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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1133 OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) 21027 OF 2013)

Union of India & Ors.   ...  Appellants

                               Versus

Diler Singh ...   Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

The respondent, a constable in Central Reserve Police

Force (CRPF), was enrolled as such on 1.4.1990.   He was

posted in  the  23 Battalion where  he  served continuously

approximately  for  fourteen  years.   Subsequently,  he  was

transferred to 61 Battalion where he served for two years.

During  the  second posting  a  charge-sheet  was  served on

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him alleging that on 22.06.2001 about 11.30 hrs. he left the

campus without permission of the competent authority and

went  to  the  bazaar  and  consumed  liquor  and  quarrelled

with some civilians.  On being informed, S.I.  Sheoji Ram,

HC Mahabir Singh and Captain Fiyaz Ahmed brought him

from bazaar to the campus.  On the advice of the competent

authority,  a  medical  examination  was  conducted  on  the

respondent  and  as  per  the  medical  report  given  by  the

assistant surgeon, District Hospital, Medak at Sangareddy,

it was found that the respondent had consumed liquor.  

2. On the basis  of  the aforesaid report,  a departmental

enquiry was ordered by Commandant 61-Bn. vide Memo No.

P-VIII-8/01-61-EC-II  dated  6.7.2001  and  the  respondent

was also placed under suspension with effect from 6.7.2001.

The enquiry officer conducted an enquiry and on the base of

the material  and testimony of the witnesses came to hold

that the charges had been proved.  

3. The disciplinary authority concurred with the findings

recorded by the enquiry officer and came to hold that the

charges  levelled  against  the  respondent  had  been  proved

beyond  doubt.   Recording  concurrence  with  the  findings

returned by the  enquiry  officer,  the  disciplinary  authority

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opined that the respondent was not fit to continue any more

in the Force and accordingly in exercise of power conferred

under Section 11(1) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act,

1949 (for  brevity,  ‘the Act’)  read with Rule  27-A(1)  of  the

Central  Reserve  Police  Force  Rules,  1955  (in  short  ‘the

Rules’)  ordered  the  respondent  to  be  removed  from  the

service.  It was further stipulated in the order that except

the  pay  and  allowances  given  to  the  respondent  during

suspension period from 7.7.2001 to 12.9.2001, he would not

be  entitled  to  any  pay  or  allowances  and  the  period  of

suspension shall  be  treated  as  such.   That  apart,  it  was

directed  that  medals  and  awards,  if  any,  that  had  been

received by the delinquent employee during service period

shall be forfeited under the provision of Section 12(1) of the

Act.  

4. The respondent initiated a civil  action by filing Civil

Suit  No.253/2002/05 in the Court  of  Civil  Judge (Senior

Division),  Narnaul  seeking  a  declaration  that  the  orders

passed  against  him by  the  authorities  were  illegal.   The

appellants contested the suit by putting forth a stand that

due enquiry was held by the authorities and the charges

levelled against the respondent were duly proved and there

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was no procedural error in the enquiry.  

5.  Learned Civil Judge framed the following issues:

“1.  Whether  the  impugned  order  No. P-III-8/2001-61  Stha  II  dated  12  September, 2001 are  wrong,  illegal,  against  facts,  arbitrary malafide,  against  principles  of  natural  justice, null and void and ineffective against the rights of plaintiff?

2. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit?

3. Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit?

4.  Whether  the suit  is  not  maintainable  in the present form?”

6. While dealing with the issue number 1, the trial Court

took note of the fact that the charges were issued against

the delinquent officer under Section 11(1) of the Act, relied

on the decision rendered in  Ram Singh Rai v. Union of

India1 and Rattan Singh v. Union of India & Others2 and

came to hold that the disciplinary authority was not entitled

in law to convert the charge under Section 11(1), a minor

penalty to a major penalty and accordingly opined that the

impugned order of dismissal was illegal, null and void.  The

trial  Court further held that it  had jurisdiction to try the

suit and eventually decreed the suit with costs.  It directed

1 2003 (1) SCT 523 2 2003 (1) SCT 59

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for reinstatement of the respondent plaintiff in service with

effect  from  12.09.2001  along  with  arrears  of  pay  and

allowances and other consequential benefits.

7. Being  aggrieved,  the  aforesaid  judgment  and  decree

was called in question by the department in Civil  Appeal

No.11 of 2009 before the Additional District Judge, Narnaul

who by judgment dated 27.03.2010 reversed the judgment

of  the  trial  Court  and  held  that  the  trial  Court  had  no

jurisdiction to try the suit, and further the judgment and

decree  passed  by  it  were  not  sustainable  in  view  of  the

decision in  Union of  India & others v.  Ghulam Mohd.

Bhat3.

8. The  respondent  assailed  the  defensibility  of  the

judgment  of  the  first  appellate  Court  in  Regular  Second

Appeal  No.4578/2010.   Learned  single  Judge  noted  the

grounds of challenge, referred to the decision in Ram Singh

Rai (supra) and reproduced a passage from the decision in

Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF and another

v. Akhilesh Kumar4 and came to hold that the controversy

is  covered  by  the  judgment  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court

rendered  in  Akhilesh  Kumar   (supra)  and  accordingly 3 (2005) 13 SCC 228 4 2007 (6) SLR 438

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opined that the allegations levelled against the respondent

plaintiff  were  not  of  serious  nature  which  would  have

attracted  penalty  of  dismissal  from  the  services.   The

aforesaid  perception led  to  acceptance  of  the  appeal  and

dislodgment  of  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  first

appellate Court and restoration that of the trial Court.

9. We have heard Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional

Solicitor  General  for  Union  of  India  and  Mr.  J.S.  Naik,

learned counsel for the respondent.

10. To appreciate the controversy, it is relevant to refer to

the relevant provisions of the Act.  Section 2(c) defines “the

Force” to mean the Central Reserve Police Force.  Section

2(d) defines “member of the Force” to mean a person who

has been appointed to Force by the Commandant, whether

before or after the commencement of the Act and in Section

1,3,6,7,16,17,18 and 19, includes also a person appointed

to the Force by the Central Government, whether before or

after  such commencement.  Section 7  specifies  in  general

duties  of  members  of  the  Force.  Section  8  provides  for

superintendence, control  and administration of  the Force.

Section  9  stipulates  about  more  heinous  offences.   It

provides that a member who commits heinous offences shall

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be punishable with transportation for life for a term of not

less  than  seven  years  or  with  imprisonment  for  a  term

which may extend to fourteen years or with fine which may

be extended to three months’ pay or with fine to that extent

in  addition  to  such  sentence  of  transportation  or

imprisonment.   Section  10  provides  for  less  heinous

offences.  It states that a member of the Force who commits

such offence shall be punishable within imprisonment for a

term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may

extend  to  three  months’  pay,  or  with  both.   Thus,  the

aforesaid  provision  defines  the  offences  and  provides

punishment for the same.  

11. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the concept

of minor punishments as postulated under Section 11 of the

Act.  Section 11 of the Act reads as follows:-

“11. Minor punishments. – (1) The Commandant or  any  other  authority  or  officer  as  may  be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under this  Act,  award  in  lieu  of,  or  in  addition  to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following  punishments  to  any  member  of  the Force  whom  he  considers  to  be  guilty  of disobedience,  neglect  of  duty,  or  remissness  in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force, that is to say, -

(a) reduction in rank;

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(b) fine  of  any  amount  not  exceeding  one month’s pay and allowances;

(c) confinement to quarters, lines or camp for a term not exceeding one month;

(d) confinement in the quarter-guard for not more than  twenty-eight  days;  with  or  without punishment drill or extra guard, fatigue or other duty, and

(e)  removal  from  any  office  of  distinction  or special emolument in the Force.

(2)  Any  punishment  specified  in  clause  (c)  or clause (d) of sub-section (1) may be awarded by any  gazetted  officer  when  in  command  of  any detachment of the Force away from headquarters, provided he is specially authorised in this behalf by the Commandant.

(3) The assistant commandant, a company officer or a subordinate officer, not being below the rank of subedar or inspector, commanding a separate detachment  or  an  output  or  in  temporary command at the headquarters of the Force, may, without, a moral trial, award to any member of the Force who is for the time being subject to his authority  any  one  or  more  of  the  following punishments  for  the  commission  of  any  petty offence against discipline which is not otherwise provided  for  in  this  Act,  or  which  is  not  a sufficiently serious nature to require prosecution before a Criminal Court, that is to say, -  

(a) confinement for not more than seven days in the quarter-guard or such other place as may be considered suitable, with forfeiture of all pay and allowances during its continuance;

(b)  punishment  drill,  or  extra-guard,  fatigue  or other duty, for not more than thirty days, with or

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without confinement to quarters, lines or camp;

(c) censure or severe censure: provided that this punishment  may  be  awarded  to  a  subordinate officer only by the Commandant.

(4) A jamadar or sub-inspector who is temporarily in command of a detachment or an outpost may, in like manner and for the commission of any like offence, award to any member of the Force for the time  being  subject  to  his  authority  any  of  the punishments  specified  in  clause  (b)  or sub-section (3) for not more than fifteen days.”

12. At  a  subsequent  stage,  we  shall  advert  to  the

interpretation placed by this Court on the aforementioned

provision.  Prior to that, it is necessary to state in detail the

misconduct or misbehaviour in support of charges framed

against the respondent. The same is as under:

“  Article – 1

That,  on  transfer  of  Force  No.901342841 Constable Diler Singh, from 23 Battalion C.R.P.F. to  61  Battalion  C.R.P.F.,  he  reported  on 28.09.2000 and was posted in C/61.  Presently, Force  No.  901342841  Constable  Diler  Singh  is posted at Platoon No.7, Police Station Jinnaram, C.R.P.F.  Narsapur,  Medhak,  Andhra  Pradesh, which is a Naxalwadi Area. Therefore, keeping in view the sensitivity of the area, it was necessary for each personnel to take permission for leaving the camp.  Despite applicability (implementation) of  these orders,  Force No.901342841 Constable Diler Singh, on 22.06.2001 at about 1330 hours, went outside the Camp without permission of any competent officer, which is against the discipline of force and good orders.

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Article – 2

That,  Force  No.  901342841  Constable  Diler Singh, on 22.06.2001 at about 1330 hours left out from platoon No.7, Police Station Jinna Ram, C/61,  C.R.P.F.  Narsapur,  Medhak,  Andhra Pradesh,  which  is  Naxalwadi  Area,  without permission  of  any  competent  officer  and  after going  to  the  market,  he  consumed  very  much liquor  (wine)  and  quarrelled  there  with  many civilians.  On receiving information about this at Platoon,  witness  No.2,5  and  Constable  Nawaj Ahmad  brought  him  from  the  market  under influence of liquor at about 1500 hours.  At about 1800  hours,  witness  No.4  with  one  Section handed  over  it  to  C.H.M.  in  Company Headquarters.  Thereafter at about 2030 hours, he was taken to .... Singa Reddy’s Civil Hospital, where  his  medical  examination  was  got conducted.  According to the medical certificate, he had consumed liquor(wine).  Therefore, the act on  his  part  is  against  the  worthy  orders  and discipline of the Force.”

13. The enquiry officer, as is vivid from the enquiry report,

found that all the witnesses had supported the fact that on

22.06.2001 the respondent had gone out of the camp and in

the market he had consumed liquor and quarrelled with the

local  persons,  and  accordingly  has  proceeded  to  hold  as

under:-

“Thus,  it  is  also  proved  that  on  22.06.2001, constable  Diler  Singh  came  out  of  his  platoon post without obtaining permission from any one and  consumed  liquor,  thereafter,  he  quarrelled with the local persons in the market and besides

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above,  he  by  using  indecent  language  hurled abuses to the personnel present in the camp and on reaching at company headquarters Narsapur against  CRPF  personnel  and  officers,  which  is totally  against  the  conduct  and behaviour  of  a civilized and good constable.”

14. In this backdrop, the judgments of the Courts below

and that of the High Court are to be scrutinised.  The trial

Court by placing reliance on the decisions in  Ram Singh

Rai (supra) and Rattan Singh (supra) has opined that the

punishment of dismissal could not have been imposed on

the delinquent employee under Section 11(1) of the Act.  The

first appellate Court while holding that the trial Court has

no  territorial  jurisdiction  also  reversed  the  finding  which

was rendered in the context of Section 11(1) of the Act.  In

this context, learned appellate Judge relied on the decision

in  Ghulam Mohd.  Bhat (supra).  The  High  Court,  as  is

evident, has not referred to the decision in Ghulam Mohd.

Bhat  (supra) but has adverted to a different aspect which is

in the relam of proportionality.  

15. It  is  submitted  by  Mr.  Maninder  Singh,  learned

Additional Solicitor General for the appellants that the High

Court has not framed any substantial question of law under

Section  100  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  which  is

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absolutely mandatory.  It has further been submitted that

the High Court should have applied the ratio laid down by

this Court in  Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (supra) which defines

the operational spectrum of Section 11(1) of the Act and also

not  followed  the  decision  in  Akhilesh  Kumar (supra)  to

dislodge the judgment of the appellate Court.

16. Learned counsel for the respondent, per contra, would

support  the  judgment  passed  by  the  High  Court  on  the

foundation  that  this  High  Court  has  ascribed  adequate

reasons to come to the  conclusion and,  in  any case,  the

punishment of dismissal in the facts and circumstances is

too harsh and shocks the conscience.

17. First, we shall deal with the submission with regard to

framing of substantial question(s) of law.  On a perusal of

the judgment of the High Court, it is evident that it has not

framed  any  substantial  question  of  law.  The  Court  in

Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari5,  has held that

the  High  Court  cannot  proceed  to  hear  a  second  appeal

without formulating the substantial question of law involved

in  the  appeal  and  if  it  does  so  it  acts  illegally  and  in

abnegation or  abdication  of  the  duty  cast  on Court.  The

5  (2001) 3 SCC 179

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existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non

for  the  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction  under  the  amended

Section  100  of  the  Code.   The  said  principle  has  been

reiterated  in  many  a  decision  including  the  one  in  the

Govindaraju  v.  Mariamman6 which  has  been  placed

reliance upon by Mr. Maninder Singh.  In the said case it

has been laid down, the substantial question of law has to

be framed for such a formulation is the  sine qua non for

exercise  of  power under  Section 100 of  the Code of  Civil

Procedure

18. It is necessary to state here that the High Court while

admitting  the  second  appeal  should  have  framed  the

substantial  question(s)  of  law  which  would  have  been

adverted  to  at  the  time  of  final  hearing.   That  is  the

command of the provision and has been clearly stated by

this Court in number of occasions.  We may unhesitatingly

state  that  we  do  not  remotely  get  a  sprinkle  of  bliss  by

ingeminating  or  repeating  the  same.   It  has  been  done

following the rigoristic concept of ‘duty for duty sake’ with

the great expectation that this would be the last one.

19. The  core  issue  that  emerges  for  consideration  is

6 (2005) 2 SCC 500

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whether  under  Section  11(1)  of  the  Act,  punishment  of

dismissal can be imposed.  The controversy is no more res

integra.  In Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (supra) while interpreting

Section 11 of the Act, it has been held thus:-

“5. A bare perusal of Section 11 shows that it deals with minor punishment as compared to the major punishments prescribed in the preceding section.  It lays down that the Commandant or any  other  authority  or  officer,  as  may  be prescribed, may subject to any rules made under the  Act,  award  any  one  or  more  of  the punishments to any member of the Fore who is found guilty of  disobedience, neglect of  duty or remissness  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty  or  of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force. According to the High Court the only punishments which can be awarded under this Section are reduction in rank, fine, confinement to  quarters  and  removal  from  any  office  of distinction or special emolument in the Force. In our  opinion,  the  interpretation  is  not  correct, because the section says that these punishments may  be  awarded  in  lieu  of,  or  in  addition  to, suspension or dismissal.

6. The use of the words “in lieu of, or in addition to,  suspension  or  dismissal”,  appearing  in sub-section(1) of Section 11 before clauses (a) to (e) shows that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of the Force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the punishment mentioned in clauses (a)  to  (e) may also be awarded.”

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And again:-

“7. … It is, therefore, clear that section 11 deals with only those minor punishments which may be awarded in a departmental inquiry and a plain reading  thereof  makes  it  quite  clear  that  a punishment  of  dismissal  can  certainly  be awarded thereunder even if the delinquent is not prosecuted  for  an  offence  under  Section  9  or Section 10.”

20. We respectfully agree with the said view and opine that

under  the scheme of  the Act,  in exercise  of  power under

Section 11(1)  of  the  Act  punishment  of  dismissal  can be

imposed.   As is  seen from the impugned order,  the High

Court, to reverse the conclusion of the first appellate Court,

has  extensively  quoted  from the  decision  of  the  Calcutta

High Court  rendered in  Akhilesh Kumar (supra).   Be  it

stated  that  the  charges  levelled  against  the  delinquent

officer  therein was the same.  The Division Bench of  the

Calcutta High Court, analysing the Act, especially Section

10(m) and various clauses of  the CRPF Manual,  came to

hold thus:-

“It is an admitted position from the factual matrix of  the  departmental  proceedings  that  the  writ petitioner/delinquent was posted in a camp.  As per  rule  of  such  positing  in  a  camp/lines  the concerned personnel is not free to move as per his choice even during the period when he is not on  actual  duty.   The  discipline  of  a  camp  is completely  different  in  comparison  with  the

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posting  of  an individual  in  an office  and or  in other places outside of the camp.  It is true, by rotation  of  8  hours  duty  is  allotted  to  the respective  personnel  who  are  attached  to  the camp and staying in the camp but that does not mean that when he will not be in active duty, he would  be  allowed  to  go  outside  of  the  camp without  prior  permission.   From  the  relevant provision  of  Clauses  7.2  and  6.23  as  already quoted it appears  that absence without leave or permission from the camp would invite initiation of  judicial  trial  of  the  delinquent  if  there  is  a serious  and  grave  situation  or  otherwise  a departmental  enquiry.   Hence,  finding  of  the learned  trial  judge  that  as  the  delinquent/writ petitioner was not on active duty, the aforesaid clauses got no effect, is not appealing us for its applicability  to  quash  the  order  of  dismissal. However,  from  the  aforesaid  provision  of maintaining  discipline  while  a  personnel  is posted  in  a  camp  which  requires  a  prior permission  to  leave  the  camp even for  a  short period from the Company Commander, we are of the view that the charge under Article no.1 was proved.   Now,  on  the  question  of  quantum  of punishment,  namely,  dismissal  from service  as imposed on such charge, we are of the view that as  under  clause  6.23  there  is  a  provision  for initiation of the departmental enquiry and as per decision  only  a  minor  punishment  could  be imposed  and  as  Section  10(m)  of  CRPF  Act provides  the  minor  punishment  issue  in  that field,  we are of  the view that dismissal being a major punishment should not have been passed by the Disciplinary Authority.  

8. Considering all the issues, we are quashing the  order  of  dismissal  as  well  as  the  order  of confirmation of such by the Appellate Authority and  remanding  the  matter  back  to  the Disciplinary  Authority  under  the  service regulation  of  the  delinquent  to  decide  the quantum  of  punishment  as  would  be

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commensurating with the charge of  misconduct as  admitted,  which  invites  only  minor punishment.”

21. The aforesaid analysis reveals that the Division Bench

has  clearly  held  that  the  delinquent  employee,  being  a

member of the Force, could not have left the camp without

prior permission.  It has also opined when a personnel is

posted in a camp, he is not free to move as per his choice

even during the period when he is not on duty.  However, as

is  manifest,  the  Division  Bench  has  opined  that  the

imposition of dismissal as a punishment, which is a major

one,  could  not  have  been  imposed  by  the  disciplinary

authority.   The  said  opinion  has  been  expressed  without

referring to  the position of  law that  has been clearly  laid

down in the case of Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (supra).  Thus, the

basic premise is erroneous.  In the impugned order, the writ

court  has,  after  reproducing  the  passage  from  Akhilesh

Kumar (supra),  opined that the controversy is covered by

the judgment rendered by the High Court of Calcutta.  It is

extremely significant to note that the learned Single Judge

has not even made an effort to appreciate the decision in

Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (supra) though the same was relied

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upon  by  the  learned  first  appellate  Judge.   Thrust  of

reasoning  of  the  first  appellate  court  was  that  a  major

punishment of dismissal could be imposed in law.  It is quite

unfortunate that the High Court has dislodged the finding

without any analysis but reproducing a passage from the

Calcutta High Court which had not referred to the ratio laid

down by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ghulam Mohd.

Bhat’s case.  Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the High

Court is wholly unsustainable.   

22. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted

that even if the charges have been proven, the punishment

of  dismissal  in  the  obtaining  factual  matrix  is  absolutely

harsh and shocking to the conscience.   It is his submission

that the punishment is disproportionate.   The respondent

was a part of the disciplined force.  He has left the campus

without  prior  permission,  proceeded  to  the  market,

consumed liquor and quarrelled with the civilians.  It has

been established that he had consumed liquor at the market

place, and it has been also proven that he has picked up

quarrel with the civilians.  It is not expected of a member of

the  disciplined  force  to  behave  in  this  manner.   The

submission,  as  has  been  noted  earlier,  is  that  the

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punishment  is  absolutely  disproportionate.   The  test  of

proportionality  has  been  explained  by  this  Court  in  Om

Kumar and others v. Union of India7,   Union of India

and another v. G. Ganayutham8 and  Union of India v.

Dwarka  Prasad  Tiwari9.   In  Dwarka  Prasad  Tiwari

(supra),  it  has  been  held  that  unless  the  punishment

imposed  by  the  disciplinary  authority  or  the  appellate

authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there

is  no  scope  for  interference.   When  a  member  of  the

disciplined  force  deviates  to  such  an  extent  from  the

discipline and behaves in an untoward manner which is not

conceived of, it is difficult to hold that the punishment of

dismissal  as  has  been  imposed  is  disproportionate  and

shocking to the judicial conscience.   

23. We  are  inclined  to  think  so  as  a  member  of  the

disciplined force, the respondent was expected to follow the

rules,  have control  over  his  mind and passion,  guard his

instincts  and feelings  and not  allow his  feelings  to  fly  in

fancy.  It is not a mild deviation which human nature would

grant some kind of lenience.  It is a conduct in public which

7  (2001) 2 SCC 386 8  (1997) 7 SCC 463 9  (2006) 10 SCC 388

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has compelled the authority to think and, rightly so, that the

behaviour  is  totally  indisciplined.   The  respondent,  if  we

allow  ourselves  to  say  so,  has  given  indecent  burial  to

self-control,  diligence  and  strength  of  will-power.   A

disciplined  man  is  expected,  to  quote  a  few  lines  from

Mathew Arnold:-

“We cannot kindle when we will The fire which in the heart resides, The spirit bloweth and is still, In mystery our soul abides: But tasks in hours of insight will’d Can be through hours of gloom fulfill’d.

Though the context is slightly different, yet we have felt, it is

worth reproducing.   

24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and

decree passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the

first appellate court is restored and the suit instituted by the

respondent/plaintiff  stands  dismissed.   In  the  facts  and

circumstances  of  the  case,  there  shall  be  no  order  as  to

costs.  

.............................J. [Dipak Misra]

..........................., J.      [N.V. Ramana]

New Delhi; June 30, 2016

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