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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7400 OF 2013

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.              … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

MAJOR GENERAL SHRI KANT SHARMA & ANR.           … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7338 OF 2013, CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7375-7376 OF 2013, CIVIL APPEAL NO.7399 OF 2013, CIVIL APPEAL NO.9388 OF 2013, CIVIL APPEAL NO.9389 OF 2013 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.96 OF 2014.

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J

In these appeals the question raised is whether the right of  

appeal under Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007  

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Áct’), against an order of Armed  

Forces Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) with  

the leave of the Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act or leave  

granted by the Supreme Court, or bar of leave to appeal before the  

Supreme Court under Article 136(2) of the Constitution of India,  

will bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of  

the  Constitution  of  India  regarding  matters  related  to  Armed

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Forces.  

Union of India and others are  the appellants in all these  

appeals  except  in  C.A.No.7338,  C.A.No.  7399  of  2013  and  

C.A.No.96/2014 wherein they are the respondents. The respondents  

in all these appeals except the three mentioned above are-Army  

Personnel who moved before the Tribunal for adjudication or trial  

of disputes and complaints with respect to condition of service.  

Having not granted relief, the Army personnel assailed the order  

passed by the Tribunal before the respective High Courts under  

Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant in C.A.No.7338 of  

2013 on being aggrieved by the order passed by the Armed Forces  

Tribunal, Regional Bench, Chennai challenged the same before the  

High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. In the  

cases in hand except C.A.No.7338 of 2013 and C.A.No.96 of 2014 the  

High  Court  entertained  the  writ  petitions  and  adjudicated  the  

disputes. The High Court having granted relief after reversing the  

order of Tribunal, the Union of India has challenged the same. In  

C.A.No.7338  of  2013  and  C.A.No.96  of  2014,  the  appellants-Army  

Personnel have challenged the orders by which High Courts refused  

to entertain their writ petitions. In C.A. No. 7399 of 2013, the  

appellant-Army Personnel has challenged the order of Delhi High  

Court allowing the writ petition of respondent No.2 therein.

2. At the outset, in all the writ petitions preliminary objection  was  raised  on  behalf  of  the  Union  of  India  as  to  the  

maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that against  

the orders impugned a remedy of appeal to the Supreme Court is

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provided under Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India  submitted  that  the  High  Court  cannot  entertain  writ  petitions  

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India contrary to the law  

enacted by the Parliament being the Armed Forces Tribunal, 2007  

which is a special enactment exclusively provided for an appellate  

remedy by way of leave before this Court.

Further, according to learned counsel for the Union of India  

as none of the respondents raised any issue of jurisdiction of the  

Tribunal and it was essentially a challenge to the order of the  

Armed Forces Tribunal only on merits. Therefore, the High Court  

was not correct in entertaining the writ petitions under Article  

226 of the Constitution against the well considered and reasoned  

order passed by the Tribunal.

4. Col.  A.D.  Nargolkar  appeared  in  person  made  the  following  submissions:

(i) The power of judicial review under Article 226 and  

227 of the Constitution is an inviolable part of its basic  

structures.  This  power  cannot  be  ousted  by  an  Act  of  

Parliament i.e. the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.

(ii) Section 14 of the Act itself provides for judicial  

review by the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the  

Constitution.  There exists clear and recorded legislative  

intent behind the specific provisions.

(iii) Article 227(4) of the Constitution does not exclude  

the  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  over  the  Armed  Forces

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Tribunal as no such Tribunal existed when Article 227(4) of  

the Constitution was substituted.  

Similar submissions were made by the learned Senior Counsel  

for the respondent-Army Personnel.  

5. For the determination of the present issue it is necessary to  refer the relevant provisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act,  

2007, the power of the High Court under Sections 226 and 227 of  

the Constitution, and the power of Supreme Court under Articles 32  

and 136 of the Constitution.

6. The  Armed  Forces  Tribunal  Act,  2007  has  been  enacted  to  provide  for  adjudication  or  trial  by  Armed  Forces  Tribunal  of  

disputes and complaints with respect to commission, appointments,  

enrolment and conditions of service in respect of persons subject  

to the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force At,  

1950  and  also  to  provide  for  appeals  arising  out  of  orders,  

findings or sentences of Courts-Martial held under the said Acts  

and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

7. As per Section 14 of the Act, the Armed Forces Tribunal has  been  established  by  the  Central  Government  to  exercise  the  

jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on it by the said  

Act. Section 14 specifies the jurisdiction, powers and authority  

of the Tribunal in relation to service matters as follows:

“Section 14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority  in  service  matters.-  (1)  Save  as  otherwise  expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall  exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the  jurisdiction,  powers  and  authority,  exercisable  immediately before that day by all courts (except  the  Supreme  Court  or  a  High  Court  exercising  jurisdiction  under  articles  226  and  227  of  the

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Constitution) in relation to all service matters.  

(2)  Subject  to  the  other  provisions  of  this  Act, a person aggrieved by an order pertaining to  any service matter may make an application to the  Tribunal  in  such  form  and  accompanied  by  such  documents or other evidence and on payment of such  fee as may be prescribed.  

(3) On receipt of an application relating to  service matters, the Tribunal shall, if satisfied  after due inquiry, as it may deem necessary, that  it  is  fit  for  adjudication  by  it,  admit  such  application;  but  where  the  Tribunal  is  not  so  satisfied,  it  may  dismiss  the  application  after  recording its reasons in writing.  

(4)  For  the  purpose  of  adjudicating  an  application,  the  Tribunal  shall  have  the  same  powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908) while  trying a suit in respect of the following matters,  namely—  

(a) summoning  and  enforcing  the  attendance  of any person and examining him on oath;  

(b) requiring the discovery and production of  documents;  

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;  

(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123  and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, (1  of 1872) requisitioning any public record or  document or copy of such record or document  from any office;  

(e) issuing commissions for the     examination  of witnesses or documents;  

(f) reviewing its decisions;  

(g) dismissing an application for default  or  deciding it exparte;  

(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any  application for default or any order passed  by it exparte; and  

(i) any other matter which may be prescribed by  the Central Government.  

(5) The Tribunal shall decide both questions of

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law and facts that may be raised before it.”

It is clear that in relation to service matters the Tribunal  

has  been  empowered  to  exercise  the  jurisdiction,  powers  and  

authority,  exercisable  by  all  the  Courts  except  the  power  of  

Supreme  Court  or  a  High  Court  exercising  jurisdiction  under  

Section 226 and 227 of the Constitution.  

8. Section 15 specifies the jurisdiction, powers and authority to  be exercised by the Tribunal relating to matters of appeal against  

the Court-Martial.  The said Section reads  as fellows:

“Section 15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority  in  matters  of  appeal  against  court-martial.-(1)  Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,  the  Tribunal  shall  exercise,  on  and  from  the  appointed  day,  all  the  jurisdiction,  powers  and  authority exercisable under this Act in relation to  appeal  against  any  order,  decision,  finding  or  sentence passed by a court martial or any matter  connected therewith or incidental therto.  

(2)  Any  person  aggrieved  by  an  order,  decision, finding or sentence passed by a court  martial  may  prefer  an  appeal  in  such  form,  manner  and  within  such  time  as  may  be  prescribed.  

(3) The Tribunal shall have power to grant  bail to any person accused of an offence and in  military  custody,  with  or  without  any  conditions which it considers necessary:  

Provided that no accused person shall be so  released if there appears reasonable ground for  believing that he has been guilty of an offence  punishable with death or imprisonment for life.  

(4)  The  Tribunal  shall  allow  an  appeal  against conviction by a court martial where –

(a) the  finding  of  the  court  martial  is  legally not sustainable due  to  any  reason whatsoever; or

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(b) the finding involves wrong decision on  a question of law; or  

(c) there  was  a  material  irregularity  in  the  course  of  the  trial  resulting  in  miscarriage of justice,  

but, in any other case, may dismiss the appeal  where  the  Tribunal  considers  that  no  miscarriage of justice is likely to be caused  or has actually resulted to the appellant:  

Provided that no order dismissing the appeal  by  the  Tribunal  shall  be  passed  unless  such  order is made after recording reasons therefor  in writing.  

(5) The Tribunal may allow an appeal against  conviction, and pass appropriate order thereon.  

(6)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the foregoing provisions of this section, the  Tribunal shall have the power to—  

(a) substitute  for  the  findings  of  the  court martial, a finding of guilty for  any other offence for which the offender  could have been lawfully found guilty by  the  court  martial  and  pass  a  sentence  afresh  for  the  offence  specified  or  involved  in  such  findings  under  the  provisions of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of  1950) or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957)  or the Air Force Act, 1950, (45 of 1950)  as the case may be; or  

(b) if sentence is found to be excessive,  illegal or unjust, the Tribunal may—  

(j)  remit the whole or any part of the  sentence,  with  or  without  conditions;  (ii) mitigate the punishment awarded;  

(iii) commute  such  punishment  to  any  lesser  punishment  or  punishments  mentioned in the Army Act, 1950, (46 of  1950) the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and  the Air Force Act, 1950, (45 of 1950) as  the case may be;

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(c) enhance the sentence awarded by a court  -martial:  

Provided that no such sentence shall be  enhanced unless the appellant has been given  an opportunity of being heard;  

(d) release the appellant, if sentenced to  imprisonment, on parole with or without  conditions;  

(d) suspend a sentence of imprisonment;  

(e) pass any other order as it may think  appropriate.  

(7)  Notwithstanding  any  other  provisions  in  this Act, for the purposes of this section, the  Tribunal shall be deemed to be a criminal court  for  the  purposes  of  sections  175,  178,  179,  180, 193, 195, 196 or 228 (45 of 1860) of the  Indian Penal Code and Chapter XXVI of the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (2 of 1974).”

Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  15  specifies  the  right  of  any  

person to prefer an appeal against order, decision, finding or  

sentence passed by a Court-Martial.  

9. Chapter V of the Act relates to appeal. Section 30 which  provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court and Section 31 deals  

with leave to appeal. The said Sections read as under:

“Section  30. Appeal  to  Supreme  Court :-(1)  Subject to the provisions of section 31, an appeal  shall lie to the Supreme Court against the final  decision or order of the Tribunal (other than an  order passed under section 19):  

Provided that such appeal is preferred within a  period  of  ninety  days  of  the  said  decision  or  order:  

Provided further that there shall be no appeal  against an interlocutory order of the Tribunal.  

(2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court as  of right from any order or decision of the Tribunal

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in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for  contempt: .  

Provided that an appeal under this sub-section  shall be filed in the Supreme Court within sixty  days from the date of the order appealed against.  

(3) Pending any appeal under sub-section (2),  the Supreme Court may order that—  

(a) the execution of the punishment or the  order appealed against be suspended; or  

(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be  released on bail:  

Provided that where an appellant satisfies the  Tribunal that he intends to prefer an appeal, the  Tribunal  may  also  exercise  any  of  the  powers  conferred under clause (a) or clause (b), as the  case may be.  

Section 31. Leave to appeal.- (1) An appeal to  the Supreme Court shall lie with the leave of the  Tribunal;  and  such  leave  shall  not  be  granted  unless it is certified by the Tribunal that a point  of law of general public importance is involved in  the decision, or it appears to the Supreme Court  that the point is one which ought to be considered  by that Court.

 (2) An application to the Tribunal for leave to  

appeal to the Supreme Court shall be made within a  period of thirty days beginning with the date of  the decision of the Tribunal and an application to  the Supreme Court for leave shall be made within a  period of thirty days beginning with the date on  which the application for leave is refused by the  Tribunal.  

(3) An appeal shall be treated as pending until  any application for leave to appeal is disposed  of and if leave to appeal is granted, until the  appeal is disposed of; and an application for  leave to appeal shall be treated as disposed of  at the expiration of the time within which it  might have been made, but it is not made within  that time.”

10. Section 32 empowers the Supreme Court to condone the delay  i.e. to extend the time within which an appeal may be preferred by  

the person to the Court under Section 30 or sub-section (2) or

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Section 31.  The said Section reads as follows:

“Section  32.Condonation.-  The  Supreme  Court  may, upon an application made at any time by  the appellant, extend the time within which an  appeal may be preferred by him to that Court  under section 30 or sub-section (2) of section  31.”

11. Section 33 excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Section  34 deals with transfer of pending cases before any court including  

a High Court or other authority immediately before the date of  

establishment of the Tribunal, the cause of action of which would  

have been within the jurisdiction of Tribunal. Sections 33 and 34  

read as under:

“Section 33. Exclusion of jurisdiction of civil  courts.-  On  and  from  the  date  from  which  any  jurisdiction,  powers  and  authority  becomes  exercisable by the Tribunal in relation-to service  matters under this Act, no Civil Court shall have,  or  be  entitled  to  exercise,  such  jurisdiction,  power  or  authority  in  relation  to  those  service  matters.  

34. Transfer of pending cases.- (1) Every suit, or  other proceeding pending before any court including  a High Court or other authority immediately before  the  date  of  establishment  of  the  Tribunal  under  this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of  action whereon it is based, is such that it would  have been within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,  if it had arisen after such establishment within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  Tribunal,  stand  transferred on that date to such Tribunal.   (2) Where any suit, or other proceeding stands  transferred  from  any  court  including  a  High  Court or other authority to the Tribunal under  sub-section (1),—  

(a) the court or other authority shall, as  soon as may be, after such transfer,  forward the records of such suit, or  other proceeding to the Tribunal;  

(b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such  records,  proceed  to  deal  with  such

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suit, or other proceeding, so far as  may be, in the same’ manner as in the  case of an application made under sub- section (2) of section 14, from the  stage  which  was  reached  before  such  transfer or from any earlier stage or  de novo as the Tribunal may deem fit.”  

12. A plain reading of the above provisions shows: i    A remedy of appeal to Supreme Court against any  

final order passed by the Tribunal under Section 30  

with  the  leave  of  the  Tribunal  is  provided  under  

Section 31 of the Act.

ii   In  case  leave  is  refused  by  the  Tribunal,  an  

application to the Supreme Court for leave can be made  

as provided under sub-section (1) and (2) of Section  

31 of the Act.

iii Against any order or decision of the Tribunal made  

under Section 19 in exercise of its jurisdiction to  

punish for contempt, an appeal under sub-section (2)  

of Section 30 lies to the Supreme Court as of right.

Section 33 excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and  

not the High Court under Article 226 and 227. However, Section 34  

relates to transfer of pending cases, suits and cases pending in  

other courts including the High Court. The suit pending before any  

Court or High Court may stand transferred if the cause of action  

comes under the jurisdiction of the Arms Forces Tribunal Act but  

it does not affect the power of the High Court under Section 226  

and 227 of the Constitution.

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13. The Parliamentary 10th Standing Committee for Defence in May,  2006 deliberated on the proposed Section 30 and 31 of the Act.  

Chapter XIV of the recorded deliberations provides insight into  

the  legislative  intent  and  replies/advice  of  the  Law  Ministry,  

relevant portion of which is reproduced below:  

“CHAPTER XIV CLAUSE  30  :  JURISDICTION  OF  TRIBUNAL  AND  HIGH  COURT  IN MATTERS RELATING TO APPEAL 84. Clause 30 provides:- 1. Subject to the provision of section 31, an appeal shall  lie to the Supreme Court against the final decision or  order of the Tribunal (other than an order passed under  section 19): Provided that such appeal is preferred within a period of  ninety days of the said decision or order. Provided further that there shall be no appeal against an  interlocutory order of the Tribunal. 2. An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court as of right  from any order or decisions of the Tribunal in the exercise  of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Provided that an appeal under this sub-section shall be  filed in the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date  of the order appealed against. 3. Pending any appeal under sub-section (2), the Supreme  Court may order that:- (a) the execution of the punishment or the order appealed  against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on  bail; Provided that where an appellant satisfies the Tribunal  that he intends to prefer an appeal, the Tribunal may also  exercise any of the powers conferred under clause (a) or  clause (b), as the case may be. 85. The Committee enquired about the nature of the proposed  Tribunal, whether it would be a judicial, quasi judicial  body in the line of Central Administrative Tribunal, the  Ministry replied:- “Since  the  Armed  Forces  Tribunal  would  be  dealing  with  offences,legally awardable punishments and termination of  service  etc.  and  the  Tribunal  is  being  armed  with  the  powers of contempt, it would be a judicial body. It would  be a permanent Tribunal and a Court of record.” 86. When Committee asked, whether appeal would be preferred  in High Courts or Supreme Court, the Ministry stated: “Clause 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Bill, 2005 provides  that an appeal against the final decision or order of Armed

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Forces Tribunal shall lie to the Supreme Court. Under the  Constitution, the power of superintendence of High Court is  already excluded against a Court Martial verdict.” 87.  On  a  specific  query  to  the  representatives  of  the  Ministry of Law & Justice, on the issue of appeal against  the order of the Tribunal, they stated:-

“In a case, L. Chandrakumar’s case, which was relating  to  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  which  was  established  by  an  Act  of  Parliament,  similar  provisions  were  there  where  an  appeal  against  the  orders  of  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal  was  preferred to the Supreme Court but for some time it  was entertained by the Supreme Court. But later on,  subsequently in L. Chandrakumar’s case, the Supreme  Court said that the powers of the High Court under  articles 226 and 227 cannot be taken away by an Act of  Parliament. Thus, you know again from the orders of  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  we  have  started  preferring appeals to the High Court under article  226.”

88. They further supplemented: “It is not only in one case but also subsequently in a  number of cases, the Supreme Court reiterated that  principle.  Many  High  Courts  have  reiterated  that  principle. When in another Bill, that is, National Tax  Tribunal was being processed in this Committee Room by  another Committee, there also many hon. Members of the  Standing  Committee  said  that  in  view  of  L.  Chandrakumar’s case, you cannot have a touch tribunal  from which you can directly go to the Supreme Court  and  we  had  accede  that  before  that  Committee  tha  article 226 is still there with the High Court. The  minute  you  abolish  article  226,  then  it  will  be  treated by the Supreme Court as a violation of the  essential characteristics of the basic structure of  the Constitution, which is a limitation even on the  power of Parliament to amend the Constitution.” 89. When the Committee asked the Ministry of Law &  Justice regarding possible solution of it, they stated  that: “We have processed the Bill. In the Bill we have taken  the  precaution  that  the  Chairman  of  the  Tribunal  should be a retired judge or a sitting judge of the  Supreme Court. If the Chairman of the Tribunal himself  is  a  Supreme  Court  judge,  then  you  know  the  High  Courts are slightly hesitant in interfering with the  judgment.  That is only thing but if a judge finds that there is  a  Constitutional  violation  of  certain  fundamental  rights or there is a gross arbitrariness in an order  of  the  Tribunal,  then  it  will  exercise  its

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jurisdiction under article 226.” In this connection, the Ministry of Defence in a written  note stated:

“The proposed Armed Forces Tribunal Bill, 2005 does  not envisage a situation where an accused can approach  the High Court in an appeal against the order of the  Tribunal. There can be no equation between the High  Court  and  any  other  Tribunal.  On  the  other  hand,  analogy can be drawn between the CAT and the proposed  Armed  Forces  Tribunal.  In  CAT,  single  member  also  constitutes a Bench [section 5(6)]. However, in the  Armed Forces Tribunal, the minimum number of members  to constitute a Bench is two. Further, as opposed to  the CAT where the Chairperson is a serving or retired  High Court judge, the Chairperson of the Armed Forces  Tribunal is a retired Supreme Court Judge or retired  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court.  Further  Article  227(iv)  of  the  Constitution  excludes  the  power  of  superintendence  of  High  Courts  over  any  court  or  Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to  the Armed Forces. Therefore, an accused cannot go to  the High Court in appeal against the order of the  Armed Forces Tribunal.”

90. The Committee note that clause 30 provides that subject  to provisions of section 31, an appeal shall lie to Supreme  Court against the final decision or order of the Tribunal.  The Committee, however, are given to understand that in the  case of L. Chanderkumar, where appeal against the order of  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal  was  preferred  to  Supreme Court, the Court stated that powers of the High  Court under Articles 226 and 227 cannot be taken away by an  Act of Parliament. The Committee are of the view that the  appeal against the Tribunal should be preferred as per the  provisions of the Constitution. NEW DELHI; BALASAHEB VIKHE PATIL, 16 May, 2006 Chairman, 26 Vaisakha, 1928 (Saka)Standing Committee on Defence.”

14. Therefore,  it  is  clear  from  the  scheme  of  the  Act  that  jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Armed Forces  

Tribunal Act is in substitution of the jurisdiction of Civil Court  

and  the  High  Court  so  far  as  it  relates  to  suit  relating  to  

condition of service of the persons subject to Army Act, 1950, the  

Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950, which are special laws  

enacted by the Parliament by virtue of exclusive legislative power

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vested under Article 246 of the Constitution of India read with  

Entries 1 & 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.

15. Constitution of India In this context, it is also necessary to notice Articles 32  

and 33 of the Constitution. Article 32 falls under Chapter III of  

the Constitution which deals with fundamental right.  The said  

article guarantees the right to move before the Supreme Court by  

appropriate  proceedings  for  the  enforcement  of  the  fundamental  

rights conferred by the Part III.  Article 32 reads as follows:

“Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights  conferred by this Part.—(1) The right to move the  Supreme  Court  by  appropriate  proceedings  for  the  enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is  guaranteed.  

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue  directions or orders or writs, including writs in  the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,  quo  warranto  and  certiorari,  whichever  may  be  appropriate,  for  the  enforcement  of  any  of  the  rights conferred by this Part.  

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on  the  Supreme  Court  by  clauses  (1)  and  (2),  Parliament may by law empower any other court to  exercise  within  the  local  limits  of  its  jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable  by the Supreme Court under clause (2).  

(4) The right guaranteed by this article  shall  not  be  suspended  except  as  otherwise  provided for by this Constitution.”

16. Article 33 empowers the Parliament to restrict or abrogate the  application  of  fundamental  rights  in  relation  to  Armed  Forces,  

Para  Military  Forces,  the  Police  etc. (refer:  Ous  Kutilingal  

Achudan  Nair  vs.Union  of  India,  (1976)  2  SCC  780).   The  said  

article reads as follows:

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“Article 33. Power of Parliament to modify the  rights conferred by this Part in their application  to Forces, etc.—Parliament may, by law, determine  to what extent any of the rights conferred by this  Part shall, in their application to,—  

(a) the members of the Armed Forces; or  

(b) the members of the Forces charged with  the maintenance of public order; or  

(c) persons employed in any bureau or other  organisation established by the State  for purposes of intelligence or counter  intelligence; or  

(d) person  employed  in,  or  in  connection  with, the telecommunication systems set  up  for  the  purposes  of  any  Force,  bureau or organisation referred to in  clauses (a) to (c),

be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the  proper  discharge  of  their  duties  and  the  maintenance of discipline among them.”

17. Article 226 empowers High Court to issue prerogative writs.  The said Article reads as under:

“Article  226.Power  of  High  Courts  to  issue  certain  writs.-  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  article  32  every  High  Court  shall  have  power,  throughout the territories in relation to which it  exercises jurisdiction, toissue to any person or  authority,  including  in  appropriate  cases,  any  Government,  within  those  territories  directions,  orders or writs, including 1[writs in the nature of  habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto  and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement  of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for  any other purpose.

(2)  The  power  conferred  by  clause  (1)  to  issue  directions,  orders  or  writs  to  any  Government,  authority or person may also be exercised by any  High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to  the territories within which the cause of action,  wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such  power,  notwithstanding  that  the  seat  of  such  Government or authority or the residence of such  person is not within those territories.

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(3) Where any party against whom an interim order,  whether by way of injunction or stay or in any  other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings  relating to, a petition under clause (1), without—

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such  petition and all documents in support of  the plea for such interim order; and

(b)   giving  such  party  an  opportunity  of  being  heard, makes an application to the High Court for  the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of  such application to the party in whose favour such  order has been made or the counsel of such party,  the  High  Court  shall  dispose  of  the  application  within a period of two weeks from the date on which  it is received or from the date on which the copy  of such application is so furnished, whichever is  later, or where the High Court is closed on the  last day of that period, before the expiry of the  next  day  afterwards  on  which  the  High  Court  is  open; and if the application is not so disposed of,  the  interim  order  shall,  on  the  expiry  of  that  period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the  said next day, stand vacated.

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this  article shall not be in derogation of the power  conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of  article 32.”

18. Article  227  relates  to  power  of  superintendence  of  High  Courts over all Courts and Tribunals. It reads as follows:

“Article  227.  Power  of  superintendence  over  all  courts by the High Court.- (1) Every High Court  shall  have  superintendence  over  all  courts  and  tribunals throughout the territories in relation to  which it exercises jurisdiction.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may—

(a) call for returns from such courts;

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(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe  forms  for  regulating  the  practice  and  proceedings of such courts; and

(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such  courts.

(3) The High Court may also settle tables of  fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks  and  officers  of  such  courts  and  to  attorneys,  advocates and pleaders practising therein:

Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed  or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3)  shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any  law for the time being in force, and shall require  the previous approval of the Governor.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to  confer on a High Court powers of superintendence  over any court or tribunal constituted by or under  any law relating to the Armed Forces.”

19. In this context, it is also necessary to notice Article 136 of  the Constitution which provides special leave to appeal to Supreme  

Court:

“136.Special leave to appeal by the Supreme  Court.-(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  this  Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,  grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,  decree,  determination,  sentence  or  order  in  any  cause or matter passed or made by any court or  tribunal in the territory of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any  judgment, determination, sentence or order passed  or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or  under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”

In view of clause (2) of Article 136 which expressly excludes  

the  judgments  or  orders  passed  by  any  Court  or  Tribunal  

constituted by or under any law relating to Armed Forces, the

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aggrieved  persons  cannot  seek  leave  under  Article  136  of  

Constitution of India; to appeal from such judgment or order. But  

right to appeal is available under Section 30 with leave to appeal  

under Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.

20. We may also refer to Article 227(4) of the Constitution, which  reads as under:

“Article 227(4) Nothing in this article shall  be  deemed  to  confer  on  a  High  Court  powers  of  superintendence  over  any  court  or  tribunal  constituted by or under any law relating to the  Armed Forces.”

Thus, we find that there is a constitutional bar not only  

under  Article  136(2)  but  also  under  Article  227(4)  of  the  

Constitution  of  India  with  regard  to  entertaining  any  

determination or order passed by any court or Tribunal under law  

relating to Armed Forces.

21. Judicial review under Article 32 and 226 is a basic feature of  the  Constitution  beyond  the  plea  of  amendability.  While  under  

Article 32 of the Constitution a person has a right to move before  

Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the  

rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, no fundament  

right can be claimed by any person to move before the High Court  

by appropriate proceedings under Article 226 for enforcement of  

the rights conferred by the Constitution or Statute.  

22. In  L. Chandra kumar vs. Union of India, (1997)3 SCC 261 a  Bench of seven-Judge while dealing with the essential and basic  

features  of  Constitution  –  power  of  review  and  jurisdiction  

conferred  on  the  High  Court  under  Article  226/227  and  on  the

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Supreme Court under Article 32 held as follows:

“75. In Keshav Singh,  (1965) 1 SCR 413  while  addressing this issue, Gajendragadkar, C.J. stated  as follows: (SCC at pp. 493-494)

“If the power of the High Courts under Article  226 and the authority of this Court under Article  32 are not subject to any exceptions, then it would  be futile to contend that a citizen cannot move the  High  Courts  or  this  Court  to  invoke  their  jurisdiction even in cases where his fundamental  rights  have  been  violated.  The  existence  of  judicial power in that behalf must necessarily and  inevitably postulate the existence of a right in  the  citizen  to  move  the  Court  in  that  behalf;  otherwise the power conferred on the High Courts  and  this  Court  would  be  rendered  virtually  meaningless.  Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  the  judicial  power  conferred  on  the  High  Courts  and  this  Court  is  meant  for  the  protection  of  the  citizens’  fundamental  rights,  and  so,  in  the  existence  of  the  said  judicial  power  itself  is  necessarily involved the right of the citizen to  appeal to the said power in a proper case.”

(emphasis added)

76. To express our opinion on the issue whether the  power of judicial review vested in the High Courts  and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and  32  is  part  of  the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution, we must first attempt to understand  what  constitutes  the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution. The doctrine of basic structure was  evolved  in  Kesavananda  Bharati  case (1993  4  SCC  225). However, as already mentioned, that case did  not  lay  down  that  the  specific  and  particular  features  mentioned  in  that  judgment  alone  would  constitute the basic structure of our Constitution.  Indeed, in the judgments of Shelat and Grover, JJ.,  Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. and Jaganmohan Reddy, J.,  there are specific observations to the effect that  their  list  of  essential  features  comprising  the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution  are  illustrative and are not intended to be exhaustive.  In  Indira  Gandhi  case,  (1975  Supp  SCC  1),  Chandrachud, J. held that the proper approach for a

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Judge who is confronted with the question whether a  particular facet of the Constitution is part of the  basic structure, is to examine, in each individual  case, the place of the particular feature in the  scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose,  and the consequences of its denial on the integrity  of our Constitution as a fundamental instrument for  the governance of the country. (supra at pp. 751- 752).  This  approach  was  specifically  adopted  by  Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills case [(1980) 3 SCC  625] (at pp. 671-672) and is not regarded as the  definitive  test  in  this  field  of  Constitutional  Law.

77. We find that the various factors mentioned  in the test evolved by Chandrachud, J. have already  been considered by decisions of various Benches of  this Court that have been referred to in the course  of our analysis. From their conclusions, many of  which have been extracted by us in toto, it appears  that this Court has always considered the power of  judicial review vested in the High Courts and in  this Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively,  enabling legislative action to be subjected to the  scrutiny of superior courts, to be integral to our  constitutional scheme. While several judgments have  made  specific  references  to  this  aspect  [Gajendragadkar, C.J. in Keshav Singh case, Beg, J.  and  Khanna,  J.  in  Kesavananda  Bharati  case,  Chandrachud,  C.J.  and  Bhagwati,  J.  in  Minerva  Mills,  Chandrachud,  C.J.  in  Fertilizer  Kamgar[(1981) 1 scc 568], K.N. Singh, J. in Delhi  Judicial Service Assn. [(1991)4 scc 406], etc.] the  rest  have  made  general  observations  highlighting  the significance of this feature.”

23. In  S.N. Mukherjee vs.Union of India, (1990)4 SCC 594, this  Court noticed the special provision in regard to the members of  

the  Armed  Forces  in  the  Constitution  of  India  and   held  as  

follows:   

” 42. Before referring to the relevant provisions  of the Act and the Rules it may be mentioned that  the  Constitution  contains  certain  special  provisions  in  regard  to  members  of  the  Armed  Forces. Article 33 empowers Parliament to make law

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determining the extent to which any of the rights  conferred by Part III shall, in their application  to the members of the Armed Forces be restricted or  abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of  their  duties  and  the  maintenance  of  discipline  amongst  them.  By  clause  (2)  of  Article  136  the  appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article  136  of  the  Constitution  has  been  excluded  in  relation to any judgment, determination, sentence  or order passed or made by any court or tribunal  constituted by or under any law relating to the  Armed Forces. Similarly clause (4) of Article 227  denies  to  the  High  Courts  the  power  of  superintendence  over  any  court  or  tribunal  constituted by or under any law relating to the  Armed Forces. This Court under Article 32 and the  High Courts under Article 226 have, however, the  power of judicial review in respect of proceedings  of  courts  martial  and  the  proceedings  subsequent  thereto  and  can  grant  appropriate  relief  if  the  said  proceedings  have  resulted  in  denial  of  the  fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the  Constitution or if the said proceedings suffer from  a jurisdictional error or any error of law apparent  on the face of the record.”

24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in R.K. Jain vs. Union of  India & ors., (1993) 4 SCC 119, observed:

“66. In S.P.  Sampath Kumar  v. Union  of India  this  Court  held  that  the  primary  duty  of  the  judiciary is to interpret the Constitution and the  laws and this would predominantly be a matter fit  to be decided by the judiciary, as judiciary alone  would be possessed of expertise in this field and  secondly  the  constitutional  and  legal  protection  afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if  it  were  left  to  the  executive  to  determine  the  legality of its own action. The Constitution has,  therefore,  created  an  independent  machinery  i.e.  judiciary to resolve disputes, which is vested with  the  power  of  judicial  review  to  determine  the  legality of the legislative and executive actions  and to ensure compliance with the requirements of  law  on  the  part  of  the  executive  and  other  authorities.  This  function  is  discharged  by  the  judiciary  by  exercising  the  power  of  judicial  review which is a most potent weapon in the hands  of the judiciary for maintenance of the rule of

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law. The power of judicial review is an integral  part of our constitutional system and without it,  there will be no government of laws and the rule of  law would become a teasing illusion and a promise  of unreality. The judicial review, therefore, is a  basic and essential feature of the Constitution and  it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic  structure  of  the  Constitution.  The  basic  and  essential  feature  of  judicial  review  cannot  be  dispensed  with  but  it  would  be  within  the  competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution  and to provide alternative institutional mechanism  or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is  no less efficacious than the High Court. It must,  therefore,  be  read  as  implicit  in  the  constitutional scheme that the law excluding the  jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226  and 227 permissible under it, must not leave a void  but it must set up another effective institutional  mechanism  or  authority  and  vest  the  power  of  judicial  review  in  it  which  must  be  equally  effective and efficacious in exercising the power  of judicial review. The tribunal set up under the  Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was required to  interpret and apply Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in  quite  a  large  number  of  cases.  Therefore,  the  personnel  manning  the  administrative  tribunal  in  their  determinations  not  only  require  judicial  approach but also knowledge and expertise in that  particular  branch  of  constitutional  and  administrative  law.  The  efficacy  of  the  administrative tribunal and the legal input would  undeniably be more important and sacrificing the  legal input and not giving it sufficient weightage  would  definitely  impair  the  efficacy  and  effectiveness  of  the  Administrative  Tribunal.  Therefore,  it  was  held  that  an  appropriate  rule  should  be  made  to  recruit  the  members;  and  to  consult the Chief Justice of India in recommending  appointment  of  the  Chairman,  Vice-Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Tribunal  and  to  constitute  a  committee  presided  over  by  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court to recruit the members for appointment. In  M.B. Majumdar v. Union of India when the members of  CAT claimed parity of pay and superannuation as is  available to the Judges of the High Court, this  Court held that they are not on a par with the  judges but a separate mechanism created for their  appointment  pursuant  to  Article  323-A  of  the  Constitution.  Therefore,  what  was  meant  by  this  Court  in  Sampath  Kumar  case  ratio  is  that  the

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tribunals when exercise the power and functions,  the Act created institutional alternative mechanism  or  authority  to  adjudicate  the  service  disputations. It must be effective and efficacious  to  exercise  the  power  of  judicial  review.  This  Court  did  not  appear  to  have  meant  that  the  tribunals are substitutes of the High Court under  Articles  226  and  227  of  the  Constitution.  J.B.  Chopra v. Union of India merely followed the ratio  of Sampath Kumar.”

25. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court in L. Chandra and  S.N. Mukherjee, we find that the power of judicial review vested  

in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic essential  

features of the Constitution and any legislation including Armed  

Forces Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail jurisdiction of the  

High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

26. Basic principle for exercising power under Article 226 of the  Constitution:  In  Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and  

others, AIR 1974 SC 2105 this Court held as follows:

“9.....Exercise  of  the  jurisdiction  is  no  doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be  exercised  on  sound  judicial  principles.  When  the petition raises complex questions of fact,  which may for their determination require oral  evidence to be taken, and on that account the  High  Court  is  of  the  view  that  the  dispute  should  not  appropriately  be  tried  in  a  writ  petition, the High Court may decline to try a  petition  (See  Gunwant  Kaur  v.Bhatinda  Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 802). If, however,on  consideration of the nature of the controversy,  the High Court decides, as in the present case,  that it should go into a disputed question of  fact and the discretion exercised by the High  Court  appears  to  be  sound  and  in  conformity  with judicial principles, this Court would not  interfere in appeal with the order made by the  High Court in this respect.”

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27. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and others vs.Union of India and  others, (1997) 5 SCC 536, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court while  

considering  the  Excise  Act  and  Customs  Act  held  that  the  

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court  

under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions  

of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the  

legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Acts  

and  would  exercise  their  jurisdiction  consistent  with  the  

provisions of the Act. This Court held:  

“108. The discussion in the judgment yields the  following propositions. We may forewarn that these  propositions are set out merely for the sake of  convenient  reference  and  are  not  supposed  to  be  exhaustive. In case of any doubt or ambiguity in  these propositions, reference must be had to the  discussion  and  propositions  in  the  body  of  the  judgment.    (i)...........While the jurisdiction of the High  Courts under Article 226 — and of this Court under  Article  32  —  cannot  be  circumscribed  by  the  provisions  of  the  said  enactments,  they  will  certainly have due regard to the legislative intent  evidenced by the  provisions of the said Acts and  would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with  the provisions of the Act. The writ petition will  be considered and disposed of in the light of and  in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-B.  This is for the reason that the power under Article  226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of  law and not for abrogating it.

Xxx xxx xxx xxx

28. In  Kanaiyalal Lalchand and Sachdev and others vs. State of  Maharasthra and others, (2011) 2 SCC 782, this Court considered  

the  question  of  maintainability  of  the  writ  petition  while  an

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alternative remedy is available. This Court upheld the decision of  

the Bombay High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the  

appellants therein on the ground of existence of an efficacious  

alternative remedy under Section 17 of SARFASI Act and held:

“23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court  rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that  an  efficacious  remedy  was  available  to  the  appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well  settled  that  ordinarily  relief  under  Articles  226/227  of  the  Constitution  of  India  is  not  available if an efficacious alternative remedy is  available  to  any  aggrieved  person.  (See  Sadhana  Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai  v.  Ram  Chander  Rai  and  SBI  v.  Allied  Chemical  Laboratories7.)

24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v.  Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed  that: (SCC p. 175, para 30)

“30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction  under  Article  226  is  duty-bound  to  consider  whether:

(a) adjudication of the writ petition involves  any  complex  and  disputed  questions  of  facts  and  whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

(b) the petition reveals all material facts;

(c)  the  petitioner  has  any  alternative  or  effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;

(d)  the  person  invoking  the  jurisdiction  is  guilty of unexplained delay and laches;

(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;

(f) grant of relief is against public policy or  barred  by  any  valid  law;  and  host  of  other  factors.”

29. In  Nivedita  Sharma  vs.  Cellular  Operators  Association  of

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India and others, (2011)14 SCC 337, this Court noticed that when a  

statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a  

writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the  statutory  

dispensation. The Court further noticed the previous decisions of  

this  Court  wherein  the  Court  adverted  to  the  rule  of  self-

restraint  that  writ  petition  will  not  be  entertained  if  an  

effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person as follows:

13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of  Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para  11)

“11. … It is now well recognised that where a  right or liability is created by a statute which  gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy  provided by that statute only must be availed of.  This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes,  J.  in  Wolverhampton  New  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495)

‘…  There are three classes of cases in which a  liability  may  be  established  founded  upon  a  statute. … But there is a third class viz. where a  liability not existing at common law is created by  a statute which at the same time gives a special  and  particular  remedy  for  enforcing  it.  …  The  remedy provided by the statute must be followed,  and it is not competent to the party to pursue the  course applicable to cases of the second class. The  form  given  by  the  statute  must  be  adopted  and  adhered to.’

The rule laid down in this passage was approved  by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express  Newspapers  Ltd.  and  has  been  reaffirmed  by  the  Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and  Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd. and Secy. of  State v. Mask and Co. It has also been held to be  equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and  has  been  followed  by  this  Court  throughout.  The  High Court was therefore justified in dismissing  the writ petitions in limine.”

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14. In  Mafatlal  Industries  Ltd.  v.  Union  of  India  B.P.  Jeevan  Reddy,  J.  (speaking  for  the  majority  of  the  larger  Bench)  observed:  (SCC  p.  607, para 77)

“77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High  Court  under  Article  226—or  for  that  matter,  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article  32—is  concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the  Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is,  however, equally obvious that while exercising the  power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would  certainly  take  note  of  the  legislative  intent  manifested in the provisions of the Act and would  exercise  their  jurisdiction  consistent  with  the  provisions of the enactment.”

15. In  the  judgments  relied  upon  by  Shri  Vaidyanathan, which, by and large, reiterate the  proposition laid down in Baburam Prakash Chandra  Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, it has been  held that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the  entertaining  of  writ  petition  filed  for  the  enforcement  of  any  of  the  fundamental  rights  or  where there has been a violation of the principles  of  natural  justice  or  where  the  order  under  challenge  is  wholly  without  jurisdiction  or  the  vires of the statute is under challenge.

16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has  recognised  some  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  alternative remedy. However, the proposition laid  down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes8 and  other similar judgments that the High Court will  not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is  available to the aggrieved person or the statute  under which the action complained of has been taken  itself  contains  a  mechanism  for  redressal  of  grievance still holds the field.”

30. In Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of  Orissa Limited (SOUTHCO) and another vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill,  

(2012) 2 SCC 108, a three-Judge Bench held:  

“80. It is a settled canon of law that the High  Court would not normally interfere in exercise of

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its  jurisdiction  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution of India where statutory alternative  remedy  is  available.  It  is  equally  settled  that  this canon of law is not free of exceptions. The  courts, including this Court, have taken the view  that  the  statutory  remedy,  if  provided  under  a  specific law, would impliedly oust the jurisdiction  of the civil courts. The High Court in exercise of  its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of  the  Constitution  of  India  can  entertain  writ  or  appropriate proceedings despite availability of an  alternative  remedy.  This  jurisdiction,  the  High  Court would exercise with some circumspection in  exceptional  cases,  particularly,  where  the  cases  involve a pure question of law or vires of an Act  are  challenged.  This  class  of  cases  we  are  mentioning by way of illustration and should not be  understood to be an exhaustive exposition of law  which,  in  our  opinion,  is  neither  practical  nor  possible to state with precision. The availability  of alternative statutory or other remedy by itself  may not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of  jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend  upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.  The further question that would inevitably come up  for  consideration  before  the  Court  even  in  such  cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction  has to be exercised.

81. Should the courts determine on merits of the  case  or  should  they  preferably  answer  the  preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising  in the facts of the case and remit the matter for  consideration on merits by the competent authority?  Again,  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  state  with  absolute  clarity  any  principle  governing  such  exercise  of  jurisdiction.  It  always  will  depend  upon  the  facts  of  a  given  case.  We  are  of  the  considered view that interest of administration of  justice shall be better subserved if the cases of  the present kind are heard by the courts only where  they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or  the  matters  which  go  to  the  very  root  of  jurisdiction and where the authorities have acted  beyond  the  provisions  of  the  Act.  However,  it  should only be for the specialised tribunal or the  appellate  authorities  to  examine  the  merits  of  assessment or even the factual matrix of the case.”

31. In Cicily Kallarackal vs. Vehicle Factory 2012(8) SCC 524,

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the Division Bench of this Court held:

“4. Despite this, we cannot help but state in  absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the  High  Courts  to  entertain  writ  petitions  under  Article 226 of the Constitution of India against  the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory  appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the  provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.  Once the legislature has provided for a  statutory  appeal  to  a  higher  court,  it  cannot  be  proper  exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to  bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court  and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  Even in the present case, the High Court has not  exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law.  The  case  is  one  of  improper  exercise  of  jurisdiction. It is not expected of us to deal with  this  issue  at  any  greater  length  as  we  are  dismissing this petition on other grounds.

XXX XXX XXX XXX

9. ........, we hereby make it clear that the  orders  of  the  Commission  are  incapable  of  being  questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High  Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section  27-A(1)(c) lies to this Court. Therefore, we have  no  hesitation  in  issuing  a  direction  of  caution  that  it  will  not  be  a  proper  exercise  of  jurisdiction by the High Courts to entertain writ  petitions against such orders of the Commission.”

32. Another  Division  Bench  of  this  Court  in   Commissioner  of  Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agrawal, (2014)1 SCC 603  

held:

“11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we  would notice the principle of law as laid down by  this  Court.  It  is  settled  law  that  non- entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction  by the High Court when an efficacious alternative  remedy  is  available  is  a  rule  of  self-imposed  limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy,  convenience and discretion rather than a rule of  law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of  the High Court to grant relief under Article 226  despite the existence of an alternative remedy.

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However,  the  High  Court  must  not  interfere  if  there  is  an  adequate  efficacious  alternative  remedy  available  to  the  petitioner  and  he  has  approached  the  High  Court  without  availing  the  same unless he has made out an exceptional case  warranting  such  interference  or  there  exist  sufficient  grounds  to  invoke  the  extraordinary  jurisdiction under Article 226. (See State of U.P.  v. Mohd. Nooh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v.  State of Orissa, Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil  Corpn. Ltd. and State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja  Cement Ltd.

12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in  K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation  Commission,  Sangram  Singh  v.  Election  Tribunal,  Union of India v. T.R. Varma, State of U.P. v.  Mohd. Nooh2 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd.  v. State of Madras have held that though Article  226  confers  very  wide  powers  in  the  matter  of  issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of  writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If  the  High  Court  is  satisfied  that  the  aggrieved  party  can  have  an  adequate  or  suitable  relief  elsewhere,  it  can  refuse  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction.  The  Court,  in  extraordinary  circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes  to the conclusion that there has been a breach of  the principles of natural justice or the procedure  required for decision has not been adopted. [See  N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, Municipal  Council,  Khurai  v.  Kamal  Kumar,  Siliguri  Municipality v. Amalendu Das, S.T. Muthusami v. K.  Natarajan, Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Kerala  SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu  v. S. Chellappan, L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of  A.P., Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri  Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State  of Maharashtra, Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana  and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO.]

13. In  Nivedita  Sharma  v.  Cellular  Operators  Assn. of India, this Court has held that where  hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute,  the  party  must  exhaust  the  statutory  remedies  before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief  and observed as follows: (SCC pp. 343-45, paras  12-14)

“12.  In  Thansingh  Nathmal  v.  Supt.  of  Taxes

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this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed  restraint  that  the  writ  petition  will  not  be  entertained if an effective remedy is available to  the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423,  para 7)

‘7. … The High Court does not therefore act as  a court of appeal against the decision of a court  or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does  not  by  assuming  jurisdiction  under  Article  226  trench upon an alternative remedy provided by the  statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to  the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal,  or  even  itself  in  another  jurisdiction  for  obtaining  redress  in  the  manner  provided  by  a  statute, the High Court normally will not permit  by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of  the Constitution the machinery created under the  statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party  applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so  set up.’

13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State  of Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41,  para 11)

‘11. … It is now well recognised that where a  right or liability is created by a statute which  gives  a  special  remedy  for  enforcing  it,  the  remedy  provided  by  that  statute  only  must  be  availed  of.  This  rule  was  stated  with  great  clarity  by  Willes,  J.  in  Wolverhampton  New  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Hawkesford  in  the  following  passage: (ER p. 495)

xxx xxx xxx xxx

14. In  Mafatlal  Industries  Ltd.  v.  Union  of  India  B.P.  Jeevan  Reddy,  J.  (speaking  for  the  majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p.  607, para 77)

‘77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High  Court under Article 226—or for that matter, the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article  32—is  concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of  the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It  is, however, equally obvious that while exercising  the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court

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would  certainly  take  note  of  the  legislative  intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and  would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with  the provisions of the enactment.’”

(See G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., CCE  v. Dunlop India Ltd., Ramendra Kishore Biswas v.  State of Tripura, Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of  Maharashtra, C.A. Abraham v. ITO, Titaghur Paper  Mills  Co.  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Orissa,  Excise  and  Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi  Nath and Sons, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of  Trade Marks, Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State  of Bihar, Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh and Punjab  National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan.)

15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court  has  recognised  some  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  alternative  remedy  i.e.  where  the  statutory  authority  has  not  acted  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  enactment  in  question,  or  in  defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial  procedure,  or  has  resorted  to  invoke  the  provisions which are repealed, or when an order  has  been  passed  in  total  violation  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice,  the  proposition  laid  down  in  Thansingh  Nathmal  case,  Titaghur  Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that  the High Court will not entertain a petition under  Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective  alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved  person  or  the  statute  under  which  the  action  complained  of  has  been  taken  itself  contains  a  mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds  the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is  created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ  petition should not be entertained ignoring the  statutory dispensation.”

33. Statutory Remedy In Union of India vs. Brigadier P.S. Gill, (2012) 4 SCC 463,  

this Court while dealing with appeals under Section 30  of the  

Armed Forces Tribunal Act following the procedure prescribed under  

Section 31 and its maintainability, held as follows:

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“8. Section  31  of  the  Act  extracted  above  specifically provides for an appeal to the Supreme  Court but stipulates two distinct routes for such  an  appeal.  The  first  route  to  this  Court  is  sanctioned by the Tribunal granting leave to file  such an appeal. Section 31(1) in no uncertain terms  forbids  grant  of  leave  to  appeal  to  this  Court  unless the Tribunal certifies that a point of law  of  general  public  importance  is  involved  in  the  decision.  This  implies  that  Section  31  does  not  create a vested, indefeasible or absolute right of  filing  an  appeal  to  this  Court  against  a  final  order or decision of the Tribunal to this Court.  Such an appeal must be preceded by the leave of the  Tribunal and such leave must in turn be preceded by  a certificate by the Tribunal that a point of law  of  general  public  importance  is  involved  in  the  appeal.

9. The second and the only other route to access  this Court is also found in Section 31(1) itself.  The expression “or it appears to the Supreme Court  that the point is one which ought to be considered  by that Court” empowers this Court to permit the  filing of an appeal against any such final decision  or order of the Tribunal.

10. A conjoint reading of Sections 30 and 31 can  lead to only one conclusion viz. there is no vested  right of appeal against a final order or decision  of  the  Tribunal  to  this  Court  other  than  those  falling under Section 30(2) of the Act. The only  mode to bring up the matter to this Court in appeal  is either by way of certificate obtained from the  Tribunal that decided the matter or by obtaining  leave of this Court under Section 31 for filing an  appeal depending upon whether this Court considers  the point involved in the case to be one that ought  to be considered by this Court.

11. An  incidental  question  that  arises  is:  whether an application for permission to file an  appeal  under  Section  31  can  be  moved  directly  before the Supreme Court without first approaching  the  Tribunal  for  a  certificate  in  terms  of  the  first part of Section 31(1) of the Act?

12. In the ordinary course the aggrieved party  could perhaps adopt one of the two routes to bring

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up  the  matter  to  this  Court  but  that  does  not  appear to be the legislative intent evident from  Section  31(2)  (supra).  A  careful  reading  of  the  section  shows  that  it  not  only  stipulates  the  period for making an application to the Tribunal  for grant of leave to appeal to this Court but also  stipulates the period for making an application to  this  Court  for  leave  of  this  Court  to  file  an  appeal against the said order which is sought to be  challenged.

13. It is significant that the period stipulated  for  filing  an  application  to  this  Court  starts  running from the date beginning from the date the  application  made  to  the  Tribunal  for  grant  of  certificate  is  refused  by  the  Tribunal.  This  implies that the aggrieved party cannot approach  this Court directly for grant of leave to file an  appeal under Section 31(1) read with Section 31(2)  of the Act.

14. The  scheme  of  Section  31  being  that  an  application for grant of a certificate must first  be moved before the Tribunal, before the aggrieved  party  can  approach  this  Court  for  the  grant  of  leave to file an appeal. The purpose underlying the  provision appears to be that if the Tribunal itself  grants  a  certificate  of  fitness  for  filing  an  appeal, it would be unnecessary for the aggrieved  party to approach this Court for a leave to file  such an appeal. An appeal by certificate would then  be maintainable as a matter of right in view of  Section  30  which  uses  the  expression  “an  appeal  shall lie to the Supreme Court”. That appears to us  to be the true legal position on a plain reading of  the provisions of Sections 30 and 31.”

Thus, we find that though under Section 30 no person has a  

right  of  appeal  against  the  final  order  or  decision  of  the  

Tribunal  to  this  Court  other  than  those  falling  under  Section  

30(2) of the Act, but it is statutory appeal which lies to this  

Court.

34. The  aforesaid  decisions  rendered  by  this  Court  can  be  summarised as follows:

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(i) The power of judicial review vested in the High Court  

under Article 226 is one of the basic essential features  

of the Constitution and any legislation including Armed  

Forces Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail jurisdiction  

of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution  

of India.(Refer: L. Chandra and S.N. Mukherjee).

(ii)The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and  

this  Court  under  Article  32  though  cannot  be  

circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment, they  

will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent  

evidenced  by  the  provisions  of  the  Acts  and  would  

exercise  their  jurisdiction  consistent  with  the  

provisions of the Act.(Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd.).

(iii)When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal  

of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained  

ignoring  the  statutory  dispensation.  (Refer:  Nivedita  

Sharma).

(iv)The  High  Court  will  not  entertain  a  petition  under  

Article  226  of  the  Constitution  if  an  effective  

alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person  

or the statute under which the action complained of has  

been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of  

grievance. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma).

 35. Article 141 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

“Article 141.Law declared by Supreme Court  to  be  binding  on  all  courts.-The  law

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declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  shall  be  binding on all courts within the territory  of India.”

36. In Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of  Orissa Limited(SOUTHCO) this Court observed that it should only be  

for  the  specialised  tribunal  or  the  appellate  authorities  to  

examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the  

case.

In Chhabil Dass Agrawal this Court held that when a statutory  

forum  is  created  by  law  for  redressal  of  grievances,  a  writ  

petition  should  not  be  entertained  ignoring  the  statutory  

dispensation.  

In Cicily Kallarackal this Court issued a direction of caution  

that it will not be a proper exercise of the jurisdiction by the  

High  Court  to  entertain  a  writ  petition  against  such  orders  

against which statutory appeal lies before this Court.

In view of Article 141(1) the law as laid down by this Court,  

as referred above, is binding on all courts of India including the  

High Courts.

37. Likelihood of anomalous situation If the High Court entertains a petition under Article 226 of  

the Constitution of India against order passed by Armed Forces  

Tribunal under Section 14 or Section 15 of the Act bypassing the  

machinery of statute i.e. Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, there is  

likelihood  of  anomalous  situation  for  the  aggrieved  person  in  

praying for relief from this Court.  

Section 30 provides for an appeal to this Court subject to

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leave  granted  under  Section  31  of  the  Act.  By  clause  (2)  of  

Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  the  appellate  

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 has been excluded in  

relation to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed  

or made by  any court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law  

relating to the Armed Forces. If any person aggrieved by the order  

of the Tribunal, moves before the High Court under Article 226 and  

the High Court entertains the petition and passes a judgment or  

order, the person who may be aggrieved against both the orders  

passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal and the High Court, cannot  

challenge  both  the  orders  in  one  joint  appeal.  The  aggrieved  

person  may  file  leave  to  appeal  under  Article  136  of  the  

Constitution against the judgment passed by the High Court but in  

view of the bar of jurisdiction by clause (2) of Article 136, this  

Court  cannot  entertain  appeal  against  the  order  of  the  Armed  

Forces Tribunal. Once, the High Court entertains a petition under  

Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of Armed Forces  

Tribunal and decides the matter, the person who thus approached  

the  High Court, will also be precluded from filing an appeal  

under Section 30 with leave to appeal under Section 31 of the Act  

against  the  order  of  the  Armed  Forces  Tribunal  as  he  cannot  

challenge the order passed by the High Court under Article 226 of  

the Constitution under Section 30 read with Section 31 of the Act.  

Thereby, there is a chance of anomalous situation. Therefore, it  

is always desirable for the High Court to act in terms of the law  

laid down by this Court as referred to above, which is binding on

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the High Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India,  

allowing the aggrieved person to avail the remedy under Section 30  

read with Section 31 Armed Forces Act.

38. The High Court (Delhi High Court) while entertaining the writ  petition  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  bypassed  the  

machinery created under Sections 30 and 31 of Act. However, we  

find that Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Allahabad High Court  

had not entertained the petitions under Article 226 and directed  

the writ petitioners to seek resort under Sections 30 and 31 of  

the Act. Further, the law laid down by this Court, as referred to  

above, being binding on the High Court, we are of the view that  

Delhi High Court was not justified in entertaining the petition  

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

39. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgments  passed by the Delhi High Court and upheld the judgments and orders  

passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Allahabad High Court.  

Aggrieved  persons  are  given  liberty  to  avail  the  remedy  under  

Section 30 with leave to appeal under Section 31 of the Act, and  

if so necessary may file petition for condonation of delay to  

avail remedy before this Court.

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40

40. The Civil Appeal Nos.7400, 7375-7376, 7399, 9388, 9389 of 2013  are allowed and the Civil Appeal Nos.7338 of 2013 and 96  of 2014  

are dismissed.

…………………………………………………………………………J.               (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

………………………………………………………………………J.  (N.V. RAMANA)    

NEW DELHI, MARCH 11, 2015.