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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.5158 OF 2009

Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. ……Appellant(s)

VERSUS

M. Chinniyan & Anr. ……Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This appeal is filed by the plaintiffs against the  

final judgment and order dated 11.07.2007 passed by  

the   High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  in  Civil  

Revision Petition No. 337 of 2002 whereby the High  

Court allowed the revision petition filed by respondent  

No.1  herein  and  set  aside  the  judgment  dated  

28.06.2001 of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Erode  

in R.C.A. No. 5 of  2001 and order of  eviction dated  

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31.10.2000  passed  by  the  Rent  Controller  (I  Addl.  

District Munsif), Erode in RCOP No. 26 of 1998.   

2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in this  

appeal, it is necessary to set out in brief the relevant  

facts  in  relation  to  eviction  case  out  of  which  this  

appeal arises and also state the facts of  three cases  

filed  by  the  parties  in  respect  of  the  suit  premises  

because they were referred to in the proceedings out of  

which this appeal arises.

3) The appellants (plaintiffs) are the wife and sons  

of one A. Radhakrishnan.  The suit premises bearing  

Door  No.  S-3,  Periyar  Nagar  Housing  Unit,  Erode  

Town, comprised in T.S. No. 909/3, Block No. 17 and  

598/2  Part,  Ward  1,  Block  20,  Surampatti  Village,  

Erode  Taluk,  Erode  sub-District,  Erode  Registration  

District  was  allotted  to   A.  Radhakrishan  by  Tamil  

Nadu Housing Board. In fact, entire area was acquired  

by the Housing Board and one house site therein was  

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allotted  to  A.  Radhakrishnan.  Subsequently,  A.  

Radhakrishnan made construction on the site allotted  

to him.  

4) On  22.02.1987,  A.  Radhakrishnan  executed  a  

general power of attorney in favour of one V. Dhanapal  

and nominated him to administer and manage the suit  

premises on his behalf.

5) One  N.  Kalidass  was in  occupation  of  the  suit  

premises as tenant.  On 04.02.1988, he vacated and  

surrendered  the  possession  of  the  suit  premises  to  

Dhanapal.  Thereafter respondent No.1  took the suit  

premises on lease rent from Dhanapal under a written  

lease deed dated 12.02.1989 for a period of 11 months  

on a monthly rent of Rs.850/- and paid Rs.4000/- as  

advance. Respondent No.1 then obtained possession of  

the suit premises and started residing therein with his  

family.   

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6) The appellants,  however, came to know that A.  

Radhakrishnan without their knowledge entered into a  

sale  agreement  dated  30.07.1987  to  sell  the  suit  

premises  to  one  A.S.  Pongianna.  The  appellants,  

therefore, instituted a suit being O.S. No. 53 of 1989  

(re-numbered  as  O.S.549/1989)  in  the  Court  of  

District  Judge,  Erode and sought a declaration that  

the sale agreement dated 30.07.1987 was neither valid  

and nor binding on them and also sought a permanent  

injunction against A. Radhakrishnan restraining him  

from  executing  the  sale  deed  in  favour  of  A.S.  

Pongianna  and  delivering  possession  of  the  suit  

property to him. In this  suit,  respondent  No.  1 was  

impleaded as one of defendants.  

7) Respondent No.1 filed a written statement in the  

aforesaid suit reiterating therein that he was inducted  

in the suit premises as a tenant under a lease deed  

dated  12.02.1989  for  a  period  of  11  months  at  

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monthly  rent  of  Rs.850/-  and  on  the  expiry  of  the  

contractual period of lease, he continued to remain in  

the suit premises as a tenant.

8) Respondent No.1 also, in the meantime, filed a  

suit  being  O.S.  No.  87  of  1989  in  the  Court  of  

Subordinate Judge, Erode against A. Radhakrishnan  

and  the  appellants  herein  seeking  permanent  

injunction  restraining  the  appellants  from  

dispossessing them from the suit premises.  According  

to respondent No.1,  he was a tenant and was put in  

possession  of  the  suit  premises  by  Dhanapal,  the  

power  of  attorney  holder  of  A.  Radhakrishnan,  

pursuant  to  a  lease  deed  dated  12.02.1989  for  a  

period of 11 months at a monthly rent of Rs.850/-. He  

also alleged that since the appellants were dissatisfied  

with  the  rent  fixed  under  the  lease  deed,  therefore,  

they were attempting to dispossess him from the suit  

premises.   In  this  suit,  on  22.02.1990,  A.  

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Radhakrishnan filed a written statement stating  inter  

alia that respondent No.1 was put in possession of the  

suit premises as his tenant and that he had already  

cancelled  the  power  of  attorney  executed by  him in  

favour  of  Dhanapal  by  executing  a  registered  

cancellation deed dated 13.03.1989.

9) Since A. Radhakrishnan was refusing to accept  

the rent from February 1989, respondent No.1 filed a  

petition bearing R.C.O.P. No. 2 of 1991 under Section  

8(5)  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Buildings  (Lease  and  Rent  

Control)  Act  in  the  Court  of  the  Rent  Controller  of  

Erode.  In  the  meantime  on  23.09.1994,  A.  

Radhakrishnan expired intestate  leaving behind him  

the  present  appellants  as  his  class  I  heirs  and one  

daughter  –  Tmt.  R.  Kanjana.  The  appellants  thus  

became  the  owners  of  the  suit  premises  by  

inheritance.  

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10) On  14.10.1998,  respondent  No.1  through  his  

advocate  sent  a  notice  to the  appellants  herein and  

Tmt.  R.  Kanjana,  the  daughter  of  late  A.  

Radhakrishnan, claiming that upon payment of Rs. 1  

lakh on 08.05.1988, A.S. Pongainna had assigned his  

rights  in  the  agreement  dated  30.07.1987  executed  

between him and late A. Radhakrishnan, in his favour,  

therefore, he called upon the appellants to execute the  

sale deed of the suit premises in his favour.

11) The  appellants  then  filed  Eviction  Petition  

bearing R.C.O.P. No. 26 of 1998 in the Court of the  

Rent  Controller  (District  Munsif)  Erode  against  

respondent  No.  1  out  of  which  the  present  appeal  

arises  seeking  eviction  of  respondent  No.1  from the  

suit premises under Sections 10 (2) and 10(3)(a)(i) of  

the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act  

1960  (in  Short  “the  Act”).  The  eviction  was  sought  

essentially on two grounds, namely, willful default in  

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paying monthly rent since 12.02.1989 and secondly,  

bona  fide need  for  the  use  and  residence  of  the  

appellants in the suit premises because according to  

the  appellants  they  were  residing  in  rented  

accommodation and had no other  suitable  house of  

their own in the city where they could live.   

12) Vide  order  dated  21.12.1998,  the  Court  of  the  

Subordinate Judge, Erode decreed O.S. No. 87 of 1989  

filed by respondent No.1 against the appellants on the  

basis of an endorsement made by the appellants and  

passed  a  permanent  injunction  restraining  the  

appellants  from  interfering  with  the  peaceful  

enjoyment of respondent No.1 over the suit property  

and from dispossessing him till he was evicted under a  

due process of law.

13) Vide order dated 05.01.1999, O.S. No. 53/1989  

(which was renumbered as O.S.  No.  549/1989)  was  

dismissed as not pressed by the appellants.

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14) So far as the eviction petition out of which this  

appeal arises is concerned, the Rent Controller allowed  

RCOP No. 26 of 1998 filed by the appellants vide order  

dated  31.10.2000  and  directed  the  eviction  of  

respondent No.1 from the suit premises. It was held  

that  the  appellants  are  the  owners/landlords  of  the  

suit premises. It was also held that respondent No. 1  

is in occupation of the suit premises as tenant. It was  

further  held  that  respondent  No.  1  has  committed  

willful default in paying the monthly rent and being a  

defaulter in payment of rent is liable to be evicted from  

the suit premises. It was also held that the appellants  

have  proved  bona  fide need  for  their  personal  

residence in the suit premises because they were living  

in  the  rented  house  at  a  place  called  Salem.  The  

appellants  were,  therefore,  held  entitled  to  claim  

eviction of respondent No. 1 from the suit premises on  

these findings.   

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15) Against the said order, respondent No.1 filed an  

appeal bearing T.C.A. No. 5 of 2001 in the Court of  

Subordinate  Judge,  Erode.  Vide  order  dated  

28.06.2001, the subordinate Judge, Erode dismissed  

the said appeal and confirmed the judgment passed by  

the Rent Controller.

16) Against  the  said  order,  the  respondent  filed  a  

revision petition being C.R.P. No. 337 of 2002 before  

the High Court.  The High Court, by judgment dated  

19.12.2003,  dismissed  the  revision  petition  filed  by  

respondent No.1.

17) Respondent  no.  1  then  filed  an  application  

seeking review of the order dated 19.12.2003 passed  

by the High Court in C.R.P. No. 337 of 2002.

18) The High Court by judgment dated 05.02.2007,  

allowed Review Application No. 91 of 2004 filed by the  

respondent No.1.  

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19) As  a  result  of  review being  allowed  C.R.P.  No.  

337/2002  was  restored  to  file  for  its  hearing  on  

merits. The High Court, this time, by impugned order  

dated  11.07.2007  allowed  the  revision  filed  by  

respondent No.1 on two legal grounds and set aside  

the order of the first appellate Court and also of Rent  

Controlling Authority. As a consequence, thereof, the  

eviction  petition  (RCOP  No.26  of  1998)  filed  by  the  

appellants  was  dismissed.   It  was  held  that  the  

eviction  petition  filed  by  the  appellants  is  not  

maintainable  because  the  daughter  of  Late  A.  

Radhakrishnan,  Tmt.  R.  Kanjana  was  not  made  a  

party to the eviction petition.  According to the High  

Court  she  being  one  of  the  co-owners  of  the  suit  

premises was a necessary party to eviction petition.  It  

was also held that appellants failed to establish the  

relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  with  the  

respondent No.1 and on the other hand it  appeared  

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that tenancy in relation to suit property was between  

Dhanapal and respondent No.1.  The High Court thus  

allowed the respondents’ revision essentially on these  

two grounds

20) Aggrieved by the said judgment,  the appellants  

have filed this appeal by way of special leave before  

this Court.    

21) Heard  Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel for the  

appellants and Mr. B. Adinarayan Rao, learned senior  

counsel  for  respondent  No.1  and  Mr.  Amit  Gupta,  

learned counsel for respondent No.2.

22) Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel appearing for  

the  appellants  while  assailing  the  legality  and  

correctness  of  the  impugned  order  urged  three  

submissions.  

23) In the first place, learned counsel submitted that  

the High Court having rightly dismissed the revision  

petition  filed  by  respondent  No.1  in  the  first  round  

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erred  in  allowing  the  review  petition  of  respondent  

No.1  and in any event  after  its  restoration  erred in  

allowing  the  said  revision  petition.  It  was  his  

submission  that  the  High  Court  committed  

jurisdictional  error  in  interfering  in  its  revisionary  

jurisdiction  in  upsetting  well  reasoned  concurrent  

findings of facts recorded by the Rent Controller and  

the first appellate Court in appellants’ favour and that  

too on two grounds, which were not urged before the  

Rent Controller and the appellate Court by respondent  

No.1.  

24) In the second place, learned counsel urged that  

two legal grounds on which the High Court allowed the  

revision petition,  namely,  that  non-joinder  of  one  of  

the co-owners of the suit property (daughter of late A.  

Radhakrishnan)  to  the  eviction  petition  was fatal  to  

the  filing  of  eviction  petition  and  secondly,  the  

appellants were not able to establish the relationship  

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of  landlord  and  tenant  with  respondent  No.1  in  

relation  to  the  suit  premises,  have  no  merit  and  

deserve rejection.

25) Elaborating  this  submission,  learned  counsel  

contended that so far as the first ground is concerned  

it is untenable in the light of the law laid down by this  

Court  in  Dhannalal  Vs.  Kalawatibai  and  Others,  

(2002) 6 SCC 16, wherein it is laid down that it is not  

necessary  to  implead  all  the  co-owners  of  the  suit  

premises in eviction petition and even if some of the  

co-owners  have  filed  the  eviction  petition,  it  is  

maintainable  in  law.  According  to  learned  counsel  

since  this  finding  was  recorded  by  the  High  Court  

without taking into consideration the law laid down by  

this Court in the case of  Dhanalal (supra), the same  

deserves to be set aside.  

26) Learned  counsel  also  pointed  out  that  in  any  

event, the aforementioned infirmity was cured by the  

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appellants  factually  because  the  daughter  of  late  A  

Radhakrishnan, Tmt R. Kanjana was later added as a  

party in the eviction proceedings.

27) In the third place, learned counsel urged that so  

far  as  the  second  ground  is  concerned,  namely,  

respondent  No.  1 was inducted by Dhanapal  in the  

suit  premises  and  not  by  the  appellants  and,  

therefore,  the  appellants  were  not  able  to  establish  

their  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  with  

respondent No.1 also has no merit for the reason that  

Dhanapal did not execute the tenancy agreement with  

respondent No.1 in his capacity as owner/landlord of  

the  suit  premises  but  executed  the  said  tenancy  

agreement on behalf of late A. Radhakrishnan as his  

power of attorney holder.  

28) Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  in  these  

circumstances any act done by Dhanapal in relation to  

suit premises including creation of tenancy was an act  

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done for and on behalf of A. Radhakrishnan. It was,  

therefore,  urged  that  the  tenancy  was,  as  a  fact,  

between  A.  Radhakrishnan  being  owner/landlord  of  

suit  premises  and  respondent  No.1  as  his  tenant  

which later devolved on the appellants after the death  

of  A.  Radhakrishanan  by  operation  of  law  thereby  

conferring a right on the appellants as co-owners of  

suit  premises  to  file  the  eviction  petition  against  

respondent  No.1  for  his  eviction  from  the  suit  

premises.

29) Lastly,  learned  counsel  contended  that  on  the  

aforementioned grounds, which had no substance, the  

High Court could not  have set aside the concurrent  

findings of facts recorded in appellants’ favour  by the  

Rent Controller  and the first  appellate  Court,  which  

had ordered the eviction of respondent No.1 from the  

suit premises.

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30) In  reply,  learned  counsel  for  respondent  No.1  

supported the impugned judgment and contended that  

it  deserves  to  be  upheld,  calling  no  interference  

therein.

31) Having heard learned counsel for the parties and  

on perusal of the record of the case, we find force in  

the  submissions  urged  by  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants.

32) Before we proceed to examine the issues raised in  

this appeal, we consider it apposite to take note of the  

law laid down by this Court on three issues which are  

involved  in  this  appeal,  viz.,  issue  in  relation  to  

revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in  

rent matters; second, the scope of inquiry to examine  

the title of the landlord of the suit premises in eviction  

matters;  and  third,  whether  all  the  co-owners/co-

landlords of suit premises are necessary parties in the  

eviction petition filed under the Rent Laws and lastly  

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law relating to power of attorney executed by principal  

in favour of his agent.

33) So  far  as  the  issue  pertaining  to  exercise  of  

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while hearing  

revision  petition  arising  out  of  eviction  matter  is  

concerned, it remains no more res integra and stands  

settled  by  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  

Hindustan  Petroleum  Corporation  Limited  vs.  

Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78.  Justice R.M. Lodha,  

the learned Chief Justice speaking for the Bench held  

in para 43 thus:

“43. We hold, as we must, that none of the  above  Rent  Control  Acts  entitles  the  High  Court  to interfere with the findings of  fact  recorded  by  the  first  appellate  court/first  appellate authority because on reappreciation  of the evidence, its view is different from the  court/authority below. The consideration or  examination  of  the  evidence  by  the  High  Court  in  revisional  jurisdiction  under  these  Acts is confined to find out that finding of  facts recorded by the court/authority below  is according to law and does not suffer from  any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by  court/authority  below,  if  perverse  or  has  been arrived at without consideration of the  material evidence or such finding is based on  

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no evidence or misreading of the evidence or  is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand,  it would result in gross miscarriage of justice,  is open to correction because it is not treated  as a finding according to law. In that event,  the High Court  in exercise of  its  revisional  jurisdiction  under  the  above  Rent  Control  Acts  shall  be  entitled  to  set  aside  the  impugned order as being not legal or proper.  The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as  to the correctness or legality or propriety of  any decision or order impugned before it as  indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to  the  regularity,  correctness,  legality  or  propriety  of  the  impugned  decision  or  the  order,  the High Court shall  not exercise its  power as an appellate power to reappreciate  or  reassess  the  evidence  for  coming  to  a  different finding on facts. Revisional power is  not and cannot be equated with the power of  reconsideration of all  questions of fact as a  court of first appeal. Where the High Court is  required to be satisfied that the decision is  according to law, it may examine whether the  order  impugned  before  it  suffers  from  procedural illegality or irregularity.”

34) Similarly,  so  far  as  the  scope  and  nature  of  

inquiry,  which  is  required  to  be  undertaken  to  

examine the title of the landlord in eviction matter is  

concerned,  it  also  remains no  more  res  integra and  

stands settled in the case of  Sheela & Ors. vs. Firm  

Prahlad  Rai  Prem  Prakash,  (2002)  3  SCC  375.  

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Justice  R.C.Lahoti  (as  His  Lordship  then  was)  

speaking  for  the  Bench  held  that  the  concept  of  

ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by  

Rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one  

in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the  

import whereof depends on the context in which it is  

used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be  

said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal  

right,  as  distinguished  from  for  and  on  behalf  of  

someone else to evict  the tenant and then to retain  

control, hold and use the premises for himself.  What  

may suffice and hold good as proof  of  ownership in  

landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be  

enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership  

in a title suit.  

35) Likewise, so far as issue pertaining to joinder of  

all  co-owners  in  eviction  petition  filed  against  the  

tenant under the Rent Laws is concerned, the same  

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also remains no more res Integra and stands settled by  

several  decisions  of  this  Court.  In  Dhannalal  vs.  

Kalawathibai  Ors.,  (Supra),  this Court took note of  

all  case laws on the subject and explained the legal  

position  governing  the  issue.  Justice  R.C.Lahoti  (as  

His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held in  

paragraph 16 as under :       

“16. It  is  well  settled  by  at  least  three  decisions  of  this  Court,  namely,  Sri  Ram  Pasricha v.  Jagannath,(1976)  4  SCC  184  Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814  and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC  444 that one of the co-owners can alone and  in his own right file a suit for ejectment of  the tenant and it is no defence open to the  tenant to question the maintainability of the  suit on the ground that the other co-owners  were not joined as parties to the suit. When  the  property  forming  the  subject-matter  of  eviction  proceedings  is  owned  by  several  owners, every co-owner owns every part and  every  bit  of  the  joint  property  along  with  others and it cannot be said that he is only a  part-owner  or  a  fractional  owner  of  the  property so long as the property has not been  partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for  eviction  of  the  tenant  without  joining  the  other co-owners if  such other co-owners do  not object. In Sri Ram Pasricha case reliance  was placed by the tenant on the English rule  that if two or more landlords institute a suit  for possession on the ground that a dwelling  house  is  required  for  occupation  of  one  of  

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them as a residence the suit would fail; the  requirement must be of all the landlords. The  Court  noted  that  the  English  rule  was  not  followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and  Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully  dissented from the rule of English law. This  Court held that a decree could be passed in  favour of the plaintiff though he was not the  absolute  and  full  owner  of  the  premises  because he required the premises for his own  use  and  also  satisfied  the  requirement  of  being “if he is the owner”, the expression as  employed  by  Section  13(1)(f)  of  the  W.B.  Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.”

36) The  issues  involved  in  this  case  need  to  be  

decided  keeping  in  view  the  law  laid  down  in  the  

aforesaid three cases and the one cited infra.

37) Coming to the first question,  in our considered  

opinion,  the  High  Court  erred  in  holding  that  the  

daughter  of  late  A.  Radhakrishnan,  i.e.,  Tmt.  R.  

Kanjana was a necessary party to the eviction petition  

filed by the appellants and hence failure to implead  

her rendered the eviction petition as not maintainable.  

This finding of the High Court, in our view,  is against  

the  law  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Dhannalal (supra),   wherein it is laid down that it is  

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not  necessary  to  implead  all  the  co-owners  in  the  

eviction petition.  

38) In  the  light  of  law  laid  down  in  the  case  of  

Dhannalal (supra), in our view, it was not necessary  

for the appellants to implead the Tmt. R. Kanjana –  

the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan in the eviction  

petition. Even otherwise, as rightly argued by learned  

counsel for the appellants, the High Court should not  

have allowed respondent No.1 to raise such objection  

for  the first  time in the revision because it  was not  

raised  in  the  courts  below.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  

daughter  having  been  later  impleaded  in  the  

proceedings, this objection was not even available to  

respondent No.1.  

39) In  view  of  foregoing  discussion,  we  can  not  

concur with the finding of the High Court and while  

reversing the finding hold that the eviction petition can  

not be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of Tmt.  

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R. Kanjana – the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan  

and is held maintainable.  

40) Now coming to the  question as to  whether  the  

tenancy was between the appellants and respondent  

No.1  or  whether  it  was  between  Dhanapal  and  

respondent No.1, we are of the considered view that to  

begin  with  the  tenancy  was  between  A.  

Radhakrishanan  and  respondent  No.1  and  on  the  

death of A.  Radhakrishnan, it was created between  

the  appellants  being  the  Class-I  heirs  of  A.  

Radhakrishnan and respondent No.1 by operation of  

law.   

41) In our opinion, Dhanapal was a power of attorney  

holder of A. Radhakrishnan.  He executed the tenancy  

agreement  on  behalf  of  the  original  owner  –  A.  

Radhakrishnan in favour of  respondent No.1.  Such  

act done by Dhanapal did not create any right,  title  

and interest in his favour and nor he ever asserted any  

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such  right  in  himself  and  indeed  rightly  qua A.  

Radhakrishnan  or  the  appellants  in  relation  to  suit  

premises.  That apart, respondent No.1 in clear terms  

admitted in his evidence and in the pleading of cases  

filed by him against the appellants about his status as  

being the tenant.  In the light of this legal position, the  

High Court should have held this issue in appellants’  

favour.   

42) The law relating to power of attorney is governed  

by the provisions of the Power of Attorney Act, 1982.  

It is well settled therein that an agent acting under a  

power of attorney always acts, as a general rule, in the  

name of his principal. Any document executed or thing  

done by an agent on the strength of power of attorney  

is as effective as if executed or done in the name of  

principal,  i.e.,  by  the  principal  himself.  An  agent,  

therefore, always acts on behalf  of the principal and  

exercises only those powers, which are given to him in  

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the power of attorney by the principal. Any act or thing  

done by the agent on the strength of power of attorney  

is, therefore, never construed or/and treated to have  

been done by the agent in his personal capacity so as  

to  create  any  right  in  his  favour  but  is  always  

construed as having done by the principal himself. An  

agent, therefore, never gets any personal benefit of any  

nature. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court in  

Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2)  vs.  

State of Haryana & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 656 held in  

paragraphs 20 and 21 as under:

“20. A power of attorney is not an instrument  of  transfer  in  regard  to  any  right,  title  or  interest in an immovable property. The power  of attorney is creation of an agency whereby  the grantor authorises the grantee to do the  acts specified therein, on behalf  of  grantor,  which when executed will be binding on the  grantor  as  if  done by him (see  Section 1-A  and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act,  1882).  It  is  revocable  or  terminable  at  any  time  unless  it  is  made  irrevocable  in  a  manner  known to  law.  Even  an  irrevocable  attorney  does  not  have  the  effect  of  transferring title to the grantee.

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21. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata,  (2005) 12 SCC 77, this Court held: (SCC pp.  90 & 101, paras 13 & 52)

“13.  A  grant  of  power  of  attorney  is  essentially  governed  by  Chapter  X  of  the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of  power of attorney, an agent is formally  appointed  to  act  for  the  principal  in  one  transaction  or  a  series  of  transactions or to manage the affairs of  the  principal  generally  conferring  necessary  authority  upon  another  person. A deed of power of attorney is  executed by the principal in favour of  the agent. The agent derives a right to  use  his  name and all  acts,  deeds  and  things done by him and subject to the  limitations contained in the said deed,  the same shall be read as if done by the  donor. A power of attorney is, as is well  known, a document of convenience.

* * * 52. Execution of a power of attorney in  terms of the provisions of the Contract  Act as also the Powers of Attorney Act  is valid. A power of attorney, we have  noticed  hereinbefore,  is  executed  by  the donor so as to enable the donee to  act on his behalf. Except in cases where  power  of  attorney  is  coupled  with  interest,  it  is  revocable.  The donee in  exercise of his power under such power  of  attorney  only  acts  in  place  of  the  donor subject of course to the powers  granted  to  him by  reason thereof.  He  cannot  use  the  power  of  attorney  for  his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary  capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach  of trust is a matter between the donor  and the donee.”

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An  attorney-holder  may  however  execute  a  deed of conveyance in exercise of the power  granted  under  the  power  of  attorney  and  convey title on behalf of the grantor.”

This was followed by this Court in  Church of Christ  

Charitable  Trust  and  Educational  Charitable  

Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust,  (2012)  

8 SCC 706 (para 20)

43) When we apply this well settled principle of law to  

the facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered  

view that when Dhanapal, who was acting as an agent  

of  A.  Radhakrishnan  on  the  strength  of  power  of  

attorney,  executed  the  tenancy  agreement  with  

respondent No. 1 in relation to the suit premises then  

he did such execution for and behalf of his principal -  

A  Radhakrishnan,  which   resulted  in  creating  a  

relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  A.  

Radhakrishnan and respondent No. 1 in relation to the  

suit  premises.  In this  execution,  Dhanapal  being an  

agent did not get any right, title and interest of any  

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nature  either  in  the  suit  premises  or  in  tenancy  in  

himself. The effect of execution of tenancy agreement  

by an agent was as if  A. Radhakrishnan himself had  

executed with respondent No.1.  

44) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the  

considered opinion that the High Court was not right  

in holding that the tenancy in relation to suit premises  

was with Dhanapal. We cannot thus concur with the  

finding of the High Court and accordingly reverse the  

finding and hold that the appellants were able to prove  

that the tenancy in relation to the suit premises was  

between A. Radhakrishnan and respondent No.1 and  

on  the  death  of  A.  Radhakrishnan,  it  was  created  

between  the  appellants  and  respondent  No.1  by  

operation  of  law  which  entitled  the  appellants  to  

maintain the eviction petition against respondent No.1  

seeking his eviction on the grounds available to them  

under the Act.  

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45) Since the High Court allowed the revision filed by  

respondent No.1 on the aforementioned two grounds  

only, which we have reversed in preceding paras, the  

revision petition filed by the respondent No.1 deserves  

to be dismissed. That apart keeping in view the law  

laid  down  by  this  Court  in  Hindustan  Petroleum  

Corporation  Limited  Case  (supra),  the  concurrent  

findings of facts recorded by the Rent Controller and  

affirmed  by  the  first  appellate  Court  in  appellants’  

favour on the issue of appellants  bona fide need for  

their  personal  residence  and  default  committed  by  

respondent No.1 in paying rent to the appellants were  

binding on the High Court.  

46) We have also perused these findings with a view  

to find out  as to whether  there is  any perversity  in  

these findings. We, however, find that these findings  

are  based  on  proper  appreciation  of  evidence  as  is  

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required  to  be  done  in  eviction  matters  and  hence,  

they do not call for any interference in this appeal.

47) Learned  Counsel  for  the  respondent  made  

attempt to support the impugned judgment and urged  

submissions but we were not impressed by any of the  

submissions urged.  

48) In the  light  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal  

succeeds  and  is  hereby  allowed.  The  impugned  

judgment is set aside and that of the judgment of the  

first appellate Court dated 28.06.2001 in R.C.A. No. 5  

of  2001  is  restored.  As  a  consequence  thereof,  the  

eviction  petition  filed  by  the  appellants  against  

respondent  No.1  in  relation  to  the  suit  premises  is  

allowed. Respondent No.1 is,  however,  granted three  

months’ time to vacate the suit premises from the date  

of  this  judgment  subject  to  furnishing  of  the  usual  

undertaking in this Court to vacate the suit premises  

within 3 months and further on depositing all arrears  

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of rent (if there are any arrears still due and not paid)  

till  date  at  the  same  rate  at  which  they  had  been  

paying monthly rent to the appellants and would also  

deposit  three  months’  rent  in  advance  by  way  of  

damages for use and occupation.  Let the undertaking,  

arrears  of  rent,  damages for  three months  and cost  

awarded by  this  Court  be  deposited  within  15 days  

from the date of this judgment. The appellants on such  

deposit being made would be entitled to withdraw the  

same after proper verification.  

49) The  appeal  is  accordingly  allowed  with  costs  

which  is  quantified  at  Rs.5000/-  to  be  paid  by  

respondent No.1 to the appellants.   

                                    .……...................................J.                     [J. CHELAMESWAR]

                                     ………..................................J.                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi, January 28, 2016.

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