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C.A.No.7535/11   

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7535 OF 2011

Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy        …..Appellant

Versus

State of West Bengal & Ors.   …..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for both the parties.  This appeal has  

been preferred to assail an order dated 20th March 2009 by the  

High Court  at  Calcutta in W.P.L.R.T.  No.54 of  2009.  The High  

Court  placed reliance  upon a Division Bench judgment  of  that  

very Court in the case of  Manju Banerjee v.  Debabrata Pal  

reported in (2006) 1 WBLR (Cal) 147 and held the writ petition  

preferred by the appellant to be not maintainable.

2. The issue raised in this appeal is whether a writ application  

is maintainable against an order of West Bengal Land Reforms  

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and  Tenancy  Tribunal  (‘the  Tribunal’),  refusing  to  initiate  

contempt  proceedings  against  an  authority  arrayed  as  

respondent no.5 before the Tribunal.  Such pristine question of  

law does not require any reference to the facts  which led the  

appellant to file O.A.No.2744 of 2007 corresponding to M.A.No.24  

of 2008 before the Tribunal with a prayer to initiate proceeding  

under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before us the  

Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of  

Manju Banerjee (supra) and has submitted that the view taken  

therein  that  there  is  no  right  of  appeal  against  dismissal  of  

contempt proceeding, is correct and requires no discussion but  

the further view that even in gross cases of palpable contempt  

the  concerned  informant  aggrieved  by  refusal  to  initiate  

contempt proceeding can move only the Supreme Court under  

Article 136 of the Constitution of India, has been assailed on the  

ground that such observation in the judgment is on account of  

non-appreciation  of  relevant  facts  in  the  judgment  of  the  

Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra  

Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261.

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4. On  behalf  of  appellant,  it  was  further  submitted  that  

judgment  in  the  case  of  L.  Chandra  Kumar (supra)  was  

rendered on 18th March 1997.  The relevant Act, i.e., The West  

Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (for brevity  

referred to  as the ‘Act  of  1997’)  was enacted subsequently  in  

terms  of  the  enabling  provisions  under  Article  323B  of  the  

Constitution of India.  Under Section 15 of the Act of 1997 the  

Tribunal  has  been  vested  with  such  power  to  punish  for  its  

contempt as is vested in the High Court under the provisions of  

the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.  For convenience, Section 15 is  

set out hereinbelow :

“15.  Power  to  punish  for  contempt  of  Tribunal.-The  Tribunal  shall  have,  and  shall  exercise,  the  same  jurisdiction,  power  and  authority  in  respect  of  contempt of the Tribunal as a High Court has and may  exercise, and, for this purpose, the provisions of the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971,  shall  have  effect,  subject to the modifications that –  

(a) the  reference  therein  to  a  High  Court  shall be construed as a reference to the Tribunal,  and

(b) the  reference  therein  to  the  Advocate- General  in  Section  15  of  the  said  Act  shall  be  construed as a reference to the Advocate-General  of the State.”

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5. There  is  no  caveat  to  the  proposition  of  law  that  under  

Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 an appeal lies  

before the Supreme Court only against such order of the High  

Court which imposes punishment for contempt and no appeal will  

lie against an interlocutory order or an order dropping or refusing  

to initiate contempt proceedings.  This was clearly laid down in  

the case of  State of Maharashtra v.  Mahboob S. Allibhoy  

(1996) 4 SCC 411.  This view was also followed in several cases  

including in the case of Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd.  

v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 399.

6. In the case of  L. Chandra Kumar (supra) a Constitution  

Bench of this Court declared certain clauses in Articles 323A and  

323B of  the Constitution of  India to be unconstitutional  to the  

extent they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the  

Supreme Court under Articles 226/227and 32 of the Constitution.  

This was on the premise that power of judicial review is a basic  

and essential feature of the Constitution and, therefore, could not  

be taken away even by constitutional amendment.  Paragraphs  

91,  92  and  93  of  this  judgment  were  highlighted  by  learned  

counsel  for  the appellant  in  support  of  his  submission that  all  

decisions of tribunals created pursuant to Article 323A or Article  

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323B of the Constitution have been held to be subject to the High  

Courts’ writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

7.  On the other hand,  learned counsel  for  the respondents  

relied upon paragraph 4 in the case of  Mahboob S. Allibhoy  

(supra) wherein it  was clarified that no appeal is  maintainable  

against an order dropping proceeding for contempt or refusing to  

initiate a proceeding for contempt in terms of Section 19 of the  

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.  It was also submitted that since  

under Section 15 of the Act of 1997 the Tribunal  enjoys same  

jurisdiction,  power and authority as a High Court in respect of  

contempt under the provisions of  the Contempt of  Courts  Act,  

therefore,  High Court  cannot  exercise  power  of  judicial  review  

when the Tribunal  exercises same powers  as that  of  the High  

Court to reject or drop a contempt petition.

8. On  a  careful  consideration  of  judgment  of  the  Division  

Bench in the case of  Manju Banerjee (supra) which has been  

followed in the impugned order, we are unable to agree with the  

view that writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is  

not maintainable when the Tribunal refuses to initiate a contempt  

proceeding.   Such  inference  has  been  drawn  by  the  Division  

Bench on the basis of some judgments of this Court such as in  

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the case of  D.N. Taneja v.  Bhajan Lal (1988) 3 SCC 26.  In  

those cases the order refusing to initiate proceeding had been  

passed by the High Court and not by a tribunal and, therefore,  

this Court observed that in a fit and proper case the aggrieved  

person who informed the court of the alleged act of contempt can  

approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution  

of India.  Obviously in those cases there could be no occasion to  

observe that the aggrieved person can also approach the High  

Court  under  Article  226/227.   The  submission  that  because of  

similar powers of contempt vested in the Tribunal under Section  

15 of the Act of 1997, the Tribunal ceases to be inferior to the  

High  Court  for  exercise  of  writ  jurisdiction  is  devoid  of  any  

substance because it ignores that High Courts have constitutional  

status and are vested with extraordinary writ jurisdiction whereas  

the  Tribunal  is  only  a  creature  of  statute.   Hence,  in  our  

considered view,  in  the  case of  Manju Banjerjee (supra)  the  

Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court does not lay down the  

law correctly that when the  tribunal refuses to initiate contempt  

proceeding, the aggrieved person has remedy only under Article  

136 and not under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

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9. As  held  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  the  case  of  L.  

Chandra Kumar (supra) the power of judicial review of the High  

Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution cannot be taken  

away by a law or even by a constitutional amendment.  Hence, it  

will be indeed a rare case where the High Court can hold that a  

writ petition against any order of inferior court or tribunal is not  

maintainable.  However, we hasten to add that it is always open  

for  the  High  Court,  in  appropriate  cases,  to  hold  that  a  writ  

petition  is  not  entertainable  on  account  of  propriety,  

constitutional scheme, some settled rules of self-restraint or its  

peculiar facts.  

10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order is  

set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for  

considering the writ petition of the appellant afresh on its own  

merits and as per law.  We make it clear that we have not applied  

ourselves to the merits of the matter.  The appeal is allowed to  

the aforesaid extent.  No costs.

     …………………………………….J.       [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]

      ……………………………………..J.

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                [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]

New Delhi. March 13, 2015.

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