25 April 2011
Supreme Court
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U.P. AVAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD, LUCKNOW Vs SHEO NARAIN KUSHWAHA .

Bench: R.V. RAVEENDRAN,A.K. PATNAIK, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-003615-003615 / 2011
Diary number: 7113 / 2006
Advocates: VISHWAJIT SINGH Vs R. D. UPADHYAY


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Reportable  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3615/2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.5950 of 2006)

U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad … Appellant

                Vs.

Sheo Narain Kushwaha & Ors.       … Respondents

O R D E R

R. V. Raveendran.J,   

Leave granted. Heard.  

2. The  appellant,  for  whose  benefit  certain  lands  

(including the land of respondents) at village Daulatpur,  

District Kanpur were acquired, filed an appeal before the  

Allabahad  High  Court  challenging  the  judgment  of  the  

Reference Court which increased the compensation for the  

acquired land of respondents from Rs.10,250/- per bigha to  

Rs.1,10,250/- per bigha. The said appeal has been dismissed  

summarily by a division bench of the Allahabad High Court,  

by  the  impugned  non-speaking  order  dated  20.12.2005  

upholding  the  award  of  Rs.1,10,250/-  per  bigha  as

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compensation. The High Court has stated that it was doing  

so, in exercise of the power under Order 41 Rule 11 of the  

Code of Civil Procedure (‘Code’ for short). The said order  

is challenged in this appeal by special leave.  

3. The appeal in question was filed under section 54 of  

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘LA Act’) which  

provides that an appeal shall lie in any proceedings under  

that Act, to the High Court from the award of the Reference  

Court,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  

Procedure, applicable to appeals from original decrees. An  

appeal is a proceeding where a higher forum reconsiders the  

decision  of  a  lower  forum,  on  questions  of  fact  and/or  

questions of law, with power to confirm, reverse, modify  

the decision or remand the matter to the lower forum for  

fresh  decision.  In  Hari  Shanker  vs.  Rao  Girdhari  Lal  

Chowdhury (AIR 1963 SC 698) this court held :

“….A  right  of  appeal  carries  with  it  a  right  of  rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute  conferring the right of appeal limits the rehearing in  some way as, we find, has been done is second appeals  arising under the Code of Civil Procedure.”  

4. Section  96  of  the  Code  provides  that  save  where  

otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by  

any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall  

lie  from  every  decree  passed  by  any  court  exercising  

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original  jurisdiction  to  the  court  authorized  to  hear  

appeals from the decisions of such court. Order 41 of the  

Code regulates appeals from original decrees. Rule 11 of  

Order  41  relates  to  power  to  dismiss  appeals  without  

sending notice to lower court and sub-rules (1) and (4)  

thereof, relevant for our purpose, are extracted below :

“11. Power to dismiss appeal without sending notice to  Lower Court.-  

(1) The Appellate Court after fixing a day for hearing  the  appellant  or  his  pleader  and  hearing  him  accordingly if he appears on that day, may dismiss the  appeal.  

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(4)  Where  an  Appellate  Court,  not  being  the  High  Court,  dismisses  an  appeal  under  sub-rule  (1),  it  shall  deliver  a  judgment,  recording  in  brief  its  grounds for doing so, and a decree shall be drawn up  in accordance with the judgment.”

 5. It  is  evident  from  sub-rule  (1)  that  an  appellate  

court  can  dismiss  an  appeal  after  a  preliminary  hearing  

without  calling  for  the  records  of  the  trial  court  and  

without  issuing  notice  to  the  respondent,  if  it  is  

satisfied that the appeal has no merit. Sub-rule (1) does  

not  however  state  that  such  dismissal  can  be  without  

assigning any reasons.  

6. Sub-rule (4) provides that where the appellate court,  

not being the High Court, dismisses an appeal under sub-

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rule (1), it shall deliver a judgment recording in brief,  

its  grounds  for  doing  so.  Sub-rule  (4)  by  implication  

therefore provides that if the appellate court is the High  

Court,  and  it  chooses  to  dismiss  a  first  appeal  at  the  

stage of preliminary hearing, without issuing notice to the  

respondent  and  without  calling  for  records,  it  need  not  

deliver a formal brief judgment as is required by other  

appellate fora. A ‘judgment’, even a brief one, which is  

required to be rendered by appellate courts other than High  

Courts, should necessarily refer to the pleadings, nature  

of relief, the points for consideration and the decision  

thereon.  But  sub-rule  (4)  does  not  say  that  if  the  

appellate  court  which  dismisses  the  appeal  is  the  High  

Court, no reasons be assigned for dismissing the appeal.  

Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 11 does not enable the High Court to  

dismiss first appeals by one line orders to the effect that  

‘appeal is dismissed’ or by non-speaking orders. The order  

of the High Court dismissing the first appeal should be  

sufficiently reasoned to disclose the application of mind  

to the grounds of appeal and make out that the High Court  

was resorting to dismissal in limine as it found the appeal  

either to be vexatious or wholly without merit. Order 41  

Rule 11 of the Code, while relieving the High Court from  

the  obligation  to  write  a  ‘judgment’,  does  not  dispense  

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with  the  obligation  to  assign  reasons  in  brief,  when  

summarily dismissing the appeal.  

7. Unless the order is reasoned, there will be no way of  

knowing whether the appellate court has examined the appeal  

before deciding that it did not deserve admission. As a  

limited  right  to  appeal  to  Supreme  Court  is  available  

against the appellate judgments of the High Court, unless  

there are reasons in the order of dismissal, it will not be  

possible for the Supreme Court to examine whether the High  

Court has rightly rejected the appeal. The appellant who  

has  filed  the  first  appeal  in  pursuance  of  a  statutory  

right to file such appeal, paying necessary court fee, can  

legitimately expect reappreciation of the evidence and re-

determination of the questions raised, unless the statute  

providing for the appeal provides otherwise.

8. This  court  has  repeatedly  pointed  out  that  any  

dismissal  of  an  first  appeal  even  at  the  preliminary  

hearing  stage,  should  be  supported  by  brief  reasons.  In  

Kiranmal Zumerlal Borana Marwadi vs.  Dnyanoba Bajirao Khot  

- [1983 (4) SCC 223] this court observed :

“As numerous points both of law and facts appear to  have  been  raised  in  the  appeal,  which  again  were  sought to be canvassed before us, in fairness to the  parties and to us, some reasons ought to have appeared  in the judgment indicating what appealed to the High  

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Court to be in entire agreement with the learned trial  Judge.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  it  was  the  first  appeal against the decision of the trial Court and  therein  the  appellant  can  and  has  raised  serious  questions of law and disputed decision on facts. We,  therefore, think that this is pre-eminently a fit case  which ought to have been admitted and disposed of on  merits.”

In  Jayanmti De vs. Abani Kanta Barat - AIR 2000 SC 3578,  

this Court observed thus :

“We  are  not  satisfied  that  the  High  Court  has  considered the appeal on merits. Even if the dismissal  is under Order 41 Rule 11 and the High Court is not  required under Sub-rule (4) to record in brief its  grounds for doing so, it is not a carte blanche to  enable  the  appellate  court  to  avoid  recording  any  reason whatsoever. We think that the appeal required  consideration on merits. We, therefore, set aside the  impugned order and remit the appeal to the High Court  for disposal of the same on merits and in accordance  with law by stating the reasons.”

9. Under section 54 of the LA Act, a party aggrieved by  

the award of the Reference Court is entitled to file an  

appeal  against  the  award  of  the  Reference  Court  as  of  

right. Such appeals which mostly relate to the correctness  

of the quantum of compensation or apportionment, raise both  

questions  of  facts  as  well  as  questions  of  law.  The  

provisions of Order 41 of the Code are made applicable to  

such appeals. The High Court, should therefore, if it wants  

to  dismiss  an  appeal  summarily  without  issuing  notice,  

assign  brief  reasons,  though  not  required  to  render  a  

‘brief  judgment’.  Subject  to  the  requirements  and  

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limitations  placed  by  the  statute  providing  for  the  

appeals,  appeals  may  be  disposed  of  summarily,  where  so  

provided. ‘Summary decision’ refers to a decision which is  

short and quick and not elaborate. But it does not mean  

‘non-reasoned dismissal’, as any order appealable in law  

has  to  be  reasoned.  A  dismissal  in  limine refers  to  

dismissal at the outset. Summary dismissal or dismissal in  

limine does  not  refer  to  a  dismissal  without  assigning  

reasons.

10. In  this  case  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  has  

awarded Rs.10,250 per bigha. The Reference Court awarded  

Rs.1,10,250 per bigha. The Reference Court stated that one  

bigha is equivalent to 2250 sq.yds. and it was awarding  

Rs.45/- per sq.yd. On that basis, that is at the rate of  

Rs.45  per  sq.yd.  the  price  of  a  bigha  comprising  2225  

sq.yds. would be Rs.1,01,250 and not Rs.1,10,250. Thus even  

without a detailed examination, there is an error apparent  

on the face of the award of the Reference Court. The other  

grounds raised by the appellant also deserved examination  

and consideration, particularly having regard to the fact  

that  several  other  appeals  relating  to  the  same  

notification, against similar fixation of market value by  

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the Reference Court were already admitted by the High Court  

and pending consideration.  

11. We  may  refer  to  another  unconnected  but  relevant  

aspect relating to the use of locally prevalent units of  

measurement. A ‘bigha’ as a unit of measurement varies in  

extent  in  different  parts  of  India.  The  Advanced  Law  

Lexicon (P. Ramanatha Iyer: 3rd Edition, Vol.1; page 528)  

states that in upper India, one bigha refers to 3025 sq.yd.  

of land, whereas in Bengal, it is equal to 1600 sq.yd. We  

are  informed  in  Delhi  and  Punjab,  a  Bigha  equals  1008  

sq.yd. The Reference Court states that a bigha is equal to  

2250 sq.yds. In public documents, deeds of conveyance and  

judicial  orders,  it  is  advisable  to  use  units  of  

measurement which have the same meaning in all parts of the  

country. For example, the term ‘gunta’ is prevalently used  

to  refer  to  one-fortieth  of  an  acre  in  Maharashtra,  

Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. But the word refers to the  

same  extent  of  measurement  in  all  states.  On  the  other  

hand, a word like ‘Bigha’, describing a unit of measurement  

which refers to different extents in different states, or  

different  parts  of  the  same  state,  should  be  avoided.  

Description by standard units of measurement will be the  

solution. Be that as it may.  

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12. We  are  of  the  view  that  the  appeal  filed  by  the  

appellant  raised  sufficient  grounds  which  require  to  be  

dealt  with  and  decided  by  the  High  Court  on  merits.  We  

therefore allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the  

High  Court  and  remand  the  matter  to  the  High  Court  for  

disposal of the appeal on merits.        

...................J. [ R.V. RAVEENDRAN ]

NEW DELHI ...................J. APRIL 25, 2011 [ A.K. PATNAIK ]  

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