10 December 2012
Supreme Court
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TOK TADE Vs NABAM AMAS

Bench: H.L. DATTU,CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002023-002023 / 2012
Diary number: 23952 / 2010
Advocates: RAJIV MEHTA Vs ANIL SHRIVASTAV


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2023   OF 2012  (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.)NO.7695 OF 2010)  

TOK TADE                                APPELLANT VERSUS

NABAM AMAS & ANR.                     RESPONDENTS O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Gauhati  in  Criminal Appeal No.3 (AP) of 2009, dated 03.05.2010.  By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has  affirmed the judgment and order passed by the Trial  Court, in Sessions Case No. 490 of 2006, by convicting  the first respondent-herein (R-1) under Sections 302,  376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the “IPC”  for  short).  However,  taking  into  consideration  the  plea of the learned Counsel for the R-1, as to the  juvenility of R-1 on the date of the commission of the  offence,  i.e.,  06.09.2005,  the  High  Court,  while  sustaining the conviction passed by the Trial Court,

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has granted R-1 the benefits under the provisions of  the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)  Act, 2000 (the “Act” for short). The High Court vide  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  has  restricted  the  sentence awarded by the Court below to the period of  imprisonment already undergone by R-1.     3. Aggrieved by the latter part of the judgment  with respect to the benefits conferred upon R-1 under  the Act, the Complainant-herein, who was not a party  before the High Court, is before us with permission to  file the Special Leave Petition.  This Court, while  issuing notice on 10.09.2010, had granted permission  to the Complainant to file the Special Leave Petition  against  the  judgment and order passed by the High  Court, insofar as the latter portion of the judgment  and order passed by the High Court is concerned.

4. The  learned  Counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant brings to our notice that he had approached  the competent authority, i.e., the Public Information  Officer,  O/o.  Deputy  Commissioner,  Papum  Pare  District,  Yupia,  Arunachal  Pradesh.  The  concerned

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authority has furnished the required information. The  learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance  on  the  information  so  obtained  under  the  Right  to  Information Act, 2005 and submits that the date of  birth of R-1 is infact 05.02.1988 and not 05.04.1991,  as claimed by R-1 before the High Court. The alleged  claims  by  R-1  were  based  on  the  date  of  birth  mentioned in the School Transfer Certificate, the date  of birth as on the admission register and the medical  report furnished vide their letter dated 28.03.2010.     5. In  our  opinion,  this  aspect  of  the  matter  requires to be re-looked into by the High Court, for  the simple reason that the Complainant was not a party  before the High Court and the above-stated fact was  not brought to the notice of the High Court at the  time of the decision.  

6. In view of the above, we partly allow this  appeal and set aside only that portion of the order of  the High Court, where the High Court has come to the  conclusion that R-1 is a juvenile under the provisions  of  the  Act.  The  High  Court  will  now  consider  this

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particular  aspect  of  the  matter  afresh  itself  or  assign  the  same  to  any  competent  authority.   We  request the High Court to decide and complete this  exercise as expeditiously as possible, at any rate,  within six months from the date of receipt of a copy  of this order.  

Appeal is disposed of accordingly.  

.......................J. (H.L. DATTU)

.......................J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 10, 2012.