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PETITIONER: THE SUPREME COURT REPORTSASWINI KUMAR GHOSH AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ARABINDA BOSE AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/10/1952

BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM

CITATION:  1952 AIR  369            1953 SCR    1  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1954 SC  92  (36)  R          1955 SC 765  (33)  RF         1956 SC 105  (6)  RF         1956 SC 246  (65)  R          1957 SC 657  (36)  D          1957 SC 832  (25)  RF         1958 SC 468  (19)  RF         1958 SC 578  (173)  R          1960 SC1080  (15,74)  D          1962 SC 201  (7,8)  R          1962 SC1781  (18)  RF         1964 SC 855  (5)  R          1971 SC 221  (15)  MV         1971 SC 530  (373)  RF         1977 SC 366  (15)  R          1980 SC 962  (69,79,113)  RF         1980 SC2147  (20)  RF         1981 SC 917  (18)  E          1982 SC 149  (264)  RF         1987 SC 117  (40)  R          1992 SC  81  (11)

ACT: Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, s.  2-Advocate of Supreme Court-Bight to appear in  Original Side  of  Calcutta High Court without  attorney-"  Pactice", meaning  ofInterpretation of s. 2-Indian Bar  Councils  Act, 1926,  ss. 4(2), 5(1), 8(1), 9(4), 14-Calcutta  High  Court, Original Side Rules, Chapter I, rr. 37, 38-Bombay High Court Original  Side  Rules, Chapter I, r.  40-Interpretation  of, Statutes-Reference   to   title,   statement   of   objects, punctuation, speeches, original Bill.

HEADNOTE: Section  2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in  High Courts)  Act, 1951, provided that "notwithstanding  anything contained  in the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926  (XXVIII  of 1926), or any other law regulating the conditions subject to which  a  person not entered in the roll of advocates  of  a

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High  Court may be permitted to practise in that High  Court every advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as  of right to practise in any High Court whether or not he is  an advocate of that High Court " : Held  by the Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., VlvIAN BosE,  and GHULAM  HASAN  JJ.-MUKHERJEA  and  DAS  JJ.  dissenting)-The practice of law in India generally involves the exercise  of both  the  functions  of acting  and  pleading    behalf  of litigant  parties,  and  when  s. 2  of  the  abovesaid  Act conferred upon an advocate of the Supreme Court the right to "  practise  "  in  any High  Court,  it  is  legitimate  to understand that expression as authorising him to appear  and plead as well as to act   behalf of suitors in all the  High Courts-including   the   Original  Side  thereof.    It   is fallacious  to  relate  that expression  as  applied  to  an advocate  either,   the one band, to the court in which  the advocate  is  enrolled, or,,   the other, to  the  court  in which  he  seeks to exercise the statutory  right  conferred him.  It must be related to the general constitution of  the Bar in India as a single agency in dealing with the litigant public.   A  rule made by a High Court which denies  to  an’ advocate  the  right; to exercise an essential part  of  his function by insisting   a dual agency   the Original Side is much more-than, a rule of practice and constitutes a serious invasion  of his statutory right to practise, and the  power of making such a rule, Unless expressly reserved (as it ’was reserved by the Bar Councils Act) would be repugnant, to the right  conferred by s. 2; and as the, Act does  not  reserve any  such  power, the statutory right, of  a  Supreme  Court advocate  under s. 2 to plead as well as’to act in the  High Courts of Calcutta, and Bombay in the exercise 2 of  their  Original Jurisdiction can-not be  taken  away  or curtailed  by the rules of those courts, and any rule  which the Calcutta High Court may have made in the past purporting to exclude any advocate from practising   the Original  Side or from appearing and pleading unless he is instructed by an attorney cannot affect such right. MUKHERJEA J.-The word " practise" when used with   reference to  an advocate is an elastic expression having no rigid  or fixed connotation and the precise ambit of its contents  can be  ascertained  only  by  reference to  the  rules  of  the particular forum in which the profession is exercised.  When a.  2  of  the Supreme Court  Advocates  (Practice  in  High Courts) Act, 1951, speaks of a Supreme Court advocate  being entitled as of right to practise in any High Court, what  it actually means is that he would be clothed by reason of this statutory provision with all the rights which are enjoyed by an advocate of that court, and his right to plead and to act would  depend   the Bar Councils Act and the  rules  validly framed  by  that  court, subject to this  that  no  rule  or provision of law would be binding which would affect in  any way his statutory right to practise in that court solely  by reason  of his being enrolled as an advocate of the  Supreme Court. DAS J.-The words "to practise", used in relation to  lawyers as  a  class, mean "to exercise their profession"  which  is their  dictionary meaning and which is wide enough to  cover the  activities  of the entire genus of lawyers.   They  are words of indeterminate import and have no fixed  connotation or  content.  In their application to particular species  of lawyers  their  meaning varies according to  the  scope  and ambit  of  the  profession  of  the  particular  species  in relation to whom they may be used and such meaning has to be ascertained  by  reference  to the subject  or  context.   A

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Supreme  Court advocate being entitled only,"to  appear  and plead" in that court, when s. 2 autborised him to  practise" in  any High Court it must be taken, to have meant  that  he was  authorised  to do in the High Courts all  that  he  was entitled  to do in the Supreme Court, namely, to appear  and plead  only.   Alternatively the section must  be  taken  to authorise  every  Supreme Court advocate to practise  as  of right  in any High Court as advocates of that High Court  do and the exercise of the profession of an advocate in a  High Court   by  a  Supreme  Court  advocate  must  involve   the observance  of  the  rules of practice of  that  High  Court except  to the extent they are abrogated by s. 2. That  sec- tion  has  made  the  Supreme  Court  advocate  a  statutory advocate’ of the High Court where he goes to practise and as such  he  is bound by the rules of such High  Court  except, such  of them as are contrary to this new  statutory  right. Whichever  of  the two constructions is adopted,  a  Supreme Court  advocate  cannot appear in the Original Side  of  the Calcutta or Bombay High Courts unless he is instructed by an attorney. Queen  v.  Doutre  (L.R.  9  App.   Cas.  745),  Powers   of Advocates, ln re (I.L.R. 52 Mad. 92) and Laurentius Ekka  v. Dukhi Koeri (I.L.R. 4 Pat. 766) referred to. 3  Per  PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., VIVIAN BOSE, and  GHULAM  HASAN JJ.-The  non-obstante clause in s. 2 can reasonably be  read as overriding "anything contained" in any relevant  existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment.   Sections 9(4)  and 14(3) of the Bar Councils Act and s. 2 of the  new Act  cannot  stand together.  Whether by force of  the  non- obstante   clause  liberally  construed  or  of   the   well established maxim of construction that the enacting part  of an  Act  must, when it is clear,  control  the  non-obstante clause  when both cannot be read harmoniously, the  new  Act must  have the effect of abrogating the powers reserved  and continued  in the High Courts by ss. 9(4) and 14(3)  of  the Bar  Councils Act-.  MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-The  non-obstante clause in s. 2 of the said Act removes only those provisions contained  in the Bar Councils Act, 1926, and in  any  other law, which regulate the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court may  be permitted to practise in that High Court.  Other  provisions contained  in the Bar Councils Act or other statutes,  which lay down the conditions under which an advocate enrolled  in the High Court is entitled to practise in the Original  Side of  that  court stand unaffected by the Act.   Even  if  the entire Bar Councils Act is excluded for the purpose of s. 2, the  rules  framed by the Calcutta and  Bombay  High  Courts under their Letters Patent would remain valid and  effective of  their  own  force  even  without  the  saving  provision contained  in  the Bar Councils Act and the  Letters  Patent would also remain in full force. Per PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MUKHERJEA, DAB, VIVIAN BosE, and GHULAM  HASAN JJ.-Speeches made by members of the  House  of Parliament    the floor of the House are not  admissible  as extrinsic   aids   to  the   interpretation   of   statutory provisions. State  of Travancore-Cochin and Another v. Bombay  Co.  Ltd. etc,  ([1952] S.C.R. 1112), Administrator-General of  Bengal v. Prem Lal ( [1895] 22 I.A. 107), Krishna Aiyangar v. Nella Perumal  ( [1920] 47 I.A. 33), A.K. Go‘alan v. The State  of Madras ( [1950] S.C.R. 88) and Debendra Narain Roy v. Jogesh Chandra Deb (A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 593) referred to. Held per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., DAs, VIVIAN BOSE and  GHULAM HASAN JJ.--The statement of objects and reasons annexed to a

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Bill,  the  form  of the original Bill  and  the  fact  that certain words: or phrases were added to or omitted from  the original  Bill  are  also  not admissible  as  aids  to  the construction  of a, statute.  MUKHERJEA J.-Judicial  opinion the point whether in construing a statute the, statement  of objects  and  reasons or the original form of -the  Bill  or reports  of  committees can be referred to is  not  uniform. English  Courts  and the Privy Council have laid  down  that such  extrinsic aids must be dismissed  from  consideration. But  there  are American decisions to the  effect  that  the general  history of a statute and the various steps  leading up to an enactment including amendments or modifications  of the original Bill and reports of Legislative Committees can, be looked I at for 4 ascertaining the intention of the legislature where it is in doubt.    The  legislative  history  is,  however,   clearly inadmissible where there is no obscurity in the meaning of a statute. Per  MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-Punctuation is after all a  minor element  in the construction of a statute, and even  if  the orthodox view that it forms no part of the statute is to  be regarded as of imperfect obligation and it can be looked  at as  contemporanea, expositio, it is clear that it cannot  be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text. Stephenson v. Taylor ( [1861] 1 B.S. 101), Clawdon V.  Green [1868] L.R. 3 C.P. 511), Duke of Devonsshire v. Conor  (L.R. 1890  Q.B.D.  468), Maharani of Burdwan v.  Murtanjoy  Singh ([1886]  14 I.A. 30), Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen (  (1928]55  I.A. 63) referred to. Judgment of the Calcutta High Court reversed.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Petition (No. 160  of  1952)  under article 32 of the Constitution of India  for the enforcement of fundamental rights.  The facts of the case and  arguments of the counsel are stated fully in the judgment. Petitioner No. I (Aswini Kumar Ghosh) in person. B.   Sen for the respondents. N.   C.  Chatterjee (S.N. Mukherjee and B. Sen,  with   him) for  the  Incorporated  Law  Society,  Calcutta  High  Court (Intervener No. 1) Dr.  N. C. Sen Gupta (A.  K. Dutt and V. N. Sethi, with him) for the Secretary, Bar Association, Calcutta High      Court (Intervener No. 2). N.   C.  Chatterjee (B.  Sen, with him) for  Secretary,  Bar Library,  Calcutta  High  Court (Intervener No.  3).  C.  K. Daphtary,  Solicitor-General for India (G.  N. Joshi and  J. B.    Dadachanji,   with  him)  for   the   Secretary,   Bar Association, Bombay High Court (Intervener No. 4). K.   B.  Naidu for Secretarv,  Advocates’  AssociationMadras High Court (Intervener No. 5). M.   C. Setalvad, Attoney-General for India (Intervener  No. 6). 1952. October 27.  The The judgment of Patanjali Sastri C.J. and  Vivian  Bose  and Ghulam Hasan  JJ.  was  delivered  by Patanjali  Sastri  C. J. Mukherjea and,  Das  JJ.  delivered separate judgments. 5 PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.-This is an application under  article 32  of the Constitution for relief in respect of an  alleged infringement  of  the fundamental right of  the  petitioners under  article 19 (1) (g) or, alternatively,  under  article

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136 for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the  High Court of Judicature at Calcutta rejecting their  application for the same relief under article 226. As the petitioners would clearly be entitled to relief under the one or the other form of remedy if their claim was well- founded,  no objection was taken to the  maintainability  of the  present  proceeding, and we desire to  guard  ourselves against being taken to have decided that a proceeding  under article 32 would lie after an application under article  226 for the same relief   the same facts had been rejected after due  enquiry by a High Court.  We express no opinion    that point. The facts leading to this proceeding are not in dispute  and may be briefly stated.  The first petitioner is an  Advocate of  this Court and his name is also   the roll of  Advocates of the High Court of Calcutta.  As an Advocate of the latter Court  he  is entitled, under the relevant  rules  there  in force, both to act and to plead   the Appellate Side but not to act or to appear, unless instructed by an Attorney,   the Original Side.    18th July, 1951, he filed in the  Registry the  Original  Side a warrant of authority executed  in  his favour  by the second petitioner to defend the latter  in  a pending suit.  The warrant was returned   27th July, 195  1, with  the endorsement that it "must be filed by an  Attorney of  this  Court  under  the High  Court  Rules  and  Orders, Original Side, and not by an Advocate".  The return was made by  an Assistant in charge of Suit Registry Department,  who is  called  as the first respondent to this  petition.   The second  respondent is the Registrar, Original Side,  who  is alleged  to  have  refused   the same  ground  to  accept  a warrant  filed earlier in a company matter.  It is  conceded that the action of the respondent would be 6 valid  apart from the right claimed by the first  petitioner as  an  Advocate  of  this Court  under  the  Supreme  Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951,  (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  new Act)  which  provides  that  such Advocates  are  " entitled as of right to practise"  in  any High Court in India.  The petitioners, however, claimed that the right to practise thus conferred included also the right to  act as well as to appear without the intervention of  an Attorney   the Original Side, and moved the High Court under article  226  for  issue  of  appropriate  writs  orders  or directions  to the respondent for enforcement of  the  right denied  to  them.   A Special  Bench  consisting  of  Trevor Harries C.J., Chakravartti and Banerjee JJ. heard the motion and dismissed it, holding that the first petitioner did not, being  enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court,  become entitled to act   the Original Side of the Court. The  second  petitioner  has  since  dropped  out  of  these proceedings,  and  the  first petitioner,  who  appeared  in person  and  argued  his  case  before  us,  is  hereinafter referred to as the petitioner. I  As the issues involved are of far-reaching importance  to certain sections of the Bar at Calcutta and at Bombay,  this Court  directed notice of the proceeding to be served    the Incorporated  Law  Society, Secretary Bar  Association,  and Secretary, Advocates’ Association, Calcutta High Court,  and Secretary,  Bar Association, Bombay High Court, and  all  of them appeared by their learned counsel, while the  Attorney- General appeared in person as intervener.  We have thus  had the advantage of a full argument from all points of view. A  brief  historical  survey of the  functions,  rights  and duties of legal practitioners in this country may facilitate appreciation of the contentions of the parties.  Before  the

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Indian High Courts Act of 1861 (24 and 25 Vic.  Ch. 104) was enacted,  there  were,  in the territories  subject  to  the British   rule   in   India,   Supreme   Courts   exercising jurisdiction mainly in the 7 Presidency  Towns and Sudder Courts exercising  jurisdiction over the mofussil.  Though the Supreme Courts were given, by the  Charter Acts and the Letters Patent establishing  them, power  to  enroll Advocates who could be authorised  by  the rules  to  act as well as to plead in  the  Supreme  Courts, rules  were  made empowering Advocates only  to  appear  and plead  and  not to act, while Attorneys  were  enrolled  and authorised  to act and not to plead.  In the  Sudder  Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto, pleaders who obtained  a certificate  from those Courts were allowed both to act  and plead.   When the Supreme Courts and the Sudder Courts  were abolished  and their jurisdictions were transferred to  High Courts  under the statute of 1861, this  differentiation  in the  functions of legal practitioners was continued  in  the High  Courts  under the notion, apparently,  that  the  High Court,   in   the   exercise  of   its   Ordinary   Original Jurisdiction,  was the successor of the Supreme  Court,  and that,    the Appellate Side, it inherited  the  jurisdiction and  powers  of  the Sudder Courts,  with  the  result  that Advocates  were allowed only to appear and plead  instructed by Attorneys empowered to act   the Original Side as in  the Supreme Court, while   the Appellate Side, they were allowed both  to act and plead as in the Sudder Courts.   There  was also another class of practitioners known as Vakils who were neither allowed to act nor to plead   the Original Side, but were  allowed  both to act and plead   the  Appellate  Side. Within  a  short time, however, the Vakils  at  Madras  were permitted by a rule made by the High Court to appear,  plead and  act   the Original Side as wel1-vide In the  Matter  of the  Petition of the Attorneys(1)-but the  cleavage  between the   two   jurisdictions,  Original  and   Appellate,   was maintained in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts with modi- fications  by means of rules framed by the  respective  High Courts  from time to time.  While this was the  position  in the  High Courts in the three Presidency Towns of  Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, no distinction (1)  (1876-78) I.L.R. I Mad. 24.                             8 was drawn between Advocates and Vakils (except in the matter of authorisation by their clients) as regards their right to appear, plead and act in the other High Courts  subsequently established in British India without original  jurisdiction. The position in these Courts was correctly stated by a  Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court thus:- " Not only by the Letters Patent but by the Civil  Procedure Code,  an Advocate may act for his client in this  Court  in the manner in that statute set forth and do all things  that a  Pleader, that is, a Vakil, may do, provided  always  that he.  be upon the Roll of the Court’s  Advocates":  Bakhtawar Singh v. Sant Lal(1). In  this situation, the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879,  (Act XVIII  of  1879)  which consolidated  and  amended  the  law relating to Legal Practitioners was passed.  By section 4 it empowered  the  Advocates and Vakils enrolled  in  any  High Court  to  "practise" in all subordinate courts and  in  any other High Court with the "permission" of the latter  Court. No  Vakil  or’Pleader,  however,  was  to  be  entitled   to "practise"  in  a High Court exercising  jurisdiction  in  a Presidency  Town.   By  section 5 all  persons  enrolled  as Attorneys in any High Court became "entitled to practise" in

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all courts .subordinate to such High Court and in any  court in  British  India other than a High  Court  established  by Royal Charter   the roll of which he is not entered.  It  is worthy  of  note that the right to practise  thus  conferred included  the right to plead a,; well as to act in  all  the courts referred to above. Then  came  the  Indian Bar Councils Act,  1926,  which  was enacted in response to a demand by the legal profession  for unification  and  autonomy  of the Bar, and  it  achieved  a certain  measure  of  both, eliminating the  two  grades  of practitioners, the Vakils and the Pleaders, by merging  them in the class of Advocates who, were "entitled as of right to practise" in the High Courts in which they were enrolled and in any other court in British India, subject to certain (1)  (1887) 9 All. 617, 621. 9 exceptions.   It also provided for the constitution  of  Bar Councils  for  the High Courts with power  to  regulate  the admission  of Advocates, to prescribe  their  qualifications and  to  inquire  into any case of miscouduct  that  may  be referred  to them.  But the right to practise and the  power to  make  rules were not to limit or in any way  affect  the unlimited  powers of the High Courts at Calcutta and  Bombay to make rules allowing or disallowing Advocates to  practise their  Original Side: (vide section 9 (4) and  section  14). While  such was the position of Advocates in the  courts  in what -used to be known as British India, it is not a  matter of  dispute that Advocates practising in the courts of  what were  known as Indian States were allowed to  appear,  plead and act   behalf of suitors. It  will thus be seen that legal practitioners, by  whatever name  called,  practising in all the High Courts  in  India, except    the Original Side of the Calcutta and Bombay  High Courts,  and in the innumerable subordinate courts all  over India  were always entitled to plead as well as to act.   In the  Original  Side of the Calcutta and Bombay  High  Courts alone, where the cleavage between the Original and Appellate jurisdictions continued to be marked, due, as we have  seen, to historical reasons, the functions of pleading and acting, which  a  legal practitioner normally combines  in  his  own person,  were bifurcated and assigned, following "the  usage and the peculiar constitution of the English Bar" (per  Lord Watson in the case cited below), to Advocates and  Attorneys respectively. In this situation, the establishment of the Supreme Court of India,  exercising appellate jurisdiction over all the  High Courts  naturally stimulated the demand for the  unification of the Bar in India, and Parliament enacted the new Act as a step  towards that end.  It is a brief  enactment  intituled "an  Act  to  authorise Advocates of the  Supreme  Court  to practise as of right in any High Court" and consists of only two 10 sections.   Section I describes the short title of  the  Act and   section  2  enacts  (so  far  as  material   here   :-     "Notwithstanding  anything contained in the Indian  Bar Councils  Act,  1926,  or in any other  law  regulating  the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of  Advocates of a High Court may, be permitted to  practise in that High Court every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be  entitled  as  of right to practise  in  any  High  Court whether or not he is an Advocate of that High Court: Provided  that  nothing in this section shall be  deemed  to entitle  any  person,  merely  by reason  of  his  being  an Advocate of the Supreme Court, to practise in any High Court

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of  which  he was at any time a judge, if he  bad  given  an undertaking  not to practice therein after ceasing  to  hold office as such judge." According  to  the petitioner’s contention, an  Advocate  of the Supreme Court becomes entitled as of right to appear and plead as well as to act in all the High Courts including the High  Court  in which he is already  enrolled,  without  any differentiation  being  made for this  purpose  between  the various  jurisdictions exercised by those courts.  The  word "practise" as applied to an Advocate in India includes  both the  functions of acting and pleading, and there is  nothing in  section 2 to warrant the cutting down of that  statutory right  to pleading only   the Original Side of the  Calcutta High Court as the respondents seek to do.   the other  hand, the respondents contend that the non obstante clause in  the first  part of the section furnishes the key to  the  proper interpretation  of  its scope, and inasmuch as  that  clause supersedes  only those pro-visions of the Bar Councils  Act, and  of any other law which exclude persons not  entered  in the  roll  of Advocates of a High Court from  the  right  to practise  in  that  Court,  the  enacting  clause  must   be construed  as conferring only a right co-extensive with  the disability  removed by the opening clause; that is  to  say, the  section  is designed only to enable  Advocates  of  the Supreme Court who are not enrolled as 11 Advocates of any High Court to practise nevertheless in that High  Court.  The petitioner, who is already an Advocate  of the  Calcutta High Court, could derive no  additional  right from  the section in relation to that Court, as he does  not fall within the purview of the section.  Alternatively, even if  the provision is read as conferring   Advocates  of  the Supreme  Court the right to practise in relation to all  the High  Courts  in India, including the High Courts  in  which they  are  already enrolled, the section does no  more  than entitle  them to practise in conformity with the  conditions subject  to  which advocates are permitted  to  practise  in those  Courts,  for  the  word  "practise"  is  a  term   of indefinite  import  and, as applied to an Advocate,  it  may mean pleading or acting or both, according to the conditions under  which the profession of an Advocate is  exercised  in the  court concerned. Both branches of this contention  have found favour with the learned Judges of the court below. A third view was also suggested in the course of the  debate before  us.   An Advocate of the Supreme Court  is  entitled under  the Rules of that Court only to appear and plead  and not  to  act,  while Agents who are  enrolled  as  such  are entitled  only  to  act but not to  appear  and  plead.   In dealing with the right of Advocates of the Supreme Court  to "practise" in the High Courts, Parliament must therefore  be taken to have used that word in the sense only of  appearing and  pleading, the object of section 2 being only to  confer the Supreme Court Advocates the right to appear and plead in all the High Courts and no further or other right. Having  given  the  matter  our  most  careful  and  anxious consideration,  we  have  come to the  conclusion  that  the petitioner’s contention is correct and must prevail. As we have already seen, there are in this country more than 20 High Courts (including the Judicial Commissioners’ Courts which  are treated as High Courts for this purpose), and  in all these 12 High  Courts  excepting  the original  jurisdiction  of  the Calcutta  and  Bombay High Courts and in  all  the  numerous subordinate  courts, both civil and criminal,  existing  all

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over  the country, an Advocate combines in himself both  the functions  of  acting  and pleading  which  constitute  the. normal activities of all legal practitioners except  members of  the English Bar whose "usage and peculiar  constitution" allow  them  only to appear and plead and not  to  act.   It would seem that this peculiar British system of division  of functions  between Barristers and Attorneys is not in  vogue even  in  all  the  British  Dominions  and  Colonies.   For instance,  in the report of the case Queen v. Doutre(1),  we find counsel for the respondent stating in the course of his argument that "In all the Provinces of Canada the  functions of  Barristers and Solicitors are united in the same  person and  the rules of the English Bar do not apply  there".   In upholding  in that case the right of counsel to sue for  and recover    a  quantum  meruit  in  respect  of  professional services rendered by him, the Judicial Committee remarked:-      "Their  Lordships entertain serious doubts whether  in an  English  Colony where the common law of  England  is  in force, they (i.e., general considerations of public  policy) could  have any application to the case of a lawyer  who  is not  a more advocate or pleader and who combines in his  own person  various  functions  which  are  exercised  by  legal practitioners of every class in England all of whom, the Bar alone excepted, can recover their fees by an action at law." It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the  practice of  law in this country generally involves the  exercise  of both  the  functions of acting and pleading,   behalf  of  a litigant party; in other words, the Bar in India,  generally speaking,  is  organised as a single  agency.   Accordingly, when the Legislature confers upon an Advocate "the right  to practise"  in a Court, it is legitimate to  understand  that expression as authorising him to appear and plead as well as to (1)(1883) 9 App.  Cas. 745.                             13 act   behalf of suitors in that Court.  It is true that  the word "practice" used in relation to a given profession means simply  the  pursuit  of that profession  and  involves  the exercise of the functions which are cordinarily exercised by the  members  of  the  pro  fession.  But  it  seems  to  be fallacious  to  relate  that expression, as  applied  to  an Advocate, either,   the one, hand, to the Court in which the Advocate is enrolled or,   the other, to the Court in  which he  seeks to exercise the statutory right  conferred    him. It  must,  in  our  opinion,  be  related  to  the   general constitution  of  the  Bar in India as a  single  agency  in dealing  with the litigant public, a system  which  prevails all over this vast country except in two small pockets where adual agency imported from England was maintained, owing, as we have seen, to historical reasons. We  are  accordingly unable to accept  the  suggestion  that because  the Advocates of the Supreme Court are  not,  under the  Rules  of  that  Court,  entitled  to  act,  the   word "practise"  as  used  by Parliament in  section  2  must  be understood in the restricted sense of appearing and pleading only.   Parliament was, of course, aware that the  right  of the Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise in that Court was confined only to appearing and pleading, but the  object of  section  2  was  to confer upon  a  designated  body  of persons, namely, the Advocates of the Supreme Court, a right to  practise in other courts, viz., the various High  Courts in India, whether or not they were already enrolled in  such courts.   This  statutory right, which  is  conferred    the Supreme  Court  Advocates in relation to  other  courts  and which  they  did  not have before) cannot, as  a  matter  of

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construction,  be  taken to be, controlled by  reference  to what  they are allowed or not allowed to do in  the  Supreme Court under the Rules of that Court.  Such Rules are  liable to  be  altered at any time in exercise of  the  rule-making power  conferred  by article 145 of the  Constitution.   The scope and 14 content of the new statutory right conferred in relation  to the High Courts could not have been intended to depend   the varying  scope  of  the functions which  the  Supreme  Court Advocates  are allowed to, exercise in that Court from  time to  time.  Besides, the consequences of such a  construction would  be somewhat startling.  For instance, if an  Advocate of the Supreme Court not entered   the Roll of the Allahabad High  Court  desired to practise in the latter  Court  where there are no Attorneys or Agents, he would find himself in a difficult  situation.   It was said that a,  local  Advocate could  be  engaged to instruct him, acting for  the  client. Even  if it were permissible to substitute a local  Advocate for  an "Agent" to overcome the disability imposed by  Order IV,  Rule 11, of the Supreme Court Rules which prohibits  an Advocate  from  appearing  "unless he is  instructed  by  an Agent", it would be tantamount to introducing a new type  of dual  agency  where  it  does  not  exist  at  present,   an innovation   which,  we  think,  could  hardly   have   been contemplated.  Such an interpretation would also render  the right conferred by the new Act largely illusory in practice.          The construction adopted by the learned Judges  of the High Court, which relates the word "practise" in section 2  to  the High Court in which the  Supreme  Court  Advocate seeks to exercise his right, seems to us to be equally  open to  objections.  In their view, that word as applied to  the same  Advocate should be understood in a wider  or  narrower sense  in relation to different High Courts, and indeed,  to different jurisdictions of the same High Court, according to the rules there in force.  They say:--    "Since the section applies to a number of different High Courts  where-different conditions of practice prevail,  the word ’practice’ has no one particular and invariable meaning in  the section but its meaning must vary according  as  the section  is  applied to one High Court or another.   In  its application  to  each High Court it will  have  the  meaning which an Advocate’s right to practise bears in that Court at 15 the  time  under  the local  rules  and  regulations.   This meaning  may  be  wider in relation to one  High  Court  and narrower in relation to another, and even in relation to the same  High  Court it may not always remain the same,  for  a High  Court-may  enlarge  the  professional  rights  of  its Advocates and if it does so, Advocates of the Supreme  Court will,  thereafter, have the enlarged rights in  that  Court. But at any given point of time the rights of an Advocate  of the Supreme Court to practise in -any particular High  Court in exercise of the power conferred   him by section 2 can at most  be  co-extensive with but no greater  than  the  right which  Advocates  of that Court themselves  possess  at  the time."       We  are unable to agree with this  ambulatory  inter- pretation of section 2. It may be that the full sense of the word "practise" as including., both acting and pleading  may be  out  down  by  the context in which  it  is  used  in  a particular statute.  But we do not find any such context  in the language of the new Act or in its object as we  conceive it.-  The construction which the learned Judges have  placed section 2 was supported before us by attributing to the word

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((practise"  the "dictionary meaning", as it was called,  of exercising a profession and postulating the exercise by  the Advocate  of the Supreme Court of different  professions  in different High Courts in which he may seek to appear.  Thus, he  exercises  the  profession of a  Madras  Advocate  while appearing in Madras; the  profession of an.  Appellate  Side Advocate  or of an Original Side Advocate, as the  case  may be,  while appearing   those sides of the Calcutta  and  the Bombay  High Courts, and so  .  The object of  this  curious differentiation  is to read the different  conditions  under which.  an  Advocate exercises his professsion  in  each  of those  Courts  or  jurisdictions into  the  word  "practise" itself  as  the  necessary  implication  of  its  dictionary meaning  so  as to bring in the exclusion  of  acting    the Original  Side  as  part of its  connotation.   We  find  it difficult  to  appreciate this view.  The  Advocate  of  the Supreme Court in all the cases 16 referred  to  above seeks to practise only  one  profession, namely, the profession of an Advocate.  As such he would  be bound  to observe the rules of practice of each Court,  that is,   the   prescribed  procedure   for   conducting   legal proceedings in the Court concerned; but a rule which  denies to  him  the  right to exercise an  essential  part  of  his function by insisting   a dual agency   the Original Side is much  more than a rule of practice and the power  of  making such a rule, unless expressly reserved by the new Act, as it was  reserved in section 9 (4) and section 14(3) of the  Bar Councils  Act, would be repugnant to the right conferred  by section 2. In this connection, it may be pertinent to  point out  that  the  power of the High Courts to  make  rules  of practice  regulating  the procedure to be  followed  in  the conduct  of proceedings before them and the power  to  frame rules regulating the admission and conduct of legal  practi- tioners   were   always  derived   from   distinct   sources originally  under  different clauses of the  Letters  Patent establishing  them and later from the Civil  Procedure  Code and the Bar Councils Act. The  learned  Judges  have  also  overlooked  an   important distinction  between  the  position of an  Advocate  of  the Calcutta  or the Bombay High Court in relation to his  Court and that of an Advocate of the Supreme Court in relation  to those Courts.  The former is not entitled to practise "as of right"   the Original Side of his High Court as his right to practise  is made under section 14(1) (a) expressly  subject to section 9(4) which reserves the power of those Courts  to exclude  him from such right so far as the Original Side  is concerned.   In  other  words,the  local  Advocate  is   not entitled  "as of right" to practise   the Original  Side  of those  two High Courts, whereas it is open to  argument  and indeed is now argued that the Advocate of the Supreme  Court becomes under the new Act entitled to practise "as of right" in all High Courts without any distinction in the matter  of the jurisdictions exercised by them, because no, such  power is preserved and continued in the new Act.  In -view of this 17 difference,  which is vital to the petitioner’s  contention, it  is  not correct to say that the  right  conferred    the Supreme Court Advocate "can at most be co-extensive with but no  greater  than the right which Advocates  of  that  Court themselves possess at the time".  Here, indeed, we reach the crux of the whole case. Now, section 14(1) (a) of the Bar Councils Act enacts 14.(1)  An  Advocate  shall  be  entitled  as  of  right  to practise-(a) subject to the provisions of subsection (4)  of

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section  9, in the High Court of which he is  an  Advocate," and Section 9(4) provides:- "Nothing in this section or in any other, provision of  this Act shall be deemed to limit or in any way affect the powers of  the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William in  Bengal and  at  Bombay  to  prescribe  the  qualifications  to   be possessed  by  persons applying to practise  in  those  High Courts  respectively  in  the  exercise  of  their  original jurisdiction or the powers of those High Courts to grant  or refuse,  as  they  think fit, any such  application,  or  to prescribe  the conditions under which such persons shall  be entitled to practise or plead." Section 14(3) reads "Nothing  in  this section shall be deemed to  limit  or  in anyway  affect the power of the High Court of Judicature  at Fort William in Bengal or of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay  to make rules determining the persons who  shall  be entitled  respectively to lead and to act in the High  Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction." It is to be noted that by virtue of the last two  provisions to  which  the right of local Advocates  is  made  expressly subject,  the  High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay  have  the power to "grant or refuse as they think fit" the application of  any person applying to practise in the Original Side  of those  Courts, and the power to make rules laying  down  who shall plead and 18 who  shall  act    that side.  It is in  exercise  of  these powers that the High Courts have framed the rules, to  which reference  has  been  made, cutting down the  right  of  the Advocates of those Courts to practise   the Original Side to appearing   and   pleading  only  and   otherwise   imposing restrictions   that right, such as, that they     shall  not appear unless instructed by an Attorney. That is to say, the Advocates  of those Courts are  not entitled to practise  as of  right   the Original Side.  As the powers thus  reserved are  exercisable  only in regard to the Original  Side,  the Advocates  of  these  Courts are  under  section  14(1)  (a) entitled as of right to practise in the appellate and  other jurisdictions  exercised by those Courts.  Similarly,  under section 2 of the new Act every Advocate of the Supreme Court is entitled as of right to practise in any High Court.   But it is significant that no power is reserved, to the Calcutta or  the Bombay High Courts to cut down this statutory  right and  confine it to pleading alone   the Original Side.   Why were  the  reservations which the Legislature took  care  to insert  in  the Bar Councils Act in conferring  a  statutory right of practice   Advocates of the High Courts omitted  in the  new Act in conferring a similar right in similar  terms the  Advocates of the Supreme Court in relation to the  High Courts?  Why this departure from the pattern of what is,  in this respect, a closely analogous piece of legislation?  The respondents  made  two,answers to this question  neither  of which  seems  to  us satisfactory.  One was  that  the  word "practise" itself connoted, in relation to the Original Side of  the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, only  pleading  and not  acting, as Advocates of those Courts practising    that side had long been only appearing and pleading instructed by Attorneys who acted for the suitors.  This argument we  have already rejected.  But, even so, why insert section 9(4)  in the Bar Councils Act and make the right under section  14(1) (a) subject to the overriding powers under section 9(4)?  If the  argument  were valid, such provisions would  have  been wholly unnecessary, for,

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19 even in their absence, the word "practise" would con-.  note only pleading and not acting.  This indeed is an  additional ground  for rejecting that construction.  It is  legitimate, therefore,  to conclude that the Legiglature used  the  word "practise"  both in the Bar Councils Act and in the new  Act in  its full sense of acting and pleading, but while in  the case of Advocates of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts  it has  expressly  preserved and continued the power  of  those courts  to restrict or exclude the right of  practice    the Original  Side,  it has reserved no  such  overriding  power under the new Act with the result that any restrictive  rule cutting  down  the  statutory right would  be  repugnant  to section 2 and therefore void and inoperative. A similar view of the effect of section 14(1) (a) of the Bar Councils  Act  was expressed by a Full Bench of  the  Madras High  Court in Powers of Advocates, In re (1), where it  was held that a rule made by that Court excluding the  Advocates enrolled  there  from acting   the  Insolvency  Side  became invalid and inoperative after the enactment of that Act, and we  entirely agree with that decision.  The  learned  Judges below attempted to distinguish that case, as Mr.  Chatterjee for the respondents did before us, by observing that because the  Bar  Councils  Act  made  no  distinction  between  the different  jurisdictions  of the Madras High Court  and  the rules  of that Court allowed the Advocates to act and  plead the  Original  as  well  as    the  Appellate   jurisdiction thereof, the learned Judges construed the word "practise" in section 14 to mean both acting and pleading.  That is not  a correct  view of the reasoning employed by the  Full  Bench. The  learned Judges failed to see that such reasoning  would indeed  lead  to the opposite conclusion.  As a  matter  of, fact, there was a rule under which the local Advocates  were prevented from acting and they had accordingly not acted  in the  insolvency  jurisdiction  of that  Court,  so  that  if "practise" in section 14(1) (a) were to be construed (1)  (1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 92, 20 in  the  light of what the Advocates bad been doing  in  the past under the rules of that Court, the Court would have had to  hold that the Advocates acquired no new right by  virtue of  section 14(1) (a) But the Full Bench held that they  did and the gist of their reasoning was thus put by  Kumaraswami Sastri J. who delivered the leading judgment:-       "The  word ’practise’ ordinarily means  ’appear,  act and  plead,  unless  there is anything  in  the  subject  or context  to  limit its meaning...... I am  of  opinion  that where an Act confers rights to a party in general terms  and entitles him to perform more than one function, the  cutting down  of  those  rights  by a  rule  would  make  that  rule repugnant to the provisions of the Act."                It  was next suggested that no  support  for the  petitioner’s  contention  could  be  derived  from  the absence in the new Act of reservations like those  contained in  sections  9 (4) and 14 (1) (a) of the Bar  Councils  Act because   the  power  of  framing  rules   regarding   legal practitioners given to the Chartered High Courts under their respective Letters Patent could be exercised only in respect of   the  Advocates  enrolled  in  those  Courts,  and   the reservation  of a power so limited would be  meaningless  in the new Act which deals with the rights of the Supreme Court Advocates.   This argument overlooks that those High  Courts had unfettered discretion to admit or to refuse admission to any  person to practise as an Advocate, Vakil  or  Attorney. Clause  9 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High  Court,

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for  instance,  empowers that Court "to approve,  admit  and enroll such.......... Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys as  to the said High Court shall seem meet".  The Bar Councils  Act also  assumed  that  a  power to  exclude  any  person  from practising    the Original Side existed in the High  Courts, as  is  shown by section 9 (4) which provides  that  nothing contained in that Act shall be deemed to affect the power of the  Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts to grant or  refuse the  application  of "persons " applying to  practise    the Original Side of 21 those  Courts  or their power to  prescribe  the  conditions under which " such persons" could practise   that side.   Be it  noted that the word used is not " Advocates " which,  in view of the definition in section 2 (1) (a), would  indicate a power confined to the Advocates of those Courts.  And when that  Act  proceeded  to empower by section 14  (1)  (a)  an Advocate enrolled in a High Court to practise as of right in that Court, it took care to make it clear that the right  so conferred was subject to the exercise of the power  reserved under  section  9 (4).  But, as pointed out already,  it  is significant  that Parliament, in conferring a similar  right under  the new -Act   the Supreme Court Advocates,  did  not reserve  any such overriding power.  In the absence of  such reservation, the statutory right of a Supreme Court Advocate to  plead as well as to act in the High Courts of  Calcutta, and  Bombay in the exercise of their  original  jurisdiction cannot  be taken away or curtailed by those Courts, and  any rules  which they may have made in the past  purporting  to. exclude  any Advocate from acting   their Original Side,  or from  appearing and pleading unless he is instructed  by  an Attorney cannot affect such right.          Turning now to the non obstante clause in  section 2 of the new Act, which appears, to have furnished the whole basis  for the reasoning of the Court belowand the  argument before  us  closely, followed ’that  reasoning-we  find  the learned  Judges begin by inquiring what are  the  provisions which  that clause seek-, to supersede and then  place  upon the  enacting  clause such Construction as  would  make  the right  conferred by-it co-extensive with the disability  im- posed  by  the superseded provisions.  The  meaning  of  the section  will become clear", they, obser, "if we  examine  a little more closely what the, section in fact supersedes  or repeals......The  disability which the section  removes  and the right which it confers are coextensive." This is not, in our  judgments  a correct approach, to the  construction  of section 2. It should 4 22 first  be ascertained what the enacting part of the  section provides,   a fair construction of the words used  according to, their natural and ordinary meaning, and the non obstante clause  is to be understood as operating to set aside as  no longer  valid anything contained in relevant  existing  laws which  is  inconsistent  with the new  enactment.   We  will revert to this clause again presently.           Following  their  line of approach,  the  learned Judges  reached  two  conclusions:  first,  that  section  2 confers  no new right   an Advocate of the Supreme Court  in relation to the High Court in which he is already  enrolled, but  gives him the right to practise in the High Courts  in: the  roll of which he was not entered as, an Advocate.   The petitioner  was  accordingly not within the purview  of  the section in relation to the Calcutta High Court of which.  he was  already an Advocate; and secondly, that the  only  pro-

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visions superseded by the non obstante clause are section  8 (1)  and section 14 (2) of the Bar Councils Act and Rule  38 of  Ch.  V of the Original Side Rules of the  Calcutta  High Court and a similar rule framed under section,15 (b) of  the Bar  Councils  Act  by  the  Calcutta  Bar,  Council,  which prescribe the conditions subject to which Advocates of other High  Courts  are permitted to practise   the  Original  and Appellate  Sides of. that Court and the corresponding  rules then  in force in, the Bombay High Court.  These  provisions alone, it was said fell within the description "  regulating the conditions subject to which a person not eptered in  the roll  of  Advocates  of a High Court may  be.  permitted  to practise  in that High Court." All other provisions  of  the Bar  Councils Act,, including sections 9 (4) and 14 (3),  as well as other rules of the Original.  Side of both  Calcutta and Bombay High Courts have not been superseded or  repealed by section 2 of the new, Act but continue in force.  We  now proceed  to  examine  whether these  conclusions  are  well- founded.        Much  ado was made an both sides ;about  the  comina occurring just before the word " or " in the 23 non obstante clause, the petitioner stressing its importance as  showing  that  the adjectival clause  "  regulating  the conditions  etc."  does not qualify the words "  Indian  Bar Councils  Act " which are separated by the comma  and  that, therefore,   the   whole   of  that   Act   is   superseded, while’learned  counsel for the respondents insisted that  in construing a statute punctuation marks should be left out of consideration.  Nothing much we think, turns   the comma, as it seems I grammatically more correct to take the adjectival clause  as qualifying " law ". Having ’regard to the   words anything contained" and the preposition "in" used after  the disjunctive "or", the qualifying clause cannot reach back to the  words " Bar Councils Act ". But, whichever way we  take it,  it must be admitted that, in framing the  non  obstante clause,   the  draftsman  had  primarily  in,   mind   those Provisions  which  stood  in  the way  of  an  Advocate  not enrolled  in  any particular High Court practising  in  that Court.   It  does  not,  however,  necessarily  follow  that section  2 is concerned only with the right of Advocates  of the  Supreme Court to practise in the High Courts  in  which they  are  not  enrolled.  The true scope  of  the  enacting clause  must,  as we have observed, be determined    a  fair reading  of  the words used in their  natural  and  ordinary meaning, and in the present case, there is not much room for doubt    the  point.   The words " every Advocate  "  and  " whether or not he is an Advocate of that High Court" make it plain  that the section was designed to apply to  the  Advo- cates of the Supreme Court not only in relation. to the High Courts of which they are not Advocates but also in  relation to  those  High  Courts  in which  they  have  been  already enrolled.   The learned Judges below dismissed the  words  " whether  or not etc." with the remark that " they  -are  not very apposite ",,as         "     no  one  who is an Advocate of  a  particular High  Court requires to be an Advocate of the Supreme  Court in  order to practise in that Court".  While it may be  true to say that section 2 does not give Advocates of many of the High Courts any additional right 24             in  relation  to their own  Courts,  it  would, according  to the petitioner’s contention, give at least  to the  Advocates of the Calcutta and Bombay High  Courts  some additional  right in the Original Side of those Courts,  and

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that  may well have been the purpose of using  those  words. It  is not a sound principle of construction to brush  aside words  in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if  they can   have   appropriate   application   in    circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. Nor  can  we read the non obstante  clause  as  specifically repealing  only the particular provisions which the  learned Judges  below  have been at pains to pick out from  the  Bar Councils Act and the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta and Bombay  High  Courts.   If, as we,  have  pointed  out,  the enacting  part  of section -2 covers all  Advocates  of  the Supreme  Court,  the non obstante clause can  reasonably  be read  as  overriding " anything contained" in  any  relevant existing  law which is inconsistent with the new  enactment, although the-draftsman appears to have had primarily in  his mind  a particular type of law as conflicting with  the  new Act.   The  enacting  part of a statute must,  where  it  is clear,  be  taken to control the non obstante  clause  where both cannot be read harmoniously; for, even apart from  such clause,   a  later  law  abrogates  earlier   laws   clearly inconsistent  with it. Posteriores leges priores  contrarias abrogant (Broome’s Legal Maxims, 10th Edn., p. 347).   Here, section 2 entitles every Advocate of the Supreme Court as of right to practise in any High Court in India.  The phrase  " entitled as of right " has evidently  been adopted from  the Bar  Councils, Act, and we have already indicated  our  view that; the word "Practise as applied to a legal  practitioner in,,,  India  includes, in the absence of  any  limiting  or restrictive;  context,  both  the functions  of  acting  and pleading.   The phrase " entitled as of right to practise  " is  an emphatic affirmation of a right to plead, and to  act independently,of the will or discretion of any other person. Could it be said that sections 9 (4)and 14 (3) 25            of the Bar Councils Act are consistent with  the existence of such a right ? As we have seen already, section 9  (4) preserves the powers of the High Courts  at  Calcutta and  Bombay,  among other things, " to grant or  refuse,  as they think fit " the applications of persons to practise  in those  High  Courts  in  the  exercise  of  their   original jurisdiction How could a person be said to be entitled as of right  to  practise  in  a High  Court  if  that  Court  has unfettered power to reject his application to practise    an important side of its jurisdiction ? Similarly, bow Could  a person be said to be entitled as of right to pleadin a  High Court if that Court has the power to frame a rule which pre- cludes  him  from pleading in the original  jurisdiction  of ;that Court unless he is instructed by an Attorney? Obviously, sections 9 (4) and 14 (3) of the Bar Councils Act and  section 2 of the new Act entitling an Advocate of  the. Supreme  Court  as of right to practise in  any  High  Court cannot stand together.  Whether by force of the non obstante clause  liberally  construed as indicated above  or  of  the wellestablished  maxim of construction already referred  to, the  new Act must have the effect of abrogating  the  powers reserved  and continued in the High Courts by the  aforesaid provisions  of the Bar Councils Act.  We cannot,  therefore, agree  with   the learned Judges  below that  the  said  two provisions  have not been superseded or repealed by  section 2.  As  we have already observed, if such  reservations  bad also been inserted in the new Act, the analogy with  section 14 (1) (a) of the Bar Councils Act would have been  complete and the petitioner as an Advocate of the Supreme Court could be prevented by rules made in appropriate terms from  acting the  Original  Side  of the Calcutta  and  the  Bombay  High

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Courts.  But, in the absence of such reservations in the new Act, his claim in these proceedings must succeed.              It has been said in the course of the argument that,  notwithstanding the absence of such  reservations  in the  new Act, it must be assumed that the Advocates  of  the Suprme Court have become entitled to practise 26 in any High Court only subject to the rules and  regulations of that Court or, as the High Court put it " section 2  does not  confer  Ian uncharted freedom   the  Advocates  of  the Supreme Court to practise in any High Court in any way  they like, but only puts them, in each different High Court,    a par  with  the;  Advocates of that Court,  where  they  must submit  to  the  same terms and  conditions  as  bind  those Advocates".   Otherwise,  it  was said,  the  Supreme  Court Advocates  would  be "let loose" to practise in  all  Courts freed of all obligations to observe the rule and regulations of those Courts and the result would be confusion and chaos. Therefore,  it  was  urged, the rules of  the  Calcutta  and Bombay High Courts, which preclude Advocates of those Courts from  acting    the Original Side of their  jurisdiction  or from  pleading without the intervention of an Attorney,  are binding  upon Supreme -Court Advocates as well.  We  see  no force   in   the  argument  which  seems  to   proceed     a misconception.  The right of an Advocate to practise, as  we have  seen, normally Comprises the exercise of his  two-fold function’ of acting and pleading without the intervention of anybody else.  Any rule or condition that prevents him  from exercising one of those functions is plainly a cutting  down of his right to practise and, affecting as it does the  sub- stance  of his right, is in its operation, quite unlike  the rules  and conditions of practice under which all  Advocates normally carry   their business in courts.  No one  suggests that  a Supreme Court Advocate is, by becoming  entitled  to practise  in the High Courts, freed from all. obligation  to conform  to  the ruler, of practice and regulations  as,  to costume  and  Such  other matters, according  to  which  the profession  of  law must be exercised in  the  various  High Courts.  There is a vital distinction between such rules and regulations  and the rules which seek to out down  the  sub- stance  of  an  Advocate’s  right to act  and  to  plead  by excluding  him from the exercise of the one or the other  of those  two functions.  The Bar Councils Act recognises  this distinction by expressly reserving the 27 power  of the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay to  exclude or impose restrictions upon the right of Advocates to  plead and   to  act    the  Original  Side,  whereas  no   similar reservation has been considered necessary in respect of  the power  to  make rules and regulations of  the  former  type, because  they  were  not regarded  as  derogating  from  the substance of the statutory right to practise.  Suppose,  for instance,  the  Calcutta,  High Court made a  rule  that  no person  other than those mentioned in Rule 2 (1), Chapter  I of  the Original Side Rules (i.e., practising Barristers  in England,  N. Ireland, etc.) will be entitled to  appear  and plead   its Original Side, could it reasonably be  suggested that   such  -a  rule  was  only  a  matter   of   "internal administration"  and,  as  such, would  bind  all  Advocates practising  in that Court even apart, from section 9  (4)  ? Any  rules  which  prevent an  Advocate  from  acting    the Original   Side  or  appearing    that  side   without   the intervention of an Attorney constitute a serious invasion of his  statutory  right to practise, and unless the  power  to make such rules is reserved in the statute which confers the

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right they cannot prevail against that right.           Reference was also made in this connection to the difficulty  of  exercising  disciplinary  control  over  the Supreme  Court  Advocates practising in the High  Courts  in which they are not enrolled but such difficulty, if any, may arise  under both the interpretations contended  for  before us.   It  is  not denied that a Supreme  Court  Advocate  is entitled  to, appear and plead and act   the Appellate  Side of  all  the  High  Courts  and  the  question  as  to   how disciplinary  jurisdiction  is to be exercised over  him  in relation to his activities   the Original Side will have  to be  determined    the  same  lines as  in  relation  to  his activities    the Appellate Side and the possibility of  any such  difficulty arising cannot be more of an  objection  to the one construction than to the other.            There was much argument before us as to the  ob- ject which Parliament had in view in passing, the; new, Act, each side suggesting an object which would 28 support  the  construction  which it sought  to  place  upon section  2. Each side relied upon the "statement of  objects and  reasons"  annexed  to the Bill in support  of  its  own contentions.  Reference was also made to speeches made   the floor of the House by members during the debate   the  Bill. Our  attention  was also called to the form of the  Bill  as originally  introduced  in the House and  its  amendment  by omitting part (a) of the proviso to clause (2) thereof.              As regards the speeches made by the members of the  House  in  the course of the  debate,  this  Court  has recently held that they are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions: The State  of Travancore-Cochin & Another v. The Bombay Co.  Ltd. etc.(1).             As  regards the propriety of the  reference  to the statement of objects and reasons, it must be  remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to  introduce  the  Bill in the House and  what  objects  he sought to achieve.  But those objects and reasons may or may not  correspond  to  the objective  which  the  majority  of members had in view when they passed it into law.  The  Bill may  have  undergone  radical  changes  during  its  passage through the House or Houses, and there is no guarantee  that the  reasons which led to its introduction and  the  objects thereby  sought  to  be  achieved  have  remained  the  same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the  Legislature for they do not form part,of the  Bill  and are not voted upon by the members.      We,       therefore, consider  that the statement of objectsand reasons  appended to  the  Bill  should  be,  ruled  out  as  an  aid  to  the construction of a statute.                        The  omission  of part  (a)  of  the proviso to clause (2) of the Bill seems to us to stand    no higher  footing.  It sought to exclude from  the purview  of the  Bill the right of an Advocate of the Supreme  Court  to plead  or to act in any, High Court in the exercise  of  its original jurisdiction,. - Its omissions was strongly  relied by the petitioner   as  indicating the  intension of (1)  [1952] S,C.R. 1112. 29 Parliament  that  the right of a Supreme Court  Advocate  to plead and to act should prevail also   the Original Side  of a High Court.  It was urged that acceptance or rejection  of amendments  to  a  Bill  in  the  course  of   Parliamentary proceedings  forms  part of the pre-enactment history  of  a statute  and  as  such  might  throw  valuable  light    the intention  of the legislature when the language used in  the

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statute  admitted  of more than one  construction.   We  are unable  to  assent to this proposition.  The  reason  why  a particular  amendment was proposed or ’accepted or  rejected is  often a matter of controversy, as it happened to  be  in this case, and without the speeches bearing upon the motion, it  cannot  be  ascertained with any  reasonable  degree  of certainty.    And  where  the  legislature  happens  to   be bicameral,  the second Chamber may or may not have known  of such  reason  when  it  dealt with  the  measure.   We  hold accordingly  that  all  the three forms  of  extrinsic  aid- sought to be resorted to by the parties in this case must be excluded from consideration in ascertaining the true  object and intention of the Legislature.            In  the result, treating this proceeding  as  an appeal from the judgment of the High Court, we set aside the order  of that Court and direct the respondents  to  receive any  warrant  of authority which the first;  petitioner  may produce   from  the  legal  representative  of  the   second petitioner who is reported to have died in the course of the proceeding.  We make no order as to costs. MUKHERJEA  J.-This  case  has been  argued  before  us  with elaborate fulness by the ’petitioner No. 1, Mr. Aswini Kumar Ghosh,  who  appeared in person, as well as by a  number  of eminent counsel representing the Barristers’ and  Advocates’ Associations   in the three principal High Courts in  India. Having given their learned arguments the best  consideration that  I  am capable of, I have come to the  conclusion  that this application cannot succeed. 30 The  matter  in  controversy  is  a  very  short  one.   The petitioner  No. I is an Advocate of the Calcutta High  Court entitled  to  practise  both   its  Original  and  Appellate Sides.   This  means, that he can both plead and  act    the Appellate  Side of the Court and plead only    its  Original Side.   Mr. Ghosh later got himself enrolled as an  Advocate of  the Supreme Court and after the passing of  the  Supreme Court  Advocates  (Practice in High Courts)  Act,  1951,  he asserted his right,   the strength of the provision of  that enactment,  to  "  or act" also the  Original  Side  of  the Calcutta High Court.  He actually filed "a warrant of  power and  appearance"   behalf of the petitioner No. 2 in a  suit pending  in  the Original Side of that Court  in  which  the latter figures ’as the- defendant.  The warrant was returned to  him  by  the  Suit Registrar,  Original  Side,  with  an endorsement    it, that it must be filed by an  Attorney  of the Court under the rules and orders of the Original Side of the High Court, and not by an Advocate.  Being aggrieved  by this  refusal,  the  petitioners  presented  an  application before  the  Calcutta High Court under article  226  of  the Constitution,   complaining  of  infraction  of  the   right conferred upon the first petitioner by Act XVIII of 1951 and praying  for  an appropriate writ or order  to  enforce  the same.   A  rule was granted   this application  by  Bose  J. sitting  singly;  and  eventually,  having  regard  to   the importance of the question involved in the application,  the rule  was  heard by a Special Bench of  three  Judges,  con- sisting of Trevor Harries C.J. and Chakravartti and Banerjee JJ.   By  the judgment, which was delivered by  Mr.  Justice Chakravartti   21st December, 1951, the rule was  discharged and  the application of the petitioner was  dismissed.   The petitioners  have now come up to this court   a  substantive petition under article 32 of the Constitution and have  also prayed  for special leave to appeal against the judgment  of the  Calcutta  High  Court.  We admitted  the  petition  and issued  notices to the Attorney-General of India as well  as

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to the Barristers’ and Advocates "Associations in those High Courts in India which are likely, 31 to  be  affected by the decision in the case.  A  number  of them, as said above, appeared before us through counsel  and we  had also the advantage of hearing the learned  Attorney- General   the points that were raised in course of hearing.      The  sole  point for consideration in  this  case  is, whether  the  petitioner No. 1, who is an  Advocate  of  the Supreme  Court’ can, in addition to exercising his right  of pleading    the  Original Side of the  Calcutta  High  Court which is not challenged by anybody, claim, by virtue of  the provision  of section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951, the  right  to "act"   the Original Side of that Court, although  according to the rules framed under the Letters Patent an Advocate  of the Calcutta High Court may not appear in the Original  Side unless instructed by an Attorney: (vide Chapter 1, Rule  37, of  the  Original Side Rules).  To decide this  question  we will  have  to investigate the precise extent of  the  right that has been conferred upon the Supreme Court Advocates  by section  2  of the Act mentioned above  and  ascertain  what exactly  is the meaning of the word "practise’.’ as used  in that section’.       The Act is a very short one and consists  only of two sections.  The first section gives the name and  description of  the Act which is intituled "The Supreme Court  Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act" and the object, as stated  at the,  outset  before the enacting clause  commences,  is  to "authorise Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise as  of right  in any High Court".  The entire provision of the  Act is contained in section 2 which runs thus             "Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in   the Indian  Bar Councils Act, 1926 (XXXVIII of 1926) or  in  any other  law  regulating  the conditions subject  to  which  a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court, may  be  permitted  to practise in  that  High  Court  every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of  right to’  practise  in  any High Court whether or not  he  is  an Advocate of that High Court".                             32            Upon this,aproviso is engrafted to the following effect  that"nothing  in  this section shall  be  deemed  to entitle any person merely by reason of his being an Advocate of the Supreme Court to practise in a High Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if he had given an undertaking  not to  practise  therein after ceasing to hold office  as  such Judge".  Then follows a short explanation which simply  lays down  that  the  expression  "High  Court"  in  the  section includes  the  Court  of a  Judicial  Commissioner  and  the statute ends there.         It may be mentioned at the outset that the  Supreme Court was established in the year 1950 and article 145(1) of the  Constitution  empowered the Court to  make  rules  "for regulating  generally  the  practice and  procedure  of  the court"  including  (a) rules as to  the  persons  practising before  the  Court’.  The Supreme Court Advocates  were  not entitled  to  practise  as  of right  in  any  of  the  High Courts/in  India.   The  rules made by  the  different  High Courts  impose  considerable restrictions  and  disabilities upon the Advocates of other High Courts who wanted to appear and  conduct  cases  before them.  The  power  to  grant  or withhold  permission to these outside Advocates lay for  the most part in the exercise of an unfettered discretion by the Chief  Justice  of  the Court, and that  too  in  individual cases, and instances were not rare of such permission  being

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refused  to  lawyers of acknowledged eminence  belonging  to other  High Courts.  After the establishment of the  Supreme Court in India and with the prospect of a united Bar looming in  the minds of the people, this was felt to  be  extremely unjust  and  anomalous.   It was primarily  to  remedy  this defect  in the existing law, that this particular  enactment was  passed by the legislature and the legislative  purpose, as  is  disclosed in the language of the  enactment,  is  to allow  the Supreme Court Advocates access to the other  High Courts in India as of right, untrammelled by any restriction or condition that the High Courts themselves might lay  down in respect to the "Outside 33             Advocates.  So far there is little room for any controversy.  The dispute centers round the point as to  the extent  of  right that the legislature  conferred  upon  the Supreme  Court  Advocates  in  achieving  this   legislative purpose.  The question is, what meaning is to be  attributed to the word "practise" as used in the section ?                     Mr.   Ghosh   argues  that   the   word "practise" in its ordinary and literal sense would mean  the right  to  appear, plead and to act’as well; and  it  is  an established rule of construction that a literal  interpreta- tion  should not be departed from unless there are  adequate grounds  for  such  departure.  It is  said  next  that  the literal meaning of the word "practise" cannot be out down or controlled in any way by the language of the opening  clause in  section  2  of  the Act; and  that  clause  which  maybe described  as a non-obstante clause is not confined  in  its operation  to removal of the disabling provisions  affecting those whose names are not entered as Advocates   the roll of a particular High Court, but has the effect of excluding all the provisions of the Bar Councils Act for purposes of  this enactment.  It is further argued that the words "whether  or not  he  is  an Advocate of that High  Court"  occurring  in section  2 unmistakably indicate that the  -legislature  had not in mind the removal of disabilities attaching to outside Advocates  merely,  but that it intended to  confer  certain privileges    domestic Advocates as well who happened to  be enrolled  as  Advocates  of the Supreme  Court.   All  these matters require to be examined carefully.          The word "practise" when used with reference to  a profession  means "to follow, pursue, work at,  or  exercise such  profession".   The  profession  Of  an  Advocate   may contemplate   both  acting  and  pleading;   under   certain circumstances it may mean pleading alone without acting, but it can never mean acting simply, for those who are  entitled to  act only and have no right to plead do not  come  within the  description  of  Advocates at  all.   There  are  other classes  of  nonAdvocate  lawyers who  like  Solicitors  and Agents can 34 act  only but cannot plead, and to the carrying    of  their profession  also the same expression practise"  is  applied. What  is  to be remembered in this connection  is  that  the profession  of an Advocate can be carried   only in a  court of   law  and  within  the  framework  of  the   rules   and regulations that obtain in such court.  The word  "practise" when  used  with  reference ,to an Advocate  is  an  elastic expression,  having no  rigid or fixed connotation  and  the precise  ambit  of its contents can be ascertained  only  by reference to the rules of the particular forum in which  the profession is exercised. Thus  in the Supreme Court Rules the  expression  "Advocate" has  been defined to mean "a person entitled to  appear  and

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plead before the Supreme Court".   He has no right of acting at all.  In Order IV,    Rule  31, of the Rules, this  right of an Advocate to  ’appear and plead has been spoken  of  as the  right of "practising"; while in the rule that  follows, the  function of an Agent, who can only act and  not  plead, has also been spoken of as "practice" before the Court.        In the Bar Councils Act the right of practice as  an Advocate has been defined in section 14 (1) which lays  down that "an Advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise- (a)  subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of  section 9, in the High Court of which he is an Advocate".  The  word "practise"  has  apparently been used here  in  the  general sense of both pleading and acting and these rights have been limited  by  and made subject to the rules  which  the  High Courts  of  Calcutta and Bombay may  make,  determining  the persons  who shall be entitled to plead and to act in  these High Courts in the exercise of their original  jurisdiction. Sections 9 (4) and 14 (3) of the Bar Councils Act  expressly reserve to the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts the power to make rules in this respect and under the rules framed  by them  an Advocate is not permitted to appear   the  Original Side unless he is instructed by an Attorney 35 The words "entitled to practise as of right" which occur  in section 14 (1) mentioned above have also been used in  other parts of the Bar Councils Act, to wit, in sections 4 (2),  5 (1)  and  8 (1) of the Act; but the word "practise"  in  all these  provisions does not mean pleading find acting  in  an unlimited  sense.  It connotes the same rights and the  same limitations  which are prescribed in section 14 of the  Act. The  same  expression  has been used in  section  2  of  the Supreme Court Advocates Act apparently in the same sense and with  the same implications and it cannot be argued that  it connotes  an  unrestricted  right  of  pleading  and  acting because the reservations mentioned in section 14 (1) of  the Bar Councils Act have not been repeated there.     Mr.   Ghosh has in this connection drawn our  attention to  two reported cases, one of which is a  pronouncement  of the Patna High Court and the other of the Madras High Court.             In  the Patna case(1) the question &rose as  to whether an Advocate or Vakil whose name appeared   the  roll of  any  High Court could "act"   behalf of  his  client  by presenting an application for review of a judgment in a case which  was tried by a court subordinate to the  High  Court. The  question was answered in the affirmative  and  reliance was  placed  upon section 4 of the Legal  Practitioners  Act which  lays down that "an Advocate or Vakil  enrolled    any High  Court’shall  be  entitled to practise  in  all  courts subordinate to the court   the roll of which he is entered". This case, it is to be noted, deals with Advocates’ right to practise  in subordinate courts where no distinction at  all exists between pleading and acting.  Consequently, the  word "practise"  in this context does include both  pleading  and acting.           In the Madras case(1) the point for consideration was,  whether  an  Advocate enrolled in the  High  Court  of Madras  ’under the Indian Bar Councils Act was entitled  not only to appear and plead (1)  Laurentius Ekka v. Dhuki, [1925] I.L.R. 4 Pat- 766. (2)  In  re  the Powers of the Advocates,   [1928]  I.L.R.52 Mad. 92, 36           but also to "act" in the insolvency  jurisdiction of  the court, in spite of the provision in Rule 128 of  the Insolvency  Rules of the High Court, which gave  such  right

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only to the Attorneys. It was held that the Advocate had the right  to  "act"  by reason of the  provision  contained  in section  14  (1) of the Bar Councils Act which  entitled  an Advocate to practise as of right in the High Court in  which he  is  an Advocate; and because so far as the  Madras  High Court was concerned the Bar Councils Act made no distinction between  different  jurisdictions of the court and  did  not save  the powers of the court to frame rules in  respect  of the   original  and  insolvency  jurisdictions.   In   these circumstances, a rule which cut down the right conferred  by sections 8 and 14 of the Bar Councils Act would be deemed to be  repealed  under  section  19 (2) of  the  Act  as  being repugnant to its provisions.  It was expressly stated in the judgment  that the position was different in regard  to  the Bombay  and Calcutta High Courts and so far as these  courts were concerned, their powers were expressly saved by the Bar Councils   Act.   This  decision  clearly  shows  that   the ’expression  " practise" would not include "acting" if  with regard to particular jurisdictions of a High Court there are valid rules to the contrary.          The question for our consideration really is, what exactly  is  the position of a Supreme  Court  Advocate  who wants  to  avail himself of the right of practising  in  any High  Court  in India in terms of section 2 of  the  Supreme Court Advocates Act?  Is he to exercise the right only as  a Supreme  Court  Advocate and in accordance  with  the  rules which  the  Supreme  Court  itself has  laid  down  in  this respect, or is his position, when he appears before a  High- Court, the same as that of an Advocate enrolled in the  said court  and  he has the same rights  and  disabilities  which attach  to  such persons under its rules?   The  only  other alternative  that  is or can be suggested and has  been  put forward    behalf  of  the petitioner is  that  he  is  not’ fettered by any rules either of the Supreme Court or of  the particular High Courtr in,which he appears; 37 and as the extent of his right depends upon the language  of the  section  itself,  the legislature  by  using  the  word "practise" has conferred upon him the righ of both  pleading and acting in any High Court he chooses, irrespective of the rules of practice which obtain in such court.            The  first  view  does not appear to  me  to  be tenable.    ’I  If  it  is  held,  that  what  the   section contemplates is that a Supreme Court Advocate in  exercising his  right of practice in any High Court should be  governed by  the  Supreme  Court  Rules,  the  Act  itself  would  be altogether  unworkable.  It is laid down in Order  IV,  Rule 12, of the Supreme Court Rules that "no person shall  appear as Advocate in any case unless he is instructed by an Agent. By "Agent" is meant an Agent of the Supreme Court and  under no  provision  of law is such Agent entitled to act  in  any High Court in India.  The result, therefore, is that if  the Supreme  Court  Rules  are applied,  no  Advocate  would  be entitled to appear in any High Court at all.                It  cannot  be argued that even  though  the rules  of the Supreme Court may not be strictly  applicable, the  intention  of the legislature is that a  Supreme  Court Advocate  in  appearing  before a High  Court  either    the Original  or   the Appellate Side shall have only the  right of pleading and he has to be instructed by an Attorney or  a local Advocate who is competent to act.  Whatever the merits of this view might otherwise be, the language of the section does  not at all warrant such a construction and  it  cannot seriously  be suggested that the word " practise ",.must  in all cases be confined to pleading only.  The result of  such

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a  construction would be to extend the dual system which  is at  present confined to the Original Sides of  the  Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts to all the High Courts in  India, in all their jurisdictions and to the subordinate courts  as well  a possibility which the legislature could  never  have contemplated. To  me  it seems that when section 2 -speaks  of  a  Supreme Court Advocate being entitled as of right to practise in any High Court, what it actually means is 38 that  he  would,  be clothed by  reason  of  this  statutory provision  with  all  the rights which  are  enjoyed  by  an Advocate  of  that Court and his right to plead  or  to  act would  depend upon. the provisions of the Bar  Councils  Act and  the rules validly framed by the said Court, subject  to this  that  -no rule or provision of law would  be  binding, which  would  affect  in  any way  his  statutory  right  to practise  in  that  Court  solely by  reason  of  his  being enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court.      It is suggested that if this was the intention of  the legislature,  nothing could have been easier for it than  to state  explicitly that a Supreme Court Advocate  would  have the  right to practise in any High Court in the same way  as an  Advocate  of  that Court.  In my opinion,  that  is  the implication of the general word It practise " that has  been used.   As  said already, the practice of an  Advocate  must always  have  reference  to a court and it  must  imply  the carrying    of the profession according to the rules  which. are  binding    that court, except to the  extent  that  the rules  themselves are invalidated expressly or by  necessary implication.   If the legislature had expressly stated  that an Advocate qualified under section 2 of the Act would  have the  right of both pleading and acting in any High Court  in India  or if that was the clear intendment. and  implication of  the  language  used,  any  rule  conflicting  with  that provision could certainly have been held to be invalid;  but I  am  unable to say that the use of the word "  practise  " which has only a general import, by itself, would have  that effect.          Looked  at  from this standpoint, the  third  view indicated above, which has been pressed vehemently    behalf of  the petitioner, cannot certainly be supported.  So  long as  the rules relating to pleading and acting in  particular jurisdictions of specified High Courts are allowed to remain valid  and  binding,  no intention can  be  imputed  to  the legislature,   without  clear  words  to  that  effect,   of abrogating  these rules with regard to the few  persons  who happen  to be enrolled as Advocatess of the  Supreme  Court. Far 39          from  achieving  uniformity in any  sense  of  the word, such step would lead to serious anomaly and  practical difficulties  of  an enormous character.  In.  the  original jurisdictions  of the Calcutta and the Bombay  High  Courts, where  the dual system subsists, there are  elaborate  rules regarding  the  functions of the Solicitors  who  alone  are competent  to  act    that side, both in  ’relation  to  the courts  and to the litigants.  The whole procedure is  of  a different type, dissimilar in many respects to that which is laid  down  in  the  Civil  Procedure  Code.   It  would  be difficult, if not impossible, for an Advocate of the Supreme Court,  who  chooses  to  act   the  Original  Side  of  the Calcutta or the Bombay High Court, to fit himself within the framework of these rules.  He cannot possibly carry   unless a  fresh  set of rules is prepared and the  framing  of  new

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rules,  which  must exist side by side with the  old  rules, would  lead to further complications and  diversities.   The position  would  certainly have been  understandable  if  it could  be held that the legislature wanted to do  away  with the  dual system altogether and introduce one set  of  rules which  would  apply  uniformly to all  classes  of  lawyers. Speaking  for  myself,  I  would  consider  that  to  be  an extremely   desirable  change;  but  I  look  in  vain   for expression  of  any such legislative intent  either  in  the enactment itself or even in its historical background.   The object  of the legislation is quite simple.  It is  only  to allow  Advocates of the Supreme Court the right to  practise in  all the High Courts in India irrespective of  the  rules framed   by  them  imposing  restrictions    the  right   of Advocates whose names do not appear   their rolls.  From the mere use of the word it practise ", the connotation of which is not at all definite, I am unable to hold that it was  the intention  of  the legislature to  introduce  such  sweeping changes  in the existing rules which the acceptance of  this view would imply.          This leads me to an examination of the other parts of  section  2 of the Act to discover, what light,  if  any, they throw upon the present question. 40 It  is  one  of the settled rules of  construction  that  to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent  parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word,  phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the  general purpose   and  object  of  the  Act  itself.   Mr.   Justice Chakravartti  of  the Calcutta High Court  laid  very  great stress    the opening clause of section 2 of the  Act  which excludes the operation of certain statutory provisions,  and this negative part of the section constitutes, according  to the  learned Judge, the measure and criterion of  the  right which the positive part formulates.  The first question  is, to what extent the provisions of any existing law have  been eliminated  by the opening clause of section 2 The  language of the clause is as follows:-            " Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Bar Councils  Act  (XXXVIII  of  1926),  or  in  any  other  law regulating  the  conditions subject to which  a  person  not entered  in  the roll of Advocates of a High  Court  may  be permitted      to      practise      in      that       High Court......................."            Mr. Justice Chakravartti is of opinion that this clause  purports to remove all those provisions of  the  Bar Councils Act or of any other law which imposed  restrictions upon persons not enrolled as Advocates of a particular court in the matter of practising in that court.  The exclusion is to  this  extent and no further; and  consequently  all  the other provisions contained in the Bar Councils Act or  other statutes  which lay down the conditions ’under which an  Ad- vocate  enrolled in a High Court is entitled to practise  in the  Original Side of that Court, stand unaffected  by  that clause.  If these provisions remain valid and effective,  it is quite reasonable to hold that the word "practise " in the section  must  mean " practise " in  accordance  with  these rules and not in supersession of them.        The  contention  of  Mr. Ghosh is  that    a  proper construction  of the language of the claue the whole of  the Bar  Councils  Act and not merely those  provisions  in  it, which relate to disabilities attaching to                             41 Advocates  of  other  High  Courts, must  be  deemed  to  be eliminated,  so  that  the  right  of  practising  that   is

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conferred  by  the section is to be  exercised  without  the restrictions   or  limitations  flowing  from  any  of   the provisions  of  the  Bar Councils Act.  In  support  of  his contention  that  the  whole  of the  Bar  Councils  Act  is excluded by the opening clause, Mr. Ghosh lays great  stress a  comma,  which  separated the Bar  Councils  Act  and  the figures  and words that follow, from the expression " or  in any other law " which comes immediately after that.  He says further that under the ordinary rules of interpretation  the adjectival phrase "-regarding the conditions etc." should be taken  to apply to the word or phrase immediately  preceding it  and  not to the remoter antecedent term  or  expression. These  arguments,  though they have an air  of  plausibility about them, do not impress me much, Punctuation is after all a  minor element in the construction of a statute, and  very little attention is paid to it by English, courts.  Cockburn C.J. said. in Stephenson v. Taylor (1) : "   the  Parliament Roll there is no punctuation and we therefore are not  bound by that in the printed copies".  It seems, however, that  in the Vellum copies printed since 1850 there are some cases of punctuation, and when they occur they can be looked upon  as a  sort  of contemporanea expositio(2).  When a  statute  is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation(1).  I need  not  deny that punctuation may have its uses  in  some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a  controlling element  and cannot be allowed to control the plain  meaning of a text(4).         Similarly,  although  a relative  or  a  qualifying phrase  is  normally taken with the  immediately.  preceding term or expression, yet this rule has got to be discarded if it is against common sense and natural (i)  (i861) 1 B. & S. page 101. (2)  See Craies   Statute Law, page 185. (3)  Vide Crawford   Statutory-Construction, Page 343. (4) lbid. 42          meaning of the words and the expressions used.   I find   considerable  force  in  the  opinion  expressed   by Chakravartti J. that in the present case the effect. of  the position  of the comma or the particular array of ,words  in the sentence has been completely neutralised I by the use of the  word  " other " occurring in the #phrase "  or  in  any other  law ". The result is, as the learned Judge has  said, that the Bar Councils Act has been posited as an alternative to   other  laws  and  both  have  been  subjected  to   the qualification contained in the qualifying clause. Assuming,  however,  for argument’s sake that Mr.  Ghosh  is right  and  that  the  whole of  the  Bar  Councils  Act  is eliminated  by the opening clause of the section, I  do  not think  that even then it really improves his position.   The Bar Councils Act itself does not make any provision relating to the rights of pleading and acting in the Original Side of any  High  Court.  Sections 9(4) and 14(3) of the  Act  save only the rights of the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay to make rules in relation thereto ; and these rules are made by these  courts  in the exercise -of their  powers  under  the Letters Patent.  Section 19(2) of the Bar Councils Act  lays down as follows:-    "  When sections 8 to 16 come into force in  respect  of any High Court of Judicature established by Letters  Patent, this  Act  shall  have  effect  in  respect  of  such  Court notwithstanding  anything contained in such Letters  Patent, and  such  Letters  Patent  shall, in so  far  as  they  are inconsistent with this Act or any rules made there under, be

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deemed to have been repealed."     If the entire Bar Councils Act is excluded for purposes of  section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951, the rules framed by  the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay under-the Letters  Patent would  remain valid -and effective of their own  force  even without  the  saving  provision  contained  in  the   above- mentioned section of the Bar Councils Act, and section 19(2) of  the  Act being out of the picture,  the  Letters  Patent would                             43 also  remain fully alive.  The result will be that Rule  37, Chapter  I, of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta  High Court  or Rule 40(2) of Chapter II of the Bombay High  Court Rules,  under which no Advocate can appear in  the  Original Side of these courts unless instructed by an Attorney, would not come within the purview of the opening clause of Section 2,  as  they  do  not  relate  to  matters  regulating   the conditions of outside Advocates.  Rule 6, Chapter I, of  the Bombay High Court Rules, to which our attention was drawn by the learned Attorney-General, lays down that an Advocate  of any  other High Court may appear in a particular case,  with the permission of the Chief Justice,   the Original Side  of the Court, provided he is instructed by an Attorney, and  an Advocate  of the Bombay High Court appears along  with  him. In  my opinion, -the whole of this provision must be  deemed to  be  invalid for purposes of section 2 of  Act  XVIII  of 1951, and a Supreme Court Advocate,, who wants to appear and plead  in  a case in the Original Side of  the  Bombay  High Court,  has  neither  to take the permission  of  the  Chief Justice  nor is it necessary that he should have along  with him  an  Advocate  of that court.  He  should  certainly  be instructed by an Attorney, but that is because of the  other provisions, which I have already mentioned, and which  apply to the Advocates of the Bombay High Court itself.       I would be quite prepared to hold that what has  been excluded  by the opening clause of section 2 of the Act  may not  be the exact measure of the new right that the  section purports  to  create.   In my  opinion,  the  section    its negative  side  eliminates  so far  as  the  Supreme,  Court Advocates  are concerned, all disabling provisions  existing under  any  law in regard to persons who  are  not  enrolled as .Advocates of any particular High Court.    the  positive Side,  the  section confers   Supreme  Court  Advocates  the statutory  privilege of practising as of right, in any  High Court  in  India,  no matter whether he is  enrolled  as  an Advocate of that court or not. 44 It  is this positive aspect that has been emphasised by  the words "whether or not he is an Advocate of that court" which occur  at  the  conclusion of the section.  It  may  not  be strictly  correct  to say that these  words  are  altogether inappropriate,  for the section aims at  conferring,  though indirectly,’ certain privileges   those who are enrolled  as Advocates  of the particular High Court as well.  Section  9 (4) of the Bar Councils Act lays down:-      "Nothing in this section or in any other provision  of this Act shall be deemed to limit or, in any way affect  the powers  of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William  in Bengal  and at Bombay to prescribe the qualifications to  be possessed  by  persons applying to practise  in  those  High Courts  respectively  in  the  exercise  of  their  original jurisdiction or the powers of those High Courts to grant  or refuse,  as  they  think fit, any such  application  (or  to prescribe  the conditions under which such persons shall  be entitled to practise or plead)."

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    Provisions  of this type are to be found in the  Rules of both the Bombay and the Calcutta High Courts.  Under Rule 1, Chapter I, of the Calcutta, Original Side Rules, even  an Advocate of that court has to make an application for  being entitled to appear and plead   the Original Side and he  can exercise  that right only after that permission is  granted. Such  rules would have no effect after the passing  of  Act- XVIII  of 1951 and an Advocate of the Supreme Court will  be entitled to plead in the Original Side of the Calcutta  High Court as a matter of right and without complying with any of the formalities that may be prescribed by the rules of  that court.   Mr.  Justice  Chakravartti expressed  doubt  as  to whether an Advocate of the Supreme Court, who presumably  is not  an Advocate of the Calcutta High Court, can,  as  such, plead  in the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court.   In my opinion, there is no room for doubt   this point at  all. He  is  entitled to appear and plead as a  matter  of  right under the express provision of section 2 of the, Act, 45 Mr.  Ghose finally attempts to support his  Contention  that the  intention  of the legislature was to  confer  upon  the Supreme Court Advocates the right to plead as well as to act in  all High Courts in India by calling in aid  three  other facts.   It  is said first of all that in the  statement  of objects and reasons which accompanied the original bill, the right  to  practise  was expressly stated  to  include  both pleading and acting.  In the second place it is pointed  out that proviso (a) to section 2 which occurred in the original bill and which excluded the right of both pleading and  act- ing  in  the  Original  Side of the  High  Courts  from  the operation  of section 2 was dropped altogether and  the  Act was  passed -without that proviso.  Lastly it is urged  that the  expression "practise", which has been employed  in  the existing  proviso  to  the  section,  obviously  means  both pleading  and  acting,  and it is  against  sound  rules  of construction  to attach different meanings to the same  word used in, two parts of the same section.       There are weighty pronouncements of English courts as well as of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which lay  down  that  in construing  a  statute  all  negotiation previous  to the Act or the original form of- the bill  must be  dismissed from consideration.  "We cannot interpret  the Act" said Lord Halsbury, "by any reference to the bill,  nor can  we determine its construction by any reference  to  its original  form"(1).  It is not permissible to ascertain  the meaning  of  the  word used in an Act by  reference  to  the proceedings in the Legislative Council, and the language  of a  "Minister  of  the  Crown"  in  proposing  a  measure  in Parliament which eventually becomes law is  inadmissible(2). In a, Calcutta case the learned Judges refused to look  into the  statement  of  objects  and  reasons  accompanying   an enactment as an aid to its construction(3).  The (i)Vida Herron V. Rathmins (1802] A.C. 492 at 5o2. (2)Vida  Krishna Ayyangar v. Nellaperumal[1920] 47 I.A-  33; Assam.  Railway  &  Trading  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Inland   Revenue Commissioners  (1935]  A.C, 443;  Administrator  General  of Bengal v. Premlal [1895] 12 I.A. 107 (3)  Vida Debendra v. Jogendru, A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 593. 46 judicial opinion   this point is certainly not quite uniform and  there  are American decisions to the  effect  that  the general history of a statute, and the various steps  leading up to an enactment including amendments or modifications -of the original bill and reports of Legislative Committees  can be,  looked  at  for  ascertaining  the  intention,  of  the

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legislature  where it is in doubt; but they hold  definitely that  the legislative history is inadmissible when there  is no  obscurity  in  the  meaning  of  the  statute(1).   Even assuming that the latter view is correct, it does not appear to  me  that  the first and the second  contentions  of  the petitioner  indicated above are really of any assistance  to him.   It  is  true that in the statement  of,  objects  and reasons which was circulated’ along with the original  bill, the  word "practise" was said to include both  Pleading  and acting;  but  at the same time the original   bill  did  not purport  to confer at all upon the Supreme Court  Advocates, the’ right either of pleading or of acting in any High Court in  the  exercise of its original  jurisdiction.   This  was expressly laid down in the original proviso (a) to section 2 and  the concluding portion of the statement of objects  and reasons stood thus:         "The  present  bill  is intended  to  achieve  such unanimity  by providing that every Advocate of  the  Supreme Court shall be entitled to practise as of right, in any High Court otherwise than   its Original Side."          Conceding that Mr. Ghosh is entitled to rely   the fact  that the first; proviso, which excluded  the  original jurisdiction of the High Courts from the purview of  section 2  was subsequently dropped the dropping of the  proviso  by itself  proves  nothing.  What the proviso intended  was  to confine the right of practising which section 2 of -the  Act conferred    Supreme  Court’ Advocates  exclusively  to  the appellate jurisdiction of the High Courts.  A Supreme  Court Advocate  as such was not entitled under the proviso to  act or plead in the Original Side of any (1)  Vide Crawford Oil statutory Construction page 383                             47 High  Court  in India.  It is to be noted  that  this  prohi bition had nothing to do with the dual system that exists in the  original  jurisdiction of the Calcutta and  the  Bombay High  Courts  and  it  was  totally  unconnected  with   the provisions  of  the Bar Councils Act, or the  rules  of  the Calcutta and the Bombay High it Courts in relation  thereto. the  other hand, if, as I-have already stated, section-2  of the  Act purported to confer   the Supreme  Court  Advocates the right of practice in the different High Courts in  India in  the same way as the Advocates enrolled in those,  courts are  entitled to do, the original proviso (a)  purported  to cut  down that- right to a considerable extent.  Under  this proviso  the, Supreme Court Advocates were denied the  right of  pleading    the Original Side of the  Calcutta  and  the Bombay  High  Courts and they could neither  act  nor  plead the  Original Side of the Madras High Court,  although  they would  have  those rights under the Bar Councils  Act.   The dropping  of the proviso might mean nothing else  than  this that  this restriction was withdrawn and the rights  created by the section without the proviso stood intact.        Be  that  as it may, it is, in my  opinion,  a  most risky thing to attempt to construe the meaning of a word  in a  statute with the aid of a nonexistent provision.   We  do not  know  the  reasons -why the  legislature  deleted  this clause and it is not permissible for us to speculate   these matters.   A  reference to the legislative  debates  or  the speeches  that were actually delivered in the floor  of  the House  is,  in  my opinion, inadmissible  to  ascertain  the meaning of the words used in the enactment.         The  use of the word "practise" in the, proviso  to section  2,  as it now stands, is also a matter  of  no  im- portance.  Section 2 confers certain additional rights  upon the  Supreme  Court  Advocates and they have  the  right  of

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practising  in  all the High Courts in India subject,  as  I have  said,  to  the rules  and  regulations  binding    the Advocates  in  each  one  of them.   The  proviso  makes  an exception to this rule, and in case 48 an Advocate of an particular High Court, who became a  Judge of  that  court,  gave an undertaking at the  time  when  he assumed his office that he would not practise in that  court after he ceased to be a Judge, the provision in the  section could  not  be  availed  of   by him  in  the  face  of  his undertaking.   This  is the plain meaning  of  the  proviso. Apparently  the legislature was not in the  least  concerned when it enacted this proviso with the extent of right  which such  Advocate  possessed when be became a  Judge;  and  the extent  of the right would certainly depend upon  the  rules and regulations of the High Court in which he carried    his practice.     My  conclusion is that the view taken by  the  Calcutta High  Court  is the right and proper view to take  and  this application must fail.  I make no order as to costs.       DAS  J.-The present proceedings before us  have  been initiated    a  petition  by  two  petitioners.   The  first petitioner is ’Sri Aswini’ Kumar Ghosh who is an advocate of the Calcutta High Court enrolled   the Original Side as well as   the Appellate Side of that Court.  As such advocate  of the  Calcutta  High Court, he is entitled to act  and  plead the  Appellate Side, but only to plead   the Original  Side. He has since been enrolled also in this Court as an advocate which  term is defined in Order’ 1, rule 2, of the Rules  of this Court as meaning a person entitled to appear and  plead before the Supreme Court.    May 26, 1951, petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh served notices   the Registrars of the  Original Side  as well as of the Appellate Side of the Calcutta  High Court intimating that, in exercise of the right conferred by the  Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in the  High  Courts) Act,  1951, he, would thenceforth "practise, i.e.,  act  and plead", in the said High Court at Calcutta also as a Supreme Court  advocate.    July 14, 1951, petitioner  Aswini  Kumar Ghosh, as a Supreme Court advocate, tendered what he calls a warrant of appearance under rule 58 of the Indian  Companies Rules framed by the Calcutta High "Court in the matter of 49       a  winding  up petition regarding  a  company.   That "warrant  of  appearance"  was  returned  by  the  Registrar evidently  because rule 58 requires a person who intends  to appear    the  hearing of the winding up petition  to  leave with  or sent to the petitioner or to his attorney a  notice of  such  intention signed ’by him or by his  attorney"  and does  not  authorise  the filing of a notice  signed  by  an advocate.   The second petitioner is one Sri Jnanendra  Nath Chatterjee  who  is the defendant in Suit No. 2270  of  1951 pending    the  Original Side of the  Calcutta  High  Court. July  18,  1951,  petitioner Jnanendra  Nath  Chatterjee  as defendant  in  the  said Suit No. 2770 of  1951  executed  a "warrant of appearance and power" in the said suit in favour of the-petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh.  The petitioner Aswini Kumar  Ghosh as advocate for the petitioner  Jnanendra  Nath Chatterjee’filed  the warrant with the Assistant  in  charge -of the Suit Registry Department of the Original Side.  This was,  clearly done in purported compliance with  the  provi- sions  of  Chapter 8, rule 15, of the Original  Side  Rules. That  rule,  however, requires the defendant  to  enter  his appearance  to a writ of summons by filing a  memorandum  in writing  containing  the name and place of business  of  the defendant’s  attorney or stating that the defendant  defends

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in  person  and containing his name and place  of  business. That  rule does not in terms contemplate an advocate  acting for  a defendant.  It is, therefore, not surprising  at  all that    July  27,’1951,  the  "warrant  of  appearance"  was returned  by the respondent Arabinda Bose, the Assistant  in the  Suit Registry ]Department of the Original Side  of  the Calcutta High Court, with the endorsament that "the  warrant must be filed by an attorney of this Court under High  Court Rules  and Orders, Original Side, and not by  an  Advocate". The  petitioner Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee thereupon  entered appearance in person   July 30, 1951, and has been defending the suit in person. The two petitioners, however, moved the Calcutta High  Court under article 226 of the Constitution 50      and  obtained a Rule calling upon the two  respondents Sri Arabinda Bose, the Departmental Assistant, and Sri S. N. Banerjee, the Registrar of the Original Side, to show  cause why  an order or direction in the nature of  an  appropriate writ  should  not  be  issued for  the  enforcement  of  the fundamental  right of the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh  "to practise, i.e., to act and plead   the Original Side of this Court",  as  conferred    him  by  Act  XVIII  of  1951  and guaranteed  by  article 19 (1) (g) of  the  Constitution  of India and why consequential orders therein mentioned  should not  be made.  The Rule was heard by a Special Bench of  the Calcutta   High  Court  consisting  of  Harries   C.J.   and Chakravartti  and  Banerjee  JJ.  who  discharged  the  Rule December  21,  1961, and dismissed the  petition.   As  will appear  from  the judgment of the High Court’  the  argument addressed   to  it  "made  no  reference  to   the   alleged fundamental  right  and  that the  petitioner  confined  his argument to the provisions of the Supreme Court Advocates  ( Practice  in the High Courts) Act, 1951." The powers of  the High  Court  under  article 226 not being  confined  to  the enforcement  of fundamental rights it was possible  for  the petitioner  to  rely   the rights under the  last  mentioned Act.     The  petitioners did not apply for or obtain the  leave of  the High Court to appeal to this Court.  Long after  the time  fixed by the rules for applying for special, leave  to apppal  to this Court had expired the petitioners filed  the present   petition  against  the  same  respondents.    The. petition  is intituled as an application under  articles  22 (1), 32 (1) and (2), 135 and 136 (1) of the Constitution  of India.    In  the  prayer  portion  of  the  petition,   the petitioners ask for directions, orders or appropriate  writs the  respondents  for the enforcement of  their  fundamental rights  guaranteed under articles 19 (1) (g) and 22  (1)  of the  Constitution,  an  order declaring  the  right  of  the petitioner  Aswini Kumar, Ghosh act   behalf of his  clients the  Original  Side of all, High Courts in  India  including Calcutta, an order upholding the                             51 right  of  the petitioner Jnanendra Nath  Chatterjee  to  be defended  in  the said suit by the petitioner  Aswini  Kumar Ghosh   and  other  consequential  reliefs.   There  is   an alternative  prayer asking this Court to treat the  petition as  an application, under article 136, for special leave  to appeal against the judgment and order of, the Special, Bench of  the  Calcutta  High Court  dismissing  the  petitioners’ application,  under article 226 of the Constitution and  for condonation of the delay in presenting the present petition.           At  the  hearing  before  us  it  has  not   been seriously  suggested  that  the  rights  of  the  petitioner

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Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee, fundamental or otherwise, have in any  way  been infringed.  Nor was  the  petition  presented before  us  as one for the enforcement  of  any  fundamental right  of the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh  -guaranteed  by article 19 of the Constitution.  What Was pressed before  us by  the  petitioner  Aswini Kumar Ghosh,  who  appeared  in, person,  was the right said to have been conferred-  him  as an advocate of this Court by section 2 of the Supreme  Court Advocates  (Practice  in the High Courts) Act (Act  XVII  of 1951) hereinafter in this judgment referred to as "the Act". In  the  circumstances the petition has not  seriously  been presented  before  us  as  one  under  article  32  of   the Constitution  and it is not necessary for me to express  any opinion  as  to whether a petitioner whose  application  for enforcement  of an alleged fundamental right  under  article 226  has  been rejected by the High Court  can  maintain  an application  under  article 32 to this Court  for  the  same relief  based   precisely the same facts and  grounds.   The petition,  however,.  has been presented -before  us  as  an application  under  article  136  of  the  Constitution  for special  leave  to appeal from the judgment of  the  Special Bench  of the Calcutta High Court.  We have been pressed  to proceed with the matter   the footing as if special leave to appeal  has  been given and the delay  in  the  presentation thereof  has been condoned by this Court.  I deprecate  this suggestion’ for I do not desire to encourage the belief that an intending 52          appellant who has not applied for or obtained, the ,leave of the High Court and who does not say a word by  way of explanation in the petition as to why be did not apply to the  High Court and as to why there’ has been such delay  in applying to this Court should nevertheless get special leave from  this  Court  for the mere asking.   As,  however,  the matter  has been proceeded with as an appeal, I  express  my views   the questions that have been canvassed before us.         There is no dispute that the Act has conferred some new  rights   the Supreme Court Advocates.  The  controversy is as to the ambit and scope of the. right so conferred  and it  has centred round the expression "to  practise" used  in section 2 of the Act.  In order to resolve that  controversy we have to ascertain the true meaning of that expression  as used in the Act.            The provisions of the Act quite clearly apply to and  affect  all High Courts in India.   It  is,  therefore, necessary  to  bear  in  mind the  status  and  position  of advocates as they prevail in the different High Courts.  The Indian  High  Courts  Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vic.   C.  104)  by section  I  authorised Her Majesty, by  Letters  Patent,  to erect  and establish High Courts for the three  Presidencies of  Bengal,  Madras and Bombay.  Section 9 of  that  statute provided  that each of the High Courts to be so  established should   have  and  exercise  civil,  criminal   and   other jurisdiction,  original and appellate, as therein  mentioned and all such powers and authority for and in relation to the administration of justice in the presidency for which it  is established,  "as Her Majesty may by such Letters Patent  as aforesaid grant and direct." Section 16 of that statute also empowered  Her Majesty to establish a High Court in and  for any   portion  of  the  territories  within  Her   Majesty’s dominions  in India, not included within the limits  of  the local jurisdiction of another High Court.  Pursuant to  this authority High Courts were established by Letters Patent  at Fort William in Bengal, Madras and Bombay.  Clause 9 of  the Letters Patent of each of the three Presidency High

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                           53 Courts  authorised  and  empowered each  of  the  said  High Courts:       "to  approve,  admit,  and enrol  such  and  so  many Advocates,  Vakils, and Attorneys as to the said High  Court shall  seem meet; and such Advocates, Vakils  and  Attorneys shall  be  and  are here by authorised  to  appear  for  the suitors  of the said High Court, and to plead or to act,  or to  plead  and act, for the said suitors, according  as  the said  High Court may by its rules and directions  determine, and subject to such rules and directions. Subsequently other, High Courts -were established from  time to  time  by  Letters  Patent  at  different  places,   e.g. Allahabad, Patna,, Lahore and Nagpur, and similar power was, by  clause  7 of the respective  Letters  Patent,  conferred each  of the said High Courts to make similar,rules.  It  is well  known  that each of the High  Courts  actually  framed rules for the admission of advocates, vakils and  attorneys. The High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay divided their jurisdictions  into two broad categories, namely,  ,original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction, and by their  Rules made  an ’internal classification of the  advocates,  vakils and attorneys.  Thus the advocates or vakils enrolled    the Appellate Side were empowered "to appear, act and plead" but the  advocates enrolled   the Original Side  were  permitted only "to appear and plead", the "acting"   the Original Side being  reserved for the attorneys for whom a  separate  roll was  maintained.  The, Madras High Court has, however,  done away with this internal classification and advocates of that High Court may now appear, act and plead/  the Original Side as  well as   the Appellate Side.  The Calcutta  and  Bombay High  Courts, however, maintained the distinction.   Chapter I-, rule 37, of the Rules of the Original Side of--the  Cal- cutta  High-Court  provides that persons to whom  the  rules contained  in  that chapter are applicable  may  not  appear unless instructed by an attorney.  Chapter I.     rule   40, of the Rules of the Original Side :of the 54 Bombay  High  Court  is    the  same  lines.   Although  the remaining   Letters  Patent  High  Courts  in   India   have extraordinary   original   jurisdiction,  both   civil   and criminal, they did not make any distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction as in Calcutta and Bombay and the advocates  enrolled  in  those  High  Courts  were  and  are permitted   "to  appear,  act  and  plead"  in   all   their jurisdictions.   Apart from the several Letters Patent  High Courts other High Courts, e.g., the High Courts of Assam and Orissa,  and  the High Courts of Part B  States,  also  have framed  rules  of their own for admission of  advocates  and according  to  those rules the advocates of all  these  High Courts   can  ((appear,  act  and  plead".   The   position, therefore,  was that, at the date of the Act, all  advocates of all High Courts including those of the Appellate Side  of Calcutta  and  Bombay  High Courts but  excluding  only  the Original  Side  advocates  of  Calcutta  and  Bombay   could "appear,  act  and plead" in their own High  Courts  in  all jurisdictions  but  the advocates of the  Original  Side  of those  two High Courts could only "appear and  plead"    the Original Side.         Apart  from the bar against acting imposed  by  the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay   their own Original Side advocates,  all the High Courts, by their respective  rules, prescribed  certain  conditions subject to  which  alone  an advocate who was not   their rolls could "appear and  plead" in  such High Courts.  Chapter I, rule 38, of  the  Original

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Side of the Calcutta High Court provides as follows:-            "An  Advocate of any other High Court  or  Chief Court  may with the permission of the Chief  Justice  appear and  plead for parties in matters arising in or out  of  the original  jurisdiction, or in or out of  appeals  therefrom, provided he is a member of the Bar of England or of Northern Ireland,  or  a  member  of  the  Faculty  of  Advocates  in Scotland,  or  a person entitled to appear and  plead    the Original Side of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, and that he is properly instructed by an Attorney-"                             55            There is also a rule framed under section 15 (b) of  the  Indian  Bar  Councils  Act  which  applies  to  the Appellate  Side of the Calcutta High Court prescribing  that an  advocate  of another High Court can  "appear  and-plead" the  Appellate  Side  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court  in   a particular  case or cases only with the previous  permission of  the Chief Justice.  Reference may in this connection  be made to Chapter I, rule 6, of the Bombay Rules applicable to the  Original Side and the rule framed under the Indian  Bar Councils  Act which applies to the Appellate Side of  Bombay High  Court and is set out in Schedule II of Part II of  the Appellate  Side Rules. There is no dispute that each of  the other  High  Courts  have rules  in  pari  materia  imposing conditions   advocates not   its roll in the matter of their appearing and pleading in such High Court.  Thus it is clear that an advocate not   the rolls of a particular High  Court could not as of right "appear and plead" in that High Court. He  had  to satisfy the conditions laid down  by  that  High Court before he could "appear and plead" in that High Court. It  should  be particularly noticed that under  these  rules foreign   advocates  who  satisfied  the   conditions   were permitted  only to "appear and plead".  There never was  any question  or claim of a foreign advocate being permitted  to "act" in a High Court of which, he was not an advocate.          The  legislature which enacted the Act  now  under our  consideration  had  full  knowledge  of  the   internal classification  of the advocates of the Calcutta and  Bombay High Courts into Original Side advocates and Appellate  Side advocates, the disability of the Original Side advocates  of those two High Courts, namely, that they were not  permitted "to  act"   the Original Side and could only  ’,’appear  and plead",    the  instruction  of an  attorney  and  that  the attorneys alone were permitted "to act"   that side of those two High Courts.  Further the legislature was well aware  of the  bar  imposed   foreign advocates, i.e.,  advocates  not the  roll of a High Court in the matter of  their  appearing and pleading in that High 56 Court and the fact that eminent advocates of one High  Court were not,   many occasions in the past, given permission "to a’  pear and plead" in another High Court.  The  legislature knew that under Order I, rule 2, of the Supreme Court  Rules an advocate had been defined as a person entitled "to appear and plead" before the Supreme Court and that Order IV,  rule 30, precluded an advocate from acting as agent and an  agent as  advocate in any circumstances whatsoever.  Finally,  the legislature  was cognisant of the fact that a Supreme  Court advocate  was a, foreign advocate in all High  Courts  other than  the  one, where he was enrolled and as  such  was  not entitled  as  of right "to appear and plead" in  those  High Courts.  With knowledge of all these facts and circumstances the legislature proceeded to enact this Act and,  therefore, the provisions of the Act have to be considered in the light of these prevailing circumstances which undoubtedly form the

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background’ of this enactment and which cannot be-overlooked or ignored.            Turning  now to the text of the Act, one  cannot but be impressed at once with ’the wording of the full title of  the  Act.  Although there are  observations  in  earlier English  cases that the title is not a part of  the  statute and  is,  therefore, to be excluded  from  consideration  in construing the statute, it is now settled law that the title of  a  statute is an important part of the Act  and  may  be referred  to  for the purpose of  ascertaining  its  general scope and of throwing light   its construction, although  it cannot  override  the clear meaning of the  enactment.  (See Maxwell   the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn.P. 44  and the  cases cited therein).  The full title ’of the  Act  now under consideration runs thus:    "An  Act to authorise Advocates of the Supreme Court  to practise as of right in any High Court." One  cannot  fail to note the words " as of right   and  the words " in any High Court " which follow immediately.  Those two sets of words at once convey 57 to my mind that the act is directly and intimately concerned with the disability imposed by a High Court   advocates  not its roll in the way of their appearing and pleading in  such High  Court without the permission of the Chief Justice  and without  satisfying other conditions if any, and that  their purpose  is to remove and supersede that disability, so  far as the Supreme Court advocates are concerned, by authorising them  to do so as of right.  The words " as of right  "  are quite  clearly indicative of an independent statutory  right as  opposed to the conditional right dependent    the  sweet will  of the Chief Justice concerned.  Those words are  used byway of antithesis and bring out prominently the object  of the  Act.   In  view of  that  well-known  disability  which naturally was irksome, those words cannot fail to convey  to one’s  mind the conviction that the purpose of the  Act,  as indicated by its title, is to confer   the advocates of  the Supreme Court a right which was denied to them by the  Rules of  the  High  Courts referred to above.   The  language  in which-  the title of the Act has been, expressed appears  to me  to  be a good and cogent means of finding out  the  true meaning and import of the Act, and, as it were, a key to the understanding of it.        The  matter, however, does not rest   the  title  of the Act alone and I pass   to section 2 of the Act which  is expressed in the following terms: "  Notwithstanding  anything contained in  the  ’Indian  Bar Councils  Act, 1926 (XXXVIII of 1926), or in  any  other,law regulating  the  conditions subject to which  a  person  not entered  in  the roll of Advocates of a High  Court  may  be permitted to  practise in that High Court every Advocate. of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of right to  practise in  any High Court whether or not he is an Advocate of  that High Court. Provided  that  nothing in this section shall be  deemed  to entitle  ’any  person  merely by reason  of  his  being  all Advocate of the Supreme Court to practise 58 in  a High Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if  he had  given  an undertaking not ’to  practise  therein  after ceasing to hold office as such Judge."         It  will  be  noticed that the  main  body  of  the section consists of two parts, namely, a non-obstante clause beginning  with  the words " Notwithstanding  anything"  and ending  with the words "permitted to practise in  that  High

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Court " and a positive part beginning with the words " every Advocate of -the Supreme Court " and ending with the words " of that High Court." To clear the ground it will be  useful, at the outset, to ascertain the ’scope and ambit of the non- obstante clause.      The  controversy    this clause has  raged  round  the question whether the adjectival clause, namely,  "regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered in  the roll  of  Advocates  of a High Court may  be  permitted.  to practise in that High Court " governs the words " the Indian Bar  Councils  Act " as well as the words  "any  other  law" which immediately precede that clause.  If that clause  also attaches to and qualifies the words "the Indian Bar Councils Act"  then  there  can remain no manner of  doubt  that  the ambit,  scope and purpose of the non-obstante clause are  to supersede, not the whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act but, only that part of it which regulates the conditions  subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of  a High Court may be permitted to practise in that High  Court, that  is  to say, that the supersession of  the  Indian  Bar Councils.   Act  is only to the same extent  to  which  that adjectival  clause  supersedes "any other  law".   Conscious that such a construction will run counter to his contention, it  has  been the endeavour of the petitioner  Aswini  Kumar Ghosh to keep the adjectival clause separated from the words "Indian  Bar  Councils Act".  For this  purpose  he  fastens the  comma appearing after the bracket and before  the  word "or"  and  contends  that  the  comma  indicates  that   the qualifying  clause does not govern the Indian  Bar  Councils Act.                             59 The High Court has rejected the contention of the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh   two grounds.  In the first place it has been  said that the comma was no part of the Act.  That  the orthodox view of earlier English Judges was that punctuation formed no part of the statute appears quite clearly from the observations of Willes J. in Claydon v. Green(1).   Vigorous expression was given to this view also by Lord Esher, M.   R. in Duke of Devonshire v. Connor(1) where he said In an Act of Parliament there are no such things as brackets any more than there are such things as stops." This  view  was  also adopted by the Privy  Council  in  the matter  of interpretation of Indian statutes as will  appear from  the  observations  of Lord  Hobhouse  in  Maharani  of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh(1), namely, that " it is an error to   rely     punctuation   in  construing   Acts   of   the Legislature."  Same  opinion  was  expressed  by  the  Privy Council  in Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen(4).  If, however, the  rule regarding  the rejection of punctuation for the purposes  of interpretation is to be regarded as of- imperfect obligation and  punctuation  is to be taken at least  as  contemporanea expositio, it will nevertheless have to be disregarded if it is  contrary  to  the  plain meaning  of  the  statute.   If punctuation  is  without sense or conflicts with  the  plain meaning of the words, the Court will not allow it to cause a meaning  to  be placed upon the words which  they  otherwise would not have.  This leads me to the second ground    which mainly  the High Court rejected the plea of  the  petitioner Aswini  Kumar  Ghosh, namely, that the Word "other"  in  the phrase "any other law" quite clearly connects the Indian Bar Councils  Act with other laws as alternatives  and  subjects both  to  the  qualification  contained  in  the  adjectival clause.  I find myself in complete- (1)  (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 51i at P. 522. (2)  (1890) L.R.Q.13.D 468.

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(3)  (1886) L.R. 14 I.A. 30 at P. 35. (4)  (1928) L.R. 56 I.A. 93 at p. zoo, 60 agreement  with  the  High  Court    this  point.   If   the intention wag that the adjectival clause should not  qualify the  Indian  Bar  Councils Act, then the  use  of  the  word "other"  was wholly inapposite and unnecessary.  The use  of that  word  ’unmistakably leads to the conclusion  that  the adjectival clause also qualifles something other than "other law".   If the intention were that the Indian  Bar  Councils Act  should remain unaffected by the qualifying  phrase  and should  be superseded in toto for the purposes of  this  Act the  legislature would have said "or in any  law  regulating the  conditions etc." It would have been yet simpler not  to refer to the Indian Bar Councils Act at all and to drop  the adjectival  clause  and  to  simply  say  "Not  withstanding anything  contained in any law".  In the light of  the  true meaning  of the title of the Act as I have  explained  above and  having regard to the use of the word " other " I  have, no hesitation in holding, in agreement with the High  Court, that  what  the non-obstante clause intended to  exclude  or supersede was not the whole of the Indian Bar, Councils  Act but to exclude or supersede that Act and any other law  only in  so far as -they or either of them purported to  regulate the conditions subject to which a person not entered in  the roll  of  advocates of a High Court might  be  permitted  to practise in that High Court and that the comma, if it may at all be looked at,, must be disregarded as being contrary  to this plain meaning of the statute.           Assuming,  however,  that the  qualifying  clause does not attach to the words "Indian Bar Councils Act", that circumstance  will, nevertheless, make no difference in  the legal position.  ’Section 8(1) of the Indian.  Bar  Councils A-et provides as follows: "No person shall be entitled as of right to practise in  auy HighCourt,unless  his  name is entered in the  roll  of  the advocates of the High Court maintained under this Act: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any attorney of the High Court."                             61 Section 14(2) runs thus: "Where  rules  have been made by any High Court  within  the meaning  of clause (24) of section 3 of the General  Clauses Act,  1897, or in the case of a High Court for which  a  Bar Council  has  been constituted under this Act, by  such  Bar Council under section 15, regulating the conditions  subject to which advocates of other High Courts may be permitted  to practise  in  the  High Court, such advocates  shall  no  be entitled to practise therein otherwise than subject to  such conditions."      Section  15(b)  authorises the Bar Council,  with  the previous  sanction  of  the High Court,  to  make  rules  to provide  for and regulate "the conditions subject  to  which advocates of other High Courts may be permitted to  practise in  the  High Court".  As already stated, a  rule  has  been framed  under  this section by the Calcutta Bar  Council  as well  as by the Bombay Bar Council.  These three  provisions are  the only provisions of the Indian Bar Councils  Act  or the rules thereunder which place a bar against an  advocate, not   the roll of a Hiah Court, from practising in such High Court.   It  is  interesting to note  that  the  nonobstante clause in section 2 of the Act we are construing is  couched in language which has unmistakably been taken from  sections 14  (2)  and  15-(b).   There can  be  no  question  that  a supersession  of the Indian Bar Councils Act will  supersede

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those provisions of that Act and the rules thereunder  which "’regulate  the  conditions subject to  which  advocates  of other  High Courts may be permitted to practise in the  High Court".   Apart from this I find nothing in the  Indian  Bar Councils Act which has any direct bearing   section 2 of the Act we are construing or whose supersession is necessary  to give effect to it.It is said that        the rules of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts  do prescribe  the  qualifications to be  possessed  by  persona applying  to  practise in those Courts  and  the  conditions under  which such persons will be entitled to  practise  and reserve to those Courts the right to grant.’ 62 or refuse any application for enrolment.  It is also pointed out that the rules of the Original Sides of’ those two  High Courts do determine the persons who shall respectively plead and  act  in  those High Courts in  the  exercise  of  their original  jurisdictions.   It  is  next  pointed  out   that sections  9  (4) and 14 (3) of the Indian Bar  Councils  Act preserve these rules and it is contended that a supersession of the Indian Bar Councils Act in its entirety will do  away with  sections  9(4) and 14(3) and the protection  of  those sections  having  been  withdrawn,  those  rules  will  con- sequently stand abrogated, so as to facilitate the operation of  the provisions of section 2 of the Act under review.   I am unable to accept, this argument as sound.  Sections  9(4) and  14(3) do not purport to give any fresh validity to  the rules  of  the Calcutta and Bombay High  Courts.   All  that those  sections do is to declare that nothing in the  Indian Bar  Councils  Act shall be deemed to limit  or  affect  the powers  of those two High Courts which exist  in-dependently of  those  two.  sections and  flow  from  their  respective Letters  Patent.  Therefore, if the whole of the Indian  Bar Councils  Act  including  sections  9(4)  and  14(3)   stand abrogated  such abrogation will not affect the existence  or validity  of  the  rules of those High  Courts  which  will, nevertheless,  continue in full force   the strength of  the Letters   Patent  of  those  High  Courts.   It  is   clear, therefore,  that  even  if the adjectival  clause  does  not qualify  the Indian Bar Councils Act and  if,  consequently, the  nonobstante clause under review is taken  to  supersede the whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act, the effect of such supersession will, for the purposes of section 2, be only to do  away with the provisions of sections 8(1) and 14(2)  and the rule made under section 16(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act  in- so far as they "regulate the conditions subject  to which  advocates  of other High Courts may be  permitted  to practise  in  the High Court" just as it will  abrogate  all other laws in so far as they regulate those very conditions. The supersession of the whole of the Indian Bar Councils                             63          Act  will not, therefore, affect the  validity  of the  rules framed by the High Courts under their  respective Letters Patent determining the persons who will act and  who will  plead or who will act and plead and those  rules  will prevail    their  own strength and  efficacy,  although  the rules  regulating  the conditions subject to  which  foreign advocates  can be permitted to appear and plead  will  stand abrogated  by  reason of the non-obstante  clause.   In  the premises,  the  result  of the  construction  sought  to  be founded   by  the  petitioner  Aswini  Kumar,  Ghosh     the existence  of the comma in the non-obstante clause  will  be precisely  the same as it would have been if the  comma  had not  been  there and the adjectival clause  "regulating  the conditions  etc." also attached to and qualified  the  words

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"Indian  Bar,  Councils Act." In short, there is  no  escape from the, conclusion that the ambit, scope and effect of the non-obstante  clause  are,  to  supersede  the  Indian   Bar Councils  Act  and  any other Act only in  so  far  as  they regulate  the  conditions  referred  to  therein.   I  again emphasise  that  the  rules of  the  different  High  Courts regulated the conditions subject to which a foreign advocate would  be  permitted  "to appear and plead."  There  was  no question of the foreign advocate "acting" in a High Court of which  he  was  not an advocate.  The purpose  of  the  non- obstante  clause is to supersede only the provisions of  the Indian Bar Councils Act and the rules which regulated those, identical conditions.  It is not seriously disputed that the legislature  in  passing the  non-obstante clause  had  only those conditions in mind.  There can be no manner of  doubt, therefore, that the words "to practise" in the  non-obstante clause mean, in the context, "to appear and plead".      The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh then falls back   on a-second  line of reasoning.  He urges that whatever may  be the meaning, scope and effect of the non-obstante clause, it cannot  possibly cut down the meaning of the positive  words in  the  operative part of the section.  His  contention  is that  the  High Court war, wrong in holding  that  the  non- obstante clause was 64 coextensive  with the operative part.  While it may be  true that  the  non-obstante  clause  need  not  necessarily   be coextensive with the operative part, there can be no  doubt- and the petitioner and Dr. N. C. Sen Gupta appearing for the Calcutta  Bar Association and supporting the  petitioner  do not   dispute-that  ordinarily  there  should  be  a   close approximation  between the two.  What he urges is  that  the Court  should not create an ambiguity in the operative  part and then use the non-obstante clause to cut down the meaning of  the  plain  words  used in the  operative  part  of  the section.  The argument is that the words "to practise" cover both acting and pleading and that,  therefore, the operative part  of the section authorises the advocate of the  Supreme Court  as  of  right "to practise", that  is,  "to  act  and plead", in any High Court.  The whole case of the petitioner is  founded    this plea.  It is  necessary,  therefore,  to consider whether the critical words have that invariable and fixed meaning when used in relation to an advocate. The   verb  "practise"  according  to  the  Oxford   English Dictionary, Vol.  VIII, p. 1220, means :      to  work  at,  exercise, pursue  (an  occupation,  pro fession or art) ;           to exercise the profession of law or of medicine. Similar  meaning is to be found assigned to the word in  Dr. Annandale’s  New  Gresham  Dictionary.   According  to  this meaning doctors "practise", consulting architects "practise" as well as lawyers "practise" but we know that each of  them does different things.  Coming to lawyers we find that there are different categories of lawyers all of whom  "practise", although  all  of  them  do not do  the  same  thing.   Thus attorneys  "practise"  in  the Original Sides  of  the  High Courts  of Calcutta and Bombay and the agents "practise"  in the Supreme Court but we know that under the rules of  those Courts the attorneys, and agents only "act".  The  advocates -also,  "Practise"  but  we know that all  of  them  do  not perform  the  same  functions.  The advocates  of  all  High Courts  including  those  of  the  Appellate  Sides  of  the Calcutta and                             65 Bombay  High  Courts , under the rules of  their  respective

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High  Courts,  "act  and plead" and, as  the  ambit  of  the profession of such advocates extends to acting and pleading, the  words  "to  practise" in  their  application  to  those advocates   undoubtedly  mean  "to  act  and  plead".    The advocates  of  the Original Sides of those two  High  Courts can,  under the rules, ’only " plead".   the  Original  Side and the ambit and scope of the profession of these  Original Side advocates being limited only to pleading, the words "to practise" used in reference to these advocates must mean "to plead"  only.  There are thus different species of  lawyers, some  of  whom,  e.g., attorneys of the  Original  Sides  of Calcutta  and Bombay High Courts and agents of  this  Court, only  "act",  some others of whom, e.g., the  Original  Side advocates  of those two High Courts and of this Court,  only "plead"  and  all the remaining advocates of  all  the  High Courts both "act and plead".  The scope of the  professional activities  of  the  different categories  of  lawyers  thus varies  but, nevertheless, they are all said "to  practise". These   words,  therefore,  connote  the  general  idea   of exercising  the legal profession, which is their  dictionary meaning, and in that general sense apply to all lawyers as a class  or  genus but at the same time they are  capable,  in their  application  to particular species or  categories  of lawyers, to connote the different professional attributes of those different categories or species.                Turning  to the Indian Bar Councils  Act  we find  that  the expression "to practise" has  been  used  in various sections in the generic sense I have mentioned.  Let me  illustrate  my meaning by reference to a  few  sections. Section  4  of that Act deals with the  composition  of  Bar Councils.   Sub-section (1) provides that every Bar  Council shall consist of 15 members, of which 10 shall be elected by the advocates.  Sub-section (2) then provides :-          "(2) , Of the elected members of every Bar Council not  less than five shall be persons who have for  not  less than ton years been entitled as of right to 66 practise  in  the High Court for which the Bar  Council  has been constituted ."                     If  we  give  the  general   dictionary meaning to the words "to practise" used in this sub- section then this sub-section becomes easily intelligible, but if we say  that they mean "to act and plead" then the  eligibility will be confined to the advocates who, under the rules,  can "act and plead", i.e., to the Appellate Side advocates,  and the  result of that construction will be that the  advocates of  the  Original Sides of Calcutta and Bombay  High  Courts even  though  they are of ten years’ standing  will  not  be eligible for election, for, such advocates do not and indeed cannot,  under  the  rules, "act and  plead".   Such  surely cannot  be the case.  It follows, therefore, that the  words "to  practise" in this sub-section have been used  in  their generic  sense although they connote different  things  when applied to different categories of advocates all of whom are within the subsection.  Sub-section (3) rung thus:         (3).  Of the elected members of the Bar Councils to be  constituted  for the High Courts of Judicature  at  Fort William in Bengal and at Bombay such proportion as the  High Court may direct in each case shall be persons who have  for such  minimum. period as the High Court may determine,  been entitled  to practice in the High Court in the  exercise  of its  original jurisdiction, and such number as may be  fixed by  the  High  Court out of the  said  proportion  shall  be barristers  of England or Ireland or members of the  Faculty of Advocates in Scotland."

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      If we  give the words "to practise" their ordinary dictionary  meaning,then the sub-section will be quite  easy of comprehension but if we say that those words mean "to act and plead " then   the sub-section will become  meaningless, for  those  words in that sub-section refer to the  practice of  the Original Side advocates only who do not  and  indeed under the  rules cannot at all act on the Original side.  It is,  there’fore, clear that the words " to practise  "  have been  used  in both sub-sections in  their  generic  meaning which is also their dictionary meaning, namely, " to                             67 exercise their profession", although in their application to the different-species who are within the sub-, sections they mean  different  professional  attributes.   Thus,  in  sub- section  (3) which applies to Original Side  advocates  only they  must mean "to plead" whereas in sub-section (2)  which applies  to  all  categories of  advocates  the  words  have different meanings, that is to say, in relation to advocates other  than  Original Side advocates they mean "to  act  and plead"  and in relation to the Original Side advocates  they mean only "to plead".  Same remarks apply to section 5  (1). It  will be futile to refer to the principle that  the  same word should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs  in the  Act, for the context excludes the application  of  that principle.   Take section 8 (2) of the Indian  Bar  Councils Act which provides: "8. (1)........................        (2)    The  High Court shall prepare and maintain  a roll  of  advocates  of the High Court  in  which  shall  be entered the names of-’   (a)    all  persons  who were, as  advocates,  vakils  or pleaders, entitled as of right to practise in the High Court immediately before the date   which this section comes  into force  in respect thereof;........... It we do not  give  to the  words  "to  practise’ in clause  (a)  their  dictionary meaning  but  read them as meaning "to act  and  plead"  the advocates  practising,  i.e., only pleading    the  Original Sides of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, will not  find their names in the rolls maintained by their respective High Courts under this section.  That exclusion is certainly  not the  purpose  of this subsection.  Therefore, in  this  sub- section  also  the words "to practise", means  "to  exercise their  profession".   Same remarks apply to the  proviso  to section 8 (3) (b).  I come next to section 14 which provides inter alia:     "14.  (1) An Advocate shall be entitled as of right  to practise-      (9) subject  to the provisions of sub-section  (4)  of section   9,   in  the  High  Court  of  which  he   is   an Advocate;......... 68               By  sub-section (3) nothing in  this  section shall be deemed to limit or affect the power of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts to make rules determining the persons who  are  respectively to plead and to  act    the  Original Sides  of  those High Courts.  Both those High  Courts  have made  rules under which an Original Side advocate  can  only "plead", the acting having been reserved exclusively for the attorneys.  In the light of the context what is the  meaning of the words "to practise" in sub-section (1) above ? If  we put   the  ordinary  dictionary  meaning    the  words   "to practise", namely, "to exercise his profession", the section will be found to be quite intelligible and workable; but  if we  take  them  to mean only "to act  and  plead"  then  the Original  Side advocates who do not "act" but  only  "plead"

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will  not,  strictly  speaking, be within  the  section  and consequently  will  not be able to avail themselves  of  the protection of section 14 (1) (a).  Can it, for a moment,  be said  that the section gives protection and security to  all advocates  other than the Original Side advocates  and  that the latter are not entitled as of right "to practise", i.e., "to  plead", in the High Court of which he is  an  advocate? That cannot be so.  The very fact that the right is  subject to the provisions of section 9 (4) and that the  rule-making power  of the two High Courts is not affected by  virtue  of section  14  (3) quite clearly show that the  Original  Side advocates  who cannot act   the Original Side  are  intended also to be included in the term advocate used in sub-section (1).   If, therefore, this section is to give any  security’ to the Original Side advocates, as it does to the  Appellate Side advocates, then we must read the words "to practise" in their  ordinary dictionary meaning, namely "to exercise  his profession".  It is thus clear- that the words "to practise" have  been  used throughout the Indian Bar Councils  Act  in their  general dictionary meaning mentioned above except  at the  end  of  section  9 (4).  In  the  same  way  the  word "practising"  has  been used in Order IV, rule  31,  of  the Supreme Court Rules in the same generic sense and being used in relation to                             69 advocates   of  this  Court  it  must  mean  appearing   and pleading".   In  the next following rule the same  word  has been  used  in its dictionary meaning although  having  been used  in  relation  to agents  of this Court  it  must  mean "acting".   The same’ generic meaning given to the words  to practise"  will make, section 4 of the  Legal  Practitioners Act, 1879 easily intelligible and workable              The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh,   the other hand,  relies   article 220 of the Constitution  and  points out  that  while the words used in the body of  the  article forbid  judges  "to plead or act" the marginal note  to  the article  describes  the  subject-matter of  the  article  as "prohibition of practising" and concludes that " to practise "  means  "to act and plead".  In agreement  with  the  High Court  I am unable to accept this reasoning., Even  assuming that  the marginal note may by looked at in considering  the article  it  only means that the draftsman of  the  marginal note considered that the single word " practise " would be a compendious  one.   Nobody  disputes  that  the  words   "to practise"  may, in a particular context, mean "to  plead  or act"  but  it does not follow that it  invariably  has  that meaning.  Further it is clear, as the High Court points out, that  what the draftsman did was to find a word which  would cover  both acting and pleading without attempting to  bring out  the  technical distinction between the two.  Nor  do  I think,  for reasons stated by the High Court, that entry  78 of  List I in the Seventh Schedule lends any support to  the petitioner’s contentions           The petitioner then refers us to the decision  in Laurentius   Ekka  v.  Dhuk  Koeri(1)  in  support  of   his contention  that the judicial accepted meaning of words  "to practise"  is "to- appear, act and plead" In that  case  the question  was  whether an advocate   the roll.of  the  Patna High  Court, could present and move a review petition  in  a subordinate  court  unless he filed ’a  Vakalatnama  or  was instructed by a pleader (1)  (1925) I.L.R. 4 Pat. 766 19 70 of  the subordinate court.  It was held that an advocate  of

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the  High  Court,  unlike  a pleader, aid  not  need  to  be appointed in writing to act   behalf of his client and  even when verbally appointed he could under Order III, rule 1, of the  Code of Civil Procedure appear, plead and act    behalf of  his client and, therefore, when section 4 of  the  Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, provided that every person  entered as  an advocate or vakil   the role of any High Court  under the  Letters Patent should be entitled to "practise" in  all Courts subordinate to such High Court, the word         "     practise"  as applied to an advocate  of  the Patna  High Court meant "appear, plead and act".  The  ratio of  the  decision is obvious.  The scope and  ambit  of  the Patna  High Court advocate’s profession covered  acting  and pleading,  and when such an advocate was given the right  to practise"  in  the subordinate court be  was  authorised  to exercise  his profession in full, i.e., to act and plead  in the  subordinate court.  In short, the advocate carried  the attributes  of his profession with him even when he went  to exercise  his profesSion in the lower court.  This  decision is  no  authority  for the proposition that  the  words  "to practise"  have  a fixed and invariable  meaning  comprising acting and pleading in all cases.        The  petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh then referred  us to the case of In re Powers of Advocates(1)., In Madras  the High  Court in exercise of its powers under clause 9 of  the Letters Patent framed a rule empowering advocates to appear, act  and plead   the Original Side.  That rule was  held  to have been validly made in two earlier decisions.  But  Rules 128  and 129 of the Insolvency Rules permitted  an  advocate only  to " appear and plead" in’the Insolvency  Jurisdiction and  the attorney to act there. In these  circumstances  the question arose in the Madras case whether advocates enrolled under  the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, were  entitled  to "act"  in  the Insolvency jurisdiction of  the  Madras  High Court,notwithstanding  that  under the rules framed  by  the High Court they were (2)  (1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 92.                             71          only  entitled  to  "plead"  and  the  Full  Bench answered  the  question in the affirmative.   The  reasoning underlying  this decision, as I understand it, was that  the general  ambit and scope of the profession of a Madras  High Court advocate being, according to its rule, "to appear, act and  plead"  in the Original Side, the words  "to  practise" used  in section 8 (1) and section 14(1) of the  Indian  Bar Councils Act must, in relation to him, mean "to appear,  act and plead".  Rules 128 and 129, however, said that he  could only appear and plead but not act.  There being no saving of the  power of the Madras High Court as there was of that  of the  Calcutta  and Bombay High Courts by section 9  (4)  and section 14 (3) and those insolvency rules being inconsistent with the provisions of sections 8(1) and 14(1) as  construed by the Full Bench, that rule should, under sections 19(2) be deemed  to  have been repealed.  I am unable to  accept  the correctness  of this reasoning. The combined effect  of  the two sets of rules was that & Madras advocate was entitled to act  and  plead  throughout  the  Original  Side  except  in Insolvency Court which was also a part of the Original Side. It  was,  therefore,  not correct to  say  that  the  Madras advocate was entitled to act and plead in the Original Side. The  passage in the judgment of Kumaraswami Sastri J. at  p. 103,  namely  that  "the word  ’practise’  ordinarily  means ’appear,  act  and plead’, unless there is anything  in  the subject or context to limit its meaning" is not supported by any  authority and appears ,to me to be too  wide.   Indeed,

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the  learned Judge himself recognised this,  for  throughout the  judgment  it was emphasised that the  word  "practise", when applied to a Madras Advocate, meant "to appear, act and plead".  It is clear from, that judgment that, according  to the learned ’ Judge, the words had not that wide meaning  in their  application  to the Original Side  Advocates  of  the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts.  In any event, that passage should,  in the context,, be limited in its  application  to the  Madras  High Court advocates and all advocates  of  all other High Courts who, by their rule6, are permitted to act 72     Pand plead, for it cannot possibly have that meaning in relation to an Original Side,advocate who is permittad  only to  plead.   This passage in the Madras decision  could  not have  been  intended as an enumeration of  the  professional activities of an advocate as forming the invariable contents of  the words "to practise" or as an enunciation of a  fixed meaning of general application.  In this country where there exists,  as  a historical fact, a clear  division  of  legal practitioners into three separate classes, namely, those who act only, those who only plead and those who do both act and plead  such a definition will be wholly inaccurate.   It  is necessary,  therefore, to give to those words their  generic meaning  I  have mentioned.  In this view of the  matter,  I agree with the High Court that the ,petitioner can derive no support  for  his  contention  from  either  of  these   two decisions.       My  attention has also been drawn to the case of  The Queen Doutre(1) where it was held that in Canada ,where.-the functions  of Barristers, and Solicitors are united  in  the same  person,  the rules of English law  which  precludes  a Barrister to sue for his fees do not apply and that a Quebec advocate  could sue for his remuneration   a quantum  meruit basis.   I do not see how that case throws any  light    the problem  before us. In Queen all advocates "act  and  plead" and as regards Quebec advocates the critical words may cover both  acting  and pleading, but how  can  that  circumstance assist  us  in ascertaining the meaning of  those  words  in enactments of our country where we bave a clear division, of the  legal  practitioners  into  three  categories  I  have, mentioned ?  The  result of the foregoing discussion as to the  meaning of  the  words  "to practise" appears to me to  be  that  in relation to lawyers as a class  they mean "to exercise their profession"  which is their dictionary meaning and which  is wide enongh, to cover the activities of the entire genus  of lawyers.  They are words of indeterminate import and have no fixed  connotation  or  content.  In  their  application  to particular (1)  (1883) 9 App.  Cas. 745. 73 species  of  lawyers their meaning varies according  to  the scope and ambit of the profession of that particular species in  relation to whom they may be used, and such meaning  has to  be ascertained by reference to the subject  or  context. Further,  the Legislative technique, as is evident from  the Indian Bar Councils Act, the Legal Practitioners Act and the Rules of the Supreme Court to which reference has been made, is to use these neuter words in a generic sense although  in their  application  to  specific categories  or  species  of lawyers  they have different connotations which are  to.  be ascertained  from the context in which they are  used.   The question, therefore, at once arises: What in the context and a  true construction of the Act we are considering,  is  the meaning of the words "to practise"?

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The  petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh urges that the words  "to practise,"  in relation to all advocates of all the 20  High Courts,  except the Original Side advocates of the  Calcutta and  Bombay  High Courts only, mean "to act and  plead"  and seeing  that  this  is the meaning applicable  to  the  vast majority  of  advocates,  those words  must  be  given  that meaning.  Am I to apply the rule of majority in construing a statute?  Am I to assume that the Legislature had  forgotten or deliberately ignored the hard historical fact that  there exists  a  large  body of  advocates,of  not  inconsiderable importance  who  "practise",  that  is  only  "plead"    the Original Side of two premier High Courts in India?  Or am  I to  assume  that the Legislature intended, by the use  of  a dubious expression of indefinite import, to swamp one  whole class of legal practitioners, namely, the Attorneys of those two  High  Courts?  I find not the slightest  indication  of such  intention anywhere in this Act.    the  contrary,  the title  of the Act and the non-obstante clause of  section  2 itself  run  counter  to such contention.   I  have  already pointed  out that the words "to practise" have been used  in the  non-obstante  clause  in the sense  of  "appearing  and pleading"  only and that nobody can for a moment doubt  that in ’the non-obstante clause the 74 Legislature  had  in mind the provisions of the  Indian  Bar Councils Act and the rules of the High Courts regulating the conditions subject to which a foreign advocate was permitted "to appear and plead" in a High Court of which he was not an advocate.  If that be so, it is legitimate to infer that the Legislature  in  the  operative part  of  the  section  gave expression  and  effect  to what it had  in  its  mind  when enacting  the non-obstante clause.  If the intention of  the legislature were otherwise, why did not the Legislature  say openly and in a straightforward way that it gave the Supreme Court  advocate  the right "to act and plead"  in  any  High Court ? Why did it use the dubious words "to practise" ?  It is not correct to say that those words have been used in the -Indian  Bar Councils Act only in the sense of  "acting  and pleading".  As already explained, those words have been used in  their ordinary dictionary meaning, namely, "to  exercise his or their profession" so as to cover the entire genus  or class  of  Advocates,  although  in  their  application   to different   categories  or  species  they   have   different connotations   as   explained  above.    Seeing   that   the legislative practice is to use those words in their  general dictionary  meaning, there is no reason to suppose that  the Legislature  intended  to depart from  this  practice  while enacting  this piece of legislation.  It is asked:  why  did not the Legislature then insert in this Act a saving  clause like sections 9(4) and 14(3) of the Indian Bar Councils Act? The argument is that the absence of such a saving clause  in this  Act  constitutes  a  departure  from  the  legislative practice  followed  in  the Indian  Bar  Councils  Act  and, therefore, the words "to practise" in the operative part  of section  2  must  have  their  widest  meaning.   A   little reflection  will show that this argument is not sound.   The rule-making  power of the High Courts under clause 9 of  the Letters Patent was and is with respect to advocates,  vakils and  attorneys  admitted and enrolled by the,  High  Courts. The Indian Bar Councils Act dealt with advocates enrolled by the High Courts and,’ therefore, it was                             75 considered safer to provide that nothing in th a Act  should affect  or limit the rule making powers of the  High  Court. Indeed,  if the critical words were, as I think, used  in  a

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generic sense, the saving clauses must have been inserted ex abundanti  cautela.  Be that as it may, as the High  Courts’ power  to  make rules under clause 9 extended  only  to  the advocates, vakils and attorneys enrolled by them and as  the Indian  Bar Councils Act also dealt with advocates  enrolled by  the High Courts, the insertion of the saving clauses  in the last mentioned Act is intelligible.  But a saving of the rule-making  powers of High Courts over their own  advocates etc., is entirely out of place’ in an Act which is concerned not  with  High  Court  advocates  but  with  Supreme  Court advocates only’ The High Courts have no power under clause 9 of the Letters Patent to make any rule to govern the conduct and  activities of the Supreme Court advoCates and this  Act only  deals  with Supreme Court advocate and confers  a  new right    them.  Therefore a saving of the High Courts’  rule making  power  over their advocates would have  been  wholly meaningless and inappropriate, for such saving clause  would not  have given the High Courts any power to make any  rules with  respect  to  the Supreme Court  advocates  There  was, therefore,  no-  necessity  or occasion  for  inserting  any saving  clause   the lines of sections 9 (4) and 14  (3)  of the Indian Bar Councils Act.  NO-, thing can, therefore,  be founded   the absence of a saving clause   the lines of that Act.          The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh argues that  the text  of  the original Bill, the statement  of  objects  and reasons  over  the signature of the  Law  Minister  attached thereto and the debates in the Legislature resulting in  the deletion of what was clause (a) of the proviso as it existed in the original Bill will clearly show what the intention of the Legislature was.  In the original Bill as introduced  in the  Legislature there was a proviso to section 2 which  ran thus:          "Provided  that nothing in this section  shall  be deemed to entitle any person, merely by reason of his  being an Advocate of the Supreme Court-- 76 (a)  to plead or to act in any High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction ; or   (b)    to practise in a High Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if he had given an undertaking not to practise therein after ceasing to hold office as such Judge."       The argument is that the objects and reasons  clearly show that the intention was that section 2 should not affect the  Original Sides of the two High Courts, and  clause  (a) was  inserted  in  the  proviso in  order  to  achieve  that purpose.   This  shows  that if clause (a)  was  not  there, section  2 would have, entitled the Supreme  Court  advocate "to practise", i.e., "to appear, act and plead" in all  High Courts   in   all   their   several   jurisdictions.    This conclusively shows that the words ’to practise" were used in that larger sense.  Indeed in the objects and reasons  those words  were expressly stated to be synonymous with  "to  act and  plead".   The  argument is  apparently  formidable  but reflecttion will be found to be devoid of any substance.                      There is authority for the proposition that  the proceedings of the Legislative Council are  to  be excluded from consideration in the judicial construction  of an  Act  and that the debates in  the  Legislative  Council, reports  of select committees and statements of objects  and reasons   annexed  to  a  Bill  may  not  be  referred   to: Administrator-General  of  Bengal  v.  Prom  Lal(1).    When construing  section 68 of the Indian Companies  Act,  1,882, the  Privy Council in Krishna Ayyangar v.  Nella  Perumal(2) observed  that no statement made   the introduction  of  the

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measure or its discussion can be looked at as affording  any guidance  is  to the meaning of the words.   It  is  neither necessary  nor profitable to go into the numerous  decisions all  of  which it may be difficult to reconcile  but  it  is quite  clear from the decision of this Court in the case  of A. E. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(3) that the debates and speeches  in the Legislature which, reflect  the  individual opinion of the speaker cannot (1) (1895) 22 I.A. 107.      (3) [1950] S.C.R. 88, (1920) 17  33.                             77 be  referred to for the purpose of construing the Act as  it finally emerged from the Legislature and so the debates must be left out of consideration.        The statement of objects and reasons attached to the Bill  only depicts the object which the sponsor of the  Bill had  in mind, but it throws no light   the object which  the Legislature as a body had in mind when passing the Bill into an  Act.  If I may borrow and adapt the felicitous  language used by my Lord the present Chief Justice in that case those objects  and  reasons  may  at best  be  indicative  of  the subjective  intention of the Law Minister who sponsored  the Bill  but  they could not reflect  the  inarticulate  mental processes  lying behind the majority vote which carried  the Bill.  Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of  all those  legislators were in accord.  The first Privy  Council decision  referred  to above rejected any reference  to  the debates  or the objects and reasons.  So did M. N.  Mukherji J.  in  Debendra  Narain  Roy  v.  Jogendra  Narain  Deb(1). Reference  may  also be made to Craies    Interpretation  of Statutes,  5th  Edn.,  at p. 123,  regarding  the  memoranda attached  to the Bill.  In my opinion it is safer to  follow the orthodox English view and leave the objects and  reasons out of consideration.             The  petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh  points  out that  in Gopalan’s case (supra) this Court did look  at  the original  draft of what eventually became article 21 of  the Constitution  as throwing some light   the  construction  of that  article and urges that we should look at the  original Bill  and draw appropriate inferences from the fact  of  the omission  of clause (a) of the proviso from the  Act.   What was  looked at in that case was the Report of  the  Drafting Committee  appointed  by  the  Constituent  Assembly.   That Report was akin to a Report of a Select Committee made after consideration  of a Bill referred to it by  the  Legislature for-consideration.   In that Report the  Drafting  Committee recommended  the  substitution  of  the  expression  "except according to procedure established (1936) A.I. R. 1936 Cal. 593 at p. 619. 78 by  law" taken from the Japanese Constitution for the  words "without due process of law" which occurred in the  original draft  "as  the  former  is  more  specific."  The  Drafting Committee further explained that they had attempted to  make the fundamental rights conferred by the article in  question and  the  limitations  to which  they  must  necessarily  be subject as definite as possible since the Courts may have to pronounce  upon  them.  The Constitution as it  was  finally adopted  showed that the Constituent Assembly  had  accepted the amendment suggested by the Drafting Committee.  The fact that  the Drafting Committee was, in a sense, the  agent  of the Constituent Assembly, and that the amendment proposed by the   Drafting  Committee  was  in  fact  adopted   by   the Constituent Assembly, may conceivably lead to the  inference that  the reasons given by the Drafting Committee were  also

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accepted by the Constituent Assembly and that the  intention of   the  agent,  the  Drafting  Committee,  reflected   the intention of the principal, the Constituent Assembly.  This, I  apprehend, was the underlying reason why the majority  of this  Court  expressed  the  view that  the  Report  of  the Drafting Committee could be looked at as historical material throwing  some light   the question of construction  of  the article  21. -That underlying reasoning does  not,  however, apply  to the present case.  This Court,  consistently  with the  principles  laid down in numerous  judicial  decisions, some  of which I have cited above, held that recourse  could not  be had to the debates in the Legislature in  construing the Act.’ To keep out the debates which may, in some degree, have  disclosed the considerations operating   the minds  of the vocal section of the Legislature and the intention  with which they moved the amendment and then to refer to the text of the original Bill and the fact that some words or clauses thereof do not find a place in the Act as eventually  passed in-order  to ascertain the state of mind of the  members  of the  Legislature  who passed the Act will, to  my  mind,  be indicative of a mental process which can hardly be                             79 for  my  learned  colleagues who  had  pronounced  upon  the admissibility  of  the Report of the Drafting  Committee,  I feel  pressed to adhere to and abide by the views  expressed by  them    that point, I am certainly not  prepared  to  go further and to extend the principle of that decision    that question by permitting a reference to the original Bill.         Assuming  that  the reasoning of  the  decision  in Gopalan’s  case(1) regarding admissibility of the Report  as an  aid  to construction may, in certain  circumstances,  be applicable  to  the original Bill, we have yet  to  consider whether  in the case now before us the original Bill  should be referred to.  In Gopalan’s case(1) Kania C. J. said at p. 110:-              "  The report may be read not to  control  the meaning  of  the  articles,  but may  be  seen  in  case  of ambiguity." Again at p. 111 the learned Chief Justice stated:"Resort may be  had  to these sources with great cautiou and  only  when latent ambiguities are to be resolved." In point of fact the learned Chief Justice did not find  the words  of  article  21  to be ambiguous  so  as  to  require recourse  to  the  Report  of  the  Drafting  Committee   to ascertain  the  intention of the Constituent  Assembly.   My Lord the present Chief Justice and Fazl Ali J. and Mukherjea J. did refer to the Report.  In the view taken by Mahajan J. it  was not necessary for him to express any opinion    this instant  problem.  I did not refer to the debates or to  the Report of the Drafting Committee and stated at p. 297 and at p.   323  that  I  would  express  no  opinion  as  to   the admissibility of the Report or the debates.  It is, however, clear from the passages I have quoted, from the judgment  of the  late  Chief  Justice that the Report  of  the  Drafting Committee  could be looked at only to resolve ambiguity  and not  to  control  the  meaning of  the  article  if  it  was otherwise  plain,  for  the  intention  of  the  Constituent Assembly was to be gathered primarily’ from (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88. 80 the  words used in the Constitution.  The question  at  once arises: is there any ambiguity in section 2 as it now stands which  requires  a reference to the original  Bill  for  its solution  ?  Having  regard to the state of the  law  as  it existed  before  this Act was passed, namely,  that  by  the

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rules of all High Courts an advocate of one High Court could only  "appear and plead" in another High Court if  he  could obtain  the permission of the Chief Justice’ of  the  latter Court  the mischief that followed from these rules  and  was unprovided  for, namely, that even eminent  advocates  were. not accorded such permission for no apparent reason and. the fact  that the object of this Act, as indicated in the  full title   and  the  non-obstante  clause  in  section  2   was undoubtedly  to remedy this defect.  So far as  the  Supreme Court advocates were concerned- all which circumstances  are to  be  taken  into consideration in construing  an  Act  as stated  in  Heydon’s case (1) and  finally  the  legislative practice of using the words "to practise" in their  ordinary dictionary  meaning, as I have explained already, I find  no ambiguity whatever in the operative part of section 2.   The meaning  and intent of the section appear to  me  reasonably plain and I do not consider it necessary to have recourse to the original Bill at all to ascertain the meaning and intent of the words used in the section.  It is wrong to imagine or create  ambiguity and then to call in aid the original  Bill and to speculate as to the intention of the Legislature.          Again, assuming that -the original Bill has to  be looked at in ascertaining the meaning of section 2, I do not derive any assistance from the mere circumstance that clause (a) of the proviso which appeared in the original Bill  does not  find a place in the Act as it finally emerged from  the legislative  anvil.   The mere fact that  that  proviso  was omitted from the Act as finally passed does not by any means lead us to the conclusion that the construction put upon the section  by  the  petitioner  Aswini  Kumar  Ghosh  must  be correct.  There is no reason to assume that the (1)  (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7b. 81 legislators  read  the  words"to Practise"  as  meaning  "to appear,- act and plead" If they read the words to mean "  to appear  and plead only, which is the ambit and scope of  the profession  of  Supreme Court advocates under the  rules  of this  Court and of the Original Side advocates of those  two High Courts then, in so far as the proviso purported not  to extend  the application of the section -to  "’acting"    the Original  Side  it  was  wholly  unnecessary  and  may  have accordingly  been deleted as not being necessary.   Further, if  the intention was to give the Supreme Court advocates  a right  to appear and plead only in any High Court in any  of its  jurisdictions,  then  the  proviso, in  so  far  as  it purported   not  to  extend the section  to  pleading    the Original   Side  of  those two High  Courts,  could  not  be retained. If, therefore, the intention of the operative part of  the  section was that the Supreme Court  advocate  would have  the  right  only  "to  appear  and  plead",  which  is consonant with the functions of a Supreme Court advocate and also  co-extensive  with  the rights of  the  Original  Side advocates  of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts under  the rules, the proviso had to be deleted in full and, therefore, no argument can be founded   the fact of such deletion.   We have,  therefore,  to  construe the operative  part  of  the section  by  reference  to  the  intention  we  can   gather primarily  from the language used in the section  and  other parts of the Act itself.           The  Legislature  which enacted the  statute  was well aware of the state of the law as embodied in the  rules of different High Courts preventing an advocate of one  High Court  from,  as  of right, " appearing and  pleading  "  in another  High  Court of which he Was not an  advocate.   The mischief  of  withholding  of the permission  by  the  Chief

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Justices   no better ground than the absence of  reciprocity between  the High Courts was notorious.  The Act set out  to remedy  that mischief as is obvious from the full title  and the  non-obstante clause in section 2 of the Act as  I  have herein  before explained.  It was known to  the  Legislature that an advocate was by Order 1, rule 2, of the Supreme 82 Court Rules defined as a person entitled only "to appear and plead"  before the Supreme Court, that under  Order  IV,rule 11, no person could appear as an advocate unless  instructed by  an  agent  and that under Order IV,  rule  30,  such  an advocate  could  in no circumstances "act" as an  agent,  In short,  the Legislature knew that the scope or ambit of  the Supreme Court advocate’s profession was only "to appear  and plead".   With  all this knowledge the  Legislature  enacted section  2 authorising every advocate of the  Supreme  Court "to  practise as of right in any High Court".  Applying  the dictionary  meaning  to  the word  "practise,"  the  section authorises  every  Supreme Court advocate "to  exercise  his profession  as of right in any High Court".  The  scope  and ambit of the Supreme Court advocate’s profession being  only "to  appear  and  plead" there can be  no  escape  from  the conclusion  that  the section authorises the  Supreme  Court advocate only "to appear and plead" in any High Court.   The reasoning  is  the same as that adopted or involved  in  the Patna case referred to above.  An advocate of the Patna High Court  was,  under its rules, entitled "to appear,  act  and plead"  in  that High Court.  When section 4  of  the  Legal Practitioners Act authorised such advocate "to practise"  in the subordinate Court it was held in the Patna case to  mean that the advocate could do all that he could do in the  High Court,  namely,  "appear,  act and plead".   The  words  "to practise"  were  held  to cover  all  these  activities  not because those words had that invariable ,meaning but because those  words had that meaning only in relation to  advocates who  -by  the  rule of the High  Courts  were  entitled  "to appear,  act and plead In short, the content of those  words varies  with  the ambit and scope of the profession  of  the advocate  with regard-to whom they are use     a  parity  of reasoning,  the Supreme Court advocate being  entitled  only "to  appear  and plead", when section 2 authorised  him  "to practise" in any High Court, it must be taken to have  meant that he was authorised to do in the High Courts all that  he was entitled to do in the                             83 Supreme  Court,  namely, "to appear and plead"  only.   This construction   appears  to  me  to  be  quite  logical   and calculated  to  give effect to the object of  the  Act.   It brings about a close approximation between the  non-obstante clause and the operative part of the section which should be the aim of every well drawn statute.               It is asked: bow can a Supreme Court advocate who can only "appear and plead" when he is instructed by  an agent, "appear and plead" in any High Court where there  are no  Supreme  Court  agents to instruct him  ?  This,  in  my opinion,  is taking an extremely narrow view of the  matter. The Supreme Court advocate’s profession being confined  only to  appearing  and  pleading,  when  he  is  authorised  "to practise",  i.e.,  to exercise his profession  in  any  High Court, he must carry with him his  professional  limitations but  must  be governed by those rules of High  Courts  which regulate  the practice of advocates who can only  "   appear and  plead"’ in the High Courts, for he cannot  practise  in vacuo.  Seeing that there are persons authorised "to act" in every  High  Court  who may instruct  another  advocate,  no

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practical  difficulty  can arise in the way of  the  Supreme Court  advocate  appearing and pleading in the  High  Court. Under Ch. I, rule 38, of the Calcutta Original Side Rules  a Barrister  advocate of any other High Court or  an  Original Side  advocate of Bombay is permitted to "appear and  plead" in  the  Original Side of the Calcutta High Court  with  the permission  of the Chief Justice.  Surely, nobody  has  ever suggested  that such a foreign advocate must carry with  him an instructing advocate or attorney of his own court who  is competent  to act in order to instruct him when  he  appears and pleads in the Calcutta High Court.  He is instructed  by an attorney of the Original Side of the Calcutta High  Court without any difficulty.  Same remarks apply when an Original Side  --advocate of Calcutta goes to appear and plead    the Original Side of Bombay under Ch.  I, rule 6, of the  Bombay rules, for surely such an advocate does not carry a Calcutta attorney with him but is quite satisfactorily 84 instructed by a Bombay attorney.  An Original Side  advocate of the Calcutta or Bombay High Court who cannot appear   the Original  Side  unless  instructed by an  attorney  can  and frequently does appear and plead   the Appellate Side    the instruction  of an advocate of the Appellate Side who  being entitled  to act can instruct the Original Side advocate  to appear  and plead.  If we adopt this construction,  the  Act becomes workable, but if we adopt the construction suggested by   the  petitioner,  then  the  Supreme  Court   advocates practising  in High Courts by virtue of the Act will  become freelances   creating  chaos  and  confusion  as   I   shall hereinafter  more fully explain.  In my opinion there is  no substance at all in this  objection of the petitioners.             It is next pointed out that the result of  this construction will be to make the new right illusory in  that a Supreme Court advocate will not be entitled to "act"  even the Appellate Side of a High Court where he is not  enrolled and such a resuIt will militate against the principle of the unification of the Indian Bar.  This objection is  obviously based    the  assumption that the object of this Act  is  to bring  about such a drastic and far reaching result.   There is  no warrant which I can see for any such  assumption.   I have already mentioned that the point of controversy    this subject  was that an advocate   the roll of one  High  Court could  not  as  of right "appear and plead"  in  other  High Courts  but  had to depend   the good graces  of  the  Chief Justices of such other High Courts who frequently.  withheld the  requisite permission even to very.  eminent  advocates. There  was hardly ever any claim made by an advocate of  one High Court "to act" as an advocate of another High Court  of which  he was not an advocate.  The limited object  of  this Act  appearing  from  its full title  and  the  non-obstante clause as explained above was to remedy only this particular defect  by providing that an advocate of the  Supreme  Court would be entitled as of right "to practise", i.e.,  exercise his  profession,  i.e., "to appear and plead", in  any  High Court even though                             85              he  was  not  ’ the roll of that  High  Court. This  certainly  was  an important step in  the  process  of bringing  about  uniformity in the Indian Bar,  for  it  did bring into,: being a category of advocates who might "appear and  plead"  in all Court’s throughout India  and  form  the nucleus of an all India Bar.  More than this was not  within the  scope  and object of this Act as I  apprehend  it.   To adopt  a  construction  which will permit  a  Supreme  Court advocate  who  is also enrolled in the High  Court  of,  say

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Travancore-Cochin  in the south or off the  State  popularly called  Pepsu in the north, to go and "act" in the  Original Sides  of  the High Court of Calcutta or  Bombay  which  the advocates  of those High Courts cannot do, will lead  to  no end  of confusion as will be explained more fully  hereafter and  that consideration alone should induice me  to  discard the  -petitioners’  construction and  adopt  a  construction which will not give rise to practical inconvenience.             It is pointed out that while this  construction may  bring  about a perfect approximation between  the  non- obstante  clause  and  the operative part of  section  2  by entitling  only foreign Supreme Court advocates  "to  appear and  plead" in any High Court as of right,, it runs  counter to the concluding words of the operative part of section  2, namely,  "whether  or  not he is an Advocate  of  that  High Court", for, it is urged, those words clearly indicate  that the  section purports to confer   a Supreme  Court  advocate the  right to practise not only in a High Court of which  he is not an advocate, but also to give him some right in rela- tion  to his own High Court.  The Court below has held  that the  words "whether or not" are not quite apposite and  that what  was meant was that a right was given to every  Supreme Court  advocate "to practise" in any High Court even  if  he was not an advocate of that High Court.  In other words, the Act  itself gives a right to the Supreme Court  advocate  to practise as of right in any High Court and that being so  it was  immaterial to consider whether he was an advocate of  a particular High Court or not, i.e., 86             irrespective  of  his -being or  not  being  an advocate  of that High Court.  I am inclined to  agree  with this view.  Let me, however, test the soundness of the  view propounded  by  the petitioner   the strength of  the  words "whether  or not etc." Take the case of an advocate  of  the Madras High Court.  Under the rules of the Madras High Court be  is  entitled  "to  appear, act and  plead"  in  all  its jurisdictions.   When  such an advocate is  enrolled  as  an advocate  of  the Supreme Court, section 2 of  the  Act,  as construed by the petitioner, really gives him no  additional right in relation to his own High Court, for already -he  is entitled  "to  appear, act and plead" there.   That  is  the position  also  with  regard to the advocates  of  all  High Courts, other than the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay in the  matter of their right to practise in  their  respective High  Courts.  Seeing that the advocates of 18  High  Courts did  not in fact get any new right in their respective  High Courts, it cannot reasonably be said that the object of  the Act  was  to give any right to an advocate of  a  particular High Court in respect of his own High Court.  It is  pointed out  that an advocate enrolled   the Appellate Sides of  the Bombay  and  Calcutta  High  Courts is  not,  as  of  right, entitled  to appear, act and plead   the Original  Side  and the  object  of  the Act was to give  those  Appellate  Side advocates  of  the  Calcutta  and  Bombay  High-Courts  some additional  rights in the Original- Side of their  own  High Courts.   In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Act  gives  no additional  right  to the advocates of any of  the  18  High Courts  in relation to their respective High’ Courts  it  is difficult  to  imagine  that the object of the  Act  was  to bestow  some  special favours only   the. advocates  of  the Appellate  Sides  of the Calcutta and  Bombay  High  Courts. Therefore,  it appears to me that the words "whether or  not etc." read in the light of the purpose of the Act  appearing from  the  full  title  and  the  non-obstante  clause  only emphasise  that  the object was to give  the  Supreme  Court

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advocate a statutory right to practise in any High Court                             87 of  which he was not an advocate, irrespective of his  other rights, if any.  It is a new right given by the Act  proprio vigore to a class of foreign advocates.  Further, if the use of  the  words "whether or not etc." must  necessarily  mean that the object of the Act was to give a special right to an Appellate  Side  advocate of the Calcutta  and  Bombay  High Courts  in  relation  to  his own High  Court  it  does  not necessarily  follow’  that the words "to practise"  must  be given such a wide meaning as would also cover acting, for if the  words’  "to  practise" are read as  extending  only  to appearing  and  pleading,  even  then  the  Appellate   Side advocates  of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts would  get some additional right in their own High Courts in that  they become entitled by virtue of their position as Supreme Court advocates "to appear and plead"   the Original Side  without having  to  take steps under the respective rules  of  those High  Courts  to  entitle them to  appear  and  plead    the Original  Side.   In this view of the matter also  the  con- cluding  words  "whether or not etc.  "  cannot  affect  the construction put by me   the operative part of the section.            Even  if  I am wrong in adopting  the  foregoing line  of reasoning, the petitioner will yet have to meet  an alternative  construction which has commended itself to  the learned  Judges  of the High Court and  my  learned  brother Mukherjea,  and  which  I am also prepared to  accept  as  a cogent  alternative.  The Act authorises every  advocate  of the  Supreme Court as of right " to practise " in  any  High Court.   The use of the words "to practise " in relation  to an  advocate  clearly indicates that he is to  exercise  the profession of an advocate.  To exercise the profession of an advocate in a High Court must involve the observance of  the rules  of  practice of ’that High Court.  It is  urged  that this  construction amounts, in reality, to adding  words  to the  section,  namely,  as an advocate  of  that  Court"  or "according  to the rules of that Court." This contention  is founded   a clear misaprehension, for I am really not adding anything at 88          all but I am only stating what is implicit in  the section  as it stands., In other words, I am construing  the words  of the section and ascertaining its true meaning  and import.   The  necessary implication of the  fact  that  the Supreme Court advocate is to exercise his profession in  any High  Court  may  well be that he  becomes  entitled  to  do whatever  an advocate (if that particular High Court can  do under the, rules of practice of that High Court.  Thus  when the  Supreme  Court  advocate  goes  to  practise  in   the, Appellate  Side be will be entitled to act and plead  as  an Appellate Side advocate does and when he goes to practise in the  Original  Side he will only plead as an  Original  Side advocate  does  and  in either case be  must  abide  by  the relevant rules, for he must practise. as an advocate of  the particular High Court does, namely, under and subject to the rules.  Nobody has ever suggested that an advocate or  vakil authorised to practise in subordinate courts or in any other High  Court under section 4 of the Legal  Practitioners  Act was  not  bound by the rules of the Court where he  went  to practise.           It is argued that the rules of the High Courts of which  the     Supreme  Court advocate is  not  an  advocate cannot in terms apply to him when he chooses to exercise the right given to him by the Act, for those rules apply to  the advocates of those High Courts.  This again, I conceive,  is

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taking  a narrow view of the matter.  The rules of the  High Court certainly apply to the advocates entitled to  practise in that High Court and when an Act invests an advocate,  who is  not  an advocate of a particular High  Court,  with  the right  to practise in that High Court, for all  intents  and purposes  such an advocate becomes, as it were, a  statutory advocate  of  that High Court and as such  becomes  invested with the rights as well as the obligations of an advocate of that,  Court.  In other words, the Act proprio vigore  makes him a person entitled to practise in that Court and as  such amenable to and governed by all the rules applicable to  and regulating the practice of persons entitled ’to                             89 practise in that Court, except, of course, such of the rules as are contrary to, i.e., destructive of this new  statutory right  and which must, therefore, as regards him, be  deemed to be inoperative.  Surely the Supreme Court advocate cannot practise  in  vacuo.   To accede to the  contention  of  the petitioner  is  to  say that a  body  of  professional  men, namely, the Supreme Court advocates, have been let loose "to practise",  i.e., to "act and plead"’ in all High Courts  in all   their  jurisdictions  untramelled  by  any  rules   of practice--a  proposition which, in my opinion, ha-, only  to be stated to be rejected.  It is fraught with grave  dangers and,  at  any  rate,  will  inevitably  lead  to   practical inconvenience  and  to no end of utter confusion.   If  that view  were  accepted  the Supreme  Court  advocate  will  be entitled  to walk in and walk out of the High Court  in  any costume  that  his fancy may choose.  He may  throw  to  the winds the rules of precedence of advocates including that of the  Advocate-General.   According  to  the  rules  of   the Original Side of Calcutta an attorney is authorised to cause service  of  notice of motion and chamber  summons  but  the opposite party will not be bound to accept service from  the Supreme Court advocate who is not so authorised.   According to   the  Calcutta  Original  Side  rules  an  attorney   is personally responsible for the requisition fees,  deposition fees  etc.,  but  a Supreme Court  advocate  acting  in  the Original  Side will not be so responsible at all.  Nor  will the High Court be able to get at the Supreme Court  advocate to realise the fees if he is not to be governed by the rules governing  the  conduct of persons who  act    the  Original Side.’  The attorneys acting - in the Original  Side  cannot charge  the  client  with a pice over  and  above  the  fees prescribed in the rules of taxation as between attorney  and client  but a Supreme Court advocate acting in the  Original Side,  not being in terms bound by the taxation rules,  will be  free  to fleece the client to any  extent he  can.   The attorneys  being officers of the Court are under  the  rules and   the  Letters  Patent  amenable  to  the   disciplinary jurisdiction of the High 90 Court  but a Supreme Court advocate may with  impunity  snap his fingers at the High Court, for under no provision of law as it exists except section 2 of the Act can the High  Court exercise disciplinary jurisdiction   such advocates.  It  is unnecessary  to multiply instances of confusion.   This  one consideration  of inconvenience and confusion is  enough  to discard  the construction sponsored by the petitioners’  for the  true rule of construction is that if two  constructions are possible, that which-leads to absurdity and brings about practical  inconvenience and encourages confusion and  chaos must   be  eschewed.   Neither  of  the  two   constructions suggested by me will have any such consequence and either of them  will make the section workable in practice and at  the

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same  time accomplish a considerable measure of  unification of  the Indian Bar.  The petitioners see the difficulty  and to  get  over  it suggest that the  Supreme  Court  advocate practising  in  a High Court will and can be  bound  by  the existing  ordinary  rules  of  practice  except  those  that prevent him from acting and pleading or that the High  Court -may  frame separate rules for the Supreme  Court  advocates practising before them.  This very concession at once  gives away  the whole case of the petitioners.  As I have  already stated  clause  9 of the Letters Patent  empowers  the  High Courts  to  approve, admit and enrol advocates,  vakils  and attorneys  and  such  advocates,  vakils  and  attorneys  -I emphasise  the word " such "are authorised to appear in  the High  Courts and to plead or to act or to do both  according to  the  rules made by the High Courts.   The  High  Courts’ rule-making  power as to enrolment of advocates, vakils  and attorneys and their respective functions and powers is  thus quite  clearly confined to advocates, vakils  and  attorneys admitted and enrolled by them and does not and cannot extend to  Supreme  Court  advocates who  are  not    their  rolls. Section  119  of the Code of Civil  Procedure  excludes  the application  of the rules of practice relating to  advocates and  pleaders  from  Original Side  of  High  Courts  unless adopted by them by rules framed                             91 under  the Letters Patent which,as already  stated,  governs only their own advocates.  The Supreme Court of India, under article  145, can only make rules for  regulating  generally the  practice and procedure of the Supreme  Court  including rules as to the persons practising before it.  That  article does not authorise the Supreme Court to make rules  regulat- ing  the  practice  and  procedure of  High  Courts  or  the conditions subject to which the Supreme Court advocates  may practise before the High Courts.  The Act we are considering does  not confer any power   the High Courts to frame  rules subject to which the Supreme Court advocates shall  exercise in the High Court their newly acquired statutory right under this Act.  The Bar Councils’ rule-making power under section 15  is  limited  only to High Court  advocates,  clause  (b) having been superseded by, section 2 of this Act.  There is, therefore, no provision of law except section 2 itself which will  enable  the  High Courts to  prescribe  any  rules  of conduct  ’for the Supreme Court advocates or to oblige  them to conform to any rule of practice when they go to  practise in  any High Court.  Therefore, if we accept either  of  the two  constructions  suggested  by me it  will  prevent  this absurd  and undesirable result, for then the  Supreme  Court advocates  when they go ’to practise in any High Court  will appear and plead or, alternatively, do what an. advocate  of the High Court can do, and in either case be subject to  the relevant rules by which the advocates of the particular High Court are bound.  If that were not the meaning of section 2, then the Supreme Court advocates will be untrammelled by any rule  of  practice  at  all.   Further,    the  petitioners’ construction,  even  if the High Courts have power  to  make rules  with  regard to Supreme  Court  advocates  practising before them, any the least obligation or restriction imposed by such rules   the Supreme Court advocates by way of making them  personally liable for any fees etc., or bringing  them under the disciplinary jurisdiction or the High Courts  will certainly be 92 challenged  as  a fetter placed   their statutory  right  to practise,  in  the High Court and as such  not  binding  ton them.  Finally there will be two sets of rules, namely,  the

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existing  rules  governing  the  attorneys  who  act     the original Side and some new rules to be made for the  supreme Court  advocates who may choose to act   the Original  Side. The resulting creation of a now and distinct class of actors in the Original Sides of the two High Courts will indeed  be a sad commentary   the supposed intention of the Legislature to  achieve  uniformity and unification of the  Indian  Bar. The petitioners’ construction must, therefore, be rejected.          It   is   next  said   that     this   alternative construction  the  rights of a Supreme Court  advocate  will vary from High Court to High Court and that will not be con- sistent  with the policy of uniformity underlying  the  Act. In the first place it is an assumption, without any warrant, that  the  Act  was  out to  achieve  perfect  symmetry  and uniformity  of  the kind which we  may  consider  desirable. Secondly,no serious inconvenience will follow if the  rights of  a  Supreme Court advocate vary from High Court  to  High Court.  The status and rights of advocates of different High Courts  do  vary  under their   respective  rules  and  such variation   has  existed  of  or  long  time   without   any inconvenience.    This  Act  does  not  at  all   purport-to eliminate  those  differences amongst the advocates  of  the different   High  Courts  which  will  yet  continue.    The construction   sought  to  be  put    the  section  by   the petitioner  Aswini Kumar Ghosh will, therefore, only  create fresh  differences by bringing into being a new  variety  of practitioners who will have yet different rights in all  the High  Courts.    the other hand, the construction  suggested above will cause the least possible inconvenience and at the same time remedy the long-, standing grievance of  advocates of  High  Courts    account  of  the  bar  against  their  " appearing  -and pleading" in High Courts of which  they  are not advocates by authorising them, after being enrolled as Supreme Court advocates to do so as of right and                             93 without the necessity of their obtaining the sanction of the Chief  Justices  of  the High  Courts  concerned.   The  Act permits  -a well defined body of professional  men,  namely, the  Supreme Court advocates, to exercise the profession  of an  advocate in any High Court.  That this certainly  was  a forward  step  in achieving uniformity  cannot  possibly  be denied.   Nothing more was within the purview of the Act  as expressed in its full title and the non-obstante clause.          Finally,  reference is made to the proviso  as  it now  appears  in section 2 and it is claimed that  the  word "practise"  in the operative part of the section  must  mean "appear,  act and plead" because that word as  appearing  in the  proviso  obviously has that meaning,  and  reliance  is placed   the rule of construction that the same word  should be  given  the same meaning wherever it occurs in  the  Act. All  that this proviso says is that nothing in this  section shall  be  deemed to entitle a post-Constitution  Judge  who might be -an advocate of the Supreme Court to practise in  a High  Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if  he  had given an undertaking not to practise there after ceasing  to hold  office  as such Judge.  In other words, all  that  the proviso does is to say that the right created by the section shall  not extend to a Tudge if he had given an  undertaking not  to  practise in that Court.  In the  first  place  this proviso  was wholly redundant in view of the  constitutional prohibition contained in article 220.  Further, the language of the proviso is inept in that it seems to suggest that  if such  a Judge had not given an undertaking he would be  free to  practise  which certainly is contrary  to  article  220. Finally  there  is  no  difficulty in  giving  to  the  word

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"practise" occurring in the proviso the same general meaning given  to  that word in the operative part of  the  section, namely,  "to exercise the profession".  It is said  that  if the  words "to practise" mean only "to plead", then a  post- Constitution  Judge after his retirement would  be  entitled "to  act"  in the High Court of which he was at any  time  a Judge.   There is no force in this argument because such  lb Judge 94 will  be  prevented  from acting and  pleading  anywhere  by virtue of the provisions of article 220 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, not-necessary to give the word  "practise" the  wider  meaning contended for by the  petitioner  Aswini Kumar  Ghosh.  We must also remember that the  general  rule relied upon may be excluded by the subject,or context.                   For  reasons  stated  above,  whether  we adopt  one  or the other method  of  construction  suggested above, in my opinion,, this petition cannot succeed and must be dismissed.                      Appeal allowed.           Agent for the respondents: P. K. Bose.       Agent for Intervener No. 1 : P. K. Mukherjee.         Agent for Intervener No. 2: Sukumar Ghose. Agent for Intervener No. 3: I N. Shroff, for P. K. Bose. Agent for Intervener No 4: Bajinder Narain.