharma,  was  decided  vide  judgment  dated  

19.8.1986 upholding the order of termination approving  

the applicability of the doctrine of pleasure.  However,  

at  the  same  time,  the  appeal  was  partly  allowed  in  

relation to the post-retiral benefits keeping in view the  

provisions  under  the Army Act  and Rules  and it  was  

found  that  the  proposed  5%  cut-off  was  not  in  

accordance with the Act/Rules applicable therein.

6.  Several LPAs were filed by other officers relying on the  

Division  Bench  judgment  extending  the  post-retiral  

benefits, and a plea for similar relief was raised.

7.  When these appeals came up for hearing, the Division  

Bench  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  hearing  the  matter  

differed with the view on the issue of the applicability of  

doctrine  of  pleasure  and  maintainability  of  the  writ  

petitions on the ground of malafides vide order dated  

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15.5.1991.   Consequently,  this  question  of  law  was  

referred to be decided by a larger bench.

8.  The Full Bench so constituted to answer this reference  

held that an order under Section 18 of the Army Act  

invoking the doctrine of pleasure was subject to judicial  

review if it is assailed on malafides.  It was held that the  

onus  lay  on  the  petitioner/person  alleging  malafides  

and to bring material on record to satisfy the court in  

order to justify the interference.  Aggrieved, the Union  

of  India  filed the  Special  Leave Petition,  which stood  

dismissed.  

9.    It  appears  that  after  the  answer  of  reference,  the  

pending appeals were taken up for decision by the High  

Court.   On  account  of  the  answer  given  by  the  Full  

Bench,  fresh  petitions  were  filed  by  those  officers  

whose petitions  had been dismissed earlier  upto  this  

Court as referred to hereinabove, in 1980.  Some writ  

petitioners,  whose  petitions  had  been  dismissed  by  

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learned Single Judge, filed Letters Patent Appeals with  

applications  for  condonation  of  delay.   Appeals  were  

also filed against those judgments that were given in  

the second round of litigation proposing to refuse 5% of  

the terminal benefits referred to hereinabove.  These  

categories of petitions were described by the Division  

Bench hearing the matter in its order dated 2.5.1995,  

as under :-

     “LPA 77/93   & CM 823/95   

     In these batch of cases, we find there are at least two  LPAs  which  are  directed  against  the  Judgments  of  dismissal  of  the  writ  petitions  holding  that  the  particular  issue  cannot  be  gone  into  in  writ  jurisdiction.  Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  in  those  two  cases  rely  upon  the  Full  Bench  Judgment  and  the  recent  Supreme  Court  Judgment  to  contend  that  the  issue  can  be  gone  into  by  the  Court.  They  have  also  wanted  us  to  call  for  certain  records  from  the  respondents  and  in  regard  to  those  records,  respondents are claiming privilege and that is a matter  to be decided.

     There is  another  group of  cases  in which fresh writ  petitions are filed on the ground that notwithstanding  the dismissal of the earlier writ petitions or dismissal  of  the  S.L.Ps,  fresh  writ  petitions  are  maintainable  inasmuch as it is only now that the Full Bench and the  Supreme Court  have decided that  the particular  issue  can be gone into by the High Court.  In that  batch of  cases  the  question  of  res  judicata falls  for  consideration.

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     There  is  yet  another  group  of  cases  where  writ  petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judges  on the ground that the Court cannot go into the issue  and  the  LPAs  were  preferred  with  application  for  condonation of delay with delay of more than 9 years.

There is  yet another group of  cases where  writ petitions were filed against some latter  orders passed by the Government imposing  a  cut  of  5%  from  the  pension  and  upon  dismissal  of  the  writ  petitions  challenging  the said orders, LPAs have been filed and in  those  appeals  the  appellants  want  to  take  up the issue, that the Court can go into the  validity of the order of dismissal order once  again.

Inasmuch  as  there  are  four  classes  of  cases,  we  are  of  the  view  that  first  we  should  decide  the  batch  where  fresh  writ  petitions are filed, and in case we hold that  fresh  writ  petitions  are  maintainable,  then  the  question  of  going  into  the  privilege  claimed by the respondents will  have to be  decided. If the fresh writ  petitions are held  to be maintainable, then the batch wherein  appeals  are  filed  with  delay  condonation  applications  can  also  be  taken  up  for  consideration.  In  one  case  the  question  of  laches is to be decided whereas in another  the  question  of  sufficient  cause  for  condonation of  delay fall  for  consideration.  In  the  matters  challenging  the  orders  imposing  cut  in  pension,  it  will  be  for  the  parties  to  watch  the  view  the  court  may  take  in  other  three  batches  mentioned  above  so  that  they  can  pursue  one  or  the  other remedies which the Court will be able  to accept.

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Therefore,  we  will  first  take  up  fresh  writ  petitions  filed  after  the  passing  of  the  full  Court  Judgment  and  the  Supreme  Court  Judgment.”

10. Thereafter two writ petitions that were filed afresh,  

namely,  in  the  case  of  Major  Subhash  Juneja  and  

Harish  Lal  Singh,  were  heard  separately  and dealt  

with the principle o f  res judicata and constructive res judicata.  The  

said  writ  petitions  were  held  to  be  barred  by  law  vide  judgment  dated  

8.3.1996.  The  other  connected  petitions  also  appeared  to  have  been  

dismissed as not maintainable by another Division Bench vide order dated  

7.9.1992.

11.  The  Letters  Patent  Appeals  which  were  filed  with  

applications  for  condonation  of  delay  and  also  

against  the  judgment  proposing  5%  cut-off  in  the  

terminal  benefits  were  heard  by  another  Division  

Bench that reserved the judgment on 14.8.1998 by  

passing the following order:

     "LPA Nos.4/87, 43/87, 139/87, 148/87, 21/88, 77/93,  86/94 and C.W. Nos.3063/95, 4082/95:

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     Synopses  have  been  placed  on  record.   Mr.  Tikku  states  that  by  17.8.1998,  photocopy  of  the  relevant  record will be made available to Court. Originals have  been shown to us.

     Judgment reserved."

12.    The Division Bench that went on to reserve the  

said judgment delivered it after almost 3 years and  

allowed  the  appeals.  Therein,  it  was  held  that  the  

proceedings initiated against the writ petitioners as  

also against  other  officers,  who were appellants in  

the  other  LPAs,  were  vitiated  as  there  was  no  

material  to  support  the  impugned  orders  of  

termination which were camouflaged and thus,  the  

same were subject to judicial  review.  Accordingly,  

vide  judgment  dated  21.12.2000,  the  relief  of  

consequential  benefits  was  granted  after  setting  

aside the order of termination.    The relevant part  

thereof is extracted herein:

    "On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances  we  are  of  the  view that  there  is  no  other  conclusion  possible  except  to  say  that  the  orders  which  are  the  subject matter of the writ  petitions and in the Letters  Patent  Appeals  are  merely  camouflage  and  orders  have  been  passed  for  extraneous  reasons  under  the  

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cloak of innocuous form of orders of termination.  To  give an air on verisimilitude the respondents had held  the Court Martial proceedings which are wholly void.

     Accordingly, we declare that the proceedings initiated  against  the  petitioners  in  the  two  writ  petitions  are  void  in  law  and  the  orders  passed  against  the  other  officers,  the  appellants  in  L.P.As.  are  vitiated  being  without  any  material  and  being  camouflage.  Having  dropped  the  idea  not  to  conclude  Court  Martial  proceedings knowing fully well that the officers were  likely  to  be  acquitted,  without  producing  relevant  record  before  the  concerned  authority  orders  of  termination  were  passed  flouting  all  norms.  The  appellants in the L.P.A's and the petitioners in the two  writ  petitions  are  entitled  to  all  the  consequential  benefits.  We  also  hereby  declare  that  the  orders  passed against the appellants in the L.P.As are void in  law  and  the  conviction  and  sentence  by  the  GCMs  against  the  writ  petitioners  are  void  in  law.  Consequently,  the  judgments  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  which  are  subject  matter  in  Latent  Patent  Appeals  are  set  aside  and the  writ  petitions  in  those  cases  are  allowed  and  the  Letters  Patent  Appeals  stand  allowed  and  the  two  writ  petitions  also  stand  allowed.  All  the  writ  petitions  stand  allowed  to  the  above  extent  indicated  and  other  reliefs  prayed  for  cannot  be  considered  by  this  Court  and  it  is  for  the  law makers  to  attend  to  the  same.  There  shall  be  no  order as to costs."

13.  Another  relevant  event  in  this  journey  of  judicial  

conflict  which  is  worth  mentioning  is  that  two  

officers,  namely,  Subhash  Juneja  and  Harish  Lal  

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Singh,  whose writ  petitions had been dismissed on  

the  ground  of  constructive  res  judicata, filed  special  leave  

petitions that were converted to Civil Appeal Nos. 1931 and 1932 of 1997  

and  were  finally  dismissed  by  a  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  vide  

order dated 23.4.2003, which is quoted as under:

    "The grievance  of  the appellants  that  is  sought  to  be  agitated  in  these  appeals  is  already  settled  by  an  earlier  judgment  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  in  a  Writ  Petition  filed  by  the  appellants  themselves.  The  appellants  herein  challenged  the  said  judgment  by  filing Special Leave Petitions and those Special Leave  Petitions  having  been  dismissed  by  this  Court,  the  contentions raised by them have been finally decided  against the appellants herein.

    The  appellants  are  now  trying  to  re- agitate  those  issues  because  the  High  Court  in  some  other  case  has  taken  a  different  view.  Mr.  Yogeshwar  Prasad,  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  states  that  these  cases  should  be  heard  along  with  the  cases  of  Union  of  India which are pending against the latter view of the  High  Court.  We  find  no  reason  to  do  so.  The  contention  of  the  appellant  raised  was  rightly  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  in  the  impugned  judgment  by  applying  the  principles  of  constructive  res  judicata.  The  appeals  are  accordingly dismissed."

(Emphasis added)

14.  Thus,  it  can  be  seen  from  the  narration  of  facts  

hereinabove  that  with  regard  to  some  of  the  

officers, who were involved in this very incident, the  

evidence which  had already  been assessed by  the  

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High Court,  had been looked into and it  was found  

that the doctrine of pleasure had been upheld in the  

earlier round of litigation and, therefore, the matter  

stood  foreclosed  and  could  not  be  reopened.  The  

adjudication, therefore, between the Union of India  

who  is  the  present  appellant  and  the  officers  who  

were  involved  in  the  same  set  of  incidents  had  

attained  finality  up  to  this  Court.  It  was  in  this  

background that the Union of India filed the appeals  

in  the  year  2001  against  the  judgment  dated  

21.12.2000 referred  to  hereinabove.  The judgment  

dated 21.12.2000 in relation to all  the four sets of  

litigations  that  have  been  referred  to  by  the  High  

Court  in  its  order  dated  2.5.1995  is,  therefore,  

extracted hereinabove.

15.  The  appeals  filed  by  the  Union  of  India,  pending  

before  this  Court  against  the  judgment  dated  

21.12.2000, were split into two parts by the order of  

this  Court  dated  14.2.2006,  which  is  extracted  

herein:

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"C.A. Nos.2949-2950/2001  :  Arguments heard.  Judgment reserved. The  entire  original  record  including  the  administrative receipts  be called  for  either  by  FAX  or  by  telephonic  message  immediately by the Registrar (Judicial).  C.A.Nos.2951-2957/2001  :  De-linked. These  matters  shall  be  heard  separately.  List after four months."

16.  Accordingly,  the  arguments  were  heard  and  

judgment was reserved in the matter arising out of  

the two writ petitions filed by Ranbir  Singh  Rathaur  

and Ashok  Kumar  Rana  alongwith which delinked  

seven  LPAs  were  also disposed of  even though it  

was observed by  this  Court  that  they   arose  out  

of  the  same   incident.  This Court vide judgment  

dated 22.3.2006 in   the case of  Union of  India  &  Ors.  

vs.  Ranbir  Singh Rathaur & Ors.,   (2006) 11 SCC  696  reversed the  

judgment  of  the  High  Court  dated  21.12.2000  vis-a-vis  the  two  writ   

petitions and held as follows:

"On a bare reading  o f  the High Court's order and the   averments in the writ petitions, one thing is crystal clear   that  there was no definite  allegation  against any person   who was responsible f o r  the so-called manipulation. I t  is   also  not  clear  as  to  who  were  the  parties  in  the  writ   petitions filed. In the grounds indicated in the writ petitions   

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it  was stated that  there is  no bar  or  impediment  on the   High  Court  reviewing  the  petitioner's  case  as  also   connected  cases  to  enquire  into  the  validity  o f  the  acts   done  against  the  writ  petitioner.  Therefore,  it  was  an  accepted  position that the writ petitioners wanted review   of the High Court's order, which is clearly impermissible.   No ground for seeking such review apparently was made  out. I n  any event we feel that the High Court's approach   is clearly erroneous. The present appellants in the counter- affidavit  filed  had  raised  a  preliminary  objection  as   regards the maintainability of the writ petitions  and had  requested the High Court to grant further opportunity if the  necessity so arises to file a detailed counter-affidavit a f t e r  the preliminary objections were decided.  The High Court   in  fact  in  one  of  the  orders  clearly  indicated  that  the   preliminary  objections  were  to  be  decided  first.  But  strangely it did not do so.  I t  reserved the judgment and  delivered the final judgment after about three years. There   is also dispute as to whether the relevant documents were   produced.  What  ba f f l e s  us  is  that  in  the  High  Court,   records with original documents were shown to it and the   Bench  wanted  the  copies  to  be  filed.  In  the  impugned  judgment  the High Court  proceeded on the basis as  i f   only a few pages  o f  the files were shown.  I f  that was   really the case, there was no necessity for the High Court   to  direct  the  present  appellants  to  file  copies.  If  a f t e r  perusal of the documents the High Court felt that these   were not sufficient the same would have been stated. But  that does not appear to have been done. The High Court   also had not discussed as to how the matters which stood   concluded  could  he  reopened  in  the  manner  done.  No   sufficient grounds have been even indicated as to why the   High Court felt it necessary to do so.  To say that though  finality  had  been  achieved,  justice  stood  at  a  higher   pedestal  is  not  an  answer  to  the  basic  question  as  to   whether  the  High  Court  was  competent  to  reopen  the   whole  issue which had become concluded.  The persons  whom  the  High  Court  felt  were  responsible  for  alleged   manipulation or persons behind false implication were not   impleaded  as  parties.  Newspaper  reports  are  not  to  be   considered as evidence. The authenticity o f  the newspaper   reports was not established by the writ  petitioners.  Even   otherwise, this could not have been done in a writ petition,   as disputed questions of fact were apparently involved. The   matters  which  the  High  Court  found  to  have  been   established were really not so. The conclusions were based   

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on  untested  materials,  and  the  writ  petitioners  had  not   established them by evidence. Since the High Court has not   dealt with the matter in the proper perspective we feel that   it would be proper for the High Court to rehear the matter.   The  High  Court  shall  first  decide  the  preliminary   objections raised by the present appellants about the non- maintainability  of  the  writ  petitions.  Normally  such  a   course is not to be adopted. But in view  o f  the peculiar   facts  involved,  it  would be  the appropriate  course to  be   adopted in the present case. Therefore, we remit the matter   to the High Court  f o r  fresh hearing.  We  make it clear   that whatever we have observed should not be treated to be   the  conclusive  findings  on  the  subject-matter  o f  controversy. The appeals are allowed without any order as   to costs. Since the matter is pending since long, we request   the  High  Court  to  dispose  o f  the  matter  as  early  as   practicable, preferably within four months from the date of   receipt of the judgment. No costs. "  (Emphasis added)

17.On  remand,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  writ  

petitions  vide  judgment  dated  20.12.2007  and  the  

same has been placed on record by the appellants.

18.So far  these appeals  are  concerned,  the  High  Court  

by the impugned common order dated 21.12.2000, not  

only  quashed  the  termination  orders  but  also  court  

martial proceedings held against some of the officers.

19.The  Division  Bench  of  this  Court,  after  hearing  the  

counsel appearing for the parties and legal contentions  

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urged,  formulated   the  following  points   for  

consideration  by  a  larger  bench  [Union  of  India  vs.  S.P.  

Sharma, (2013) 10 SCC 150]:-   

“31. With  reference  to  the  aforesaid  rival  factual  and  legal  contentions  urged,  the  following points would arise for consideration in  these appeals: 31.1. Whether  the  orders  of  termination  passed  by  the  first  appellant  in  absence  of  material  evidence  and  improper  exercise  of  power by the first  appellant  amount to fraud  being  played  on  the  respondent  officers  and  are  vitiated  in  law  on  account  of  legal  malafides and legal malice? 31.2. Whether the order of dismissal of earlier  writ  proceedings and confirming the same by  this Court vide order dated 1-9-1980 in relation  to the same respondent officers in C.As. Nos.  2951,  2954,  2955,  2956  and  2957  of  2001  amounts to doctrine of merger and operates as  res judicata against the present appeals? 31.3. Whether  the  exercise  of  doctrine  of  pleasure under Section 18 of the Army Act read  with Article 310 of the Constitution by the first  appellant  in  the  absence  of  any  material  evidence against  the respondent  officers  and  non-production of the relevant records/files of  these officers render the orders of termination  as illegal and invalid? 31.4. Whether  the  order  of  termination  is  arbitrary,  capricious,  unreasonable  and  violative of Articles 14,  16,  19 and 21 of  the  Constitution of India? 31.5. Whether  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  of  the  High  Court  is  vitiated  either  on  account of erroneous reasoning or error in law  and warrant interference by this Court?”

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20. The  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  at  the  very  

outset  submitted  that  issues  involving  security  of  the  

State were extremely complex and the issue related to  

the expediency and desirability  of  retaining officers  in  

the Army who had become security suspects. The instant  

cases  of  the  respondent  officers  were  examined  at  

various levels in the Army Headquarters as also in the  

Central  Government  and the final  decision to  exercise  

the power to pass an order of termination was taken by  

it  under  Section 18 of  the Army Act.  Learned counsel  

relied upon the judgment of this Court in  B.P. Singhal  

vs.  Union  of  India  &  Ors. (2010)  6  SCC  331  and  

contended that the parameters that are required to be  

taken  into  consideration  for  exercise  of  power  under  

Article  310  of  the  Constitution  are  varied.  Several  of  

these parameters entail evaluation of issues relevant to  

the security of the State. The factors that form the basis  

of exercise of power under Article 310 of the Constitution  

cannot  be  said  to  be  objective  parameters  that  are  

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amenable  to  judicially  manageable  standards.  The  

reasons that form the basis of exercise of power under  

Article  310  can  extend  to  varied  levels  of  subjective  

assessments  and  evaluations  in  entailing  expert  

knowledge as to issues of security of the State. In that  

view of the matter it is submitted that exercise of power  

of judicial review would accord great latitude to the bona  

fide evaluation made by the competent authorities in the  

course of discharge of the duties. The correctness of the  

opinion formed or the sufficiency of material forming the  

basis of their  decision to pass an order of termination  

would not be subjected to judicial scrutiny of either the  

High Court or this Court. Further, placing strong reliance  

upon B.P. Singhal case, (supra) it is contended by the  

learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  that  exercise  of  

power of judicial review under Article 310 is extremely  

narrow and is  limited  to  only  one parameter,  namely,  

violation  of  fundamentals  of  constitutionalism.  The  

standard of judicial review which applies to the case of  

exercise of executive or statutory or quasi-judicial power  

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cannot  be  extended  to  the  case  of  judicial  review  of  

constitutional power under Article 310. Learned counsel  

submitted that the fact that Article 311 does not apply to  

the  case  of  officers/employees  of  armed  forces,  the  

power  under  Article  309  also  cannot  be  exercised  for  

limiting  the  ambit  of  Article  310.  The  Army Act  is  an  

enactment  under  Article  309.  The  aforesaid  legal  

principle  has  been  followed  consistently  in  all  

subsequent  decisions  of  this  Court.  In  this  connection  

learned counsel relied upon  the judgment of this Court  

in Moti Ram Deka vs. North East Frontier Railways  

(1964) 5 SCR 683. Further, the Constitution Bench of this  

Court in  Ram Sarup vs.  Union of India, AIR 1965 SC  

247 with reference to Article 33 of the Constitution, has  

laid  down  limitations  provided  on  the  applicability  of  

fundamental rights guaranteed to the officers/employees  

of  the  Army  under  Articles  14,  16  and  21  of  the  

Constitution and under Section 21 of the Army Act. He  

has further contended that each of the provisions of the  

Army Act also carries the sanction of Parliament against  

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the applicability of all other fundamental rights contained  

under Part III of the Constitution to the extent to which  

the  rights  contained  in  the  fundamental  rights  are  

inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  the  Army  Act.  The  

aforesaid  enunciation  of  law  has  again  been  followed  

consistently by this Court in subsequent decisions.

21. The  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  further  

contended that in a matter of civilian employees, Article  

311  represents  a  limitation  over  the  absoluteness  of  

pleasure doctrine contained in Article 310. In Moti Ram  

Deka (supra)  and in the subsequent cases, this Court  

laid  down  that  Article  311  introduces  a  twofold  

procedural safeguard in favour of an employee/officer in  

relation to the exercise of pleasure doctrine. However,  

Article 311 applies only in cases of punishment and not  

otherwise. The availability of the safeguards provided for  

under Article 311 is contingent upon and limited to cases  

where  the  power  of  termination  of  services  of  an  

employee/officer  is  exercised  by  the  disciplinary  

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authority  by  way  of  punishment.  The  applicability  of  

Article 311 of the Constitution being dependent on the  

factum of the order of termination being in the nature of  

a  punishment,  judicial  review  undertaken  in  case  of  

civilian  employees  entails  the  necessity  for  and  the  

power of determining as to whether the order impugned  

is in the nature of a punishment or not. The doctrine of  

“foundation”, “camouflage” and the principles of judicial  

review,  encompassing  the  necessity  and the  power  of  

determining, whether the order impugned is by way of a  

punishment  is  thus  a  direct  emanation  and  a  logical  

corollary of the nature of enquiry warranted when Article  

311 applies to a case.

22. Since the provisions of  Article 311 of  the Constitution  

admittedly do not apply to these cases, it relates to the  

domain  of  civilian  employees/officers  service  

jurisprudence, which is controlled by Article 311, cannot  

be invoked in the case of employees/officers of armed  

forces.  Since  the  protection  of  Article  311  cannot  be  

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claimed in the case of employees of armed forces, no  

enquiry  as  to  whether  the  order  is  by  way  of  a  

punishment, which is the sine qua non for applicability of  

Article 311, is warranted. The legal issue requires to be  

considered by this Court in the context of the fact as to  

whether by virtue of anything contained in the language  

of Article 310 or the other provisions of the Constitution,  

the  constitutional  power  under  Article  310  can  be  

construed  to  be  limited  to  cases  of  termination  

simpliciter.  It  is  contended on behalf  of  the appellants  

that neither the language of Article 310 nor any other  

provision of the Constitution warrants adoption of such a  

narrow  construction.  Further,  the  learned  Additional  

Solicitor  General  has  contended  that  this  Court  has  

consistently  held  that  the  ambit  of  the  doctrine  of  

pleasure,  contained  under  Article  310,  is  an  absolute  

power,  save  to  the  extent  provided  otherwise  by  an  

express provision of the Constitution. The only express  

limitation on the power of Article 310 exists under the  

Constitution  in  relation  to  the  tenure  of  certain  

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constitutional functionaries such as the Hon’ble Judges of  

the  High  Court  and  the  Supreme  Court.  He  further  

contends,  placing  reliance  upon  Moti  Ram  Deka  

(supra) that this Court has laid down the legal principle;  

that the ambit of Article 310 is circumscribed only by the  

provisions of Article 311 and that even Article 309 does  

not  circumscribe  the  said  power.  The  conferment  of  

power upon the President of India under Article 310 is in  

absolute  terms.  Therefore,  there  is  no  basis  for  

suggesting that the power under Article 310 ought to be  

construed  as  excluding  the  power  to  dismiss  an  

employee or officer for misconduct.  The very fact that  

Article  310  makes  the  tenure  subject  to  the  absolute  

pleasure of the President means that the President can  

exercise  the  said  power  for  any  reason  and  without  

assigning any cause or reason and this is precisely what  

has  been  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  B.P.  Singhal  

(supra).  He  further  contends  that  the  power  under  

Article 310 also encompasses the power to dismiss an  

employee  or  officer  for  misconduct  and  Article  311  is  

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inapplicable in respect of an employee or officer of the  

armed  forces.  It  is  further  submitted  that  in  case  of  

armed forces scrutiny of an order passed under Article  

310  would  neither  warrant  an  enquiry  as  to  the  

foundation of the order nor an enquiry as to whether the  

order  is  in  the  nature  of  punishment.  Therefore,  he  

submits  that  the necessary  corollary  thereof  would be  

that the competent authority is also free to abandon any  

statutory procedure at any stage and take resort to the  

constitutional power under Article 310 by the President  

to terminate the services of an employee/officer of the  

armed  forces.  The  ambit  of  such  power  cannot  be  

circumscribed with reference to the concepts that govern  

the  exercise  of  the  power  in  relation  to  civilian  

employees/officers.

23. Learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  put  reliance  on  

Chief of Army Staff vs. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety,  

(1985) 2 SCC 412 where this Court has also upheld the  

competent authority’s power to switch over to its power  

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under Section 18 of the Army Act upon abandonment of  

the GCM proceedings against its employees/officers. The  

authorities  are  competent  to  take  recourse  to  their  

statutory power under Section 19 in a case where the  

court martial exercise initiated by them becomes futile.  

It  cannot  be  contended  by  the  officer  that  where  

alternative powers under the statute can be resorted to  

in  such  situations  the  authority  cannot  resort  to  its  

constitutional power under Article 310 but pass an order  

of  termination  against  the  officer  of  the  Army.  Such  

provision of the statutory power including Section 19 of  

the Army Act can be said to be subject to the limitations  

of the scheme of the Army Act. Power under Article 310,  

which  is  constitutional  power,  is  wider  and  certainly  

cannot be subjected to the constraints flowing from the  

scheme of the Army Act. It is further contended that this  

Court has examined the legality and validity of similar  

orders of termination in exercise of power under Article  

310 of the Constitution by the President upholding the  

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orders of termination passed in exercise of the aforesaid  

constitutional statutory provisions.

24.  Shri  P.P.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  

respondent  Major  S.P.  Sharma,  firstly  brought  to  our  

notice the sequence of the events happened so far as  

this respondent is concerned.  According to the learned  

counsel in spite of unblemished career and academic  

experience Major Sharma was arrested in 1979 and was  

lodged in a cell and was denied the basic facilities.  The  

said respondent represented to the Chief of Army Staff  

and Deputy Chief of Army Staff-GOC about the inhuman  

treatment.   However,  in  1979  a  charge  report  was  

handed over to the respondent on 14.04.1979 for which  

he was arrested.  It was alleged by the respondent that  

the  army  authorities  released  false,  defamatory  and  

fabricated  press  release  stating  that  the  respondent  

was the ring leader of the group with 15 others and was  

spying for Pakistan, having received huge sum in Indian  

currency for  passing of information to Pakistan about  

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the Indian Army.  A second charge report was handed  

over  to  the  respondent.   Later  on  a  summary  of  

evidence  was  commenced  on  the  basis  of  false  

allegation.   

      Mr.  Rao,  then  contended  that  about  27  

prosecution witnesses were examined and all of them  

spoke about his honesty and integrity and uprightness.  

Learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  when  the  

charges  against  the  present  respondent  were  not  

substantiated  he  was  released  from  arrest  and  

suspended from duties.  He was granted leave and after  

that he was recalled for duty and an order of dismissal  

dated 11.01.1980 was served and handed over to the  

respondent.  Subsequently, by a corrigendum the order  

of dismissal  of the respondent was substituted by an  

order of termination.   

25.  Mr.  Rao,  has  not  disputed  the  fact  that  the  said  

respondent Major S.P. Sharma filed a writ petition being  

W.P. No.418 of 1980 challenging the order of dismissal  

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dated 11.01.1980.  The said writ petition was dismissed  

by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and against  

the said order the respondent preferred a Special Leave  

Petition before this Court being 7225 of 1980 which was  

also dismissed.  When the order of dismissal attained  

finality, the respondent was served with a show cause  

notice as to why a cut-off 5% in the retirement gratuity  

and Death-Cum-Retirement Gratuity be not imposed as  

his  service  was  not  satisfactory.   The  respondent  

Sharma again challenged the said notice by filing a writ  

petition in the High Court being W.P. No.1643 of 1982.  

In the said Writ Petition the respondent also challenged  

the order dated 03.03.1980 by which the dismissal was  

substituted by an order of termination.  The said writ  

petition was dismissed by the High Court on 22.03.1985  

holding  that  the  said  order  of  termination  is  a  

termination  simpliciter  without  being  any  stigma  

attached.   The  said  order  was  challenged  by  the  

respondent by filing LPA No.77 of 1993.   The matter  

then travelled to a Full Bench and finally concluded by  

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the impugned order  passed by the Division Bench of  

the Delhi High Court.  

26.  Mr.  P.P.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel  advanced  his  

argument on the points formulated by this Court and  

submitted that the second writ petition cannot, at any  

stretch  of  imagination,  be  held  to  be  barred  by  the  

principles  of  res  judicata.   Learned  counsel  further  

submitted  that  by  issuing  an  order  of  termination  in  

place of dismissal,  the entire finding recorded by the  

Court  while  considering  the  order  of  dismissal  got  

washed off, hence there can be no res judicata.  

27. Mr. Rao then drew our attention to the counter affidavit  

filed by the appellant  Union of  India before the High  

Court and submitted that if the offence was so grave  

then  the  respondent  should  have  been  punished  

instead of dismissal from service.

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28. Mr. Rao vehemently argued by giving reference to the  

finding recorded by the High Court that non-production  

of  records  and the materials  which are the basis  for  

passing  the  order  of  termination  is  wholly  illegal,  

arbitrary  and  unjustified.   He  reiterated  that  for  the  

non-production  of  materials  and  records  in  spite  of  

being directed by the Court, adverse inference has to  

be  drawn.   According  to  the  learned  senior  counsel,  

withholding  of  documents  by  the  constitutional  

authority and the Government is a serious matter and,  

therefore, the High Court has rightly held the order of  

termination bad in law.  In this regard learned counsel  

referred and relied upon the decisions of this Court in  

Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar  vs. Mahomed Haji Latif &  

Ors.  1968 (3) SCR 862 and Ghaio Mall & Sons  vs.  

State of Delhi & Ors., 1959 SCR 1424.  

29. On the question of doctrine of pleasure,  Mr. Rao firstly  

contended that the constitutional provisions contained  

in Article 309, 310 and 311 are subject to Article  14 of  

the  Constitution.   According  to  the  learned  counsel,  

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Article  14,  15 and 21 constitute the core values and  

such right cannot be taken away on the plea of doctrine  

of pleasure.     In this connection he relied on   I.R.  

Coelho    vs.   State of Tamil Nadu,  (2007) 2 SCC 1.

30.  Mr.  Rao  then  contended  that  Article  33  of  the  

Constitution is in the nature of exception but it does not  

abrogate  the  fundamental  rights.   In  other  words,  

Article 33 does not speak about the basic structure of  

the  Constitution.   Learned  counsel  relied  upon  the  

decision of this Court  in  B.P. Singhal  vs.  U.O.I.,  

(2010) 6 SCC 331.  

31. Mr.  Rao then contended that Article 33 in any event  

shall  be given restricted interpretation for the reason  

that  any  law  which  restricts  the  fundamental  rights  

shall be strictly interpreted.  In this connection learned  

counsel  referred  to  (1974)  1  SCC  645:  Bhut  Nath  

Mete vs. State of West Bengal.   Mr. Rao addressed  

on  legal  malice  and  malice  in  law  and  referred  a  

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decision  of  this  Court  in  Ravi  Yashwant  Bhoir vs.  

District Collector, Raigad & Ors., (2012) 4 SCC 407.  

32.  Mr.  Rao  submitted  that  only  notings  were  produced  

before the High Court but the material on the basis of  

which  opinion  was  formed  was  not  produced.   The  

detailed  summary  of  evidence,  different  memos  and  

other  documents  produced  in  the  court  martial  

proceeding  were  also  not  produced  before  the  High  

Court.   Learned counsel submitted that those notings  

produced before the High Court are not material, rather  

advisory material.  Learned counsel referred to some of  

the  paragraphs  of  the  judgment  rendered  in  S.R.  

Bommai and Ors.  vs.  Union of India and Ors.,  

(1994) 3 SCC 1.

        Learned counsel  lastly  submitted that  although  

5% cut in gratuity has been withdrawn by the appellant,  

the termination has to be held as bad.

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33. Mr. Deepak Bhattacharya, learned counsel appearing on  

behalf  of  Major Ajwani in C.A.  No.2953 of 2001,  firstly  

submitted that the order of termination under Section 18  

of the Army Act is a colourable exercise of power which  

is  arbitrary,  capricious  and  unreasonable.   Learned  

counsel  submitted  that  the  pleasure  doctrine  is  the  

residual  executive  power  under  Section  53  of  the  

Constitution and hence amenable to  judicial  review to  

ensure  that  the  same  follows  the  satisfaction  of  the  

President after due application of mind and without any  

arbitrary,  capricious  and  un-reasonable  exercise  of  

power.  According to the learned counsel the respondent  

Major  Ajwani  was  arrested  and  kept  in  solitary  

confinement  without being informed of  any reason for  

the  same  and,  thereafter,  criminal  proceedings  were  

initiated against him.  It was contended that the criminal  

proceedings  against  him  was  abandoned  without  

informing him any reason for  the same and finally  he  

was illegally terminated under Section 18 of the Army  

Act.

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34. On  the  question  of  res  judicata,  learned  counsel  submitted that there is no pleading of res judicata ever  

raised  by  the  appellant.   However,  learned  counsel  

adopted the argument advanced by Mr. P.P. Rao on the  

question of res judicata.    

35. Mrs.  Kiran  Suri,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  Capt.  

Arun  Sharma  and  Capt.  J.S.  Yadav  in  C.A.No.2954  of  

2001 and C.A.No.  2957 of  2001,  firstly  submitted that  

there is no decision on merit in the earlier writ petition  

and,  therefore,  the  question  of  application  of  res  judicata does  not  arise.   The  writ  petition  was  

dismissed since the pleasure doctrine was invoked and it  

is open to judicial review.  Learned counsel relied upon  

the decision of this Court in  Mathura Prasad Bajoo  Jaiswal  vs.  Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613;  Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association vs. Union  of India and Anr. (1989) 4 SCC 187;  Isabella Johnson  (Smt.)  vs.  M.A. Susai(dead) by LRs. (1991) 1 SCC 494  and  Kishan Lal   vs.  State of J&K (1994) 4 SCC 422.  Learned counsel then contended that the issue involved  

in the later proceedings was not an issue in the earlier  

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proceedings  inasmuch  as  the  later  writ  petition  was  

filed challenging the subsequent order converting the  

order of dismissal to order of termination and also a  

notification as to cut of gratuity.

36. Mrs.  Suri  then  submitted  that  the  order  in  the  first  

proceeding  is  an  order  which  has  been  the  result  of  

suppression of  documents/facts by the appellant  when  

these facts/documents were only within the knowledge  

of  the  appellant.    Hence  suppression  of  facts  and  

documents would not entitle the appellant to raise the  

technical plea of  res judicata and to take advantage of  the same.  It was contended that the appellant is under  

the public duty to disclose the true facts to the court  

which has not been done and it will amount to obtaining  

the order by fraud.

37. On the issue of doctrine of pleasure Mrs. Suri submitted  

that exercise of doctrine of pleasure in the absence of  

any material evidence against the respondent and non-

production of  relevant records of these officers render  

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the order of termination as illegal and invalid.  Learned  

counsel submitted that the justiciability of an action by  

the executive government is open to challenge on the  

ground of malafide and also that the formation of opinion  

is on irrelevant material.  Learned counsel in this regard  

referred to a decision of this Court in the case of  B.P.  Singhal  (supra) and  Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd.  vs.  State  of  Gujarat (1994)  4  SCC  1.   Lastly,  it  was  contended  that the  President has  been misled  without  

producing  the  relevant  material  and  on  the  basis  of  

false and misleading noting, order was obtained which  

amount to fraud and legal malafide.

38. Mr.  A.K.  Panda,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of respondent Capt. V.K. Diwan in C.A. No.2956  

of  2001,  made  his  submission  with  regard  to  the  

interpretation  of  Articles  309,  310  and  311  of  the  

Constitution.  According to the learned counsel  Article  

310 is not controlled by any legislation, on the contrary  

it is contended that Article 310 is subject to Article 309  

or 311 of the Constitution.  It was contended that the  

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respondent would have been exonerated had the court-

martial proceedings been continued.  But just to avoid  

court martial the appellant took recourse to terminate  

the services by applying the ‘pleasure’ doctrine.  On the  

point  of  res  judicata learned counsel  relied upon the  

decision in the case of V. Rajeshwari (Smt)  vs.  T.C.  

Saravanabava,  (2004)  1  SCC  551  and  Maneka  

Gandhi  vs.  Union of India & another, (1978) 1 SCC  

248.   

39. Mr. Panda, learned senior counsel further contended that  

in spite of the several  opportunities given by the Delhi  

High Court, the appellants failed to produce any material  

against  the  present  respondents   to  satisfy  the  Court  

that  the  termination  was  justified.   Learned  counsel  

submitted that the High Court has carefully analysed all  

the  facts  of  the case and recorded a  finding  that  the  

termination  was  wholly  malafide and  devoid  of  any  

substance.

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40.  Mr. Kameshwar Gumber, learned counsel appearing on  

behalf of Ex.Major R.K. Midha (now deceased) in C.A.  

No.  2952 of  2009,  at  the very outset  submitted that  

although  the  respondent  is  dead  now,  the  instant  

appeal is contested only with an object to restore the  

honour and to remove the stigma cast on him and the  

family.   Learned counsel,  however,  admitted that the  

family of the deceased respondent has been getting all  

pensionary benefits.

41.   Ms. Amrita Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the  

respondent in C.A. No.2955 of 2001 on the issue of res  

judicata, firstly contended that the earlier writ petition  

filed  by  the  respondent  challenging  the  order  of  

dismissal was dismissed up to this Court without going  

into the merit of the case and the issue of malafide was  

not discussed.  It was contended that the second writ  

petition challenging the order  of  termination and the  

show cause notice for deducting 5% of the gratuity was  

on the basis of a fresh cause of action inasmuch as the  

dismissal of writ petition up to this Court put an end to  

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the  proceedings  of  dismissal  until  the  Government  

came out  with  the  order  of  termination  with  ulterior  

motives.   Learned  counsel  then  contended  that  this  

Court in the order dated 17.11.1994 in Special Leave  

Petition agreed with the Full Bench and the matter was  

sent back to the High Court for decision on merit.  It  

was for the first time the appellant-Union of India made  

out  a  case  that  petitioners  had  been  caught  doing  

espionage  activity  and  thus  considered  a  security  

suspect. Adopting the argument of Mr. P.P. Rao, learned  

senior  counsel  submitted  that  Article  33  of  the  

Constitution  does  not  contemplate  restricting  or  

abrogating the basic structure of the Constitution or the  

core values of the Constitution.

42.   First  of  all,  we  shall  deal  with  the  following  

important  points  formulated  by  this  Court  referred  

hereinabove i.e.

 a) Whether  the  exercise  of  doctrine  of  

pleasure under  Section  18 of  the Army  Act  read  with  Article  310  of  the  Constitution in absence of  any material  

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evidence against the respondent- officer  and  the  non  production  of  relevant  records/files  of  these  officers  rendered  the  order  of  termination  as  illegal  and  invalid?

b) Whether  the  order  of  termination  is  arbitrary,  capricious,  unreasonable  and  violative  of  Articles  14,16,19 and 21 of  the Constitution of India.

c) xxxxxxxx

d) Whether  the  order  of  termination  passed  by   the  first  appellant  in  absence  of  material  evidence  and  improper exercise of power  by the first  appellant  amount to fraud being played  on  the  respondent  officers  and  are  vitiated  in  the  law  on  account  of  legal  malafides and legal malice?

43.   All  these  three  points  are  interconnected  and,  

therefore, will be discussed together.  Admittedly,  

the Division Bench while hearing the matter called  

for  the  relevant  records  from  the  appellant  and  

same  were  produced  in  the  Court.  The  Division  

Bench took notice of those files and observed:-

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   “55. The respondents had submitted for  our  perusal  four  thin  files  without  proper pagination and indexing.

     56.     From   a    reading of the files  one    could   see that    the proposal  had come from the Army    Headquarters  Directorate of Military Intelligence for  termination  of  services  of  certain  officers under Section 18 of the Army  act, 1950 and that was accepted by the  concerned  Ministry.  The  circumstances  under  which  the  Directorate  Military  Intelligence formed the opinion has not  been disclosed. A single sheet file has  been  submitted  to  show  that  on  17.12.1980  there  was  a  review  of  the  decision  taken  earlier  and  it  appears  from  a  note  typed  out  without  any  signature  of  any  authority,  that  the  very  Director  of  the  Military  Intelligence  who  proposed  action  have  been a party to the review meeting. From  the  records  produced  no  authority  can  come to any conclusion on the decision  to be taken by the authorities concerned  for terminating service of the officers.  We wanted to satisfy ourselves about the  basis on which the action was proposed  by  the  Directorate  Military  Intelligence.  Apparently,  the  Directorate  of  Military  Intelligence  though that they are not obliged in law  to produce any record before the Court  and  the  decision  of  the  Directorate  Military  Intelligence  cannot  be  scrutinised by this Court.

      xxxxx xxxxx

     129. It has   now   become    absolutely  necessary     to  Notice  the  records  produced  by  the  respondents.  When  one  the  learned  addl.  Solicitor  General  submitted  that  though  the  respondents  had  claimed  privilege  they  had  no  

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objection to place all the records for  the  perusal  of  this  Court  to  satisfy  whether  the  respondents  had  acted  in  accordance  with  law.  It  is  a  little  disturbing  to  note  that  respondents  instead  of  producing  the  relevant  records  pertaining  to  the  officers  involved in the cases had just produced  three flaps. No numbers are given. On  flap  contains  three  sheets.  The  first  sheet is mentioned as Index sheet. Index  sheet itself mentions that there is only  one page in the file. The other sheet  contains a note which states that all  the cases have been thoroughly reviewed  at  Army  Headquarters.  The  other  sheet  shows that the matter was discussed in a  meeting  held  in  the  Home  Secretary's  Room on 1.10.1980.

     130. The next flap is empty. The same  note, as found in the earlier flap, is  found pinned on to the flap itself. In  the third flap there are 15 sheets. The  first sheet is typed as Index Sheet. It  states that "this file contains a total  of 12 pages". When there are 14 sheets  besides  the  Index  Sheet  and  in  some  sheets both sides are typed. Therefore,  the  flap  contains  12  pages  is  not  accurate. These sheets also do not give  us  any  relevant  material  to  form  an  opinion   about    the action taken   by  the    respondents. Therefore, - the  irresistible  conclusion  is  that  the  respondents have suppressed the material  records  from  this  Court  and  are  not  willing to part with or produce the same  for perusal of the Court. It cannot be  pretended by the respondents that there  are no other files available with them  except the three flaps produced before  this  Court,  as  in  the  written  notes  submitted by the learned Addl. Solicitor  General reference is made to file No. 9,  10, 18, 1, 2 and pages of the files are  

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also given in the written notes,   some  files     containing  more  than  600  pages.”

44.   On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the Division  

Bench held that the respondent-appellant has not  

placed  any  material  justifying  their  action.   The  

Court has, therefore, concluded its findings in para  

168  of  the  judgment  which  is  reproduced  

hereunder:-

“168. The whole of the bundle of facts  in  the  instant  batch  of  cases  would  appear to be a pot boiler to project the  image  of  the  Military  Intelligence  Directorate,    leaving   us at the  end   with    the    cliff hanger  without any iota of materials to form an  opinion  about  the  involvement  of  the  appellants  and  the  petitioners.  They  have chosen not to produce the entire  records  without  realising  their  constitutional obligation. Just to make  an apology they have produced some flaps  as if they constitute all the records in  the case. In a system where rule of law  reigns  supreme  the  deportment  of  the  respondents cannot at all be tolerated.  Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of  the  United  States  of  America  Speaking  for the Supreme Court in Wisconsin vs.  Illinois,   281 US 179.

"The State "must... yield to an authority  that is paramount to the State".

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45.   Mr.  Paras  Kuhad,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  

General  assailed  the  aforesaid  finding  as  being  

incorrect  and  submitted  that  all  the  relevant  

materials  were  produced  before  the  Court  and  

after  hearing  was  concluded,  all  those  original  

papers  were  returned  back  to  the  appellant.  The  

appellant  had submitted  the  photocopy of  all  the  

relevant material.  

46.   During the course of hearing, Learned Additional  

Solicitor General produced before us all those files  

and  documents  which  were  produced  before  the  

High  Court.  The  Additional  Solicitor  General  also  

produced the link  file as directed by us.

47.    Mrs. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel appearing  

in  one  of  the  Civil  Appeal  No.2954  of  2001,  

submitted a note wherein she has mentioned that  

on  3.1.2001  the  Advocate  received  back  the  

following  original  file  from the  High  Court  as  per  

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the  receipt  produced  by  the  appellant  in  L.P.A.  

No.43 of 1987 and other connected matters.

i) GCM proceedings in respect of Capt. A.K. Rana IC  23440H  (Page 1-615) ii)  GCM  Proceedings  in  respect  of  Capt R.S.  Rathaur  IC  23720  N  (Page  1- 577) iii) File containing analysis of  Espionage cases  in  the  respect  of  all  the  Appellants. (Page 1-13) iv) Brief of Samba spy Cases  (Page 1-6) v) File  showing  approval  of  Chief  of  Army Staff in respect of all cases.     (Page 1-9) vi) File  showing  approval  of  Govt,  of  India  in respect of all the cases.       (Page 1-12) vii) File  showing  note  from  PMO's  Office regarding  review  note  of  review  at  office  of Home Secretary (Page 1-2)

48. We  have  minutely  perused  all  the  records  including  

notings along with link file produced by the Additional  

Solicitor General.  On perusal and scrutiny of all those  

materials we are of the view that the High Court has  

committed grave error of record and there is total non-

application of mind in recording the aforesaid findings.  

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From the record, it  is evidently clear that the inquiry  

against these respondents were initiated by the Army  

Headquarters, Director of Military Intelligence.  The file  

traveled  from Chief  of  the  Army  Staff  to  Ministry  of  

Defence with the strong recommendation to terminate  

the  services  of  the  respondents  in  the  interest  of  

security  of  the  State  as  there  was  some material  to  

show that   these officers  were involved in espionage  

cases.   The  recommendation  for  termination  of  their  

services  up  to  the  Defence  Ministry  was  finally  

approved by the Prime Minister who also happened to  

be the Defence Minister of India at that time.  The file  

was then placed before the President of India who in  

exercise  of  the  constitutional  power  terminated  the  

services of these officers.

49. The  link  file  further  reveals  that  confessional  

statements  of  Captain  Rana  and  other  officers  were  

also recorded and strong  prima facie case was found  

relating  to  the  involvement  of  these  officers  in  

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espionage activities  and sharing information with  the  

Pakistani intruders.

50. On assessing the materials contained in link file and  

the  notings  showing  the  suggestions  and  

recommendations up to the level of  defence ministry  

and  the  Prime  Minister,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  

impugned order of termination of services have been  

passed  without  any  material  available  on  record.  

There is no dispute that order of termination passed  

against  the Army personnel  in  exercise of  ‘pleasure  

doctrine’,  is  subject  to  judicial  review,  but  while  

exercising judicial review, this court cannot substitute  

its own conclusion on the basis of materials on record.  

The Court exercising the power of judicial review has  

certain  limitations,  particularly  in  the  cases  of  this  

nature.  The safety and security of the nation is above  

all/everything.  When the President in exercise of its  

constitutional  power  terminates  the  services  of  the  

Army  officers,  whose  tenure  of  services  are  at  the  

pleasure  of  the  President  and  such  termination  is  

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based  on  materials  on  record,  then  this  court  in  

exercise of powers of judicial review should be slow in  

interfering with such pleasure of President exercising  

constitutional power.  In a constitutional set up, when  

office is held during the pleasure of the President, it  

means  that  the  officer  can  be  removed  by  the  

Authority on whose pleasure he holds office without  

assigning any reason. The Authority is not obliged to  

assign  any  reason  or  disclose  any  cause  for  the  

removal.

51. Thus, it is not a case where the decisions to terminate  

the  services  of  these  officers  were  taken  under  the  

‘pleasure  doctrine’  without  any  material  against  the  

officers.  On  the  contrary,  as  noticed  above,  charges  

were leveled that these officers were involved in certain  

espionage activities.

52. In the instant case, on perusal of the link file it is further  

revealed that detailed investigation was conducted and  

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all  evidence  recorded  were  examined  by  the  

Intelligence Department and finally the Authority came  

to the finding that retention of these officers were not  

expedient in the interest and security of the State.  In  

our view, sufficiency of ground cannot be questioned,  

particularly in a case where termination order is issued  

by the President under the pleasure doctrine.

53. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of the  

State of  Rajasthan & Ors.  vs.  Union of  India &  

Ors. 1977  (3)  SCC  592,  while  considering  a  

constitutional power of the President under Article 356  

of the Constitution observed:-

“81.  A  challenge  to  the  exercise  of  power  to  issue  a  proclamation  under  Article 352 of the Constitution would be  even more difficult to entertain than to  one  under  Article  356(1)  as  all  these  considerations  would  then  arise  which  Courts  take  into  account  when  the  Executive, which alone can have all the  necessary  information  and  means  to  judge such an issue, tells Courts that the  nation  is  faced  with  a  grave  national  emergency  during  which  its  very  

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existence or stability may be at stake.  That was the principle which governed  the  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  Liversidge v.  Anderson. The principle is  summed  up  in  the  salutary  maxim:  Salus  Populi  Supreme Lex. And  it  was  that principle which this Court, deprived  of the power to examine or question any  materials  on  which  such  declarations  may  be  based,  acted  in  Additional  District  Magistrate,  Jabalpur v.  Shivakant Shukla We need not go so far  as that when we have before us only a  proclamation under Article 356(1).

xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx

87. Courts have consistently held issues  raising questions of mere sufficiency of  grounds of executive action, such as the  one under Article 356(1) no doubt is to  be non-justiciable. The amended Article  356(5) of the Constitution indicates that  the  Constitution-makers  did  not  want  such an issue raising a mere question of  sufficiency of grounds to be justiciable.  To  the  same  effect  are  the  provisions  contained  in  Articles  352(5),  360(5).  Similarly,  Articles  123(4),  213(4),  239  B(4)  bar  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  to  examine  matters  which  lie  within  the  executive discretion.  Such discretion is  governed by a large element of  policy  which is not amenable to the jurisdiction  of  courts  except  in  cases  of  patent  or  indubitable  malafides  or  excess  of  power.  Its  exercise  rests  on  materials  which  are  not  examinable  by  courts.  

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Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to   imagine  how  the  grounds of  action  under  Article  356(1)  could  be  examined when Article 74(2) lays down  that “the question whether any, and if  so,  what  advice  was  tendered  by  the  Ministers to the President, shall  not be  inquired into in any court”.

54.   In order to appreciate the application of constitutional  

provisions in respect of defence services, it would be  

appropriate to quote Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the  

Constitution. These articles read as under:-

 “Article 309:- Recruitment and conditions of  service of persons serving the Union or a State  Subject  to the provisions  of  this  Constitution,  Acts  of  the  appropriate  Legislature  may  regulate  the  recruitment,  and  conditions  of  service of persons appointed, to public services  and posts in connection with the affairs of the  Union or of any State: Provided that it shall be  competent for the President or such person as  he may direct in the case of services and posts  in connection with the affairs of the Union, and  for the Governor of a State or such person as  he may direct in the case of services and posts  in connection with the affairs of the State, to  make rules regulating the recruitment, and the  conditions of service of persons appointed, to  such services and posts until provision in that  behalf  is  made  by  or  under  an  Act  of  the  appropriate Legislature under this article, and  any rules so made shall have effect subject to  the provisions of any such Act.”

Article 310:- Tenure of office of persons serving  the Union or a State

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(1) Except  as  expressly  provided  by  this  Constitution, every person who is a member of  a defence service or of  a civil  service of  the  Union or  of  an all  India  service  or  holds  any  post connected with defence or any civil post  under  the  Union,  holds  office  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  and  every  person  who is a member of a civil service of a State or  holds any civil post under a State holds office  during  the  pleasure  of  the  Governor  of  the  State.

(2) Notwithstanding  that  a  person  holding  a  civil  post  under  the  Union  or  a  State  holds  office during the pleasure of the President or,  as  the  case  may be,  of  the  Governor  of  the  State, any contract under which a person, not  being a member of a defence service or of an  all  India  service  or  of  a  civil  service  of  the  Union  or  a  State,  is  appointed  under  this  Constitution  to  hold  such  a  post  may,  if  the  President or the Governor as the case may be,  deems  it  necessary  in  order  to  secure  the  services  of  a  person  having  special  qualifications, provide for the payment to him  of compensation, if before the expiration of an  agreed period, that post is abolished or he is,  for reasons not connected with any misconduct  on his part, required to vacate that post.”

Article 311:- Dismissal, removal or reduction in  rank  of  persons  employed  in  civil  capacities  under the Union or a State (1) No  person  who  is  a  member  of  a  civil  service of the Union or an all India service or a  civil  service  of  a  State  or  holds  a  civil  post  under the Union or a State shall be dismissed  or removed by a authority subordinate to that  by which he was appointed (2) No  such  person  as  aforesaid  shall  be  dismissed  or  removed  or  reduced  in  rank  except after an inquiry in which he has been  informed of the charges against him and given  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  being  heard  in  respect of those charges Provided that where it  

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relating  to  the  conditions  of  service  are  subject  to  

Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution. The Proviso  

to Article 309 confers powers upon the President in  

case  of  services  and  posts  in  connection  with  the  

affairs of the Union and upon the Governor of a State  

in connection with the services and posts connected  

with the affairs of the State to make rules regulating  

the recruitment and the conditions of services of the  

persons  appointed.  The  service  condition  shall  be  

regulated according to such rules.

56.  Article 310 provides that every person, who is a member  

of the defence service or of a civil service of the Union  

or All India Service, or any civil or defence force shall  

hold such posts during the pleasure of the President.  

Similarly,  every person who is  a  Member of  the Civil  

Services of a State or holds any civil post under a State,  

holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the  

State.   It  is  worth  to  mention  here  that  the  opening  

word of Article 310 “Except as expressly provided by  

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this  Constitution”  makes  it  clear  that  a  Government  

servant  holds  the  office  during  the  pleasure  of  the  

President or the Governor except as expressly provided  

by the Constitution.   

57.   From bare perusal of the provisions contained in Article  

311  of  the  Constitution,  it  is  manifestly  clear  that  

clauses  (i)  and  (ii)  of  Article  311  impose  restrictions  

upon  the  exercise  of  power  by  the  President  or  the  

Governor of the State of his pleasure under Article 310  

(1) of the Constitution. Article 311 makes it clear that  

any person who is  a  member  of  civil  services of  the  

Union or the State or holds civil posts under the Union  

or  a  State  shall  not  be  removed  or  dismissed  from  

service by an authority subordinate to that by which he  

was  appointed.   Further,  clause  (ii)  of  Article  311  

mandates that such removal or dismissal or reduction  

in rank of the members of the civil services of the Union  

or  the  State  shall  be  only  after  giving  reasonable  

opportunity of hearing in respect of the charges leveled  

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about  the  absolute  discretion  of  the  President  

exercising pleasure doctrine.  No provisions in the Army  

Act  curtail,  control  or  limit  the  power  contained  in  

Article 310(1) of the Constitution. Article 309 enables  

the legislature or executive to make any law, rule or  

regulation with regard to condition of services without  

impinging upon the overriding power recognized under  

Article 310 of the Constitution.  A Constitution Bench of  

this Court in  State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs.   

Babu Ram Upadhayay, (1961) 2 SCR 679, held that  

the Constitution practically incorporated the provisions  

of  Sections 240 and 241 of  the Government  of  India  

Act, 1935 in Articles 309 and 310 of the Constitution.  

But  the  Constitution  has  not  made  “the  tenure  of  

pleasure” subject to any law made by the legislature.  

On  the  other  hand,  Article  309  is  expressly  made  

subject to the provisions of Article 310 which provides  

for  pleasure  doctrine.   Hence,  it  can  safely  be  

concluded  that  the  Army  Act  cannot  in  any  way  

override or stand higher than Constitutional provisions  

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contained in Article 309 and consequently no provision  

of the Army Act could cut down the pleasure tenure in  

Article 310 of the Constitution. In another Constitution  

Bench Judgment of this Court in Moti Ram Deka case  

(1964) 5 SCR, 683, their Lordships observed that Article  

309  cannot  impair  or  affect  the  pleasure  of  the  

President conferred by Article 310.  There is no doubt,  

Article 309 has to be read subject to Articles 310 and  

311 and Article 310 has to be read subject to Article  

311.

60.   In  the  case  of  B.P.  Singhal (supra), a  Constitution  

Bench  of  this  Court  has  elaborately  discussed  the  

application and object of the doctrine of pleasure and  

considered most  of  the earlier  decisions  rendered by  

this  Court.  Some of  the  paragraphs  are  worth  to  be  

quoted herein below:-  

 “22. There is a distinction between the doctrine of  pleasure as  it  existed in  a feudal  set-up and the  doctrine of  pleasure in a democracy governed by  the rule of law. In a nineteenth century feudal set- up unfettered power  and discretion  of  the Crown  was not an alien concept. However, in a democracy  

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governed by rule of law, where arbitrariness in any  form is eschewed, no Government or authority has  the  right  to  do  what  it  pleases.  The  doctrine  of  pleasure does not mean a licence to act arbitrarily,  capriciously  or  whimsically.  It  is  presumed  that  discretionary  powers  conferred  in  absolute  and  unfettered  terms  on  any  public  authority  will  necessarily and obviously be exercised reasonably  and for the public good.

 33. The doctrine of pleasure as originally envisaged  in  England  was  a  prerogative  power  which  was  unfettered.  It  meant  that  the  holder  of  an  office  under  pleasure  could  be  removed  at  any  time,  without  notice,  without  assigning  cause,  and  without  there  being  a  need  for  any  cause.  But  where the rule of law prevails, there is nothing like  unfettered discretion or unaccountable action. The  degree of need for reason may vary. The degree of  scrutiny  during  judicial  review may vary.  But  the  need  for  reason  exists.  As  a  result  when  the  Constitution of India provides that some offices will  be  held  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  without  any  express  limitations  or  restrictions,  it  should  however  necessarily  be  read  as  being  subject to the “fundamentals of constitutionalism”.  Therefore in a constitutional set-up, when an office  is held during the pleasure of any authority, and if  no limitations or restrictions are placed on the “at  pleasure” doctrine, it means that the holder of the  office can be removed by the authority  at whose  pleasure he holds office, at any time, without notice  and without assigning any cause.

 34. The  doctrine  of  pleasure,  however,  is  not  a  licence  to  act  with  unfettered  discretion  to  act  arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not  dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal  of  the  pleasure.  In  other  words,  “at  pleasure”  doctrine enables the removal of a person holding  office at the pleasure of  an authority,  summarily,  without any obligation to give any notice or hearing  to the person removed, and without any obligation  to assign any reasons or disclose any cause for the  removal, or withdrawal of pleasure. The withdrawal  of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and  

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fancy  of  the  authority,  but  can  only  be  for  valid  reasons.”

61.   In  fact  the  ‘pleasure  doctrine’  is  a  Constitutional  

necessity,  for  the  reasons  that  the  difficulty  in  

dismissing those servants whose continuance in office  

is  detrimental  to  the  State  would,  in  case  necessity  

arises to prove some offence to the satisfaction of the  

court,  be such as to seriously impede the working of  

public service.

62.  There  is  no  dispute  with  regard  to  the  legal  

proposition  that  illegality,  irrationality  and  

procedural  non-compliance  are  grounds  on  which  

judicial  review is permissible.  But the question is  

as  to  the  ambit  of  judicial  review.   This  court  in  

Civil  Appeal  filed  by  the  respondents  challenging  

the order  of  termination passed under Section 18  

of  the  Army  Act  observed  that  the  order  of  

termination can be challenged only on the ground  

of malafide.  It  was further observed that it  is for  

the person alleging malafide to make out a prima  

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facie  case.   For  better  appreciation,  the  order  

passed by this Court is quoted herein below.

   “1. Special leave granted. 2. Heard both sides. According to us, all  

that the impugned judgment holds is that an  order passed under Section 18 of the Army  Act  can  be  challenged  on  the  ground  of  malafides.  This  statement  of  law  is  unexceptional.   However,  it  is  for  the  person who challenges it on the ground of  malafides, to make out a prima facie case  in that behalf. It is only if he discharges  the  said  burden,  that  the  Government  is  called upon to show that it is not passed  in  the  malafide  exercise  of  its  powers.  While  doing  so,  the  Government  is  not  precluded  from  claiming  the  privilege  in  respect of the material which may be in its  possession and on the basis of which the  order  is  passed.  The  Government  may  also  choose  to  show  the  material  only  to  the  court.  With  regard  to  the  pleadings  in  respect of the challenge to the order on  the  ground  of  malafides,  no  particular  formula  can  be  laid  down.  The  pleadings  will depend upon the facts of each case.

3.The  appellants  are  permitted  to  withdraw  from  the appeal-memo, pp. 221 to 232 which according  to the learned Solicitor General have been annexed  to the memo inadvertently. 4.The appeals are disposed of accordingly with no  order as to costs.”   

63.  The  Full  Bench  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  while  

answering  the  reference   has  observed  in  

paragraphs 37 and 38 which is quoted hereunder:-   

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“37. Undoubtedly, the power under Section 18 cannot  be  ordinarily  invoked  for  dealing  with  cases  of  misconduct and the other provisions in the Army Act  dealing with the various kinds of misconduct have to be  invoked for dealing with such cases. This power under  Section  18  must  be  used  sparingly  only  when  it  is  expedient  to  deal  with  such  cases  under  the  other  provisions  of  the  Army  Act.  In  view  of  the  sensitive  nature  of  cases  involving  security  of  State  that  may  come up in the case of armed forces it cannot be said  that  in  no  case  of  misconduct  section  18  can  be  invoked. There may be cases where security of State is  involved and it may not be expedient to continue with  the  inquiry  provided  under  the  Army Act  for  dealing  with misconduct.   It  appears that it  is specifically for  this  reason that  section 18 has been incorporated in  the Army Act despite the fact that Article 310 of the  Constitution already provided that tenure of an Army  personnel would be at  the pleasure of  the President.  This is a power given to the Supreme Commander of  the  Armed  Forces,  i.e.  the  President  of  India  to  be  invoked in such cases where inquiry in other form is not  advisable and is inexpedient.  This power is similar to  second proviso (a),  (b) & (c) of Article 311 (2) which  provides for dispensing with the inquiry in certain cases  even  in  the  case  of  civil  service.  The  safeguard  provided  for  a  government  servant  by  clause  (2)  of  Article  311  is  taken  away  when  second  proviso  to  Article 311(2) becomes applicable. The Supreme Court  in  Tulsi  Ram Patel's  case  (supra)  observed that  "the  second proviso has been mentioned in the Constitution  as a matter of public policy and in public interest for  public good." The Supreme Court further observed that  much  as  it  may  seem  harsh  and  oppressive  to  a  government  servant,  the  court  must  repel  the  temptation  to  be  carried  away  by  feelings  of  commiseration and sympathy in such cases. Therefore,  even  if  an  order  under  Section  18  for  removing  a  defense  personnel  for  misconduct  is  passed  if  it  is  found that there were sufficient reasons for resorting to  Section 18, the same would not be open to challenge  on merits. The Supreme Court in Chief of Army Staff &  Anr. v. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety, 1985 CriLJ 913, has  held  that  even  after  Court  Martial  proceedings  had  been concluded, the finding of the general court martial  having not been confirmed by the Chief of Army Staff,  further  retention  of  the  Army  personnel  being  undesirable, the Chief of Army Staff could resort to Rule  

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14, indicating thereby that even after resorting to court  martial  proceedings  if  it  is  found  inexpedient  to  continue with the Court Martial proceedings it was open  to resort to proceedings under Section 19 of the Army  Act. The Supreme Court observed:

"The crucial question, therefore, is whether  the Central Government or the Chief of the  Army Staff can have resort to Rule 14 of the  Army Rules. Though it is open to the Central  Government or the Chief of the Army Staff to  have  recourse  to  that  rule  in  the  first  instance  without  directing trial  by  a  court- martial of the concerned officer, there is no  provision in the Army Act or  in Rule 14 or  any  of  the  other  rules  of  the  Army  Rules  which prohibits  the Central  Government or  the Chief of the Army Staff from resorting in  such a case to Rule 14. Can it, however, be  said that in such a case a trial by a court- martial is inexpedient or impracticable? The  Shorter  Oxford  English  Dictionary,  Third  Edition,  defines  the  word  'inexpedient'  as  meaning "not expedient; disadvantageous in  the  circumstances,  inadvisable,  impolite".  The  same  dictionary  defines  'expedient'  inter  alias  as  meaning  "advantageous;  fit,  proper,  or suitable to the circumstances of  the case". Webster's Third New International  Dictionary also defines the term 'expedient'  inter  alias  as  meaning  'characterized  by  suitability,  practicality,  and  efficiency  in  achieving  a  particular  end;  fit,  proper  or  advantageous under the circumstances."

38. That being the position even after resorting to court  martial  proceedings  if  it  is  found  inexpedient  to  continue  with  the  same  it  is  always  open  to  the  respondent to resort to either section 18 or 19 of the  Army Act.”

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64.   Indisputably,  defence  personnel  fall  under  the  

category where President has absolute pleasure to  

discontinue the services.  Further in our considered  

opinion  as  far  as  security  is  concerned,  the  

safeguard available to civil  servants under Article  

311  is  not  available  to  defence  personnel  as  

judicial  review  is  very  limited.   In  cases  where  

continuance  of  Army  officers  in  service  is  not  

practicable for security purposes and there is loss  

of  confidence  and  potential  risk  to  the  security  

issue then such officers can be removed under the  

pleasure doctrine.  As a matter of fact, Section 18  

of  the  Army  Act  is  in  consonance  with  the  

constitutional  powers  conferred  on  the  President  

empowering  the  President  to  terminate  the  

services  on  the  basis  of  material  brought  to  his  

notice.   In  such  cases,  the  Army  officers  are  not  

entitled to claim an opportunity of hearing. In our  

considered  opinion  the  pleasure  doctrine  can  be  

invoked by the President  at  any stage of  enquiry  

on being satisfied that continuance of any officer is  

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not in the interest of and security of the State. It is  

therefore  not  a  camouflage  as  urged  by  the  

respondents.  

65.   The next question that arises for  consideration is  

as to whether the order of dismissal of the earlier  

writ petitions and confirmation of the same by this  

court  amounts  to  “Doctrine  of  Merger”  and  

operates as res judicata  against the present appeals.  As discussed  

above,   the  services  of  the  present  respondents  along  with  other   

permanent  commissioned  officers  of  the  Indian  Army were  terminated,  

since they were found suspected to  be involved in  espionage activities.  

Aggrieved  by  the  termination  order,  the  present  respondents,  except  

Major  R.K.  Midha  and  Major  N.R.  Ajwani,  filed  writ  petitions  being  

C.W.P. Nos. 418, 419, 421, 424 and 425 of 1980 before the Delhi High  

Court. These respondents challenged the said termination order as being  

illegal  and  malafide.   The  High  Court  vide  order  dated  21.4.1980  

dismissed the writ petitions. The Order dated 21.4.1980 reads as under:-

“Dismissal from service is under Section 18 of  the Army act which is complimentary to Article  310 of  the  Constitution.  This  means that  the  

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Officer held the tenure during the pleasure of  the  President.  It  has  been  contended  that  it  was not in accordance with the provisions of  the Act and that due procedure for dismissal  for  misconduct  has  not  been  followed.  The  impugned  order  does  not  say  whether  the  dismissal is for misconduct or otherwise. It only  sets out the pleasure doctrine. In this view of  the matter, no case made out for interference.  Dismissed.”

66.  Respondents then preferred special leave petitions  

against the aforesaid order dated 21.4.1980 being  

SLP  Nos.  7225  and 7233 of  1980.   A  three-Judge  

Bench  of  this  Court  dismissed  the  special  leave  

petition  by  order  dated  1.9.1980.   In  the  year  

1982,  the  show  cause  notices  dated  10.5.1982  

were  issued  to  the  officers  whose  services  were  

terminated informing them that their services were  

not  considered  satisfactory  by  the  Pensionary  

Authority  and,  therefore,  why  not  5%  of  the  

gratuity or pension be deducted.  On receipt of the  

said  show  cause  notices,  eight  of  the  officers,  

whose  services  were  terminated  initiated  the  

second  round  of  litigation  by  filing  writ  petitions  

being  C.W.P  Nos.  1643-1646  of  1982,  1777  of  

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1982, 804 of 1982, 1666 of 1982 praying not only  

to quash the show cause notices, but also to quash  

the order of termination of their services.  All those  

writ  petitions  were  finally  heard  and  came  to  be  

dismissed by the  Delhi  High Court  vide  judgment  

dated 22.3.1985.  Aggrieved by the said order, the  

respondents filed Letters Patent Appeal before the  

Delhi  High  Court.  The Division  Bench of  the  High  

Court  after  hearing  the  appeal  formulated  

questions of law and referred the same to the Full  

Bench by order dated 15.5.1991.  The question of  

law  framed  by  the  Division  Bench  was  “whether  

the  order  of  termination  passed  by  and  in  the  

name of  President  under  Section  18  of  the  Army  

Act  read  with  Article  310  of  the  Constitution  

invoking  doctrine  of  pleasure  of  the  President  be  

challenged on the ground that it is camouflage and  

as such is violative of principles of natural justice  

and  the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  under  

Article 14 of the Constitution?”.  

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67. From the above, it is clear that the Union of India  

has  been  consistently  contesting  these  petitions  

and  this  Court  has  found  substance  in  the  

argument  of  the  appellants  that  the  High  Court  

while  delivering  the  judgment  dated  21.12.2000  

overlooked  this  important  legal  aspect  of  finality  

coupled with the doctrine  o f  res judicata.  In our  considered  

opinion, this aspect cannot be ignored and the issue of fact cannot be re-

opened in the instant case as well as has been done under the impugned   

judgment by relying on certain material which the High Court described  

to have been fraudulently withheld from the courts. In our opinion, fraud  

is not a term or ornament nor can it be presumed to exist on the basis of   

a  mere  inference  on  some  alleged  material  that  is  stated  to  have  been  

discovered  later  on.  The  discovery  of  a  reinvestigated  fact  could  have  

been a ground of review in the same proceedings, but the same cannot be  

in  our  opinion made the  basis  for  re-opening the  issue  through a  fresh  

round  of  litigation.  A  fresh  writ  petition  or  Letters   Patent   Appeal  

which  is in continuation  of a  writ petition cannot  be  filed  collaterally  

to  set  aside  the  judgment  of  the  same  High  Court  rendered  in  earlier  

round  of  litigation  upholding  the  termination  order.   In  our  view,  the  

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High Court has committed a manifest error by not lawfully defining the  

scope of the fresh round of litigation on the principles o f  res judicata and  

doctrine of finality. To establish fraud, it is the material available which  

may lead to the conclusion that  the failure to produce the material  was   

deliberate  or  suppressed  or  even  otherwise  occasioned  a  failure  of  

justice. This also, can be attempted if legally permissible only in the said  

proceedings and not in a collateral  challenge raised after the matter has  

been  finally  decided  in  the  first  round of  litigation.  It  is  to  be  noticed   

that  the  judgment  which  had  become  final  in  1980  also  included  writ  

petition no.418 of 1980 filed by the respondent S.P. Sharma. Once, this  

Court had put a seal to the said litigation vide judgment dated 1.9.1980  

then a second round of litigation by the same respondents including S.P.  

Sharma in writ petition no. 1643 of 1982 was misplaced.

68.   The very genesis of an identical challenge relating  

to  the  same  proceedings  of  termination  on  the  

pretext  of  a  5%  cut  in  terminal  benefits  was  

impermissible  apart  from  the  attraction  of  the  

principle  of  merger.  This  aspect  of  finality,  

therefore, cannot be disturbed through a collateral  

challenge.

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69.  In  Naresh  Shridhar  Mirajkar  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra  &  Anr.  

AIR 1967 SC 1, this Court by a majority decision laid down the law that  

when  a  Judge  deals  with  the  matter  brought  before  him  for  his  

adjudication,  he first decides  the questions of fact on which the parties   

are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether   

the  findings  of  fact  recorded  by  the  Judge  are  right  or  wrong,  and  

whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity,  

can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of  

the Judge takes up the matter before the appellate court.  

70. A decision rendered by a competent court cannot  

be  challenged  in  collateral  proceedings  for  the  

reason that if it is permitted to do so there would  

be  "confusion  and  chaos  and  the  finality  of  

proceedings would cease to have any meaning".  

71. In the case of  Mohd. Aslam vs. Union of India, AIR  

1996 SC 1611, a writ petition under Article 32 of the  

Constitution  was  filed  seeking  reconsideration  of  the  

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judgment rendered by this Court on the ground that the  

said judgment is incorrect.  Rejecting the prayer, this  

Court  held  that  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  is  not  

available to  assail  the correctness of  the decision on  

merit or to claim its reconsideration.   

72. In the case of Babu Singh Bains etc. versus Union  

of India and others etc., AIR 1997 SC 116, this Court  

reiterated  the  settled  principal  of  law  that  once  an  

order  passed  on  merit  by  this  Court  exercising  the  

power under Article 136 of the Constitution has become  

final no writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution  

on the self-same issue is maintainable.  The principle of  

constructive  res judicata   stands fast in his way in his  

way to raise the same contention once over.

73. In  Khoday  Distilleries  Limited  &  Anr.  vs. The  

Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996)  

3 SCC 114, this Court re-iterated the view as under:  

"In  a  case  like  the  present,  where  in  substance  the  challenge  is  to  the  

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absence of such a principle great oppression might  

result  under  the  colour  and  pretence  of  law  

inasmuch as there will be no end to litigation. The  

doctrine of res-judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy.

76.  In a country governed by the rule of law, finality  

of  judgment  is  absolutely  imperative  and  great  

sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment  

and it  is not permissible for the parties to reopen  

the concluded judgments of the court as it  would  

not  only  tantamount  to  merely  an  abuse  of  the  

process  of  the court  but  would  have far  reaching  

adverse  affect  on the administration  of  justice.  It  

would  also  nullify  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis  a  well  

established  valuable  principle  of  precedent  which  cannot  be  departed  

from unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The judgments  

of  the  court  and  particularly  the  Apex  Court  of  a  country  cannot  and   

should not be unsettled lightly.

77.   Precedent keeps the law predictable  and the law  

declared by this Court, being the law of the land, is  

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binding  on  all  courts/tribunals  and  authorities  in  

India in view of Article 141 of the Constitution. The  

judicial  system "only works if  someone is  allowed  

to have the last word" and the last word so spoken  

is  accepted and religiously followed.  The doctrine  

of stare decisis promotes a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions  

and  this  helps  in  the  development  of  the  law.  Besides  providing  

guidelines  for  individuals  as  to  what  would  be  the  consequences  if  he  

chooses the legal action, the doctrine promotes confidence of the people   

in  the  system  of  the  judicial  administration.  Even  otherwise  it  is  an  

imperative  necessity  to  avoid  uncertainty,  confusion.  Judicial  propriety  

and decorum demand that the law laid down by the highest Court of the  

land must be given effect to.

78.  In Rupa Ashok Hurra v.  Ashok Hurra & Anr . ,  AIR 2002 SC 1771,  

this  Court  dealt  with  the  issue  and  held  that  reconsideration  of  a  

judgment  of  this  Court  which  has  attained  finality  is  not  normally   

permissible.  A decision  upon a  question  of  law rendered  by this  Court  

was conclusive and would bind the court in subsequent cases. The court  

cannot sit in appeal against its own judgment.

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79.   In  Maganlal  Chhaganlal  (P)  Ltd.  v.  Municipal  Corporation  of   

Greater Bombay,  AIR 1974 SC 2009, this Court held as under:

     "At  the  same time,  it  has  to  be borne  in  mind  that  certainty  and continuity  are  essential  ingredients  of the  rule  of  law.  Certainty  in  law  would  be  considerably  eroded and suffer a serious setback if the highest court of  the  land  readily  overrules  the  view expressed  by  it  in  earlier cases, even though that view has held the field for  a  number  of  years.  In  quite  a  number  of  cases  which  come up before this Court, two views are possible, and  simply  because  the  Court  considers  that  the  view  not  taken by the Court in the earlier case was a better view of  the matter would not justify' the overruling of the view.  The  law  laid  down  by  this  Court  is  binding  upon  all  courts  in  the  country  under  Article  141  of  the  Constitution, and numerous cases all over the country are  decided in accordance with the view taken by this Court.  Many people  arrange their  affairs  and large  number of  transactions  also  take  place  on  the  faith  o f  the  correctness  of  the  view  taken  by  this  Court.  It  would   create uncertainty,  instability  and confusion  i f  the law  propounded  by  this  Court  on  the  basis  of  which   numerous  cases  have  been  decided  and  m any  transactions  have  taken  place  is  held  to  be  not  the   correct law. "

Thus, in view of above, it can be held that doctrine  

of finality has to be applied in a strict legal sense.

80.  While  dealing  with  the  issue  this  court  in  Ambika  

Prasad  Mishra  v.  State  of  U.P.  &  Anr. ,  AIR 1980 SC 1762,  held as  

under:

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"6. I t  is wise to remember that fatal flaws silenced by earlier   rulings  cannot  survive  after  death  because  a  decision   does not lose its authority 'merely because it was badly   argued,  inadequately  considered  and  fallaciously   reasoned'".

81.    The view has been expressed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in   

these  very  proceedings  while  dismissing  the  special  leave  petitions  of  

Subhash  Juneja  and  Harish  Lal  Singh  vide  order  dated  23.4.2003.  This  

court  applied  the  doctrine  of  finality  of  judgment  and  res-judicata and  

refused to reopen these very proceedings.

82. Mrs.  Kiran  Suri,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondent,  put  heavy  reliance  on  a  decision  of  this  

Court in the case of  Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors. v. Dossibai   

N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970)1 SCC 613, for the proposition that question relating to  

the jurisdiction of a court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an  

erroneous decision of the court.   Further by an erroneous decision if the court  

resumes jurisdiction  which it  does not  possess  under the Statute,  the question  

cannot  operate  as  res judicata between the same parties  whether  the cause of  

action  in  the  subsequent  litigation  is  same or  otherwise.   In  our  opinion,  the  

aforesaid decision is of no help to the respondent for the simple reason that the  

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facts and the law involved in the instant case and the earlier round of litigation are  

the same.   In  para 5 of the aforesaid  judgment,  this  Court  has  laid down the  

principle, which reads as under:-

“5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the  domain of procedure: it cannot be exalted to the  status  of  a  legislative  direction  between  the  parties so as to determine the question relating to  the  interpretation  of  enactment  affecting  the  jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even  though no question of fact or mixed question of  law and fact and relating to the right in dispute  between  the  parties  has  been  determined  thereby.  A  decision  of  a  competent  Court  on  a  matter  in  issue  may be  res  judicata  in  another  proceeding  between  the  same  parties:  the  “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue  of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of  fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by  a competent Court is finally determined between  the  parties  and  cannot  be  re-opened  between  them  in  another  proceeding.  The  previous  decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata:  the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A  matter in issue between the parties is  the right  claimed by one party  and denied by  the  other,  and  the  claim  of  right  from  its  very  nature  depends upon proof of facts and application of the  relevant  law  thereto.  A  pure  question  of  law  unrelated  to  facts  which  give  rise  to  a  right,  cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When  it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it  is  meant  that  the  right  claimed  has  been  adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in  contest  between  the  same  parties.  A  previous  decision of a competent Court on facts which are  the foundation of the right and the relevant law  applicable to the determination of the transaction  which is the source of the right is res judicata. A  previous  decision  on  a  matter  in  issue  is  a  composite decision: the decision on law cannot be  dissociated from the decision on facts on which  

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the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law  will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding  between the same parties, if the cause of action  of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in  the previous proceeding, but not when the cause  of action is different, nor when the law has since  the earlier decision been altered by a competent  authority,  nor  when  the  decision  relates  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  to  try  the  earlier  proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares  valid a transaction which is prohibited by law.

83. In the case arising out  of  these  very  proceedings  reported  in  

Union  of  India  &  Ors. v. Ranbir  Singh Rathaur &  Ors., (2006)  

11 SCC 696, this Court held:

(a)That review of  the earlier orders passed by this court  was  "impermissible":  approach  of  the  High  Court  of  reopening  the  case  was  "erroneous";  the  issue  of  maintainability  of  the  petitions  was  of  paramount  importance:

(b)The  finding  recorded  by  the  High  Court  that  the  entire  record  was  not  produced  by  the  Union of India was not factually correct;

(c)To  say  that  "justice  stood  at  the  higher  pedestal"  then the finality of litigation was not  an answer enabling the court to reopen a finally  decided case;

(d)  Persons  behind  the  false  implication  were  not impleaded as parties; and

(e)  Newspaper  reports/statement  made by any  officer could not be considered as evidence.

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84.  Violation of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under  

the Constitution have to  be protected,  but  at  the  

same  time,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  ensure  

that  the  decisions  rendered  by  the  court  are  not  

overturned  frequently,  that  too,  when  challenged  

collaterally as that was directly affecting the basic  

structure  of  the  Constitution  incorporating  the  

power of judicial  review of this Court.  There is no  

doubt  that  this  Court  has  an  extensive  power  to  

correct an error or to review its decision but that  

cannot be done at the cost of doctrine of finality.  

An  issue  of  law  can  be  overruled  later  on,  but  a  

question  of  fact  or,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  

dispute with regard to the termination of services  

cannot be reopened once it has been finally sealed  

in proceedings  inter-se between  the  parties  up  to  this  Court  way  

back in 1980.

85. The  term  ‘dismissal’  in  the  original  order  was  

substituted  by  the  term  ‘termination’  issuing  the  

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corrigendum to  ratify  a  mistake  committed  while  

issuing the order. In fact, the competent authority  

had  taken  a  decision  only  to  terminate,  and  

therefore  it  was  found  necessary  to  issue  the  

corrigendum. However, in view of such substitution  

of word ‘dismissal’ by the term ‘termination’, does  

not  tilt  the balance in  favour  of  the respondents.  

More  so,  as  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Paras  Kuhad,  

learned ASG that the proposed 5% deduction had  

been  withdrawn,  and  therefore  the  issue  did  not  

survive.  

86. Analysing entire facts of the case and the material  

produced  in  Court  and  upon  an  exhaustive  

consideration of the matter, we are of the definite  

opinion  that  the  power  of  pleasure  exercised  by  

the  President  in  terminating  the  services  of  the  

respondents  does  not  suffer  from  any  illegality,  

bias or malafide or based on any other extraneous  

ground, and the same cannot be challenged on the  

ground  that  it  is  a  camouflage.   As  discussed  

above, the onus lay on the respondent-officers who  

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alleged  malafides.   No  credible  evidence  or  

material  produced  before  the  Court  impels  us  to  

come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  order  of  

termination is baseless or malafide.

87.   For  the  reasons  aforesaid,  these  appeals  are  

allowed and the judgment and order passed by the  

Delhi High Court is set aside.  Ordered accordingly.  

No costs.  

…………………………….J.                                                                  (Dr. B.S.  

Chauhan)

…………………………….J.                                                                  (J.  

Chelameswar)

…………………………….J.                                                                  (M.Y. Eqbal) New Delhi, March 6, 2014.  

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