REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9951 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 27646 of 2014)

U. Manjunath Rao                     Appellant(s)

Versus

U. Chandrashekar & Anr.      Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

The challenge in this appeal, by special leave, is to the

legal  acceptability  of  the  judgment  and  decree  dated

06.06.2014  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  at

Bangalore  in  Regular  First  Appeal  No.  1626  of  2010

whereby the learned single Judge has declined to interfere

in the appeal preferred by the first defendant questioning

the  defensibility  of  the  judgment  and  decree  dated

21.06.2010  passed  by  the  learned  XXVIII  Additional  City

Civil Judge, Mayohall, Bangalore in O.S. No. 16950 of 2004.

2

2. The  narration  of  facts  as  is  evincible  from  the

impugned  judgment  are  that  the  first  defendant  was

aggrieved as he was directed by the trial Court to execute a

rectification deed in respect of property description No. 2 in

B-schedule  in the  partition deed dated 01.04.1981 which

was  registered  on  28.07.1981  and  brought  on  record  as

Ex.P-1  and  further  granted  permanent  injunction

restraining  the  defendants  from  interfering  with  the

possession  of  the  plaintiff  in  respect  of  the  property  in

question. It was contended before the High Court that the

trial  Court  had erred in law in decreeing the suit  as the

registered  deed  of  partition  had  not  been  proved  in

accordance  with  law  and  further  the  schedule  property

formed part of the joint family property. That apart, it was

urged  that  the  said  property  was  purchased  by  the

defendant No. 1 from his own sources and his name had

been  recorded  in  the  record  of  rights  and  there  was  no

material  on  record  to  come  to  a  conclusion  that  there

existed a joint family which possessed sufficient nucleus to

purchase the schedule property. A ground was taken that

the partition deed had not seen the light of the day for more

3

than 22 years and when its genuineness was questioned on

the basis of materials brought on record, the said issue had

not been appositely addressed.  

3. The High Court,  as  the impugned judgment reveals,

noted  some  of  the  contentions  and  posed  the  question

whether  the  trial  Court  was  justified  in  directing  the

defendants  to  execute  a  rectification  deed  to  correct  the

error in stating the site number in the partition deed dated

01.04.1981 marked in evidence as Ex.P-1. It took note of

the fact that in the said partition deed site No. 25, which

was allotted to the plaintiff,  was erroneously described as

site No. 35 and hence, relief of the rectification of the error

in the deed had been granted by the trial Court.  Thereafter

the learned single Judge, as is vivid, copiously quoted from

the judgment of the trial Court and held that he did not find

any infirmities in the findings recorded by the trial Court

and certain documents brought on record showed that the

plaintiff  was  in  possession  of  the  site  No.  25.  On  the

aforesaid  basis,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  appeal

preferred by the defendant No. 1.

4

4. Despite  service  of  notice,  there  has  been  no

appearance on behalf of the respondents.   

5. We have heard Mr. R.S. Hegde, learned counsel for the

appellant. Criticising the judgment, he has submitted that

the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  first  appeal  without

appreciating the oral and documentary evidence brought on

record and further not adverting to the assailment by the

appellant  therein as regards the findings recorded by the

trial Court. It is canvassed by him that when the plaintiff

had not adduced any evidence to prove the existence of the

joint family, the question of placing reliance on the deed of

partition presuming that the property in dispute was a joint

family property and, therefore, the partition deed required to

be  rectified  as  an  error  has  been  crept  in,  is  absolutely

fallacious. Learned counsel would submit that quoting from

the  trial  Court  judgment  and  confirming  the  same  in  a

cryptic manner is not a lawful delineation of the first appeal

preferred under Section 96 of the Code of Civil  Procedure

(CPC)  and,  therefore,  the  impugned  judgment  can  be

stamped as an unreasoned one and should be set aside with

5

a direction to the High Court to dispose of the appeal on

appreciation of facts and the law in correct perspective.

6. To appreciate the submissions of Mr. Hegde, we have

perused the impugned judgment passed by the High Court.

It is clearly demonstrable that the High Court has neither

analysed  the  evidence  brought  on  record  nor  has  it

answered the  issues  raised in  law.  Stating  the  facts  and

thereafter  reproducing  few  passages  from the  trial  Court

and ultimately referring to certain exhibited documents in a

cryptic manner, we are disposed to think, will not convert

an unreasoned judgment to a reasoned one. In fact, as we

notice, the learned Judge has posed the question about the

defensibility of the ultimate direction by the trial Court and

thereafter  proceeded  to  quote  paragraphs  from  the  trial

Court  judgment.  Posing  a  question  which  is  relevant  for

adjudication of the appeal is not enough. There has to have

been  proper  analysis  of  the  same.  That  apart,  there  are

other issues they deserved to be dealt with. Therefore, the

obvious conclusion is that the judgment passed by the High

Court is not a reasoned one.

6

7. It is well settled in law that the reason is the life of law.

It is that filament that injects soul to the judgment. Absence

of  analysis  not  only  evinces  non-application of  mind  but

mummifies the core spirit of the judgment. A Judge has to

constantly  remind  himself  that  absence  of  reason  in  the

process  of  adjudication  makes  the  ultimate  decision

pregnable.  While  dealing  with  the  first  appeal  preferred

under Section 96 CPC, the Court in State of Rajasthan v.

Harphool Singh (dead) through his LRs1 took note of the

exception  to  the  judgment  passed  by  the  first  appellate

court  by  observing  that  there  was  no  due  or  proper

application  of  mind  or  any  critical  analysis  or  objective

consideration of the matter, despite the same being the first

appellate court.  

8. A  three-Judge  Bench  in  Santosh  Hazari  v.

Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs2, while discussing

about power of the first appellate court, has opined that it is

the final court of facts and, therefore, pure findings of fact

remain immune from challenge  before  the  High Court  in

1  (2000) 5 SCC 652 2  (2001) 3 SCC 179

7

second appeal.  It is necessary to note that the Court had

also held thus:

“… The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or  affirm  the  findings  of  the  trial  court.  First appeal  is  a  valuable  right  of  the  parties  and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore,  reflect  its  conscious  application  of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on  all  the  issues  arising  along  with  the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court  is  an  easier  one.  The  appellate  court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons  given  by  the  trial  court;  expression  of general  agreement  with  reasons  given  by  the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily  suffice  (See  Girijanandini  Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary3). We would, however, like  to  sound  a  note  of  caution.  Expression  of general agreement with the findings recorded in the  judgment  under  appeal  should  not  be  a device  or  camouflage  adopted  by  the  appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. …”

[Emphasis supplied]

  The aforesaid passage has to be appositely understood.

While  reversing  the  finding  and  conclusions  of  the  trial

Court, the duty of the first appellate court is different than

while affirming a judgment.  Be it stated, the Court has also

held  that  it  is  a  final  court  of  law  in  the  sense  that  its 3  AIR 1967 SC 1124

8

decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be

vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because

the  jurisdiction  of  the  High Court  has  now ceased to  be

available  to  correct  the  errors  of  law  or  the  erroneous

findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law

unless such question of law is a substantial  one.  In the

said case, the Court, after referring to the decision in Sarju

Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain

Singh4, has further opined that:  

“…  while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court  must  come  into  close  quarters  with  the reasoning assigned by  the  trial  court  and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding.  This  would  satisfy  the  court  hearing  a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation  cast  on  them  by  the  scheme  of  the present Section 100 substituted in the Code.  …”

 The  purpose  of  referring  to  the  said  decision  is  to

highlight the responsibility cast on the first appellate court

or a court hearing the first appeal.

9. In  Madhukar and others v. Sangram and others5,

the  Court  noticed  that  the  High  Court  has  framed  two

4  AIR 1951 SC 120 5  (2001) 4 SCC 756

9

questions and thereafter  had set aside the  judgment and

decree  of  the  trial  court  and  allowed  the  first  appeal.

Discussing about the duty of the first appellate court, the

Court  had  referred  to  the  decision  in  Santosh  Hazari

(supra) and reiterated the principles stated therein.

10. In  H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (dead) by LRs6,

the two-Judge Bench ruled:

“The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either  on  facts  or  on  law.  Sitting  as  the  first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title. The order of the High Court is cryptic and the same is without assigning any reason.”

 The said principle has been reiterated in  State Bank

of India and another v. Emmsons International Limited

and another7.  Thus, in the first appeal  the parties have

right to be heard both on the questions of facts as well as on

6  (2005) 10 SCC 243 7  (2011) 12 SCC 174

10

law and the first appellate court is required to address itself

to all the aspects and decide the case by ascribing reasons.

11. In this context, we may usefully refer to Order XLI Rule

31 CPC which reads as follows:

“Order XLI. Appeals from Original Decrees

31.  Contents,  date  and  signature  of judgment.- The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state—

(a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d)  where  the  decree  appealed  from  is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled,  

and shall  at  the time that  it  is  pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”

12. On a perusal of the said Rule, it is quite clear that the

judgment of the appellate court has to state the reasons for

the  decision.   It  is  necessary  to  make  it  clear  that  the

approach  of  the  first  appellate  court  while  affirming  the

judgment  of  the  trial  Court  and  reversing  the  same  is

founded on different  parameters as  per  the  judgments of

this Court.  In Girijanandini Devi (supra), the Court ruled

that while agreeing with the view of the trial court on the

evidence,  it  is  not  necessary  to  restate  the  effect  of  the

11

evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial  court.

Expression of general agreement with reasons given in the

trial  court  judgment  which  is  under  appeal  should

ordinarily suffice.  The same has been accepted by another

three-Judge  Bench in  Santosh Hazari (supra).  However,

while stating the law, the Court has opined that expression

of  general  agreement  with  the  findings  recorded  in  the

judgment  under  appeal  should  not  be  a  device  or

camouflage to be adopted by the appellate court for shirking

the duty cast on it. We are disposed to think, the expression

of  the  said  opinion  has  to  be  understood  in  proper

perspective. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated

that the first appellate court can quote passages from the

trial  court  judgment  and  thereafter  pen  few  lines  and

express the view that there is no reason to differ with the

trial  Court  judgment.  That  is  not  the  statement  of  law

expressed  by  the  Court.  The  statement  of  law  made  in

Santosh Hazari (supra) has to be borne in mind.

13. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench decision in Asha

Devi  v.  Dukhi  Sao and another8 is  worthy  of  noticing,

8  AIR 1974 SC 2048

12

although the  context  was different.  In  the  said  case,  the

question arose with regard to power of the Division Bench

hearing a Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of  the

single  Judge  in  a  first  appeal.   The  Court  held  that  the

Letters Patent appeal lies both on questions of fact and law.

The purpose of referring to the said decision is only to show

that  when  the  Letters  Patent  appeal  did  lie,  it  was  not

restricted to the questions of law. The appellant could raise

issues pertaining to facts and appreciation of evidence. This

is indicative of the fact that the first appellate court has a

defined role  and its judgment should show application of

mind and reflect the reasons on the basis of which it agrees

with  the  trial  Court.  There  has  to  be  an  “expression  of

opinion” in the proper sense of the said phrase. It cannot be

said that mere concurrence meets the requirement of law.

Needless to say, it is one thing to state that the appeal is

without any substance and it is another thing to elucidate,

analyse  and  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the  appeal  is

devoid of merit.

14. In  the  case  at  hand,  as  we  have  noted  earlier,  the

learned Judge has really not ascribed any reason.  There

13

has been no analysis of facts or law. There is no discussion

with regard to  the  points  urged.  While  agreeing  with  the

general approval of reasons to support the conclusions of

the judgment in appeal, the High Court has to keep in view

the language employed in Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and the

view expressed in  Santosh Hazari (supra).  Analysis  and

reason are to be manifest. When that is not done, needless

to  say,  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  becomes

indefensible.   

15. In view of the aforesaid premises, we allow the appeal,

set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the

High  Court  and  remit  the  matter  for  fresh  disposal  in

accordance with law. The High Court is requested to dispose

of the appeal within six months.  There shall be no order as

to costs.

………………………….J.  (Dipak Misra)  

                                                                        ………………………….J.                                                (A.M. Khanwilkar)

New Delhi.   August 04, 2017