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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  16727-16728 of 1996

PETITIONER: Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams & anr                

RESPONDENT: Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu & Ors.                     

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2003

BENCH: S.N. Variava & H.K. Sema.

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

 S. N. Variava J

These Appeals are against the Judgment dated 25th September,  1996 by which two Writ Petitions seeking writs of prohibition and a  contempt petition have been disposed of. The dispute in this proceedings relates to 28.58 acres in Survey  Numbers 686, 645 and 679 of Tirumala Village. This land is situated on  Tirumala Hills where the temple of Sri Venkateshwara Swamy is  situated. The Appellants are the statutory Devasthanam in control and  management of the temple. The facts leading to the present litigation  are set out in the impugned Judgment. In the impugned Judgment the  Appellants are referred to as "T.T.D." whereas the Respondents are  referred to as "the Tallapaka people". The facts, as set out in the  impugned Judgment, are as follows: "4.     Sri Krishna Devaraya one of the greatest Emperors  who ruled southern India in the 15th century granted an  extent of Ac. 27-04 cents of land on Tirumala Hills (now  covered  by Survey Nos. 586 and 645) to Sri Tallapaka  Annamacharya, the celebrated saint, composer and  reformer, the progenitor of the petitioners herein (for short  "the Tallapaka people").  Annamacharya was a great  devotee of Lord Venkateswara, in whose praise he wrote  and composed music for 32,000 devotional songs.  He  attained immortality as the greatest devotee of Lord  Venkateswara and also the founder of the Bhakti cult,  propagating the philosophy of Sri Ramanuja.  Kings and  emperors showered upon him honours and granted large  number of inams in recognition of the spiritual service he  rendered.  He and his descendants, for over centuries,  endowed vast properties for religious and charitable  purposes.  Tallapaka Venkata Seshacharyulu, the father of  the petitioner in W. P. No. 8347 of 1996 and C.C. No. 373  of 1996 was the 12th descendant of Annamacharya.

5.      The T.T.D. filed an application before the Revenue  Divisional Officer, Chandragiri in 1962 under the Madras  Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951  against Tallapaka Venkata Seshacharyulu seeking  resumption of the inam alleging that it was a grant in  favour of the "Manager for the time being of  Nandanavanam at Tirumala or Tirupati to be held for the  support of Sri Venkataswara Swamy Pagoda at Tirumala  and to be held so long as the conditions of the grant are  duly fulfilled".  The T.T.D. contended that the grant was for  the maintenance of flower and Tulasi garden and fruit  bearing trees for the daily worship of and offering to Lord  Venkateswara but neither offerings were made nor plants

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and trees maintained much less flowers and Tulasi plants  were supplied from the Nandanavanam to the deity by the  inamdars.  The T.T.D. therefore, prayed for: (i) resumption  of the inam and determining it as a grant of both  melwaram and kudiwaram (land revenue as well as  proprietary right); and (ii) regranting the inam to the  T.T.D. as an endowment.  That application was disposed of  by the Revenue Divisional Officer holding that the Inams  Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri had already issued a  ryotwari patta under the Inams Abolition Act in favour of  the T.T.D. and, therefore, no further relief was called for.   The inamdars carried the matter in revision to the  Commissioner, Survey, Settlements and Land Records (for  short "the Commissioner") under Section 14-A of the  Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and  Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (for short "the Inams  Abolition Act") and the Commissioner, while allowing the  revision, remitted the matter to the Tahsildar for fresh  enquiry on the ground that while granting patta in favour  of the T.T.D. the Deputy Tahsildar had not issued notices  to the parties.

6.      After the remand, the Deputy Tahsildar conducted an  enquiry under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act after  notices to both the Institution (T.T.D.) and the inamdars  and recorded a finding that the land in question is an inam  land in Ryotwari village and that it was not held by an  institution.  On appeal, preferred by the T.T.D., the  Revenue Divisional Officer affirmed the order of the Deputy  Tahsildar.  The T.T.D. carried the matter in revision to the  Commissioner who, while recording the concession made  by the Counsel for the T.T.D., that the lands in question  were in possession of the inamdars on the crucial dates (as  envisaged by Section 4 of the Inams Abolition Act) and  that the inamdars had been in possession of the lands  since 7-6-1933, dismissed the revision petition.     

               xxx             xxx             xxx

7.      The T.T.D. filed W.P. No. 11895 of 1986 challenging  the order of the Commissioner affirming the orders of the  subordinate statutory tribunals and the inamdar filed W. P.  No. 11437 of 1986 contending that an extent of Ac. 3-05  cents of land in question was illegally occupied by the  T.T.D. without paying compensation and, therefore, he  was entitled to be compensated for the wrongful  deprivation.   A learned single judge heard both the  matters together and by a common judgment, allowed the  writ petition filed by the T.T.D. holding that the grant in  question was to the institution and that the possession of  the land "on the relevant dates" by the inamdars was only  on behalf of the institution but not in recognition of their  rights as inamdars and that the view of the Commissioner  that the inam was burdened with service was contrary to  the recitals in the two title deeds.  The learned Judge by  his common judgment dated 17-4-1987 quashed the  revisional order of the Commissioner and consequently  dismissed W.P. No. 11437 of 1986 filed by the inamdar.   Two Writ Appeals W.A. Nos. 1752 of 1987 and 4 of 1993  arising out of the above two writ petitions were allowed by  a common judgment dated 23-12-1992.     

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8â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦..The judgmen t of the Division  Bench was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court in Civil  Appeal Nos. 3468-69 of 1993â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦.â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦ the   Supreme Court dismissed both the appeals on 11-1-1995â\200¦  â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦..Review Petition Nos. 683-684 of 1995   seeking review of the aforesaid order of the Supreme  Court  9th May, 1995 were dismissed.

9.      After the dismissal of the review petitions by the  Supreme Court the Tallapaka people (inamdars) filed an  application before the Inams Deputy Tahsildar for grant of  patta under Section 7(1) of the Inams Abolition Act and  the same was granted by the Deputy Tahsildar by an order  dated 9-8-1995.

10.     The T.T.D. filed a suit O.S. No. 69 of 1995 in the  Court of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupati seeking  a declaration that it is the absolute owner of the Ac. 25-08  cents of land covered by Survey Nos. 686 and 679/92 and  for a consequential direction to the Tallapaka people to  surrender possession of the same.  The T.T.D. also filed an  appeal under Section 7(2) of the Inams Abolition Act  before the Revenue Divisional Officer challenging the grant  of patta by the Deputy Tahsildar in favour of the Tallapaka  people.  In the plaint filed in O.S. No. 69 of 1995, it was  averred by the T.T.D. inter alia, that the entire property  lying within the limits of Tirumala belongs to the deity.   Lord Venkateswara.   The question of title to the suit land  was not the subject matter of the earlier litigation between  the T.T.D. and the Tallapaka people and in spite of the  failure of the T.T.D. in the revenue proceedings and the  judgment in the writ appeals (the first Tallapaka case), the  question of title can still be agitated in a Civil Court.  After  adverting to certain G.O’s. and the earlier proceedings  before the revenue authorities it was averred by the T.T.D.  in the plaint that the inam was to the temple and not a  personal grant to the Tallapaka people.   As already stated  at the very outset, the inamdars (the Tallapaka people)  filed the present two writ petitions, each for a writ of  Prohibition: one in regard to the suit and the other in  regard to the appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer,  Tirupati restraining them from proceeding further in the  matters.  In the contempt case it was alleged by the  inamdars that the T.T.D. in deliberate disobedience of the  judgment of this Court in the first Tallapaka case had  instituted the suit and, therefore, it is liable to be punished  for contempt. "  

By the impugned Judgment the contempt petition has been dismissed.  However writs of prohibition have been issued in the following terms: "34.    In the result, both the W.Ps. are allowed.  A writ of  prohibition will issue in W.P. No. 5997 of 1996 prohibiting  the principal Subordinate Judge Tirupati from proceeding  with the suit  O.S. No. 69 of 1995.   Likewise, a writ of  prohibition will issue in W.P. No. 8347 of 1996 prohibiting  the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati from proceeding  with the appeal preferred by the T.T.D. against the order  of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor in S.R. No. 1/95  dated 9.8.1995."

The reasoning adopted in the impugned judgment, in granting the writ  of prohibition, is that having urged all contentions in the earlier round

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of litigation Appellants were now estopped from claiming any rights.  The High Court held that the principles of res judicata applied. The  High Court justified issuance of writs of prohibition on the following  reasoning: "If the Civil Court and the Court of the Revenue Divisional  Officer were permitted to proceed with the trial and the  appeal, they would be acting outside their powers.  A writ  of prohibition can be issued to prevent a person from  acting or continuing to act in such a way as to abuse  jurisdiction of a judicial or quasi-judicial body.  It is not  necessary for the petitioners to wait until the decisions are  rendered by the Civil Court and the Revenue Divisional  Officer and then move this Court for a writ of certiorari."

At this stage it is necessary to set out Section 14 of the Andhra  Pradesh (Andhara Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into  Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the said Act) which reads as  follows: "Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts:-No suit or other  proceedings shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set  aside or modify any decision of the Tehsildar, the revenue  Court, or the Collector under this Act, except where such  decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or  collusion of parties."

Mr. Venugopal submitted that proceedings under the said Act are  summary in nature. He submitted that such summary proceedings can  never  bar a suit on title. He submitted that on the question, whether a  civil Court’s jurisdiction is barred, because a patta has been granted  under the said Act, there are a number of authorities of this Court. He  fairly pointed out the Judgments in the cases of Vatticherukuru Village  Panchayat vs. Nori V. Deekshithulu reported in 1991 Supp (3) SCC  228, Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar vs.  Government of A. P. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 75, Pushpagiri Math vs.  Kopparaju Veerabhadra Rao reported in 1996 (9) SCC 202, S.  Vanathan Muthuraja vs. Ramalingam reported in 1997 (6) SCC 143. In  all these cases it has been held that the suit on title was barred. He  submitted that there are identical provisions in the Tamil Nadu Estates  (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and the Madras  Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963. He  submitted that there are a number of decisions of this Court  where it  has been held that merely because a patta has been granted the  jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide title is not barred. He pointed  out the judgments in the cases of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Ramalinga  Samigal Madam reported in 1985 (4) SCC 10, R. Manicka Naicker vs.  E. Elumalai Naicker reported in 1995 (4) SCC 156, Sayyed Ali vs. A.P.  Wakf Board, Hyderabad reported in 1998 (2) SCC 642 and Sri-La-Sri  Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal vs. T. Parvathi Ammal reported  in 1998 (9) SCC 603. He submitted that there is a conflict of opinion  between the above-mentioned two sets of decisions. He submitted that  in view of the conflict of decisions the question whether a civil court  has jurisdiction to try a suit on title should be referred to a larger  bench. We are unable to except this submission. One set of Judgments  are under the said Act whereas the other set of judgments are under   legislations in Tamil Nadu. In Sri-La-Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi  Avargal’s case (supra) reliance had been placed on Vatticherukuru’s  case (supra) in support of the proposition that a suit on title was  barred. The three Judge bench distinguished that case on the ground   that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act and the Tamil Nadu Acts  are different. Once a three Judge bench has taken a view that the  provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act are different from those of the   Tamil Nadu Acts it cannot be said that there is any conflict of  decisions. The decision of the three Judge bench is binding on this  Court. It will thus have to be held that in respect of the said Act the  first set of Judgments would apply whereas in respect of the

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legislations in Tamil Nadu the second set of Judgments would apply. It  must be mentioned that in support of the submission that the title suit  is not barred Mr. Venugopal had also relied upon a full bench judgment  of the Madras High Court reported in (1998) The Madras Law Journal  Reports 722.          Thus as per the law laid down by this Court in Andhra Pradesh  the civil Court would have jurisdiction only in cases of  misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties. The question still  remains whether the High Court could or should have, in exercise of its  writ jurisdiction, issued writs of prohibition against the civil Court from  proceeding with the suit before it and against the Revenue Divisional  Officer, Tirupati from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the  Appellants against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor.   It must be remembered that in the Civil Procedure Code there are  sufficient provisions, particularly Order 7 Rule 11 and Order 14 Rule 2,  which give to the civil Court powers to decide its own jurisdiction and  questions regarding maintainability of the suit. The civil Court is also  competent to decide whether a suit before it is barred on principles of  estoppal or res judicata.         Mr. Venugopal submitted that apart from Certiorari, this is the  first time where a High Court has issued a writ, against a Civil Court,  prohibiting it from proceeding with a civil suit instituted before it. He  submitted that there are elaborate provisions in the Civil Procedure  Code for rejecting a plaint and/or deciding questions of maintainability  and for trying issues of its own jurisdiction as preliminary issues. Mr.  Venugopal submitted that the precedent set has enormous potential of  being mis-utilised and for multiplying litigation. He submitted that if  this is permitted, a defendant who does not want an interim order to  be passed against him would seek writs of prohibition against the  Court from   proceeding   with   the    hearing  and disposal of the suit.   Mr. Venugopal submitted that the consequences would be far reaching.  He submitted that if this is permitted, a writ of prohibition can be  issued by a High Court in one State against the trial of a suit in  another State provided summons are served or interim orders are  received in that State, so that part of the cause of action arises in the   former State. In support of this submission he relied upon the case of  Navinchandra N. Majithia vs State of Maharashtra and others reported  in 2000 (7) SCC 640. Mr. Venugopal showed to this Court the case of Mirajkar vs State  of Maharashtra reported in 1966 (3) SCR 779. In this case the High  Court had stopped publication of the proceedings of a trial before it. A  writ under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed challenging  the validity of that order on the ground that it infringed fundamental  rights under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. It was held,  by the majority, that if a judicial Tribunal makes an order, which it has  jurisdiction to make, the order cannot offend a fundamental right. It  was held that an order is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal if the  Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the matters that were litigated  before it. It was held that the Tribunal having jurisdiction does not act  without jurisdiction if it makes an error in the application of law. It was  held that if a judicial order is erroneous any person aggrieved by the  order, even a stranger, can file an appeal. It was held that the  question about existence of jurisdiction as well as validity and  propriety of the order cannot be raised in writ proceedings. Mr. Venugopal also relied upon a well reasoned judgment of the  Madras High Court in the case of I. S. Lulla vs Smt. Hari and others  reported in AIR (1962) Madras 458 wherein it has been held that  Article 226 does not clothe the High Court with jurisdiction to quash  the orders of a subordinate Court. It has been held that orders  susceptible to appeal or revision cannot be quashed by a Writ of  certiorari or a writ of prohibition restraining or prohibiting the  subordinate Court from proceeding to exercise jurisdiction in any  matter before it. It has been held that the jurisdiction to issue writ is  not a cloak of an appeal in disguise. It has been held that jurisdiction  under Article 226 is an original jurisdiction which is quite distinct and

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separate from the appellate jurisdiction. Mr Venugopal also relied upon the case of U. P. Sales Tax  Service Association vs Taxation Bar Association reported in 1995 (5)  SCC 716. In this case it has been held that the writ of Prohibition can  only be issued when the inferior Court or Tribunal (a) proceeds to act  without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of  rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself  ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention  of fundamental rights. Mr Venugopal very fairly brought to the notice of this Court the  case of The Failika Dabvali Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs Madan Lal  reported in 1977 (2) SCC 435 where a Writ of certiorari was issued  against a judgment on the footing that the Court had acted illegally  and there was an error apparent on the face of the record. It is  however to be noted that there is no discussion, in this case, as to the  circumstances under which a Writ of certiorari or prohibition can be  issued. He also fairly pointed out the case of Chhedi Lal Gupta & Ors.  vs Mohammad Sattar reported in AIR (1963) Allahabad 448 wherein it  had been mentioned that the Writ of Prohibition had been issued  earlier by the High Court from proceeding with the trial  on the ground  that the suit was one for infringement of trademark and could thus, by  virtue of Section 73 of the Trademark Act, be filed only in the Court of  the District Judge at Allahabad. However it must be noted that in this  case it had been held that the Writ of Prohibition did not prevent the  trial Court from returning the plaint for presentation to the proper  Court under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the other hand Mr. Mishra submitted that Article 226 of the  Constitution of India makes no distinction with respect to the power  which a Writ Court can exercise for any of the prerogative writs which  can be issued for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III  of the Constitution of India or for any other purpose. He submitted  that mandamus, prohibition and certiorari are exercised in the same  manner depending upon the nature of the controversy and the stage  at which they can be effective. He submitted that a certiorari was a  writ addressed to a proceeding in the Court and order passed therein  whereas a prohibition was directed to the subordinate Court or to any  other judicial or quasi-judicial authorities.  Mr. Mishra submitted that the instant case was one where a suit  was being entertained in the teeth of a specific bar under the said Act  and even though the suit was hit by res-judicata.  He submitted that  all the issues were adjudicated by the competent quasi-judicial  authorities and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court and  this Hon’ble Court in the earlier round of litigation. He submitted that  the Civil Court has acted without jurisdiction in entertaining and  proceedings with the suit. He submitted that the inferior court cannot  traverse the findings in the judgment of the High Court and this  Hon’ble Court.  Mr. Mishra submitted that the primary rule is that a  writ of prohibition is issued to a Court which also is an authority and  since it is issued to a Court it is also issued to such persons or  authorities who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers.   In support of the submission that the High Court has power to  issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of  habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Mr  Mishra relied upon the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmed  Ishaque reported in (1955) SCR 1104. In this case the question was  whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against an Election Tribunal  after it had become functous officio. It was held that the intention of  the Constitution was to vest in the High Court a power to supervise  decisions of Tribunals by issue of appropriate writs and directions and  that the exercise of that power cannot be defeated by technical  consideration of form and procedure.   It was held that the High Courts  must however observe the principles which regulate the exercise of  such jurisdiction.   It was held that before a writ of certiorari can be  issued there must be an error apparent on the face of the record.   Observations in following cases were cited with approval:

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"The decision in Rex v. Northumberland  Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw ([1951] 1  K.B. 711) was taken in appeal, and was affirmed by the  Court of Appeal in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation  Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw ([1952] 1 K.B. 338). In  laying down that an error of law was a ground for granting  certiorari, the learned Judges emphasised that it must be  apparent on the face of the record. Denning, L.J. who  stated the power in broad and general terms observed :  "It will have been seen that throughout all the cases  there is one governing rule : certiorari is only available to  quash a decision for error of law if the error appears on the  face of the record".  The position was thus summed up by Morris, L.J. :  "It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak  of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring an  order or decision for rehearing of the issue raised in the  proceedings. It exists to correct error of law where  revealed on the face of an order or decision, or  irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where  shown".  In Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. and  Others ([1952] S.C.R. 583), it was observed by this court  that under article 226 the writ should be issued "in grave  cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers  act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in  violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to  exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error  apparent on the face of the record". In T. C. Basappa v. T.  Nagappa ([1955] S.C.R. 250) the law was thus stated :  "An error in the decision or determination itself may  also be amenable to a writ of ’certiorari’ but it must be a  manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings,  e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of  the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error  which can be corrected by ’certiorari’ but not a mere wrong  decision".  

Mr Mishra also relied upon the case of Union of India and others  vs Upendra Singh reported in 1994 (3) SCC 357.  In this case the  Central Administrative Tribunal had examined the correctness of  charges framed in a disciplinary proceedings.  It was held that the  jurisdiction of the Tribunal was akin to the jurisdiction of the High  Court under Article 226. It has then been held that: "4. â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦   A writ of prohibition is issued  only  when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that  a High Court acting under Article 226 is not bound by the  technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative  writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United  Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms applying to  the said writs must be kept in view, as observed by this  Court in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa ((1955) 1 SCR 250 :  AIR 1954 SC 440). It was observed by Mukherjea, J.  speaking for the Constitution Bench :  "The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of  our Constitution is very wide and the powers of  the Supreme Court as well as of all the High  Courts in India extend to issuing of orders,  writs and directions including writs in the  nature of ’habeas corpus, mandamus, quo  warranto, prohibition and certiorari’ as may be  considered necessary for enforcement of the  fundamental rights and in the case of the High  Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of

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the express provisions in our Constitution we  need not now look back to the early history or  the procedural technicalities of these writs in  English law, nor feel oppressed by any  difference or change of opinion expressed in  particular cases by English Judges. We can  make an order or issue a writ in the nature of  ’certiorari’ in all appropriate cases and in  appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the  broad and fundamental principles that regulate  the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of  granting such writs in English law."  5. The said statement of law was expressly affirmed by a  seven-Judge Bench in Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. (AIR 1962  SC 1621, 1625) The reason for this dictum is self-evident.  If we do not keep to the broad and fundamental principles  that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of  granting such writs in English law, the exercise of  jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided; it tends to  become arbitrary and capricious. There will be no  uniformity of approach and there will be the danger of the  jurisdiction becoming personalised. The parameters of  jurisdiction would vary from Judge to Judge and from  Court to Court. (emphasis supplied) Mr Mishra also relied upon the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai vs State of  Uttar Pradesh reported in 1963 (1) SCR 778. In this case the question  was whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of  India was maintainable against an assessment made by a sales tax  officer under a valid act. The majority held that the writ petition was  not maintainable. In this case it has been held by Aiyar J as follows: "Now, I come to the controversial area. What is the  position with regard to an order made by a quasi-judicial  authority in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in  pursuance of a provision of law which is admittedly intra  vires ? It is necessary first to clarify the concept of  jurisdiction. Jurisdiction means authority to decide.  Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered  or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the  purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon  cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for  certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal. Where  a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a  matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a  wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The  question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not  on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to  enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these  facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable "at the  commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry’.  (Rex v. Bolten ([1841] I Q.B. 66, 74.)). Thus, a tribunal  empowered to determine claims for compensation for loss  of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law  and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the  tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction  by determine any of those questions incorrectly but it has  no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for reinstatement or  damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its  jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no  legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those  matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly  constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential  preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its  jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect  determination of any question that it is empowered or  required (i.e.,) had jurisdiction to determine. â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦..  

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The characteristic attribute of judicial act or decision is that  it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error of law or  fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body cannot,  in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless  the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which  the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles  govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu  but also the findings of administrative bodies which are  held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are  deemed to have been invested with power to err within the  limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they keep  within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as  valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine of res  judicata has been applied to such decisions."  On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court  and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of  prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the  inferior Court or Tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of  jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of rules of natural justice,  (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or  unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of  fundamental rights.  The principles, which govern exercise of such  power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued  only in rarest of rare cases.  Judicial disciplines of the highest order  has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs.   It must be remembered  that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from appellate  jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the form of  a writ.  In other words, this power cannot be allowed to be used "as a  cloak of an appeal in disguise".  Lax use of such a power would impair  the dignity and integrity of the subordinate Court and could also lead  to chaotic consequences. It would undermine the confidence of the  subordinate Court.   It was not even argued that there was total lack  of jurisdiction in the civil Court.   It could not be denied that the civil  Court, before which the suit was pending, had powers to decide on the  maintainability of the suit and to decide on questions of its jurisdiction.   The civil Court had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit was barred  by Section 14 of the said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel.  Thus unless there was some very cogent or strong reason the High  Court should not have prevented the Court of competent jurisdiction  from deciding these questions. In other words the High Court should  not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide these questions.  In the impugned Judgment no reason, much less a cogent or strong  reason, has been given as to why the civil Court could not be allowed  to decide these questions. The impugned Judgment does not state that  the civil Court had either proceeded to act without or in excess of  jurisdiction or that it had acted in violation of rules of natural justice or  that it had proceeded to act under law which was ultra vires or  unconstitutional or proceeded to act in contravention of fundamental  rights. The impugned Judgment does not indicate as to why the High  Court did not consider it expedient to allow the civil Court to decide on  questions of maintainability of the suit or its own jurisdiction. The  impugned judgment does not indicate why the civil Court be not  allowed to decide whether the suit was barred by virtue of Section 14  of the said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel.  To be  remembered that no fundamental right is being violated when a Court  of competent jurisdiction is deciding, rightly or wrongly, matters  before it. Faced with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that in the written  statement filed by the Respondents it had been contended that the  suit was not maintainable and was barred on principles of res  judicata/estoppel. He submitted that in spite of these points having  been urged before the civil Court an interim injunction restraining the  Respondents from alienating the suit lands had been issued. He  submitted that the civil Court had thus exercised jurisdiction when it  clearly had no jurisdiction. He submitted that it was under these

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circumstances that the Respondents filed writ petitions before the High  Court. On this submission Mr. Venugopal pointed out to us that whilst   granting an interim  injunction the civil Court had considered, prima  facie, the question of maintainability of the suit. Mr. Venugopal also  pointed out that the Respondents had filed an appeal against the order  granting interim injunction. It was pointed out that the appeal is also   dismissed holding prima facie that the suit was maintainable. Mr.  Mishra could not deny these facts. These facts indicate how chaotic a  result has prevailed by grant of the writ of prohibition. The impugned  Judgment  prohibits the civil Court from proceeding with the suit. Thus  the suit will lie on the dormant file of the civil Court indefinitely.  However the interim injunction granted by the civil Court, as affirmed  by the appellate Court, will continue to operate. To be remembered  that in the impugned Judgment there is no reference to these orders  and no writ of certiorari has been issued quashing those orders. The  end result would be that the suit cannot proceed yet the Respondent  will continue, indefinitely, to be restrained by the interim order. Faced  with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that this Court in exercise of  its powers should quash the interim order. Mr. Mishra submitted that  this was the equitable and correct course to be followed by this Court.  He submitted that this Court should not interfere with the impugned  order as it would be futile to force the Respondents to undergo a full  round of litigation for a second time when all questions, between the  parties, including questions of title were already decided in the earlier  round of litigation.  We have considered the rival submissions. It is not possible to  accept Mr. Mishra submission that this Court should quash the interim  orders. Those orders are not before this Court and this Court cannot  blindly quash orders passed by Courts of competent jurisdiction  without even looking into the orders. Even presuming, without so  holding, that the suit is not maintainable by virtue of Section 14 of the  said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel in our view the High  Court should have permitted the civil Court, which was competent to  decide these questions to do so.  At the most the High Court could  have directed the civil Court to decide these issues as preliminary  issues.  In our view the correct course is to set aside the impugned  Judgment and direct the civil Court to decide the question of  maintainability of the suit in view of Section 14 of the said Act and/or  its jurisdiction to entertain the suit as also the question whether the  suit is barred by principles of res judicata as preliminary issues. We  see no substance in the apprehension that in deciding the preliminary  issues the civil Court will not keep in mind Judgments of this Court (set  out therein above) pertaining to maintainability of the suit once patta  is granted under the said Act. Undoubtedly the civil Court would see  whether in effect the suit is for purposes of setting aside or modifying  the decisions taken in the earlier round of litigation.  It must also be mentioned that during arguments Mr. Venugopal  had submitted that the Appellants were considering applying for  amendment of the plaint in order to plead fraud. We are sure that if  any such application is made the same will be considered on its merits  after hearing the other side. It must be mentioned that Mr. Mishra had  submitted that by the proposed amendments admissions are sought to  be retracted. We see no reason to conclude that the civil Court would  permit retraction of admissions.  Finally it must be mentioned that both sides had argued on the  merits of the case. Mr. Venugopal relied upon, what he called, Title  Deeds bearing Numbers 2920 in respect of 1.53 acres and 2921 in  respect of 27.4 acres. The two grants are identically worded. Thus it is  sufficient to reproduce Grant number 2920 which reads as follows: "NO.2920         Title deed granted to the Manager for the time being  of Nandanavanam at Tirupati and Tirumala.

1.      By order of the Governor in council of Madras acting  on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in

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Council, I acknowledge your title to a Devadayam of  Nandanavanam Inam consisting of the right to the  Government Revenue on land claimed to be (one)  1.53 acres of dry and situated in the village of  Tirumala, Taluk of Chandragiri, District of North  Arcot and held for the support of Venkateswara  Swamy Pagoda in the village.

2.      This Inam is confirmed to you and your successors  tax-free to the held without interference as long as  the conditions of the grant duly fulfilled.

Sd/-  Inam Commissioner"

He submitted that these grants are in favour of the manager and are  a gift to the temple. He submitted that these were granted  as far back  as 9th August, 1882. He submitted that on 21st April 1960 a patta was  granted to the Devasthanam under the said Act. He submitted that the  grant of patta was confirmed in appeal by the RDO, Tirupati. He  submitted that on 4th November 1965 the Government of Andhra  Pradesh confirmed the grant of patta. He submitted that the 9th April  1990 rules were framed under Section 97 read with Section 153 of the  Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and  Endowments Act, 1987 and Rule 196 declared these properties as the  exclusive properties of the Devasthanam. He submitted that clearly  the title to the property was with the Devasthanam. He submitted that  in the earlier proceedings the only question was to whom a Ryotwari  patta had to be granted. He submitted that in those proceedings the  question of title was not looked into. He submitted that this Court in its  order dated 11th January 1995, affirmed the findings of the  Commissioner to the effect that the title to the Inam lands was not a  condition precedent for grant of patta. He submitted that thus this  Court had made it clear that it was not going into the question of title  in those proceedings. He submitted that the Appellants were thus not  estopped from filing a suit and the principles of res judicata had no  application.         Mr. Venugopal submitted that a Ryotwari patta is only a bill for  direct payment of revenue to the State and if at all only prima facie  evidence of title. In support of this proposition he relied upon the book  on Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency by S. Sunderraja Iyengar  and the case of Ramamoorthy vs State of Madras reported in (1970)  The Indian Law Reports 788. Mr. Venugopal submitted that a mere  decision on grant of patta cannot exclude a subsequent suit based on  title.  Mr. Venugopal submitted that no provision of the said Act  provides expressly for a determination of title. He submitted that Rule  15(1) of the Rules made under the Act, provides for summary  proceedings.  Mr. Venugopal submitted that if a decree is passed in  their suit on title  then  the grant of a Ryotwari patta will get nullified  incidentally. He submitted that the purpose of the said Act cannot be  that notwithstanding title (unlike agrarian reforms) the inamdar  institution will stand deprived of its property by a sidewind.                   On the other hand Mr. Mishra submitted  that the Suit is barred  in view of the specific findings by the revenue authorities and as  affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court in W.A. No. 4/1993  and 1752 of 1987 in the first Thallappaka case reported in 1993 (1)  Andhra Law Times 293. He relied on this Judgment and pointed out  that on consideration of Section 3, 4(1), 7 & 14(A) of the said Act, it is  held that as per the Inam’s Fair Register the legal title was that of  Respondents and not Appellants. He submitted that the said decision  has finally settled the question of title and rights as a rayat. Mr. Mishra  pointed out the plaint in the suit now filed by the Appellants that there  was no plea of misrepresentation, fraud or collusion in this suit. He  pointed out that even in answer to the writ petitions filed by the

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Respondents, the Appellants had not taken up a contention that the  earlier findings were obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion.  He pointed out that even in this Civil Appeal there is no ground that  there had been any misrepresentation, fraud or collusion in obtaining  the earlier decision.  He submitted that thus the express bar to the  suit, as provided under Section 14 of the said Act, willfully apply.  He  submitted that the High Court, in the impugned Judgment, has rightly  held so. Mr. Mishra submitted that the Suit is also barred on the  principle of constructive res-judicata. In support of the submission that  principles of res-judicata to apply even to decisions in Writ proceedings  Mr. Mishra relied upon the case of Gulabchand Parekh vs State of  Bombay reported in 1965 (2) SCR 547. In support of the submission  that the Inam Fair Register is evidence of utmost importance Mr  Mishra relied upon the cases of N. Y. Lakshminarasimachari vs Sri  Agasthewaraswami Varu of Kolakalur reported in 1960 (2) SCR 768;  Shri Vallabharaya Swami Varu (Deity) of Swarna vs Deevi  Hanumancharyulu & Ors. reported in 1979 (3) SCC 778 and  Subramania Gurukkal vs Shri Patteswaraswami Devasthanam reported  in 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 519. Mr. Mishra submitted that in the earlier round of proceedings  Appellants had admitted that the possession, on the relevant date, was  with the Respondents. Mr. Mishra pointed out that in the first  Thallappaka’s case the Commissioner while dismissing Appellants  revision application noted in the order dated 7.2.1986 that the then  counsel for the Appellants conceded as follows: "The counsel for the T.T.D. concedes that the lands were in  possession of the respondents on the crucial dates and  that in the notice issued by the executive officer, T.T.D. in  his ROC No. G1/10291/59 dated 8.8.1959 it has been  clearly stated that Tallapakam Venkata Seshacharyulu and  others were in possession of the lands since 7.6.1933."

Mr. Mishra submitted that it was an admitted position, even in the  plaint of the suit now filed by the Appellants, that the Respondents  were in possession of the land. He submitted that as the Respondents  alone enjoyed the land, their possession was sufficient for acceptance  of their entitlement for Ryotwari patta.  He submitted that the  Appellants had   produced no documentary evidence to show that land  in question belonged to the temple. He submitted that on the contrary  there was evidence to show that Appellants had filed a suit against one  Mahant Prayag Das for recovery of possession of vast extents of lands.  He submitted that significantly in that suit theses lands were not  shown as lands of the Appellants. He submitted that in that suit the  Appellants claimed 16 plots of land describing them as Nandanavanam  i.e. garden of the temple, however, no relief was claimed in respect of  these lands and these lands were not described in the said suit as  Nandanavanam or the garden belonging to the temple.  Mr. Mishra  submitted that in view of the above noted facts the High Court’s  Judgment is correct in law.  Mr. Mishra submitted that Section 2 A of  the said Act has to be read with Section 4(1) and 7 of the Act.  While  communal lands would vest in the Government other village lands in  possession of the inamdar shall remain with him and he would be  entitled to Ryotwari Patta. We see no reason to express any opinion on the rival  submissions. Were we to express any opinion we would be committing  the same mistake that the High Court has committed viz usurping the  jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide these questions. We therefore  express no opinion on merits. In view of what is set out herein above we set aside the  impugned Judgment to the extent that it prohibits the civil Court from  proceeding with Suit 69 of 1995. We direct the civil Court to frame and  decide, as expeditiously as possible and in any case within six months  from today, preliminary issues as to maintainability of the suit in view  of Section 14 of the said Act and whether the suit is barred on  principles of res judicata/estoppel.

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We are in agreement with the observations of the High Court  that grant of Patta to the Respondents was a formality in pursuance of  the decisions in the earlier round of litigation. It is only if it is held that  the Appellants suit is maintainable and not barred on principles of res  judicata/estoppal that the Appellants can be allowed to pursue the  appeal.  Thus  the writ of prohibition preventing the Revenue Divisional  Officer, Tirupati from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the  Appellants against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor in  S.R. No. 1/95 dated 9.8.1995 must continue for the present. Those  proceedings shall therefore continue to remain stayed till after the final  decision on the preliminary issues. If the preliminary issues are finally  answered in favour of the Appellants then the writ of prohibition in  respect of the appeal shall automatically stand vacated. If however the  preliminary issues are finally answered against the Appellants the writ  of prohibition shall stand confirmed.

These Appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no  order as to costs.