07 March 2018
Supreme Court
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UNION OF INDIA Vs M/S INTERCONTINENTAL CONSULTANTS AND TECHNOCRATS PVT.LTD

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
Case number: C.A. No.-002013-002013 / 2014
Diary number: 15236 / 2013
Advocates: B. KRISHNA PRASAD Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2013 OF 2014

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

M/S. INTERCONTINENTAL CONSULTANTS AND TECHNOCRATS PVT. LTD. .....RESPONDENT(S)

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 295-299 OF 2014  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2021 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4340-4341 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6866 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7685 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7688 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8056 OF 2015

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3360 OF 2015

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1043-1045 OF 2017

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6090 OF 2017

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10626-10627 OF 2017

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1932-1934 OF 2017

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 1 of 44

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6864 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6865 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4536-4537 OF 2016

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5130 OF 2016

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4975 OF 2016

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5453 OF 2016

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10223-10224 OF 2017

A N D

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5444 OF 2017

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

In all these appeals, legal issue that needs determination is

almost  identical,  though  there  may  be  little  variation  on  facts.

This difference pertains to the nature of services provided by the

respondents/assessees who are all covered by the service tax.

The fringe diferences in the nature of services, however, nature of

differences, however, has no impact on the final outcome.

2) All  the assessees are paying service tax.   The services which

these assessees are rendering broadly fall  in the following four

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categories:

(a) Consulting engineering services.

(b) Share transfer agency services.

(c) Custom house agent services covered by the head ‘clearing

and forwarding agent’.

(d) The  site  formation  and  clearances,  excavation  and  earth

moving and demolition services.

3) While rendering the aforesaid services, the assessees are also

getting reimbursement in respect of certain activities undertaken

by them which according to them is not includable to arrive at

‘gross value’ charged from their  clients.   As per Rule 5 of  the

Service  Tax  (Determination  of  Value)  Rules,  2006  (hereinafter

referred  to  as the  ‘Rules’),  the  value of  the said  reimbursable

activities is also to be included as part of services provided by

these respondents.  Writ  petitions were filed by the assessees

challenging the vires of Rule 5 of the Rules as unconstitutional as

well as ultra vires the provisions of Sections 66 and 67 of Chapter

V of the Finance Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

The High Court of Delhi has, by the judgment dated November

30, 2012, accepted the said challenge and declared Rule 5 to be

ultra vires these provisions.  Other cases have met similar results

by  riding  on  the  judgment  dated  November  30,  2012.   This

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necessitates examining the the correctness of the judgment of the

Delhi High Court and outocme thereof would determine the fate of

all these appeals/transfer petitions.

4) This judgment was rendered by the High court in the writ petition

filed by M/s.  Intercontinental  Consultants and Technocrats Pvt.

Ltd. out of which Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 arises.  Therefore,

for  our  purpose,  it  would  suffice  to  advert  to  the  facts  of  this

appeal and take note of the reasons which have prevailed with

the High Court in arriving at this conclusion.

5) The assessee M/s. Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats

Pvt.  Ltd.  is  a  provider  of  consulting  engineering  services.   It

specialises  in  highways,  structures,  airports,  urban  and  rural

infrastructural  projects and is engaged in various road projects

outside and inside India. In the course of the carrying on of its

business, the petitioner rendered consultancy services in respect

of  highway projects  to  the National  Highway Authority  of  India

(NHAI). The petitioner receives payments not only for its service

but is also reimbursed expenses incurred by it such as air travel,

hotel stay, etc. It was paying service tax in respect of amounts

received by it for services rendered to its clients. It was not paying

any service tax in respect of the expenses incurred by it, which

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was  reimbursed  by  the  clients.  On  19.10.2007,  the

Superintendent (Audit) Group II (Service Tax), New Delhi issued a

letter  to  the petitioner  on the subject  “service tax audit  for  the

financial year 2002-03 to 2006-07.  In this letter, it was mentioned

by the appellant that service tax was liable to be charged on the

gross value including reimbursable and out of pocket expenses

like travelling, lodging and boarding etc. and the respondent was

directed to deposit the due service tax along with interest @13%

under Sections 73 and 75 respectively of the Act.  In response,

the  respondent  provided  month-wise  detail  of  the  professional

income as well as reimbursable out of pocket expenses for the

period  mentioned  in  the  aforesaid  letter.   Thereafter,  a  show

cause  notice  dated  March  17,  2008  was  issued  by  the

Commissioner,  Service  Tax,  Commissionerate  vide  which  the

respondent was asked to show cause as to why the service tax

should  not  be  recovered  by  including  the  amounts  of

reimbursable which were received by the respondent, pointing out

these were to be included while arriving at the gross value as per

provisions of Rule 5(1) of the Rules.

6) Rule 5 was brought  into existence w.e.f.  June 01,  2007.   The

demand which was made in the show cause notice was covered

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by the period from October, 2002 to March, 2007.  Against this

show cause notice,  the respondent  preferred Writ  Petition  No.

6370 of  2008 in  the High Court  of  Delhi  challenging the  vires

thereof with three prayers, namely:

(i)  for  quashing  Rule  5  in  its  entirety  of  the  Service  Tax

(Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 to the extent it includes the

reimbursement of expenses in the value of taxable service for the

purpose of charging service tax; and

(ii)  for  declaring the  rule  to  be unconstitutional  and ultra  vires

Sections 66 and 67 of the Finance Act, 1994; and

(iii) for quashing the impugned show-cause notice-cum-demand

dated  17.03.2008  holding  that  it  is  illegal,  arbitrary,  without

jurisdiction and unconstitutional.

7) Rule 5, which provides for ‘inclusion in or exclusion from the value

of certain expenditure or costs’, is reproduced below in order to

understand its full implication:

“5.  Inclusion  in  or  exclusion  from  value  of  certain expenditure or costs.

(1)  Where any expenditure or  costs are incurred by the service provider in the course of providing taxable service, all such expenditure or costs shall be treated as consideration for the taxable service provided or to be provided and shall be included in the value for the

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purpose of charging service tax on the said service.

(2)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub  rule  (1),  the expenditure or costs incurred by the service provider as a pure agent of the recipient of service,  shall  be excluded from the value of the taxable service if all the following conditions are satisfied, namely:   

 the service provider acts as a pure agent of the recipient of service when he makes payment to third party for the goods or services procured;

 the recipient of  service receives and uses the goods  or  services so  procured by  the service provider  in  his  capacity  as  pure  agent  of  the recipient of service;   

 the  recipient  of  service  is  liable  to  make payment to the third party;

 the  recipient  of  service  authorities  the  service provider to make payment on his behalf;  

 the  recipient  of  service  knows  that  the  goods and services for which payment has been made by the service provider shall be provided by the third party;

 the payment made by the service provider on behalf  of  the  recipient  of  service  has  been separately indicated in the invoice issued by the service provider to the recipient of service;

 the service provider recovers from the recipient of service only such amount as has been paid by him to the third party; and  

 the goods or services procured by the service provider from the third party as a pure agent of the  recipient  of  service  are  in  addition  to  the services he provides on his own account.  

Explanation 1 : For the purposes of sub rule (2), “pure agent” means a person who –   

 enters  into  a  contractual  agreement  with  the

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recipient of service to act as his pure agent to incur  expenditure  or  costs  in  the  course  of providing taxable service;

 neither intends to hold nor holds any title to the goods or  services so procured or provided as pure agent of the recipient of service;   

 does  not  use  such  goods  or  services  so procured; and  

 receives  only  the  actual  amount  incurred  to procure such goods or services.  

Explanation 2 : For the removal of doubts it is clarified that the value of the taxable service is the total  amount of consideration consisting of all components of the taxable service and it is immaterial  that  the  details  of  individual components  of  the  total  consideration  is indicated separately in the invoice.

Illustration 1 : X contracts with Y, a real estate agent to sell his house and thereupon Y gives an  advertisement  in  television.  Y  billed  X including  charges  for  Television  advertisement and paid service tax on the total consideration billed.  In  such  a  case,  consideration  for  the service provided is what X pays to Y. Y does not act as an agent behalf of X when obtaining the television  advertisement  even  if  the  cost  of television  advertisement  is  mentioned separately  in  the  invoice  issued  by  X. Advertising  service  is  an  input  service  for  the estate agent in order to enable or facilitate him to perform his services as an estate agent.  

Illustration  2  :  In  the  course  of  providing  a taxable service, a service provider incurs costs such as traveling expenses, postage, telephone, etc., and may indicate these items separately on the invoice issued to the recipient of service. In such a case, the service provider is not acting as  an  agent  of  the  recipient  of  service  but procures such inputs or input service on his own account for providing the taxable service. Such

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expenses  do  not  become  reimbursable expenditure merely because they are indicated separately in the invoice issued by the service provider to the recipient of service.

Illustration 3 : A contracts with B, an architect for building a house. During the course of providing the taxable service, B incurs expenses such as telephone  charges,  air  travel  tickets,  hotel accommodation,  etc.,  to  enable  him  to effectively perform the provision of services to A. In  such  a  case,  in  whatever  form B recovers such  expenditure  from  A,  whether  as  a separately  itemised  expense  or  as  part  of  an inclusive overall  fee, service tax is payable on the  total  amount  charged  by  B.  Value  of  the taxable service for charging service tax is what A pays to B.  

Illustration  4 :  Company X provides  a taxable service of rent cab by providing chauffeur driven cars for overseas visitors. The chauffeur is given a  lump  sum  amount  to  cover  his  food  and overnight  accommodation  and  any  other incidental expenses such as parking fees by the Company X during the tour. At the end of the tour,  the  chauffeur  returns  the  balance  of  the amount with a statement of  his expenses and the  relevant  bills.  Company  X  charges  these amounts from the recipients of service. The cost incurred  by  the  chauffeur  and  billed  to  the recipient  of  service  constitutes  part  of  gross amount charged for the provision of services by the company X.”

 8) The case set up by the respondent in the writ petition was that

Rule 5(1) of the Rules, which provides that all expenditure or cost

incurred by the service provider in the course of  providing the

taxable services shall be treated as consideration for the taxable

services and shall  be included in  the value for  the purpose of

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charging service tax, goes beyond the mandate of Section 67.  It

was argued that Section 67 which deals with valuation of taxable

services for charging service tax does not provide for inclusion of

the  aforesaid  expenditure  or  cost  incurred  while  providing  the

services as  they cannot  be treated  as  element/components  of

service.  Section 67 was amended by Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f.

May 01, 2006.  Since the cases before us involve period prior to

the aforesaid amendment as well as post amendment period, it

would  apt  to  take  note  of  both  unamended  and  amended

provisions.  Unamended Section 67 was in the following form:

““67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax.

For  the  purposes  of  this  Chapter,  the  value  of  any taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the  service  provider  for  such  provided  or  to  be provided by him.  

Explanation 1. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that  the value of  a taxable service,  as  the case may be, includes,  

(a) the aggregate of commission or brokerage charges by  a  broker  on  the  sale  or  purchase  of  securities including  the  commission  or  brokerage  paid  by  the stock broker to any sub broker.  

(b) the adjustments made by the telegraph authority from any deposits made by the subscriber at the time of  application  for  telephone  connection  or  pager  or facsimile or telegraph or telex or for leased circuit;  

(c)the amount of premium charged by the insurer from the policy holder;  

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(d)  the commission received by the air  travel  agent from the airline;  

(e) the commission, fee or any other sum received by an actuary, or intermediary or insurance intermediary or insurance agent from the insurer;  

(f)  the  reimbursement  received  by  the  authorized service station from manufacturer for carrying out any service of  nay motor  car,  light  motor  vehicle or  two wheeled  motor  vehicle  manufactured  by  such manufacturer; and  

(g) the commission or any amount received by the rail travel agent from the Railways or the customer.  

But does not include –  

(i) initial deposit made by the subscriber at the time of application  for  telephone  connection  or  pager  or facsimile  (FAX)  or  telephone  or  telex  or  for  leased circuit;  

(ii)  the  cost  of  unexposed  photography  film, unrecorded  magnetic  tape  or  such  other  storage devices, if any, sold to the client during the course of providing the service;  

(iii)  the cost  of  parts  or  accessories,  or  consumable such  as  lubricants  and coolants,  if  any,  sold  to  the customer  during  the  course  of  service  or  repair  of motor cars, light motor vehicle or two wheeled motor vehicles;  

(iv) the airfare collected by air travel agent in respect of service provided by him;  

(v) the rail fare collected by rail travel agent in respect of service provided by him;  

(vi) the cost of parts or other material, if any, sold to the  customer  during  the  course  of  providing maintenance or repair service;  

(vii) the cost of parts or other material, if any, sold to the customer during the course of providing erection, commissioning or installation service; and  

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(viii) interest on loan.  

Explanation 2 – Where the gross amount charged by a service provider is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of taxable service shall be such amount as with the  addition  of  tax  payable,  is  equal  to  the  gross amount charged.  

Explanation 3. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared  that  the  gross  amount  charged  for  the taxable  service  shall  include  any  amount  received towards  the  taxable  service  before,  during  or  after provision of such service.”

 9) After its amendment w.e.f. May 01, 2006, a much shorter version

was introduced which reads as under:

“67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax.

(1)  Subject  to  the provisions of  this  Chapter,  where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall,  

(i)  in  a case where the provision of  service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;  

(ii)  in a case where the provision of  service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be  such  amount  in  money  as,  with  the  addition  of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;

(iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration  which  is  not  ascertainable,  be  the amount  as  ay  be  determined  in  the  prescribed manner.  

(2)  Where  the  gross  amount  charged  by  a  service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive  of  service  tax  payable,  the  value  of  such taxable  service  shall  be  such  amount  as,  with  the

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addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged.  

(3) The gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service  before,  during  or  after  provision  of  such service.  

(4) Subject to the provisions of sub sections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.  

Explanation: For the purpose of this section,  

(a)  “consideration”  includes  any  amount  that  is payable  for  the  taxable  services  provided  or  to  be provided;  

(b)  “money”  includes  any  currency,  cheque, promissory  note,  letter  of  credit,  draft,  pay  order, travelers cheque, money order, postal remittance and other  similar  instruments  but  does  not  include currency that is held for its numismatic value;  

(c)  “gross  amount  charged”  includes  payment  by cheque, credit card, deduction from account and any form of payment by issue of credit notes or debit notes and  book  adjustment,  and  any  amount  credited  or debited, as the case may be, to any account, whether called “Suspense account” or by any other name, in the books of accounts of a person liable to pay service tax,  where the transaction of  taxable service is  with any associated enterprise.”

 10) The  High  Court,  after  taking  note  of  the  aforesaid  provisions,

noted that the provisions both amended and unamended Section

67 authorised the determination of value of taxable services for

the purpose of charging service tax under Section 66 (which is a

charging section) as the gross amount charged by the service

provider for such services provided or to be provided by him, in a

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case  where  the  consideration  for  the  service  is  money.

Emphasising on the words ‘for such service’, the High Court took

the view that the charge of service tax under Section 66 has to be

on the value of taxable service i.e. the value of service rendered

by  the  assessee  to  the  NHAI,  which  is  that  of  a  consulting

engineer, that can be brought to charge and nothing more.  The

quantification of  the value of  the service can,  therefore,  never

exceed the gross amount charged by the service provider for the

service provided by him.  On that analogy, the High Court has

opined that scope of Rule 5 goes beyond the Section which was

impermissible as the Rules which have been made under Section

94 of the Act can only be made ‘for carrying out the provisions

of this Chapter’ (Chapter V of the Act) which provides for levy

quantification and collection of the service tax.  In the process,

the High Court observed that the expenditure or cost incurred by

the service provider in the course of providing the taxable service

can never be considered as the gross amount charged by the

service provider ‘for such service’ provided by him, and illustration

3 given below the Rule which included the value of such services

was a clear example of breaching the boundaries of Section 67.

The High Court even went on to hold further pointed out that it

may even result in double taxation inasmuch as expenses on air

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travel tickets are already subject to service tax and are included

in the bill.  No doubt, double taxation was permissible in law but it

could  only  be  done  if  it  was  categorically  provided  for  and

intended;  and could  not  be enforced by implication as held  in

Jain  Brothers  v.  Union  of  India1.   The  High  Court  has  also

referred to many judgments of this Court for the proposition that

Rules  cannot  be  over-ride  or  over-reach  the  provisions  of  the

main enactment2.  The High Court also referred to the judgment

of Queens Bench of England in the case of  Commissioner of

Customs and Excise v. Cure and Deeley Ltd.3.

11) Mr.  K.  Radhakrishnan,  learned  senior  counsel  argued  for  the

appellant, ably assisted by Ms. Nisha Bagchi, advocate who also

made significant contribution by arguing some of the nuances of

the issue involved.  Submission of the learned counsel appearing

for the appellant/Department was that prior to April 19, 2006 i.e. in

the absence of Rule 5 of the Rules, the value of taxable services

was covered by Section 67 of the Act.  As per this  Section, the

value  of  taxable  services  in  relation  to  consulting  engineering

services provided or to be provided by a consulting engineer to

1 (1970) 77 ITR 107 2 Central Bank of India & Ors. v. Workmen, etc., (1960) 1 SCR 200; Babaji Kondaji Garad v.

Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 50;  State of U.P. & Ors.  v.  Babu Ram Upadhya, (1961) 2 SCR 679; CIT v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, (1969) 74 ITR 41; Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of M.P. & Ors., (1971) 81 ITR 105 and CIT, Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel, (1971) 82 ITR 44

3 (1961) 3 WLR 788 (QB)

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the client shall be the gross amount charged for a consideration

or in money from the client in respect of engineering services.

The expression ‘gross amount charged’ would clearly include all

the  amounts  which  were  charged by  the  service  provider  and

would  not  be  limited  to  the  remuneration  received  from  the

customer.  The very connotation ‘gross amount charged’ denotes

the total  amount which is received in rendering those services

and would include the other  amounts like transportation,  office

rent,  office  appliances,  furniture  and  equipments  etc.   It  was

submitted  that  this  expenditure  or  cost  would  be  part  of

consideration  for  taxable  services.   It  was,  thus,  argued  that

essential input cost had to be included in arriving at gross amount

charged by a service provider.

12) It was further submitted that Section 67 of the Act was amended

w.e.f.  May 01, 2006 and this also retained the concept of  ‘the

gross amount charged’ for the purpose of arriving at valuation on

which the service tax is to be paid.  The learned counsel pointed

out  that  sub-section  (4)  of  amended  Section  67  categorically

provides that the value has to be determined in such a manner as

may be prescribed and in pursuant thereto, Rule 5 of the Rules

which came into effect from June 01, 2007, provided for ‘inclusion

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in or exclusion from value of certain expenditure or costs’.  It was

submitted that there was no dispute that as per this Rule, all such

expenditure or costs which are incurred by the service provider in

the  course  of  providing  taxable  services  are  to  be  treated  as

consideration for the taxable services provided or to be provided

for arriving at valuation for the purpose of charging service tax,

except those costs which were specifically excluded under sub-

rule  (2)  of  Rule  5.   Submission  was  that  since  Section  67

specifically lays down the principle of gross amount charged by a

service provider for the services provided or to be provided, Rule

5 did not go contrary to Section 67 as it only mentions what would

be the meaning of gross amount charged.

13) In the aid of this submission, the learned counsel sought to take

help from principle laid down in excise law and submitted that it is

held by this Court in  Union of India & Ors.  v.  Bengal Shrachi

Housing Development Limited & Anr.4 that same principles as

applicable in excise law are applicable while examining service

tax matters.  Reliance was placed on paragraph 22 of the said

judgment  to support this proposition.  However, we may point out

at this stage itself that the context in which the observations were

made  were  entirely  different.   The  issue  was  as  to  whether

4  (2018) 1 SCC 311

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service tax, which is an indirect tax, can be passed on by the

service provider to the recepient of the service and, in this hue,

the matter was discussed, as can be seen from the combined

reading of paragraphs 21 and 22 which are to the following effect:

“21.  It is thus clear that the judgments of this Court which referred to service tax being an indirect tax have reference only to service tax being an indirect tax in economic theory and not constitutional law. The fact that service tax may not, in  given  circumstances,  be  passed  on  by  the  service provider to the recipient of the service would not, therefore, make such tax any the less a service tax. It is important to bear this in mind, as the main prop of Shri Jaideep Gupta's argument  is  that  service  tax  being  an  indirect  tax  which must be passed on by virtue of the judgments of this Court, would make the recipient of the service the person on whom the tax is primarily leviable.

22. Let us now examine some of the judgments relating to another indirect tax, namely, excise duty. Like service tax, excise duty is also in the economic sense, an indirect tax. The  levy  is  on  manufacture  of  goods;  and  the  taxable person  is  usually  the  manufacturer  of  those  goods. InCentral  Provinces  and Berar  Sales  of  Motor  Spirit  and Lubricants  Taxation  Act,  1938,  In  re,  the  Federal  Court decided,  through  Maurice  Gwyer,  C.J.,  that  excise  duty under  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935  is  a  power  to impose duty of excise upon the manufacturer of excisable articles at the stage of or in connection with manufacture or production. In a separate judgment, Jayakar, J. held that all duties  of  excise  are  levied  on  manufacture  of  excisable goods and can be levied and collected at any subsequent stage up to consumption.”

 

14) It was also submitted that while dealing with the valuation of a

taxable service, the provision which deals with valuation has to be

taken into consideration and no assistance can be taken from

charging section, as held in  Union of India & Ors.  v.  Bombay

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 18 of 44

19

Tyre International Limited & Ors.5:

“8. Mr  N.A.  Palkhivala,  learned  counsel  for  the assessees, has propounded three principles which, he contends, form the essential characteristics of a duty of  excise.  Firstly,  he  says,  excise  is  a  tax  on manufacture or production and not on anything else. Secondly,  uniformity  of  incidence  is  a  basic characteristic  of  excise.  And thirdly,  the exclusion of post-manufacturing expenses and post-manufacturing profits is necessarily involved in the first principle and helps to achieve the second. Learned counsel urges that  where  excise  duty  is  levied  on  an  ad  valorem basis  the  value  on  which  such  duty  is  levied  is  a “conceptual value”, and that the conceptual nature is borne out by the circumstance that the identity of the manufacturer and the identity of the goods as well as the  actual  wholesale  price  charged  by  the manufacturer  are  not  the  determining  factors.  It  is urged that the old Section 4(a) clearly indicates that a conceptual value forms the basis of the levy, and that the actual  wholesale price charged by the particular assessee cannot be the basis of the excise levy. It is said that the criterion adopted in clause (a) succeeds in producing uniform taxation, whether the assessees are manufacturers who sell their goods in wholesale, semi-wholesale or in retail, whether they have a vast selling and marketing network or have none, whether they sell at depots and branches or sell at the factory gate, and whether they load the ex-factory price with post-manufacturing expenses and profits or do not do so.  Because  the  value  of  the  article  rests  on  a conceptual  base,  it  is  urged,  the  result  of  the assessment  under  Section  4(a)  cannot  be  different from the result of an assessment under Section 4(b). The  contention  is  that  the  principle  of  uniformity  of taxation requires the exclusion of post-manufacturing expenses and profits, a factor which would vary from one  manufacturer  to  another.  It  is  pointed  out  that such  exclusion  is  necessary  to  create  a  direct  and immediate  nexus  between  the  levy  and  the manufacturing activity, and to bring about a uniformity in the incidence of the levy. Learned counsel contends that the position is the same under the new Section 4 which,  he  says,  must  need  be  so  because  of  the

5  (1984) 1 SCC 467

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fundamental  nature  of  the  principles  propounded earlier.  Referring to  the actual  language of  the new Section 4(1)(a),  it  is  pointed out that the expression “normal price” therein means “normal for the purposes of excise”, that is to say, that the price must exclude post-manufacturing expenses and post-manufacturing profit  and  must  not  be  loaded  with  any  extraneous element. It is conceded, however, that under the new Section  4(1)(a)  there  is  no  attempt  to  preserve uniformity as regards the amount of duty between one manufacturer  and  another,  but  it  is  urged  that  the basis on which the value is determined is constituted by  the  same  conceptual  criterion,  that  post- manufacturing expenses and post-manufacturing profit must be excluded. Considerable emphasis has been laid on the submission that as excise duty is a tax on the manufacture or production of goods it must be a tax  intimately  linked  with  the  manufacture  or production  of  the  excisable  article  and,  therefore,  it can  be  imposed  only  on  the  assessable  value determined with reference to the excisable article at the stage of completed manufacture and to no point beyond.  To  preserve  this  intimate  link  or  nexus between the nature of the tax and the assessment of the  tax,  it  is  urged  that  all  extraneous  elements included  in  the  “value”  in  the  nature  of  post- manufacturing  expenses  and  post-manufacturing profits  have  to  be  off-loaded.  It  is  pointed  out  that factors  such as  volume,  quantity  and weight,  which enter into the measure of the tax, are intimately linked with the manufacturing activity, and that the power of Parliament  under  Entry  84  of  List  I  of  the  Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to legislate in respect of “value” is restricted by the conceptual need to link the basis for determining the measure of the tax with the very nature of the tax.

xxx xxx xxx

10. Besides  this  fundamental  issue,  there  are  other points  of  dispute,  principally  in  respect  of  the connotation of the expression “related person” in the new Section 4 as well as the nature of the deductions which  can  be  claimed  by  the  assessee  as  post- manufacturing expenses and post-manufacturing profit from  the  price  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the “value”.

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11. The submissions made by learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions cover a wide area, and several questions of a fundamental nature have been raised. We consider it necessary to deal with them because they enter into and determine the conclusions reached by us.

12.  We think it appropriate that at the very beginning we  should  briefly  indicate  the  concept  of  a  duty  of excise. Both Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the original Central Excises and Salt Act was enacted, and Entry  84  of  List  I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution under which the Amendment Act of 1973 was  enacted,  refer  to  “Duties  of  excise  on...  goods manufactured or produced in India”. A duty of excise, according  to  the  Federal  Court  in The  Central Provinces  and  Berar  Sales  of  Motor  Spirit  and Lubricants  Taxation  Act,  1938  [AIR 1939  FC 1,  6  : 1939  FCR  18]  is  a  duty  ordinarily  levied  on  the manufacturer  or  producer  in  respect  of  the manufacture or production of the commodity taxed. A distinction was drawn between the nature of the tax and the point  at  which it  was collected, and Gwyer, C.J. observed that theoretically “.  . .there can be no reason in theory  why an excise duty  should  not  be imposed even on the retail  sale  of  an article,  if  the taxing  Act  so  provides.  Subject  always  to  the legislative competence of the taxing authority, a duty on home-produced goods will obviously be imposed at the  stage  which  the  authority  finds  to  be  the  most convenient and the most lucrative, wherever it may be; but that is a matter of the machinery of collection, and does  not  affect  the  essential  nature  of  the  tax. The ultimate incidence of an excise duty, a typical indirect tax, must always be on the consumer, who pays as he consumes  or  expends;  and  it  continues  to  be  an excise  duty,  that  is,  a  duty  on  home-produced  or home-manufactured goods, no matter at what stage it is collected….” (emphasis supplied). The position was explained  further  in Province  of  Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons [1942 FCR 90, 101 : AIR 1942 FC 33] where the Federal Court observed:

“…  There  is  in  theory  nothing  to  prevent  the Central  Legislature  from  imposing  a  duty  of

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excise on a commodity as soon as it comes into existence,  no  matter  what  happens  to  it afterwards,  whether  it  be  sold,  consumed, destroyed, or given away. A taxing authority will not ordinarily impose such a duty, because it is much  more  convenient  administratively  to collect the duty (as in the case of most of the Indian Excise Acts) when the commodity leaves the factory for the first time, and also because the duty is intended to be an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer is to pass on to the ultimate consumer, which he could not do if the  commodity  had,  for  example,  been destroyed in  the factory  itself.  It  is  the fact  of manufacture  which  attracts  the  duty,  even though it may be collected later;….”

The  observations  show  that  while  the  nature  of  an excise  is  indicated  by the  fact  that  it  is  imposed in respect of the manufacture or production of an article, the point at which it is collected is not determined by the point of time when its manufacture is completed but  will  rest  on  considerations  of  administrative convenience,  and that  generally it  is  collected when the article leaves the factory for the first time. In other words, the circumstance that the article becomes the object  of  assessment  when  it  is  sold  by  the manufacturer  does  not  detract  from its  true  nature, that  it  is  a  levy  on  the  fact  of  manufacture.  In  a subsequent  case, Governor-General-in- Council v. Province  of  Madras [1945 FCR 179  :  AIR 1945  FC  98]  ,  the  Privy  Council  referred  to both Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 [AIR 1939 FC 1, 6 : 1939  FCR  18]  and Province  of  Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons [1942 FCR 90, 101 : AIR 1942 FC 33]  and affirmed that  when excise  was levied  on a manufacturer at the point of the first sale by him “that may be because the taxation authority imposing a duty of excise finds it convenient to impose that duty at the moment when the excisable article leaves the factory or workshop for the first  time on the occasion of its sale.  But  that  method  of  collecting  the  tax  is  an accident of administration; it is not of the essence of the  duty  of  excise,  which  is  attracted  by  the manufacture  itself.  This  Court  had  occasion  to consider  a  similar  question  in R.C.  Jall v. Union  of

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India [AIR 1962 SC 1281 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 436, 451]  .  In  that  case,  the  Central  Government  was authorised by an Ordinance to levy and collect as a cess on coal and coke despatched from collieries in British India a duty of excise at a specified rate. Rule 3 made  under  the  Ordinance  empowered  the Government to impose a duty of excise on coal and coke when such coal and coke was despatched by rail from the collieries of the coke plants, and the duty was to  be  collected  by  the  Railway  Administration  by means  of  a  surcharge  on  freight  either  from  the consignor  or  consignee.  It  was  contended  by  the assessee  that  the  excise  duty  could  not  legally  be levied on the consignee who had nothing to do with the  manufacture  or  production  of  coal.  The  Court remarked:

“The  argument  confuses  the  incidence  of taxation  with  the  machinery  provided  for  the collection thereof,”

and  reference  was  made  to In  re  the  Central Provinces and Berar Act 14 of 1938[AIR 1939 FC 1, 6  :  1939  FCR  18]  , Province  of  Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons [1942 FCR 90, 101 : AIR 1942 FC 33]  and Governor-General  in  Council v. Province  of Madras [1945 FCR 179 : AIR 1945 FC 98] . This Court then summarised the law as follows:

“…  Excise  duty  is  primarily  a  duty  on  the production or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country. It is an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer passes on to the ultimate consumer, that is, its ultimate incidence  will  always  be  on  the  consumer. Therefore,  subject  always  to  the  legislative competence of the taxing authority, the said tax can be levied at a convenient stage so long as the character of the impost, that is, it is a duty on the  manufacture  or  production,  is  not  lost. The  method  of  collection  does  not  affect  the essence  of  the  duty,  but  only  relates  to  the machinery  of  collection  for  administrative convenience.”

Other cases followed where the nature of excise duty was  reaffirmed  in  the  terms  set  out  earlier,  and

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reference  may  be  made  to In  re  Bill  to  Amend Section 20 of  the  Sea  Customs  Act,  1878 and Section 3 of  the Central  Excises And Salt  Act,  1944 [AIR 1963 SC 1760 : (1964) 3 SCR 787] ; Union of India v. Delhi  Cloth  &  General  Mills [AIR  1963  SC 791  :  1963  Supp  (1)  SCR  586]  ; Guruswamy  & Co. v. State of Mysore [AIR 1967 SC 1512 : (1967) 1 SCR 548] and South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1968 SC 922 : (1968) 3 SCR 21] .

xxx xxx xxx

17.   A  contention  was  raised  for  some  of  the assessees,  that  the  measure  was  to  be  found  by reading  Section  3  with  Section  4,  thus  drawing  the ingredients  of  Section  3  into  the  exercise.  We  are unable to agree. We are concerned with Section 3(1), and we find nothing there which clothes the provision with a dual character, a charging provision as well as a provision defining the measure of the charge.

xxx xxx xxx

35. We have examined the principles of an excise levy and have considered the statutory construction of the Act,  before and after  its  amendment,  in  view of  the three  propositions  formulated,  on  behalf  of  the assessees,  as  principles  constituting  the  essential characteristics of a duty of excise. It is apparent that the  first  proposition,  that  excise  is  a  tax  on  the manufacture  or  production  of  goods,  and  not  on anything else,  is indisputable and is supported by a catena of cases beginning with The Central Provinces and  Berar  Sales  of  Motor  Spirit  and  Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 [AIR 1939 FC 1, 6 : 1939 FCR 18] . As regards the second proposition. that uniformity of incidence is a basic  characteristic of  excise, we are inclined to think that the accuracy of the proposition depends on the level at which the statute rests it. We shall discuss that presently. As to the third proposition, that  the  exclusion  of  post-manufacturing  expenses and post-manufacturing profit  is  necessarily involved in  the  first  principle  does  not  inevitably  follow.  The exclusion of  post-manufacturing expenses and post- manufacturing  profits  is  a  matter  pertaining  to  the ascertainment of  the “value” of  the excisable article, and not to the nature of the excise duty, and as we

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have  explained,  the  standard  adopted  by  the Legislature for determining the “value” may possess a broader  base  than  that  on  which  the  charging provision  proceeds.  The  acceptance  of  the  further statement  contained  in  the  formulation  of  the  third proposition,  that  the exclusion of  post-manufacturing expenses  and  post-manufacturing  profits  helps  to achieve uniformity of  incidence in the levy of  excise duty,  depends  on  what  is  the  point  at  which  such uniformity  of  incidence  is  contemplated.  It  is  not necessarily involved at the stage of sale of the article by  the  manufacturer  because  we find,  for  example, that under the amended Section 3(3)  of  the Central Excises  and  Salt  Act,  different  tariff  values  may  be fixed not only (a) for different classes or descriptions of the same excisable goods, but also (b) for excisable goods of the same class or description (i) produced or manufactured  by  different  classes  of  producers  or manufacturers,  or  (ii)  sold  to  different  classes  of buyers.  That  the  “value”  of  excisable  goods determined under the new Section 4(1)(a)  may also vary  according  to  certain  circumstances  is  evident from the three clauses of the proviso to that clause. Clause (i)  recognises  that  in  the  normal  practice  of wholesale trade the same class of goods may be sold by the assessee at different prices to different classes of buyers; in that event, each such price shall, subject to the other conditions of clause (a), be deemed to be the  normal  price  of  such  goods  in  relation  to  each class of  buyers.  Clause (ii)  provides that  where the goods are sold in wholesale at a price fixed under any law or at a price being the maximum, fixed under any such law, then the price or the maximum price, as the case may be, so fixed, shall in relation to the goods be deemed to be the normal price thereof. Under clause (iii),  where  the  goods  are  sold  in  the  course  of wholesale  trade  by  the  assessee  to  or  through  a related person, the normal price shall be the price at which the goods are sold by the related person in the course of  wholesale trade at  the time of  removal  to dealers  (not  being  related  persons)  or  where  such goods are not sold to such dealers, to dealers (being related  persons)  who sell  such  goods  in  retail.  The verity  of  the three principles propounded by learned counsel for the assessees has been, as indeed it had to be, examined in the context of the Act before and after its amendment. For the case of the assessees is

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that the amendment has made no material change in the basic scheme of the levy and the provisions for determining the value of the excisable article.”

 15) It was, thus, argued that the High Court had committed serious

error in relying upon Section 66 of the Act (which is a charging

section) while interpreting Section 67 of the Act, or for that matter,

while examining the validity of Rule 5 of the Rules.  The learned

counsel also relied upon the dictionary meaning that is given to

the  word  ‘gross  amount’.   At  the  end,  it  was  submitted  that

Section  67  which  uses  the  term  ‘any  amount’  would  include

quantum as well as the nature of the amount and, therefore, cost

for providing services was rightly included in Rule 5, which was

not ultra vires Section 67 of the Act.

16) Mr.  J.K.  Mittal,  Advocate,  appeared  for  M/s.  Intercontinental

Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd.  He argued with emphasis

that the impugned judgment of the High Court was perfectly in

tune with legal position and did not call for any interference.  At

the outset, he pointed out that the Parliament has again amended

Section 67 of the Act by the Finance Act,  2015 w.e.f.  May 14,

2015.  By this amendment, explanation has been added which

now lays down that consideration includes the reimbursement of

expenditure or cost incurred by the service provider.  Taking clue

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therefrom, he developed the argument that for the first time, w.e.f.

May 14, 2015, reimbursement of expenditure or cost incurred by

the  service  provider  gets  included  under  the  expression

‘consideration’, which legal regime did not prevail prior to May 14,

2015.  Therefore, for the period in question, the ‘consideration’

was having limited sphere, viz. It was only in respect of taxable

services provided or to be provided.  On that basis, submission

was  that  for  the  period  in  question  that  is  covered  by  these

appeals,  there  could  not  be  any  service  tax  on  reimbursed

expenses as Section 67 of the Act did not provide for such an

inclusion.  Mr.  Mittal  also  referred  to  para  2.4  of

Circular/Instructions F.  No.  B-43/5/97-TRU dated June 6,  1997

wherein it is clarified that ‘...various other reimbursable expenses

incurred are not to be included for computing the service tax”.

17) Coming to the main arguments revolving around Sections 66 and

67, he submitted that the High Court was right in holding that as

per Section 66 which was a charging section, service tax is to be

charged only on the ‘value of taxable services’.  Likewise, Section

67  which  deals  with  valuation  of  taxable  service  categorically

mentions  that  it  was  only  on  the  gross  amount  charged  for

providing  ‘such’  a  taxable  service.   Therefore,  any  amount

collected which is not for providing such taxable service could not

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be brought within the tax net.  Further, w.e.f. April 18, 2006, as

per  Explanation  (c)  to  Section  67,  “gross  amount  charged”

includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account

and any form of payment by issue of credit notes or debit notes

and book adjustment, and any amount credited or debited, as the

case may be, to any account, whether called “Suspense account”

or by any other name, in the books of accounts of a person liable

to pay service tax, where the transaction of taxable service is with

any associated enterprise.”  Whereas prior to April 18, 2006, as

per Explanation 3 to Section 67, - “For the removal of doubts, it is

hereby declared that the gross amount charged for the taxable

service shall  include any amount  received towards the taxable

service before, during or after provision of such service.”  Thus,

levy on taxable services were not  levied at  once, but  tax was

levied  at  different  point  of  time,  tax  was  levied  on  difference

person  and  also  values  in  many  taxable  services  was

substantially exempted.  He demonstrated it  from the following

table:

Sl. No.

Taxable Services Sub- clause of  65 (105)

Date  of levy

Tax Rate

1 Consulting  Engineer Service

(g) 7-7-1997

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2 Rent-a-Cab  services  by  a person engage in business of renting of cabs

(o) 16-7-1997 *

3 Transport  of  Passenger  by Air by an aircraft operator (a) International (b) Domestic

(zzzo)

1-5-2006 1-7-2010

**

4 Renting  of  immovable property

(zzzz) 1-7-2007

5 Restaurant services (zzzzy) 1-5-2011 *** 6 Accommodation  services

by Hotel (zzzzw) 1-5-2011 ****

7 Telephone Services/ Telecommunication services  by  Telegraph Authority

(b), (zzzx)

1-7-1994, 1-6-2007

Notes :

* Service Tax was leviable only on 40% of value, 60% value was exempted.

** Service Tax was leviable only on 40% of value, 60% value was exempted, but prior to 01-04-2012, tax was only on 10% of value of tickets.

***  Service Tax was leviable  only  on 30% of  value, 70% value was exempted.

**** Service Tax was leviable only on 50% of value, 50% value was exempted.

 

18) Following  judgments  were  referred  to  and  relied  upon  by  Mr.

Mittal for placating the aforesaid submissions:

(a) In the first instance, reference was made to the Constitution

Bench judgment in the case of  Mathuram Agrawal  v.  State of

Madhya Pradesh6 wherein this Court held:

“12. ... The statute should clearly and unambiguously 6  (1999) 8 SCC 667

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convey the three components of  the tax law i.e.  the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. If there is any ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the needful in the matter.”

 (b) The  learned  counsel  also  relied  upon  the  following

observations  in  case  of  Govind  Saran  Ganga  Saran  v.

Commissioner of Sales Tax & Ors.7:

“6. The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well  known. The first  is  the character of  the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third is the rate at  which  the  tax  is  imposed,  and  the  fourth  is  the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those  components  of  the  levy  will  be  fatal  to  its validity.”

 19) The learned counsel reiterated that such an ambiguity in law is

now cured by amendment to Section 67 only w.e.f. May 14, 2015.

20)  We have duly considered the aforesaid submissions made by the

learned counsel for the Department as well as the counsel for the

assessees.   As  can  be  seen,  these submissions  are  noted in

respect of Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 where the assessee is

providing  ‘consulting  engineering  services’.   In  other  appeals,

7  (1985) Suppl. SCC 205

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 30 of 44

31

though the nature of  services is  somewhat  different,  it  doesn’t

alter the colour of legal issue, in any manner.  In the course of

providing  those  services,  the  assessees  had  incurred  certain

expenses  which  were  reimbursed  by  the  service  recepient.

These expenses were not included for the purpose of valuation,

while paying the service tax.  Thus, the question for determination

which is posed in Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014, answer to that

would govern the outcome of the other appeals as well.  Still, for

the sake of  completeness,  we may give  a  brief  resume of  all

these cases.  

“A.  “Consulting Engineering Services” – Assessee were providing

consulting services to  M/s.  NHAI   for  highway projects.   They

were  paying  Service  Tax  on  remuneration  only  instead  of  the

gross value charged from the client.

Sl. No. Civil  Appeal details

Facts Reimbursable claimed as not includible

1. 2013/2014 UOI  v. Intercontinental Consultants

Period:  Oct’2002  – March’  2007  (prior  to coming  into  effect  of impugned  Rule  5  on 01.06.2007]

Demand:Rs.3,55,80,38/-

Assessee filed W.P. No. 6370/2008  directly against  Show  Cause Notice dated 17.03.2008 resulting  in  the impugned  judgment

Transportation,  office rent,  office  supplies and  utilities,  testing charges,  document printing  charges, travelling,  lodging, boarding  etc.  (post 19.04.2006)

Transportation,  office rent,  office  supplies, office  furniture  and equipment,  reports and  documents

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 31 of 44

32

dated 30.11.2012 printing  charges  etc. [Pre  19.04.2006]. [page 62-64]  

2 6090/2017 CST  v. Intercontinental Consultants

Period:  2007-2008 [post coming  into  effect  of impugned  Rule  5  on 01.06.2007]

Demand:  Rs. 1,50,62,017/-

Show  Cause  Notice dated  24.10.2008  was issued  on  the  basis  of the  earlier  SCN  dated 17.03.2008  for  the subsequent period.

O-I-O  dated  02.03.2010 covered  both  SCNs dated  17.03.2008  & 24.10.2008.

Transportation,  office rent, office supplies & utilities,  testing charges,  document printing  charges, travelling,  lodging, boarding  etc.  [page 157]

B.  Share Transfer Agency Service:

Sl. No.

Civil  Appeal details

Facts Reimbursable claimed  as  not includible

1 6866/2014

CST v.  Through its Secretary

Period:  01.04.2008- 31.03.2010

Demand:Rs.13,83,479

Reimbursement  of Expenses,  out  of pocket  expenses, Postage  expenses, stationery charges

2. 3360/2015

CST v. Pinnacle Share  Registry Pvt. Ltd.

Period:  01.05.2006- 31.03.2008

Demand: Rs. 13,83,479

Reimbursement  of Expenses,  out  of pocket  expenses, Postage expenses

C.   Custom  House  Agent  covered  by  head  “Clearing  and

Forwarding Agent” prior to 18.04.2006.  Procedure of raising two

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 32 of 44

33

sets of invoices for reimbursement of various expenses and for

service/agency  charged  separately  started  after  introduction  of

Service Tax on CHA’s (wef 15.06.1997) in view of Circular dated

06.09.1997.

Invoice issued for  services/agency charges alone is used

for payment of Service Tax.

Sl. No.

Civil  Appeal details

Facts Reimbursable  claimed as not includible

1. 295-299/2014 CST  v.  Asshita International

Period:  01.10.2003- 31.03.2008  ([pre  and post  coming  into  effect of the impugned Rule 5]

Demand: 4,66,607/-

SCN dated 21.04.2009. O-I-A dated 30.11.2010 [pages  238-259]  set aside  demand  prior  to 18.04.2006  in  view  of circular  dated 06.06.1997.

Customs  Examination Chages,  Misc. Expenses,  Sundry expenses,  strapping and  re-strapping charges, documentation charges.

2. 2021/2014 CST  v.  Sunder Balan

Period: Apr.08 to Aug’08 [post coming into effect of  impugned  rule  5  on 01.06.2007]

Demand:Rs.2,26,659/-

SCN dated 24.07.2009.

Customs  Examination Charges,  Misc. Expenses,  Sundry expenses,  strapping and  re-strapping charges, documentation charges.

3. 4340-4341/2014

CST  v.  Suraj Forwarders

Period:  01.04.2004  to 31.03.2008

Demand: Rs. 6,35,071/- as confirmed in the O-I- O.   The Commissioner(Appeals) set  aside  the  demand on  the  reimbursable

Customs  Examination Charges,  Misc. Expenses,  Sundry expenses,  strapping and  re-strapping charges, documentation charges.

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 33 of 44

34

expenses  received under  the  category “Clearing  & Forwarding Agent”  Service  relation to  1.04.2004- 17.04.2006  and confirmed the remaining demand.

4. 8056/2015

CST  v.  Suraj Forwarders

Not Available

5. T.P.(C)  No. 10431045/2017

UOI  v.  Sri Chidambaram  & Ors.

A  Transfer  Petition  for transferring  W.P.  Nos. 20832,   14521  and 20590 of 2016 pending before  Hon’ble  High Court at Madras.

SCNs  raised  demands for  Rs.  37.13  lacs  and Rs.  53.30  lacs  which were dropped by the O- I-O.   However  on appeals  the  O-I-O was set  aside,  hence W.P’s were filed.

CFS charges, steamer agent  charges, delivery order charges, Airport/Customs charges  [page  25- 26/para C]

Airline/steamer charges,  storage  and handling  charges, packing  charges, transport  charges, fumigation  charges, insurance  survey charges,  original certificate  charges [pages 62-62]

Charges  paid  to: Steamer  agent, Custom  Freight Station,  Airport Authority  of  India  and Transporters  [page 106-107]

6. 7688/2014

CST  v.  Shree Gayatri  Clearing Agency

Period:  01.10.2003  to 31.03.2008

[pre  and  post  coming into effect  of  impugned Rule 5 on 01.06.2007]

Demand: Rs. 9,65,652/-

SCN  issued  on 21.04.2009. O-I-A dated

Customs  Examination Charges,  Misc. Expenses,  Sundry expenses,  strapping and  re-strapping charges, documentation charges.

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 34 of 44

35

31.07.2013  set  aside demand  for  the  period 18.04.2006-31.03.2008 in view of circular dated 06.06.1997.

7. 7685/2014

Comm.  of Customs  v. Ramdas  Pragji Forwarders  Pvt. Ltd.

Period:2004-05 & 2007- 08

The  Adjudicating Authority  held  that  no Service  Tax  was payable  on reimbursable  amount prior to 18.04.2006.  the Circular  dated 06.06.1997  lost  its validity  after introduction  of  Rule  5. Hence  the  ST  was recoverable thereafter.

CMC  charges, CONCOR,  GSEC, Transportation charges,  Air  and  sea freight,  Custom  Duty, Custom  Cess, fumigation  charges, bottom paper,  wooden etc.  handling  charges, labour  expenses, sundry charges, airport charges, documentation charges,  photocopying charges  etc.  [page 181-182]

8. T.P.(C)  1932- 1934/2017

CST  v.  Green Channel  Cargo Care

Period:  April  2006- March 2009

Harbour/Airport Authority  of India/CFS/CCTL  and delivery order charges, harbour  dues,  seal verification, warehouse/godown charges.

D.  Site Formation and clearance, excavation and earth moving

and  demolition  services:   Assessees  conduct  drilling,  blasting,

excavation, loading, transport etc. of overburdened at open cast

Mines.   Issue  is  whether  value  of  Goods/material  service  u/s.

65(97a), is to be included in ‘Gross Amount’ u/s 67 of Finance Act

for the purpose of S.T.

The  impugned  orders  follow  the  decisions  in  Bhayana  Builder

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 35 of 44

36

Intercontinental.

Sl.No. Civil  Appeal details

Facts Reimbursable  claimed as not includible

1. 6864/2014 CCE  &  ST  v. S.V. Engineering

Period:  01.02.2005- 31.03.2009

Demand:  Rs. 74,14,396/-  and  Rs. 12,26,38,376/-

Value  of  Diesel  and explosives  supplied free of  cost  by service recipient.

2. 6865/2014 CCE  &  ST  v. S.V. Engineering

Period:  01.04.2009- 31.03.2010

Demand:  Rs. 87,63,595/-

Value  of  Diesel  and explosives  supplied free of  cost  by service recipient.

3. 4356-4537/2016

CCE&ST v.  S.V. Engineering

Value of diesel  oil  and explosives  supplied free of  cost  by service recipient.

4. 5130/2016

CCE  &  ST  v. Sushree Infra

Demand  of  Rs. 18,85,88,959/-  relating to period  01.06.2008 to 31.03.2012

SCN  dated  01.10.2012 confirmed  by  O-I-O dated 04.05.2011

Value of explosives and diesel  oil  supplied  free of  cost  by  service recipient.

5. 4975/2016

CCE  &  ST  v. Gulf Oil

Period: October 2008 to November 2008  

Demand:  Rs. 50,54,746/-

Value of explosives and diesel  oil  supplied  free of  cost  by  service recipient.

6. 5453/2016

CCE  &  ST  v.

Period:  Mar’08  to  Mar’ 2012

Value of explosives and diesel  oil  supplied  free of cost

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 36 of 44

37

AMR India Demand: Rs.57,74,30,683/-

7. 10223- 10224/2017

CCE  &  ST  v. Mehrotra Buildcon

Period: Apr’09 to Jan’10 &  February  2010  to September 2010

Demand:Rs.21,48,835/- + Rs. 18,06,655/-

Value  of  diesel  oil supplied free of cost

8. 5444/2017

CCE  &  ST  v. Mehrotra Buildcon

Not available Value  of  diesel  oil supplied free of cost

E.   

Sl. No.

Civil  Appeal details

Facts Reimbursable  claimed as not includible

1. 10626- 10627/2017

Period:Apr’04 to Mar’06

[prior  to  coming  into effect of impugned Rule 5 on 01.06.2007]

Demand:Rs.24,70,790/-

SCN dated 22.10.2008

Non-payment of Service Tax  on  the  amount received  as reimbursement  by  way of  debit  notes  in addition  to  amount charged  through invoices  for  providing ‘Event  Management Service’, Section 65(40) and  Section  65(90)(zu) [page 83]

Hiring  of  venue, merchandise,  artists, travel, courier, food and beverages, administrative expenses,  [page  76 @78]

21) Undoubtedly, Rule 5 of the Rules, 2006 brings within its sweep

the expenses which are incurred while rendering the service and

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 37 of 44

38

are reimbursed, that is, for which the service receiver has made

the  payments  to  the  assessees.   As  per  these  Rules,  these

reimbursable expenses also form part of ‘gross amount charged’.

Therefore, the core issue is as to whether Section 67 of the Act

permits  the  subordinate  legislation  to  be  enacted  in  the  said

manner, as done by Rule 5.  As noted above, prior to April 19,

2006, i.e., in the absence of any such Rule, the valuation was to

be done as per the provisions of Section 67 of the Act.

22) Section  66  of  the  Act  is  the  charging  Section  which  reads  as

under:

“there shall be levy of tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) @ 12% of the value of taxable services referred to in sub-clauses .....of Section 65  and  collected  in  such  manner  as  may  be prescribed.”

23) Obviously,  this  Section refers  to  service tax,  i.e.,  in  respect  of

those services which are taxable and specifically referred to in

various sub-clauses of  Section 65.   Further,  it  also specifically

mentions  that  the  service  tax  will  be  @ 12% of  the  ‘value  of

taxable services’.  Thus, service tax is reference to the value of

service.  As a necessary corollary, it is the value of the services

which  are  actually  rendered,  the  value  whereof  is  to  be

ascertained for the purpose of calculating the service tax payable

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 38 of 44

39

thereupon.   

24) In this hue, the expression ‘such’ occurring in Section 67 of the

Act  assumes importance.  In other words,  valuation of  taxable

services for charging service tax, the authorities are to find what

is the gross amount charged for providing ‘such’ taxable services.

As  a  fortiori,  any  other  amount  which  is  calculated  not  for

providing such taxable service cannot a part of that valuation as

that amount is not calculated for providing such ‘taxable service’.

That according to us is the plain meaning which is to be attached

to Section 67 (unamended, i.e., prior to May 01, 2006) or after its

amendment,  with  effect  from,  May  01,  2006.   Once  this

interpretation is to be given to Section 67, it hardly needs to be

emphasised  that  Rule  5  of  the  Rules  went  much  beyond  the

mandate of Section 67.  We, therefore, find that High Court was

right in interpreting Sections 66 and 67 to say that in the valuation

of taxable service, the value of taxable service shall be the gross

amount charged by the service provider ‘for such service’ and the

valuation of tax service cannot be anything more or less than the

consideration paid as quid pro qua for rendering such a service.

25) This position did not  change even in the amended Section 67

which was inserted on May 01, 2006.  Sub-section (4) of Section

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 39 of 44

40

67 empowers the rule making authority to lay down the manner in

which  value  of  taxable  service  is  to  be  determined.  However,

Section 67(4) is expressly made subject to the provisions of sub-

section (1).  Mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 67 is manifest,

as noted above, viz., the service tax is to be paid only on the

services actually provided by the service provider.

26) It  is  trite  that  rules  cannot  go  beyond  the  statute.   In  Babaji

Kondaji  Garad,  this  rule  was  enunciated  in  the  following

manner:

“Now if there is any conflict between a statute and the  subordinate  legislation,  it  does  not  require elaborate reasoning to firmly state that the statute prevails over subordinate legislation and the bye- law, if not in conformity with the statute in order to give effect to the statutory provision the Rule or bye-law  has  to  be  ignored.   The  statutory provision ahs precedence and must be complied with.”

27) The  aforesaid  principle  is  reiterated  in  Chenniappa  Mudaliar

holding  that  a  rule  which  comes  in  conflict  with  the  main

enactment has to give way to the provisions of the Act.

28) It  is  also  well  established  principle  that  Rules  are  framed  for

achieving the purpose behind the provisions of the Act, as held in

Taj Mahal Hotel:

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 40 of 44

41

‘the Rules were meant only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act and they could  not  take away what  was conferred by the Act or whittle down its effect.”

29) In the present case, the aforesaid view gets strengthened from

the manner in which the Legislature itself acted.  Realising that

Section 67, dealing with valuation of taxable services, does not

include  reimbursable  expenses  for  providing  such  service,  the

Legislature amended by Finance Act, 2015 with effect from May

14, 2015, whereby Clause (a) which deals with ‘consideration’ is

suitably  amended  to  include  reimbursable  expenditure  or  cost

incurred by the service provider and charged, in the course of

providing or agreeing to provide a taxable service. Thus, only with

effect from May 14, 2015, by virtue of provisions of Section 67

itself, such reimbursable expenditure or cost would also form part

of valuation of taxable services for charging service tax.  Though,

it was not argued by the learned counsel for the Department that

Section 67 is a declaratory provision, nor could it be argued so,

as we find that this is a substantive change brought about with

the  amendment  to  Section  67  and,  therefore,  has  to  be

prospective  in  nature.   On  this  aspect  of  the  matter,  we  may

usefully refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 41 of 44

42

Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika

Township Private Limited8 wherein it was observed as under:

“27. A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory rule or a statutory  notification,  may  physically  consists  of  words printed on papers. However, conceptually it  is a great deal more than an ordinary prose. There is a special peculiarity in the  mode  of  verbal  communication  by  a  legislation.  A legislation is  not  just  a series of  statements,  such as one finds in a work of fiction/non-fiction or even in a judgment of a court  of  law.  There  is  a  technique  required  to  draft  a legislation  as  well  as  to  understand  a  legislation.  Former technique is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be  found  in  the  various  principles  of  “interpretation  of statutes”. Vis-à-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs in its provenance, layout and features as also in the implication as to its meaning that arise by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof.

28.  Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted,  one  established  rule  is  that  unless  a  contrary intention  appears,  a  legislation  is  presumed  not  to  be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it.  Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that  every human being is  entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [(1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future  acts  ought  not  to  change  the  character  of  past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.

29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of “fairness”, which must be the basis of every legal  rule  as  was  observed  in  L'Office  Cherifien  des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon  Steamship  Co.  Ltd. Thus,  legislations  which  modified  accrued  rights  or  which

8 (2015) 1 SCC 1

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 42 of 44

43

impose obligations or  impose new duties  or  attach a new disability  have  to  be  treated  as  prospective  unless  the legislative  intent  is  clearly  to  give  the  enactment  a retrospective effect;  unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain  a  former  legislation.  We  need  not  note  the cornucopia  of  case  law  available  on  the  subject  because aforesaid  legal  position  clearly  emerges  from  the  various decisions  and  this  legal  position  was  conceded  by  the counsel  for  the parties.  In any case, we shall  refer  to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later.”

30) As a result,  we do not  find any merit  in  any of  those appeals

which are accordingly dismissed.   

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6865  OF  2014,  CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6864  OF 2014, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4975 OF 2016, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5130 OF 2016 AND CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4536-4537 OF 2016

31) In the aforesaid appeals, the issue is as to whether the value of

free supplies of diesel and explosives in respect of the service of

‘Site Formation and Clearance Service’ can be included for the

purpose of assessment to service tax under Section 67 of the Act.

These  assessees  had  not  availed  the  benefit  of  aforesaid

Notifications Nos. 15/2004 and 4/2005.  Therefore, the issue has

to be adjudged simply by referring to Section 67 of the Act.  We

have already held above that the value of such material which is

supplied free by the service recipient cannot be treated as ‘gross

amount charged’ and that is not the ‘consideration’ for rendering

the  services.   Therefore,  value  of  free  supplies  of  diesel  and

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 43 of 44

44

explosives would not warrant inclusion while arriving at the gross

amount charged on its service tax is to be paid.  Therefore, all

these appeals are also dismissed.

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1043-1045 OF 2017 TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1932-1934 OF 2017

32) These  transfer  petitions  are  allowed  and  the  writ  petitions

mentioned in  the prayer  clause,  which are  pending before the

High Court of Madras, are transferred to this Court.   

33) The  transferred  writs  are  also  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the

judgment rendered above in Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 and

other connected matters.

.............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J. (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI; MARCH 07, 2018.

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 with Ors. Page 44 of 44