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REPORTABLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 8421 Of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.12601 of 2018)

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.    ..APPELLANTS

VERSUS

ACHAL SINGH            ..RESPONDENT

WITH

Civil Appeal No. 8422  of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.18737 of 2018)

Civil Appeal No. 8423 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.18739 of 2018)

AND  

Civil Appeal No. 8424 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.18741 of 2018)

J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2. The State of Uttar Pradesh in the appeals is aggrieved by

common judgment and order dated 29.11.2017 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, allowing the writ petitions filed

by the respondents herein seeking voluntary retirement from the

Government services.  Directions were issued to treat the respondents

to have retired from Government services with effect from 30.11.2017

and 31.12.2017.

3. The main question for consideration before us is as to whether

under Rule 56 of the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules (hereinafter

referred to as the “Fundamental Rules”) as amended, an employee has

unfettered right to seek voluntary retirement by serving a notice of

three months to the State Government or whether the State

Government under the Explanation attached to Rule 56 of the

Fundamental Rules, is authorised to decline the prayer for voluntary

retirement in the public interest under clause (c) of Rule 56 of the

Fundamental Rules as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh.

4. The respondent ­ Dr. Achal Singh was working as Joint Director

in  Medical,  Health  and  Family  Welfare,  Lucknow Region,  Lucknow

filed an application dated 14.12.2016 for voluntary retirement  w.e.f.

31.3.2017.  Respondent – Dr. Ajay Kumar Tiwari was holding the post

of Joint  Director,  Medical,  Health and  Family  Welfare,  Devi Patan

Mandal, Gonda, filed an application on 28.2.2017 seeking voluntary

retirement  w.e.f.  31.5.2017.   Respondent ­ Dr. Rajendra Kumar

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Srivastava was working as Senior Consultant, filed an application for

voluntary retirement on 15.4.2015 and respondent ­ Dr. Rajiv

Chaudhary  was  working as  Senior  Consultant  at  District  Hospital,

Raibareli, he sought voluntary retirement by filing an application on

3.12.2016.   The applications remained unattended and no order had

been communicated, hence writ petitions were filed in the High Court.

The respondents­doctors were members of the Provincial Medical

Services.

5. The High Court in the impugned judgment and order has

observed that it is the responsibility of the authorities to monitor the

health system in the State and they have to sincerely examine the

issues  as to  how  the working of the  Government  hospitals  can be

improved for the betterment of the general public and find out why

doctors are opting for voluntary retirement every day.  The High Court

also observed that the doctors are not interested in joining the

Government service when fresh recruitments take place.   The High

Court has also noted that posts of Medical Officers are not being filled

up on account of non­availability of candidates.  The High Court has

further noted that those who have entered into Government service

are continuously opting for voluntary retirement from service causing

serious scarcity of doctors in Government hospitals and Primary

Health Centres.

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6. The High Court in the impugned judgment has also referred to

the report of the MCI and the existing proportion of one doctor per

2000 population.    In  fact,  the number of  doctors  is much smaller

than the number given in the  MCI report.   The  High  Court also

observed that the doctors are being posted, in spite of scarcity, on the

administrative posts that causes wastage of specialised talent.   The

High Court has also observed that the authorities must provide

adequate infrastructure,  working  equipment,  and a  proper  working

environment. The hospitals should be made excellent centres of health

care.   It should  be the  object of the  State  Government to  provide

doctors with good opportunities so as to retain them in services.   At

the  same  time, the High Court  has also observed that in  order to

enhance the better medical facilities to the poor and needy people, it

would be appropriate to maintain a balance between the senior and

junior  doctors in  each Primary  Health  Centres in rural  and urban

areas.   There  is a need to provide continuing medical education to

doctors and to hold conferences and seminars to exchange the latest

views/opinions/knowledge etc. and their performance in such events

should also be considered for promotion etc.   At the same time, the

High Court has allowed the writ petitions and treated the doctors to

have retired voluntarily on the dates specified. Aggrieved thereby, the

State has come up in these appeals.

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7. It was urged by Mr. P.N. Mishra, learned senior counsel

appeared on behalf of appellant that as per Explanation attached to

Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules as amended in the State of Uttar

Pradesh, it  was open to the  State  Government to take  a decision

whether to retire an employee voluntarily under Rule 56(a) duly

considering the public interest or decline the applications for

voluntary retirement.  It was also submitted that there is no automatic

retirement on the expiry of the period of notice of three months served

under Rule 56 as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.  There has

to be an express order granting permission to retire voluntarily, only

thereafter an employee can be said to have retired voluntarily.   There

is a scarcity of doctors in the Provincial Health Services in the State of

Uttar Pradesh, thus, the State  Government has not accepted the

applications for voluntary retirement.   The directions  issued by the

High Court is based on a misinterpretation of Rule 56 of the

Fundamental Rules and is against the public interest.

8. It was contended by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf

of the appellants that in the case of Dr. Achal Singh, the State

Government has passed the order on 31.5.2017.   The prayer for

voluntary retirement was rejected on the ground of lack of specialised

doctors and in public interest and the notice seeking voluntary

retirement under Rule 56 was rejected and in other cases, the

applications were kept pending. They further contended that Rule 56

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contemplates a notice and not a request for voluntary retirement.  An

employee is not required to give reason  while giving a notice for

voluntary  retirement  and  in  any such event,  such reasons  are  not

justiciable.   It is a prerogative of the employee to seek voluntary

retirement.  The right of the employee to retire voluntarily corresponds

with the right of the State Government to retire him in the case of

deficiency in services.  As held in Dinesh Chandra Sangma vs. State of

Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, the rule provides right to retire and not to

seek it.   The acceptance of the appointing authority is required only

when the disciplinary enquiry is pending and its pendency has been

communicated to the employee.  Once notice of three months is given,

the doctor is deemed to have retired and any action of attempting to

reject the notice of voluntary retirement after the said date is

ineffective in law.   The decision has to be taken within a period of

three  months, otherwise, the employee is automatically  deemed to

have retired on the lapse of three months’ period.   It was contended

that the court not to interfere with the principle of certainty of rule of

law may be applied and long­standing precedent of  Dinesh Chandra

Sangma (supra)  may not be dislodged and be applied to the cases at

hand.   The  only condition  of voluntary retirement is fulfilled  after

completion of 20 years of service and if it is allowed, it does not affect

the availability of doctors.  The State has not taken care to recruit the

doctors.   It is not permissible to  withhold the order of voluntary

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retirement.   In case this Court does not agree  with the decision

rendered in  Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra),  the  matter  may be

referred to a larger Bench.   The view taken by the High Court in the

impugned judgment and order may be affirmed with the rider of an

imposition of the moratorium to balance the equities.

9. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, it is necessary to

consider the Fundamental  Rules  as  amended  in  the State  of  Uttar

Pradesh.   The same is somewhat different from the rules framed in

other States.  Rule 56 of Fundamental Rules as amended in the State

of Uttar Pradesh, is extracted hereunder:

“56.(a)   Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, every Government servant other than a Government servant in inferior service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years.   He may be retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement with the sanction of the Government on public grounds  which  must  be recorded in  writing,  but  he must not be retained after the age of 60 years1 except in very special circumstances.

(b)   A Government servant in inferior service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years.  He must not be retained in service after that  date,  except  in very special  circumstances and with sanction of the Government.

(c)  Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause (b), the appointing authority may, at any time by notice to any Government servant (whether permanent or temporary), without assigning any reason, require him to retire after he attains the age of fifty years or such Government servant may by notice to the appointing authority voluntarily retire at any time after attaining the age of forty­five years or after he has completed qualifying service of twenty years.

1 In the  Medical,  Health  and Family  Welfare  Department in  State  Medical  and Health Services, the retirement age of Medical Officers in public interest has been approved as 62 years in place of 60 years with certain conditions vide Notification No.2324/SEC­2­5­2017­ 7(237)/2014 dated 31.5.2017.

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(d)  the period of such notice shall be three months:

Provided that­ (i)   any such Government servant may by order of the appointing authority, without such notice or by a shorter notice, be retired forthwith at any time after attaining the age of fifty years, and on such retirement the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, if any, for the period of the notice, or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three  months,  at the same  rates  at  which  he was drawing immediately before this retirement;

(ii)   it shall  be  open  to the appointing authority to  allow a Government servant to retire without any notice or by a shorter  notice  without requiring the  Government  servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice:

Provided further that such  notice  given  by the Government servant against whom a disciplinary proceeding is pending or contemplated, shall  be effective only  if it is accepted by the appointing authority, provided that in the case of a contemplated disciplinary proceeding the Government servant shall be informed before the expiry of his notice that it has not been accepted:

Provided also that the  notice once given  by a  Government servant under clause (c) seeking voluntary retirement shall not be withdrawn by him except with the permission of the appointing authority.

(e)   A retiring pension shall be payable and other retirement benefits, if any, shall be available in accordance  with and subject to the provisions of the relevant Rules to every Government servant who retires or is required or allowed to retire under this rule.

Provided that  where a  Government servant  who  voluntarily retires or  is allowed voluntarily to retire under this rule the appointing authority may allow him, for the purposes of pension and gratuity, if any, the benefit of additional service of five years or of such period as he would have served if he had continued till the ordinary date of his superannuation, whichever be less;

Explanation.­  (1)   The decision of the appointing authority under clause (c) to require the Government servant to retire as specified therein shall be taken if it appears to the said authority to be in public interest, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to require any recital, in the order, of such decision having been taken in the public interest.

(2)   In order to be satisfied whether  it  will  be in the public interest to require a Government servant to retire under clause

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(c), the appointing authority may take into consideration any material relating to the Government servant and nothing herein contained shall be construed to exclude from consideration –

(a)  any entries relating to any period before such Government servant was allowed to cross any efficiency bar or before he was promoted to any post in an officiating or substantive capacity or on an ad hoc basis; or

(b) any entry against which a representation is pending, provided that the representation is also taken into consideration along with the entry; or

(c) any report of the Vigilance Establishment constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965.

(2A) Every such decision shall be deemed to have been taken in the public interest.

(3)   The expression appointing authority means the authority which for the time being has the power to make substantive appointments to the post or service from which the Government  servant is required or  wants to  retire;  and the expression ‘qualifying service' shall have the same meaning as in the relevant Rules relating to retiring pension.

(4)   Every order of the appointing authority requiring a Government servant to retire forthwith under the first proviso to clause (d) of this rule shall have effect from the afternoon of the date of its issue, provided that if after the date of its issue, the Government servant concerned, bona fide and in ignorance of that order, performs the duties of his office his acts shall be deemed to be valid notwithstanding the fact of his having earlier retired.”

Reading of the aforesaid rule makes it clear that an employee

can be retired by the Government after he attains the age of 50 years

or Government servant may voluntarily retire at any time after

attaining the  age  of  45  years  or  after  he  has  completed  qualifying

service of 20 years under Rule 56(c).  It is provided in the Rule 56 that

Government may retire a Government servant without any notice or by

serving a shorter  notice and on such retirement, the  Government

servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of

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his  pay plus allowances, if  any, for the period of  notice  or for the

period it falls short of three months at the same rates at which he was

drawing immediately  before  his retirement.   It is  also  open to the

Government to allow a  Government servant to retire  without any

notice or by a shorter notice without requiring the Government

servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice.  The proviso to Rule 56(d)

makes it clear that the notice given by the Government servant against

whom a disciplinary proceeding is pending or contemplated, shall be

effective only if it is accepted by the appointing authority and provided

that in case of a contemplated disciplinary proceeding, the

Government servant shall be informed before the expiry of the notice

that it has not been accepted. It is also provided that once a notice is

given by a Government servant seeking voluntary retirement shall not

be withdrawn by him except with the permission of the appointing

authority.  

Rule 56(e) provides that pension and other retiral benefits shall

be available to every Government servant, who retires or is required or

allowed to retire under the rule.   Proviso to Rule 56(e) provides that

appointing authority at its discretion may allow benefits of additional

service  of 5 years to such  employees  who voluntarily retires  or is

allowed voluntarily to retire under the rule for the purposes of pension

and gratuity  or  of  such period as he would have served  if  he  had

continued till the ordinary date of his superannuation.

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10. The  explanation  attached to  Rule  56  makes it clear that the

decision of the appointing authority under clause  (c)  of  Rule 56 to

retire a Government servant shall be taken if it appears to be in public

interest.  The explanation  is  applicable to  both  the exigencies  viz.,

when Government retires  an employee or  when an employee seeks

voluntary retirement, not only when Government desires to retire an

employee in public interest.   The Explanation attached to Rule 56 as

applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh is clear and precise.

11. In our opinion, whether voluntary retirement is automatic or an

order  is required to be passed would depend upon the phraseology

used in a particular rule under which retirement is to be ordered or

voluntary retirement is sought.  The factual position of each and every

case has to be seen along  with applicable rules  while applying a

dictum of the  Court interpreting any  other rule it should  be  Pari

Materia.   Rule 56(2) deals with the satisfaction of the Government to

require a Government servant to retire in the public interest.  For the

purpose, the Government may consider any material relating to

Government servant and may requisition any report from the Vigilance

Establishment.

12. The respondents have relied on dictum in  Dinesh  Chandra

Sangma vs. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, a three­Judge Bench of

this Court observed as under:

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“7. Before we proceed further we  may read F. R. 56 as amended:

F.R.56(a) The date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant is the date on which he attains the age of 55 years. He may be retained in service after this age with sanction of the State Government  on  public grounds  which  must  be recorded in writing and proposals for the retention of a Government servant in service after this age should not be made except in very special circumstances.

(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the appropriate authority may,  if  he  is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, retire Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, after he has attained fifty years of age or has completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier.

(c) Any Government servant may, by giving notice of not  less than three months in writing to the appropriate authority, retire from service after he has attained the age of fifty years or has completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier.

It is clear from  the above that  under  F.  R. 56(b) the Government may retire a Government servant  in the public interest by giving him three months' notice in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu thereof after he has attained the age of  fifty years or has completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier.

8.  As is well­known Government servants hold office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, under Article 310 of the Constitution. However, the pleasure doctrine under Article 310 is limited by Article 311(2). It is clear that the services of a permanent Government servant cannot be terminated except in accordance  with the rules made under Article 309 subject to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the Fundamental Rights. It is also well­ settled that even a temporary Government servant or a probationer cannot  be  dismissed  or removed  or reduced in rank except in accordance with Article 311(2). The above doctrine of pleasure is invoked by the  Government in the public interest after a Government servant attains the age of 50 years or has completed 25 years of service. This is constitutionally permissible as compulsory termination of

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service under F.R. 56 (b) does not amount to removal or dismissal by way of punishment. While the Government reserves its right to compulsorily retire a Government servant, even against his wish,  there  is a corresponding right of  the Government servant under F. R. 56(c) to voluntarily retire from service by giving the Government three  months' notice in writing. There is no question of acceptance of the request for voluntary retirement by the Government when the Government servant exercises his right under F. R. 56(c). Mr. Niren De is therefore right in conceding this position.

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13. F.R. 56 is one of the statutory rules  which binds the Government as well as the Government servant. The condition of service which is envisaged in Rule 56(c) giving an option in absolute terms to a Government servant to voluntarily retire with three months' previous notice, after he reaches 50 years of age or has completed 25 years of service, cannot therefore be equated  with  a contract of employment  as envisaged in Explanation 2 to Rule 119.

14.  The  field  occupied by  F.  R.  56  is left  untrammelled by Explanation 2 to Rule 119. The words "his contract of employment" in Explanation 2 are clinching on the point.

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17. The High Court committed an error on law in holding that consent of the Government was necessary to give legal effect to the voluntary retirement of the appellant  under  F.R. 56(c). Since the conditions of F.R. 56(c) are fulfilled in the instant case, the appellant must be held to have lawfully retired as notified by him with effect from August 2, 1976.

13. It was submitted that despite the absence of any identical

language, the rule involved in  Dinesh  Chandra Sangma (supra)  is

comparable with Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules and therefore, the

judgment is binding.  The submission based upon the same cannot be

accepted and Rule 56(b)(c) came up for consideration was somewhat

different and there was no such Explanation to Rule 56.

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14. In  Dinesh  Chandra Sangma  (supra) he  was the  District and

Sessions Judge at Dibrugarh in the State of Assam.   On account of

domestic troubles, he did not want to continue after attainment of the

age of 50 years.  He served a notice under Rule 56(c) as amended by

the Governor of Assam under Article 309 of the Constitution by

notification dated 22.7.1975.   The formal notice was served upon by

him.   The Government allowed him to retire from the State

Government Service and then there were certain developments in the

Government and Government sought to retrace its steps and passed

an order on 28.7.1976, countermanding its earlier order allowing him

to retire from service.  The High Court dismissed the writ application

filed by him.   The Fundamental  Rule  as applicable in the State  of

Assam came up for consideration.   In our opinion, it was quite

different.   It is provided in the Fundamental Rule 56(b) as applicable

in the State of Assam that public interest was germane  when a

Government servant retires.  Under Rule 56(c), a Government servant

may retire by giving notice of not less than three months.   Hence it

was observed that there was no question of acceptance of the request

for  voluntary retirement  by the  Government  when  the  Government

servant exercises his right under Rule 56(c).   Not only the rule was

different it was passed on the concession also, however, the

Explanation given to Rule 56 in the State of Uttar Pradesh makes it

completely different and the provisions in F.R.56(c) is also quite

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different.   The rules as applicable in Assam for the purpose of

retirement by the Government is contained in F.R.56(b) which require

retirement in public interest whereas no such rider exist in F.R.56(c)

when employee seek voluntary retirement, whereas rule in the State of

Uttar Pradesh both provisions are conjointly read not only the

language is different and the explanation makes out the whole

difference.

15. The Explanation attached to Rule 56 as applicable in the State of

Uttar Pradesh makes it  clear that when a decision is taken by the

authority under clause (c) of Rule 56, the right of an employee to retire

cannot be said to be absolute as in the case of resignation, voluntary

retirement is with retiral benefits whereas it may not necessarily follow

in case of resignation. The decision under the rules in U.P. is to be

based upon considering the public interest,  whether  it is a case of

retirement  by the  Government  or  a case of  a  Government servant

seeking voluntary retirement.   The decision rendered in  Dinesh

Chandra  Sangma (supra)  is distinguishable and  was  based  on the

differently couched rule.  The Explanation added makes the provisions

different in the State of Uttar Pradesh.   The decision in the case of

Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra) cannot be said to be operative being

quite distinguishable.

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16. Reliance has also been placed by the  learned counsel for  the

respondents on the decision rendered by this Court in B.J. Shelat vs.

State of Gujarat, (1978) 2 SCC 202.  The Court observed thus:

 “7. Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules provides for the retirement of Government servants before attaining the age of superannuation. Rule 161(1)(aa) provides­

Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) :

(1) An appointing authority shall, if he is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant to whom clause (a) applies by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice:

* * * * *

Sub­rule (2)(ii) is as follows:

Any  Government servant to  whom clause (a) applies  may, by giving  notice of  not less than three months in writing to the Appointing Authority, retire from service … and in any other case, after he has attained the age of 55 years.

There is no dispute that the Rule applicable is Rule 161 (2)(ii) and the appellant is entitled to retire by giving a notice of not less than 3 months after he has attained the age of 55 years. Under Rule 161(1)(aa)(1) the appointing authority has an absolute right to retire any Government servant to whom clause (a) applies in public interest by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. But the Government servant has no such absolute right. A right is conferred on the Government servant under Rule 161(2)(ii)  to retire by giving not less than three months’ notice on his attaining the prescribed age. Such a right is subject to the proviso which is incorporated to the                 sub­section which reads as follows:

Provided that it shall be open to the appointing authority to  withhold  permission to retire to  a Government servant who is under suspension, or against whom departmental proceedings are pending or contemplated, and who seeks to retire under this sub­clause.

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But for the proviso, a Government servant would be at liberty to' retire by giving not less than three months’ notice in writing to the appointing authority on attaining the prescribed age. This position has been made clear  by this Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, where the Court was considering the effect of the (Assam) Fundamental Rule 56(c) which confers right on the Government servant to voluntary retire. Rule 56(c) of the (Assam) Fundamental Rules runs as follows :

(c) Any Government servant may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appropriate authority, retire from service after he has attained the age of fifty years or has completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier.

On a construction of the Rule this Court held that the condition of service which is envisaged in Rule 56(c) giving an option in absolute terms to a Government servant to voluntarily retire with three months' previous notice, after he reaches 50 years of age or has completed 25 years of service, cannot be equated with a contract of employment as envisaged in Explanation 2 to Rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules and that Rule 56 is a statutory condition which operated in law without reference to a contract of employment and when once the conditions of Fundamental Rule 56(c) are fulfilled the Government servant must be held to have lawfully retired. But for the proviso to Rule 161(2)(ii), the decision of this Court in the case cited above would be applicable and the right would have been absolute. But the proviso has restricted the right conferred on the Government servant. Under the proviso it is open to the  appointing  authority to  withhold  permission to retire to a Government servant when (1) he is under suspension, or (2) against whom departmental proceedings are pending or contemplated. Thus the permission to retire can be withheld by the appointing authority either when the Government servant is under suspension or against  whom departmental proceedings are pending or contemplated. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that admittedly he was not under suspension on the date when he attained the age of 55 years and that no departmental proceedings were pending or contemplated against him as required under the proviso. No departmental  proceeding  was  pending  but  on the facts  one cannot say that a proceeding was not under contemplation.

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9.  Mr. Patel next referred  us to the  meaning of the  word "withhold" in  Webster's Third New International Dictionary which is given as "hold back" and submitted that the permission should be deemed to have been withheld if it is not

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communicated.  We are not able to read the meaning of  the word "withhold" as indicating that in the absence of a communication it must be understood as the permission having been withheld.”

The rule which came up for consideration in B.J. Shelat (supra)

was the Rule  161 of  Bombay Civil  Services  Rules,  1959.  The Rule

161(1) (aa) provides that appointing authority may retire a

Government servant in public interest by giving him a notice of not

less than three months or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu

thereof.  Rule 161(2)(ii) did not employ the word public interest when

the Government servant seeks voluntary retirement.   This has been

added to the Rule applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.   Neither

there is any provision in the aforesaid rules that require to pass an

order to decide an application by a Government servant seeking

voluntary retirement that too considering the public interest.   Under

the rules, it  was  open  to the  appointing  authority to  withhold the

permission to retire a Government servant who is under suspension or

against whom the departmental enquiry was pending or contemplated.

The rules considered by this Court in B.J. Shelat (supra) were different

and did not contain the provision like Explanation as incorporated in

the Fundamental Rule 56 as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

In that context, the discussion has been made and cannot be applied

to a rule differently couched in U.P.

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17. Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered by this Court

in  State of Bombay vs. United Motors,  AIR 1953 SC 252 and  Bengal

Immunity vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, in which it has been

observed that Explanation can be read as proviso and it explain the

scope of the main provision and the Explanation becomes part of the

main section.  There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition.  The

Explanation in rules in question has to be applied to both the

situations as contemplated in Rule 56(c) and is applicable to both the

exigencies not only when Government decides to retire an employee,

but also applicable where voluntary retirement is sought by an

employee.  It cannot be said that no further restriction by explanation

has been added in a case where an employee has decided to obtain

voluntary retirement.   The public interest is the prime consideration

on  which  authority  has to  decide such  a  prayer as  per the rules

applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

18. It was also urged that principles of certainty of rule of law are

squarely applicable in the present case.  Reliance has been placed on

the decision of  State of Haryana vs. S.K. Singhal,  (1999) 4 SCC 293.

This Court considered Rule 5.32(b) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules

and observed thus:

 “6. The said rule 5.32(B) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, (Vol.II) reads as follows:

“Rule 5.32(B)(1) At any time a government employee has completed twenty years’ qualifying service, he may, by giving notice of not less than

20

three months in writing to the appointing authority retire from service. However, a government employee may  make a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice  of less than  three  months  giving reason therefor. On receipt of a request, the appointing authority may consider such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of three months on the condition that the government employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the period of notice of three months.

(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority subject to Rule 2.2, of Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.II :

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in sub­rule (1) supra, the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period:

Provided further that before a government employee gives notice of voluntary retirement with reference to  sub­rule  (1)  he should satisfy himself by means of a reference to the appropriate authority that he has, in fact, completed twenty years’ service qualifying for pension.”

*** *** ***

8. It  will  be  noticed that  under Rule 5.32(B),  a  government employee  who  has  completed  20  years  of qualifying service may, by giving notice of not less than 3 months in writing to the appointing authority, retire from service. There is provision for requesting for relaxation of the notice period of 3 months and for consideration thereof. As to what the appointing authority is to do is governed squarely by sub­rule (2). That sub­rule states that the notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­rule (1) "shall" require acceptance by the appointing authority subject to Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules (Vol.II). Acceptance of the request is subject to Rule 2.2 of the Rules. But the proviso to sub­rule  (2) of Rule 5.32(B) states that if the permission to retire is not refused within the period

21

specified in sub­rule (1), the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the period. Therefore, it is clear that if a person has completed 20 years qualifying service and has given a notice under Rule 5.32(B) of 3 months (or if his request for relaxation of 3 months is accepted), then the request "shall" be accepted subject to invoking the provision of Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules (Vol.II). Under Rule 2.2, the "future good conduct" of an employee is an implied condition of every grant of pension. In other words, what all it means is that even if the  acceptance  of the  voluntary retirement is  mandatory, there is an obligation cast on the retired employee to maintain good conduct after such retirement. The words "future good conduct" mean good conduct after retirement. If the employee does not continue to maintain good conduct after retirement, then the Government can withhold or withdraw the pension or a part of it in case he is convicted of serious crime or in case he be guilty of grave misconduct. Such a decision to withhold or withdraw the whole or part of pension would be final and conclusive, that is to say, so far as the governmental hierarchy is concerned. It will be noticed that Rule 2.2 does not obstruct the voluntary retirement to come into force automatically on the expiry of 3  months and it only enables  withdrawal or withholding of pension subject to certain conditions, to a retired employee.

9. The employment of government servants is governed by rules. These rules provide a particular age as the age of superannuation. Nonetheless, the rules confer a right on the Government to compulsorily retire an employee before the age of superannuation provided the employee has reached a particular age or has completed a particular number of years of qualifying service in case it is found that his service has not been found to be satisfactory. The rules also provide that an employee who has completed the said number of years in his age or who has completed the prescribed number of years of qualifying service could give notice of, say, three months that he would voluntarily retire on the expiry of the said period of three  months.  Some  Rules are couched in language  which results in an automatic retirement of the employee upon expiry of the period specified in the employee's notice. On the other hand, certain rules in some other departments are couched in language which makes it clear that even upon expiry of the period specified in the notice, the retirement is not automatic and an express order granting permission is required and has to be communicated. The relationship of master and servant in the latter type of rules continues after the period specified in the  notice till such  acceptance is  communicated; refusal  of permission could also be communicated after 3 months and the employee  continues to  be in  service.  Cases like  Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam, (1977) 4 SCC 441, B.J. Shelat  v.  State of Gujarat, (1978)  2 SCC 202 and Union of

22

India v. Sayed Muzaffar Mir, (1995) Supp (1) SCC 76 belong to the former category where it is held that upon the expiry of the period, the voluntary retirement takes effect automatically as no order of refusal is passed within the notice period. On the other hand H.P. Horticultural Produce Marketing & Processing Corpn. Ltd. v. Suman Behari Sharma, (1996) 4 SCC 584 belongs to the second category where the bye­laws were interpreted as not giving an option "to retire" but only provided a limited right to "seek" retirement thereby implying the need for a consent of the employer even if the period of the notice has elapsed. We shall  refer  to these two categories  in some detail.

*** *** ***

13. Thus, from the aforesaid three decisions it is clear that if the right to voluntarily retirement is conferred in absolute terms  as in  Dinesh  Chandra  Sangma  case  by the relevant rules and there is no provision in rules to withhold permission in certain contingencies the voluntary retirement comes into effect automatically on the expiry of the period specified in the notice. If,  however,  as in B.J.  Shelat  case and as  in  Sayed Muzaffar Mir case, the concerned authority is empowered to withhold permission to retire if certain conditions exist, viz., in case the employee is under suspension or in case a departmental enquiry is pending or is contemplated, the mere pendency  of the suspension  or  departmental enquiry  or its contemplation does not result in the notice for voluntary retirement not coming into effect on expiry of the period specified. What is further needed is that the concerned authority  concerned must  pass a positive  order  withholding permission to retire and must also communicate the same to the employee  as stated in  B.J.  Shelat   case and in  Sayed Muzaffar Mir case before the expiry of the notice period. Consequently, there is no requirement of an order of acceptance of the notice to be communicated to the employee nor can it be said that non­communication of acceptance should be treated as amounting to withholding of permission.

*** *** ***

18. In the case before us sub­rule (1) of Rule 5.32(B) contemplates  a “notice to  retire”  and not  a request  seeking permission to retire. The further "request" contemplated by the sub­rule is only for seeking exemption from  the  3  months’ period. The proviso to sub­rule (2) makes a positive provision that "where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in Sub­rule (1), the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period. The case before us stands on a stronger footing  than Dinesh Chandra Sangma case so far as the employee is concerned. As already stated

23

Rule 2.2 of Punjab Civil Service Rules Vol.II only deals with a situation of withholding or withdrawing pension to a person who has already retired.”

19. Rule 5.32(b)(2) of Punjab Rules clearly provide that where the

appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission to retire

before the expiry of the period in sub­rule  (1), the retirement shall

become effective from the date of the expiry of the said date.  There is

no such provision of notice becoming effective from the date of the

expiry of  the period in the Fundamental Rules as applicable to the

State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.   In the  context  of the  proviso, the  notice

becomes effective from the date of expiry of the period, in that context

this Court has made observations in the aforesaid dictum that Rule

2.2  does  not obstruct the voluntary retirement to come into force

automatically on the expiry of three months.

20. In the  State of Haryana (supra), this Court also observed that

some rules are couched in language, which results in an automatic

retirement of the employee upon the expiry of the period specified in

the employee’s notice.  On the other hand, certain rules in some other

departments are couched in the language which makes it clear that

even upon expiry of the period specified in the notice, the retirement is

not automatic and an express order granting permission is required

and has to be communicated.  The relationship of master and servant

in the latter type of rules continues after the period specified in the

24

notice till such acceptance is communicated and the refusal of

permission could also be communicated after three months and the

employee continues to be in service.   It is the aforesaid later

observations made by this Court, which are squarely applicable to the

rule in question as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

21. In  Himachal Pradesh Horticultural Produce Marketing &

Processing Corporation Ltd. vs.  Suman Behari Sharma  (1996) 4 SCC

584, the Court considered the  language employed in the applicable

bye­laws. It was observed that if the permission for voluntary

retirement is not granted, the employee would not be able to retire.

The Court observed:

“8. Clause (2) of the bye­law inter alia provides for voluntary retirement from service of HPMC on completion of 25 years’ service or on attaining the age of 50 years whichever is earlier. The employee, however, has a right to make a request in that behalf  and his  request  would become effective  only if  he  is 'permitted' to retire. The  words "may be...permitted at his request" clearly indicate that the said clause does not confer on the employee a right to retire on completion of either 25 years’ service or on attaining the age of 50 years. It confers on the employee a right to make a request to permit him to retire. Obviously, if request is  not  accepted and permission  is  not granted the employee will not be able to retire as desired by him. Para (5) of the bye­law is in the nature of an exception to para (2) and permits the employee who has not completed 25 years’ service or has attained 50 years of age to seek retirement if he has completed 20 years’ satisfactory service. He can do so by giving three months' notice  in writing. The contention of the learned Counsel for HPMC was that though para 5 of the bye­law relaxes the conditions prescribed by para (2), the relaxation is only with respect to the period of service and attainment of age of 50 years and it cannot be read to mean that the requirement of permission is dispensed with. On the other  hand, the  learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as para 5 opens with the words "Notwithstanding the provision under para (2)" and the words "may be...permitted at his request" are absent that would mean that the employee has a right to retire after giving three

25

months' notice and no acceptance of such a request is necessary. We cannot agree with the interpretation canvassed by learned counsel for the respondent. The bye­law has to be read as a whole. Para (2) thereof confers a right on the employee to request for voluntary retirement on completion of 25 years’ service or on attaining the age of 50 years, but his desire would materialise only if he is permitted to retire and not otherwise.  Ordinarily, in a matter  like this an employee who has put in less number of years of service would not be on a better fooling than the employee  who  has put in longer service. It could not have been the intention of the rule­making authority  while framing para 5  of the bye­law  to  confer  on such an employee a better and a  larger right to retire after giving three months' notice in writing. The words "seek retirement" in para 5 indicate that the right which is conferred by it is not the right to retire but a right to ask for retirement. The word "seek" implies a request by the employee and corresponding acceptance or permission by HPMC. Therefore, there cannot be automatic retirement or snapping of service relationship on expiry of three months' period.”

22. In  Padubidri  Damodar  Shenoy vs. Indian  Airlines  Ltd.  &  Anr.

(2009)  10 SCC 514,  a  question arose of  voluntary  retirement from

service  which  was not acceded to by the competent authority by

according approval. The matter travelled to this Court. It was held that

voluntary retirement did not come into force.  The Court observed:

“33. There is nothing to indicate in Regulation 12 that if employer decides to withhold approval of voluntary retirement, such refusal of approval must be communicated to the petitioner during the period of notice. True it is that notice of three months for voluntary retirement given by an employee covered by Clause (b) remains valid even if no communication is received within the notice period but  it  becomes effective only on its approval by the competent authority. As a matter of fact, this seems to have been understood by both the parties.  

34. The appellant issued a notice of voluntary retirement under Regulation 12(b) on 30­9­2005. The notice period was to expire on     31­12­2005. It is an admitted position that the competent  authority  neither  gave  an approval  nor indicated disapproval to the appellant within the notice period of three months. The employee never treated that there has been cessation of employment on the expiry of three months’ notice period inasmuch as he continued to attend his duties after 31­ 12­2005 until  30­6­2006. It is only by his  letter dated 8­6­ 2006 that the appellant  requested the respondent to relieve

26

him in terms of his notice dated 30­9­2005 by 30­6­2006 and he stopped attending work from 1­7­2006. The letter dated 8­ 6­2006 does not make any material difference as the fact of the matter  is that  after the expiry of the notice period, the appellant continued to attend  his  duties for  many  months thereafter.  

35. By the letter dated 15­9­2006 the respondent communicated to the appellant that his application for voluntary retirement under Service Regulation 12(b) has not been acceded to by the competent authority. Since the notice for voluntary retirement by an employee who has not attained 55 years but has completed 20 years of continuous service, under the proviso appended to Regulation 12(b), is subject to approval  by the competent authority and that approval  was not granted, the voluntary retirement of the appellant never came into effect.”

23. In C.V. Francis vs. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 14 SCC 486, this

Court observed that it would depend upon the language used in the

rule whether notice for voluntary retirement would come into effect

automatically. There has to be a stipulation in the scheme providing

that even without acceptance of his application, it would be deemed

that the application for voluntary retirement had been accepted. There

is no such provision in the rules in question. In C.V. Francis  (supra),

this Court observed:

“13. It is well­established that a voluntary retirement scheme introduced by a company, does not entitle an employee as a matter of right to the  benefits of the  Scheme.  Whether an employee should be allowed to retire in terms of the scheme is a decision which can only be taken by the employer company, except in cases where the scheme itself provides for retirement to take effect  when the  notice period comes to an end. A voluntary retirement scheme introduced by a company is essentially  a  part of the company's desire to  weed  out the deadwood.

14. The petitioner's contention that his application for voluntary retirement came into effect on the expiry of the period of notice given by him must  fail,  since there was no such stipulation in the scheme that even without acceptance of  his application it  would  be deemed that the  petitioner's

27

voluntary retirement application had been accepted. Once that is not accepted, the entire case of the petitioner falls to the ground. The decision in Tek Chand case (2001) 3 SCC 290 will not, therefore, have any application to the facts of this case, particularly when the petitioner's application for voluntary retirement had not been accepted and he had been asked to rejoin his services. The petitioner was fully aware of this position as he continued  to  apply for leave  after the notice period was over.”

24. Decision in Tek Chand vs. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290 has been

relied upon by the respondents. This Court considered Rule 48­A(2) of

the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, proviso to said rule

contained a provision where the appointing authority did not refuse to

grant the permission  for retirement  before the expiry  of the period

specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from

the date of  expiry of  the said period. The relevant observations are

extracted hereunder:

“31. It is not disputed that the appointing authority did not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before expiry of the period specified  in the said application dated 5.12.1994 given by Nikka Ram. Further, no communication whatsoever was made to him within the said period. During the course of the argument before the High Court, the learned counsel for the parties referred to Rule 48­A of the Rules, of course, placing their own interpretation. Since the said Rule is material and has bearing on the question to be determined, it is extracted below:

   "48­A.  Retirement  on completion of  20 years’ qualifying service. ­ (1) At any time after a government servant has completed twenty years' qualifying service, he may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority, retire from service: Provided that this sub­rule shall not apply to a government servant, including scientist or technical expert who is ­

(i) on assignments under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme of the

28

Ministry of External Affairs and other aid programmes.

(ii) posted abroad in foreign­based offices of the Ministries / Departments.

(iii)  on a specific  contract assignment to a  foreign Government, unless, after having been transferred to India, he has resumed the charge of the post in India and served for a period of not less than one year.

(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority:

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the  permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall  become  effective from the date of expiry of the said period.”

*** *** ***

33. It is clear from sub­rule (2) of the Rule that the appointing authority is required to accept the notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­rule (1). It is open to the appointing authority to refuse also, on whatever grounds available to it, but such refusal has to be before the expiry of the period specified in the notice. The proviso to sub­rule (2) is clear and certain in its terms. If the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission  for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement sought for becomes effective from the date of expiry of the said period. In this case, admittedly, the appointing authority did not refuse to grant the permission for retirement to Nikka Ram before the expiry of  the period specified in the notice dated 5.12.1994. The learned Senior  Counsel for the respondent argued that the acceptance of voluntary retirement by appointing authority in all cases is mandatory. In the absence of such express acceptance the government servant continues to be in service. In support of this submission, he drew our attention to Rule 56(k) of Fundamental Rules. He also submitted that acceptance may be on a later date, that is, even after the expiry of the period specified in the notice and the retirement  could  be effective from  the  date specified in the notice. Since the proviso to sub­rule (2) of Rule 48­A is clear in itself and the said Rule 48­A is self­contained, in our opinion, it is unnecessary to look to other provisions, more so in the light of law laid down by this Court. An argument that acceptance can be even long after the date of the expiry of the period specified in the notice and that the voluntary retirement may become effective from the date specified in the notice, will lead to anomalous situation. Take a case, if an application for

29

voluntary retirement is accepted few years later from the date specified in the notice and voluntary retirement becomes operative from the date of  expiry  of the notice period  itself, what would be the position or status of such a government servant during the period from the date of expiry of the notice period up to the date of acceptance of the voluntary retirement by the appointing authority? One either continues in service or does not continue in service. It cannot be both that the voluntary retirement could be effective from the date of expiry of the period mentioned in the notice and still a Government servant could continue in service till the voluntary retirement is accepted.  The proviso to  sub­rule  (2)  of  Rule 48­A of  the Rules does not admit such situation.”

*** *** ***

35. In our view, this judgment fully supports the contention urged on behalf of the appellant in this regard. In this judgment, it is observed that there are three categories of rules relating to seeking of voluntary retirement after notice. In the first category, voluntary retirement automatically comes  into force on expiry of notice period. In the second category also, retirement comes into force unless an order is passed during notice period withholding permission to retire and in the third category voluntary retirement does not come into force unless permission to this effect is granted by the competent authority. In such a case, refusal of permission can be communicated even after the expiry of the notice period. It all depends upon the relevant rules. In the case decided, the relevant Rule required acceptance of notice by appointing authority and the proviso to the  Rule further laid  down  that retirement  shall come into force automatically if the appointing authority did not refuse permission during the notice period.  Refusal was not communicated to the respondent during the notice period and the Court held that voluntary retirement came into force on expiry of the notice period and subsequent order conveyed to him that he could not be deemed to have voluntary retired had no effect. The present case is almost identical to the one decided by this Court in the aforesaid decision.”

The rule which came up for consideration was entirely different.

There is no provision contained in rule in question in the case at hand

like the proviso to Rule 48­A(2) referred to above due to which the

retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of period of

notice in case the same was not refused.     

30

25. In our considered opinion, under Rule 56 as applicable in the

State of Uttar Pradesh, notice of voluntary retirement does not come

into  effect  automatically  on  the expiry  of the  three  months  period.

Under the rule in question, the appointing authority has to accept the

notice for  voluntary retirement  or it  can be refused on permissible

grounds.

26. In our opinion, the Rule 56(c) does not fall in the category where

there is an absolute right on the employee to seek voluntary

retirement.   In view of the aforesaid dictum and what is held by this

Court, we find that the prayer made to make a reference to a larger

Bench, in case this Court does not follow the earlier decision is

entirely devoid of merit as on the basis of what has been held by this

Court in the earlier decisions, we have arrived at the conclusion.   This

Court has authoritatively laid down the law umpteen number of time.  

27. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of respondents on the

decision in Mahant Dhanmir vs. Madan Mohan, (1987) Supp SCC 528,

in which this Court observed that law should not be unsettled unless

there are compelling reasons.   There is no dispute that the said

proposition has already been held.   There is no question of law

unsettling the law but is of its application, which unfortunately

appears as against the interests of the respondents in view of language

employed in the rule in question.  An attempt in vain has been made

31

by the respondents to wriggle out of the clutches of the various

decisions by raising the aforesaid argument.

28. It was also urged that the Rule 56(c) does not require the

employee to give reasons for voluntary retirement.   No doubt under

Rule 56(c) there is no requirement for an employee to give any reason,

however, while considering the prayer, the appointing authority has to

keep in  mind the public interest as provided in the Explanation

attached to F.R. 56.

29. Learned counsel also  urged that outside the  proviso to  Rule

56(d), there is no general right of appointing authority to reject the

notice of voluntary retirement of an employee on the ground of public

interest.   For this purpose, threefold submission has been  made.

Firstly, that the principle of liberty under the Constitution and

specifically Part III of the Constitution requires that any restriction on

freedom and liberty must have the sanction of the law and that law

must be just, fair and reasonable.   Presently, there is no law  as

enacted under Article 309 of the Constitution.  Secondly, the right of

Government employee and that of the Government are delineated in

terms of Fundamental Rules governing State Government employees.

Thus, if any Fundamental Rules do not restrict the general liberty of

an employee or do not empower the employer to act in a certain way,

an action otherwise would be impermissible.   For this purpose,

32

reliance  has  been  placed on  Moti  Ram  Deka vs.  G.M.,  North  East

Frontier Railway, (1964) 5 SCR 683.  It was also submitted that public

interest restriction that applies to the State in the case of compulsory

retirement, applies on account of Article 311.  The Court observed:

27.   In this connection, it is necessary to emphasise that the rule­making  authority contemplated by  Art. 309 cannot  be validly exercised so as to curtail or affect the rights guaranteed to public servants under Art. 311(1). Art. 311(1) is intended to afford a sense of security to public servants who are substantively appointed to a permanent post and one of the principal benefits  which they are entitled to expect is the benefit of pension after rendering public service for the period prescribed by the Rules. It would, we think, not be legitimate to contend that the right to earn a pension to which a servant substantively appointed to a permanent post is entitled can be curtailed by Rules framed under Art. 309 so as to make the said right either ineffective or illusory. Once the scope of Art. 311(1) and (2) is duly determined, it must be held that no Rule framed under Art. 309 can trespass on the rights guaranteed by Art. 311. This position is of basic importance and must be borne in mind in dealing with the controversy in the present appeals.

30. The reliance placed on Moti Ram Deka (supra) is of no avail as it

has no application to the instant case as no right conferred by Article

311 of the Constitution can be said to have been taken away and

service rule dehors of it can provide for the concept of public interest.

31. There is no doubt about it that Rule 56(d) provides that where a

disciplinary enquiry  is  pending or contemplated and  in the case of

contemplated disciplinary enquiry,  the Government servant shall  be

informed before the expiry of notice that it has not been accepted.  The

proviso to Rule 56(d) has no application where a disciplinary enquiry

33

is not contemplated or pending.  When the proviso itself is not

applicable, in no case it will dilute the provisions of Explanation with

respect to exigencies mentioned in clause (c) of Rule 56.

32. The submission made upon principle of liberty and its

curtailment, the law must be just, fair and reasonable can also not be

accepted as the Fundamental Rules are statutory rules and have been

made by the Governor under section 241(2)(b) of the Government of

India Act,1935 and provisions of rule in question cannot be said to be

unfair, unreasonable and oppressive.

33. The concept of liberty  not to serve  when the  public interest

requires  cannot be attracted as retirement which carries pecuniary

benefits can be subject to certain riders.   The general public has the

right  to obtain treatment  from super skilled specialists,  not second

rates. In  Jagadish Saran vs. Union of India,  (1980) 2 SCC 768, the

Court observed thus:

"44. Secondly, and more importantly,  it  is difficult to denounce or renounce the  merit criterion  when the selection is for post­graduate or post­doctoral courses in specialised subjects…. To sympathise  mawkishly with the  weaker sections by selecting sub­standard candidates, is to punish society as a whole by denying the prospect of excellence say in hospital service. Even the poorest, when stricken by critical illness, needs the attention of super­skilled specialists, not humdrum second­rates. So it is that relaxation on  merit, by overruling equality and quality altogether, is a social risk where the stage is post­graduate or post­doctoral.”

34

34. The concept of public interest can also be invoked by the

Government when voluntary retirement sought by an employee, would

be against the public interest.   The provisions cannot be said to be

violative of any of the rights. There is already paucity of the doctors as

observed by the High Court, the system cannot be left without

competent senior persons and particularly, the High Court has itself

observed that doctors are not being attracted to join services and there

is an existing scarcity of the  doctors.   Poorest of the  poor obtain

treatment at the Government hospitals.   They cannot be put at the

peril, even when certain doctors are posted against the administrative

posts.  It is not that they have been posted against their seniority or to

the other cadre.  Somebody has to man these administrative posts

also, which are absolutely necessary to run the medical services which

are part and parcel of the right to life itself. In the instant case, where

the right of the public are involved in obtaining treatment, the State

Government has taken a decision as per Explanations to decline the

prayer for voluntary retirement considering the  public interest.   It

cannot be said that State has committed any illegality or its decision

suffers from any vice of arbitrariness.   

35. The decision of the Government cater to the needs of the human

life and carry the objectives of public  interest. The respondents are

claiming the right to retire under Part III of the Constitution such right

cannot be supreme than right to life. It has to be interpreted along

35

with the rights of the State Government in Part IV of the Constitution

as it is obligatory upon the State Government to make an endeavour

under Article 47 to look after the provisions for health and nutrition.

The fundamental duties itself are enshrined under Article 51(A) which

require observance.   The right under Article 19(1)(g) is subject to the

interest of the general public and once service has been joined, the

right  can only be exercised as per  rules  and not  otherwise.  Such

conditions  of service  made  in  public interest  cannot  be said to  be

illegal or arbitrary or taking away the right of liberty.  The provisions

of the rule in question cannot be said to be against the Constitutional

provisions.   In case of voluntary retirement, gratuity, pensions, and

other dues etc. are payable to the employee in accordance with rules

and when there is a requirement of the services of an employee, the

appointing authority may exercise its right not to accept the prayer for

voluntary retirement.  In case all the doctors are permitted to retire, in

that situation, there would be a chaos and no doctor would be left in

the Government hospitals, which would be against the concept of the

welfare state and injurious to public interest.  In the case of voluntary

retirement, there is a provision in Rule 56 that a Government servant

may be extended benefit of an additional period of five years then an

actual period of service rendered by him there is the corresponding

obligation to serve in dire need.

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36. It was urged that in the State of Tamil Nadu, Government has

amended the rules not to retire Government doctors, if there is any

scarcity of doctors it is open to the Government of Uttar Pradesh to

amend its rules.  In India, the Government sponsored Medical Services

to cater to the needs of poorest of the poor and have­nots otherwise

there is the commercialisation of the charitable medical profession.  In

other States too, it is seen sometime that when a doctor is transferred

from one place to another, the doctor forwards application resigning

from the post or seeks voluntary retirement as he does not want to

move out and leave his lucrative private practice and joins the duty

only when he obtains posting back to the place of his choice.  In such

a scenario people cannot be deprived of the services of good doctors. In

view of the scarcity of the doctors and the unfortunate privatisation

and commercialisation of the noble medical profession, for

maintaining the efficiency of the State Medical Services, the decision

taken by the Government is permissible as per rules and cannot be

interfered with.  Unfortunately, the High Court has given the aforesaid

observations pointing out the shortage of specialised doctors and at

the same time has ultimately decided against the State Government

on wrong interpretation without considering the Explanation attached

to Rule 56 applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.  The preface given

by the High Court is just opposite to its conclusion.  The High Court

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ought to have rejected and not to allow the prayer of voluntary

retirement made by the doctors.

37. It was urged that some of the doctors suffered from neck pain

etc. as such prayer ought to have been accepted but they have not

given any such serious ailments which may make their functioning in

the hospital difficult in any manner whatsoever.   It was the pretext

that  was  used  by them  to seek  voluntary retirement. It is for the

Government to consider the efficacy. Doctors too have right under the

Rights of  Persons with Disabilities Act,  2016, they can continue in

services unfettered by such ailments.

38. Under Article 47 it is the duty of the State to improve the public

health, which is a primary duty under the Directive Principles of the

State Policy and the statutory expression  which  may  be enforced.

When we consider Article 51A containing Fundamental Duties, it is a

duty of every citizen under Article 51A(g) to have compassion for living

creatures and to have humanism is also contemplated under Article

51A(h) and to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and

collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of

endeavours and achievement.  It cannot be done by depriving poorest

of the poor essential medical services and to leave them at the mercy

of doctors.  There cannot be an exodus from the Government Medical

Services at large, which is being projected in the instant case,

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definitely this cannot be permitted to happen within four corners of

law as it has to be living organism and has to live up to the essence

and spirit  of  constitution and cannot  ignore  and overlook needs of

poorest strata of the society.

39.  It was urged that the State Government is discriminating

between the doctors in the Provincial Medical Services with the

doctors working in the State­owned Hospitals and Medical Colleges.

In the  Medical  Colleges etc. doctors  are  being  permitted to retire.

Instances of 7 doctors have been given, who were permitted to retire in

2016, 2017 and 2018.  Doctors of Medical Colleges are on a different

footing than that of Provincial Medical Services.   Even otherwise in

view of the scarcity of the doctors, no ground of equality can  be

claimed and the doctors of different services form different class, apart

from that there is no concept of negative equality that too against the

public interest.   In case, such a plea is allowed, none may be left to

serve public at large.  

40. There are several decisions of the High Court, namely,  Dr. Anil

Dewan  vs.  State of Punjab,  ILR  1  Punjab  & Haryana  46;  State of

Punjab vs. Dr. Harbir Singh Dhillon, 2010 SCC Online P&H 6159 and

Dr. Kalpana Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2014) SCC Online Raj 6253,

were cited to show that the decision in  Dinesh Chandra Sangma

(supra) had been followed.  We have considered the aforesaid decisions

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and we find that it would depend upon the scheme of the Rules.  Each

and every judgment has to be considered in the light of the provisions

which came up for consideration and question  it has decided,

language employed in the rules, and it cannot be said to be of general

application as  already observed  by  this  Court in  State  of  Haryana

(supra).   

41. It was also contended that the State of Uttar Pradesh  may

amend rules, in our opinion there is no such necessity in view of the

Explanation the State has already amended its rules so as to enable it

to pass an order with respect to retirement  whether it is at the

instance of the Government or at the instance of the employee for both

the public interest is germane.

42.  The submission was also made with respect to the imposition of

moratorium period of one year on retirement and that there should be

the recruitment of the doctors and thereafter acceptance of voluntary

retirement by the State.   We do not propose to venture into it.   The

action of the  State  Government  was  appropriate in  disallowing the

prayer  seeking voluntary  retirement.  The Government  may  fill the

vacancies if  any. But that would not bring doctors of experience at

senior level and exodus of doctors cannot be permitted to weaken the

services  when  the  public interest requires to  serve for the  sake  of

efficient  medical profession and fulfil Directive Principles of State

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Policy once they  found statutory expression in the rules cannot be

made  mockery.   When services are required, denial of voluntary

retirement is permissible under the Rules applicable in the State of

Uttar Pradesh.

43. In view of the above, we allow the civil appeals and hereby set

aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.

The applications for intervention and to implead stand allowed.

…………………………..J.       (Arun Mishra)   

…………………………..J.           (S. Abdul Nazeer)     

August 21, 2018. New Delhi.