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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8626 OF 2009

The State of Tamil Nadu  ..…Appellant  

Versus

Dr. Vasanthi Veerasekaran  ….Respondent

WITH  

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8625, 8627 and 8630 of 2009

J U D G M E N T

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

1. These  appeals emanate from  the common judgment and

order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 28th April,

2006 disposing of the concerned writ petitions instituted by the

private respondent(s) in the respective appeals.  Although four

separate writ  petitions were  filed,  one common factum noticed

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from the factual narration in the impugned judgment is that the

property owned and possessed by the private respondents in the

concerned appeals came to be acquired for the purpose of

implementing the “Mass Rapid Transport System” (for short

“MRTS”) Railway Project, under the provisions of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “1894 Act”). After following due

process, the acquisition proceedings culminated with the passing

of the award  and taking over of possession  of the concerned

property. After possession was taken, the subject property was

made over to the appropriate authority for implementation of the

Railway Project.  

2. The private respondent(s) in the respective appeals had,

however, unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings

by filing  writ  petitions in the  High  Court.  While rejecting the

challenge, the High Court vide order dated 12th December, 2003

observed that the appropriate authority of the State Government

ought to consider the representation made by the private

respondents in the concerned appeals for allotment of a housing

site by way of  rehabilitation as a special category of displaced

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persons, in view of the dictum presumably in Hansraj H. Jain

Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors.1  (incorrectly mentioned as

Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab­1993 AIR SCW 2938 which is a

decision in  a criminal  matter).  The  operative  part of the  said

order reads thus:  

“5. The learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 SC 2025, AIR 1988 SC 2181, AIR 1991 SC 90 and AIR SCW 1993 @ 2923, persuasively contended that there could be direction to the State Government to allot lands from any one of the Housing schemes in the city. There is forece and substance in this contention.  

6. In  the  circumstances, the present  applications taken out by the petitioners do deserve further consideration and the petitioners request for housing site deserves to be considered by the State by way of rehabilitation.  

7. Hence, it is made clear that in the event of the petitioners applying to the State Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board for allotment of house sites in any one of the housing projects promoted by the Tamil Nadu  Housing Board, their request shall be considered for allotment of lands, as a special category of displaced persons by the acquisition of lands for the railways as has been held by the Supreme Court  in Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2938.  

8. With the above observations, the above miscellaneous petitions are ordered accordingly.”

1 (1993) 3 SCC 634

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3. In furtherance of the direction given by the High Court, the

private respondent(s) pursued representation before the State

Government. Eventually, the State Government declined to grant

any relief to the private respondent(s) and communicated its

decision to them vide letter  dated  26th  May,  2005. It  may  be

apposite to reproduce one such communication, issued to the

private respondent in  Civil  Appeal  No.8625  of  2009  and  Civil

Appeal No.8630 of 2009. The same reads thus:  

“GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU

Housing and Urban  Development Department  Secretariat, Chennai­9

From  Thiru Lal Rawana Sailo, I.A.S., Secretary to Government  

Letter No.41629/UD3(2)/2003­13 Dated: 26.05.2005

To Thiru P. Arivudainambi,  MIG No.3, Santhome High Road,  Foreshre Estate,  TNH Board,  Chennai­600028.

Tmt. S. Sulochana, 19, Leith Castle Street,  Sea View Apartments, Santhome,  Chennai­600028  

Sir/Madam,

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Sub: Land Acquisition­Mass Rapid Transit System­ Lands acquired for Mass Rapid Transmit Syste, S.No.300/12 measuring 5445 sq.ft. belonging to Tmt. S. Sulochna­S.No.300/13 measuring 5554 sq.ft. belonging to Thiru P. Arivudainambi­ Request for allotment of plots­requested.

Ref: 1. High Court order dated 01.12.2003 in WPMP No.23077/2003 and W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.  2. High Court of Madras order dated

12.12.2003 in  W.P.M.P. No.28883/2003 in W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.  

3. Your lawyer Notice dated 10.11.2004. 4. Your petition dated 01.08.2004,

21.02.2005 and 21.04.2005.  5. High  Court order dated  04.03.2005  and

18.03.2005 in W.P. No.7469/2005.  

In the High Court order first cited, the Hon’ble Court has dismissed your W.P.M.P.23078/2003 and 11290/2003.  

2. In the High Court order second cited it has been observed  by the  Hon’ble  Court that in the event of petitioners applying to the State Government and Tamil Nadu  Housing  Board for allotment of House sites in any one of the Housing projects formulated by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, their request shall be considered. Therefore in pursuance of the orders of the Hon’ble Court your representation has been examined by the Government in consultation with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.  

3. I  am,  accordingly,  directed  to inform you  that during the land acquisition process you were informed of the procedural formalities by the Land Acquisition Officer and as per statutory requirements award No.1/2003  was  also  passed  on  08.01.2003 on land acquisition proceedings. As ordered in W.P.No.16929/99 the land in question for a public purpose. The Hon’ble Court had also on 10.10.2002 on your submission directed in W.P.No.141183/2000 and W.P.No.15974/2000 alongwith W.P.No.36980/2002 to deposit the compensation amount in the High Court which was also complied with. Therefore, the land in

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question was already taken over by the Land Acquisition Officer and handed over to the Metropolitan Transport Project (Railways) for Mass Rapid Transit System scheme after observing all statutory provisions and Hon’ble Court orders.  

4. You have again submitted a lawyer notice in the reference 3rd  cited and sent petitions in the reference 4th cited to the Government for reconsideration of your request. Therefore, your request was once again examined by the Government in the light of the High Court  orders in the reference  5th  cited.  The  Hon’ble High Court,  in the said order dated 04.03.2005 and modified on 18.03.2005, has ordered that, instead of the Housing Board, the Government would pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Hence the whole issue was again re­examined by the Government afresh.  

5. As already submitted by the Government before the High Court on more than one occasion, I am directed to  inform you that your request for allotment  of land  in  any one of the Tamil  Nadu Housing Board/Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority scheme will not arise as the lands were not acquired for the purpose of Tamil Nadu Housing Board of Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority schemes but they were acquired for Mass Rapid Transit System and handed over to the Metropolitan Transport Project (Railways) which come under Government of India for their railway scheme. Hence acquisition of your land in S.No.300/12 measuring 5445 and 5554 sq.ft. respectively was not arbitrary or illegal in any way as all procedural formalities were gone thro’ by the Land Acquisition  Officer  as  per the  Land Acquisition  Act. The lands were already vested with the Metropolitan Transport Project (Railways) for Mass Rapid Transit  System and,  therefore, there  is  no justification for  allotment  of land  to  you  in  any scheme area when the lands  were not acquired either  by  Tamil  Nadu  Housing  Board  or  Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority.

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6. I  am, therefore, directed to inform you that in view of the foregoing valid reasons your request is not feasible of compliance.  

  Your faithfully Sd/­

For Secretary to Government.  Copy to:

The Member­Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai­8.

The Managing Director,  Tamil  Nadu Housing  Board, Chennai­35.  

The Collector of Chennai, Singaravelar Maaligai, Rajaji Salai, Chennai­I.  

The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) MRTS, Tiurmailai Railway Station, Mylapore, Chennai­4.  

The Special Tahsildar, (Land Acquisition), Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai­8 (for guidance and information).”

 (emphasis supplied)

The representation made by the private respondents in the other

appeals, however, were not replied to, as a result of which they

filed fresh writ petition(s) which were heard analogously with the

writ petition(s) filed by the private respondent(s) in the

aforementioned two appeals questioning the communication

dated 26th May, 2005, rejecting their representation.  

4. All connected writ petitions  were accordingly heard and

decided together by the impugned judgment. The reason which

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weighed with the High Court to allow the writ petitions filed by

the concerned private respondent(s)  can be discerned from the

discussion in paragraph Nos.6 and 7 of the impugned judgment.

We deem it apposite to reproduce the same along with the

operative order contained in paragraph Nos.8 and 9 of the

impugned judgment. The same read thus:  

“6. We have  already  referred  to the fact that this order has become final. Though it  is stated that the petitioners/land owners  deposited, the fact remains, even without resorting to acquisition proceeding, possession of the  lands was  forcibly taken  from the petitioners. It is also not in dispute that, in order to implement the project, namely, M.R.T.S. Scheme, possession  of the lands  was taken forcibly  and the construction work was started without awaiting for the completion of the  acquisition proceedings.  That  was that reason for the learned Judge to pass the directions in the order dated 12.12.2003. In fact, the learned  Judge  heavily relied on the  Supreme  Court decision reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2923 (cited supra) while passing the positive direction to the Government. As  rightly  observed  by  the learned Judge in  the order dated 12.12.2003, the petitioners are entitled to alternate site under the Special Category of displaced persons due to the acquisition of their lands for the Railways. Unfortunately, in W.P. No.39279 of 2005, the second respondent, in spite of the reasoned positive direction dated 12.12.2003 of the learned Judge of this Court, rejected the request of the petitioner. Likewise, in the other two cases, though the order was passed even as early as on 12.12.2003 and representations were made on 18.4.2005, no order has been passed by the Government till this date.  

7. In view of the peculiar factual position, viz, that the land of the petitioners were taken possession forcibly even before initiation of the acquisition

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proceedings; and of the stand taken by the petitioners that they lost their respective housing plots; and also taking note of the positive direction of this Court, dated 12.12.2003, to provide equivalent alternate site under the special category of displaced persons;  we are of the view that the rejection order dated 26.5.2005 passed by the Government in respect of the petitioner in W.P. No.39279 of 2005 is liable to be quashed. As far as the petitioners in W.P. Nos.11907 and 11908 of 2006 are concerned, they are also entitled to similar allotment  as  directed in the order dated 12.12.2003.  

8. In these circumstances,  we issue the  following directions:­

(i) The Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Land Development Department, Fort St. George, Chennai­9 is directed to allot alternate land to the petitioners,  approximate in extent to the acquired land, within the Corporation/City limits, within a period of eight  weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.  (ii) the petitioners are liable to pay the cost of the land as fixed by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.  

9. Writ petitions are allowed with the above directions. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions stand closed.”     

(emphasis supplied)

5. By these appeals, the State Government has assailed the

aforementioned judgment. According to the appellant, the lands

in question  were acquired in accordance  with law and, after

following  due  process,  possession thereof  was taken  over  and

thereafter made over to the appropriate authority of the MRTS

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Project (Railways). In other words, the land was not acquired for

the  Tamil  Nadu Housing  Board  as  such. It is  urged that the

direction issued by the High Court vide the impugned judgment

is on an erroneous assumption that the State Government was

obliged to provide an alternative housing site to the private

respondent(s) in the concerned appeals, in terms of the direction

given by the High Court vide order dated 12th December, 2003. It

is then contended that the direction given by the High Court in

the impugned judgment is in the nature of granting an extra­legal

concession by way of allotment of an alternative site in lieu of

acquired lands sans any such legal obligation on the State under

the 1894 Act or any policy in force pertaining to the project of

MRTS (Railways) to be implemented by the Ministry of Railway,

Government of India. The appellant has relied on the decisions of

this Court to buttress the proposition that the private

respondent(s) had no legal right to get an alternative housing site

in  such a  situation.  The  appellant  has  also  distinguished the

reported judgments referred to by the High Court in the

impugned judgment as being inapplicable to the facts of the

present case.

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6. The private respondent(s), on the other hand, have

supported the view expressed by the High Court in the impugned

judgment and would submit that the direction was in furtherance

of the obligation of the State flowing from the order dated 12th

December, 2003. Further, in light of the reported decisions

adverted to by the High Court in the impugned judgment, it is

not open to the appellant­State to deny the relief of allotment of

an alternative housing site to them as a special category of

displaced persons due to the stated project. In addition, the

private respondent(s), during the pendency of these appeals, had

filed an affidavit to place on record that in the past, the State

Government exercised discretionary power to allot alternative

housing site to the affected persons due to the acquisition of their

land for public purposes. The private respondent(s) would submit

that no interference in the fact situation of the present case is

warranted and the appeals be dismissed.

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7. We have heard Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, for the

appellant and Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned Senior Counsel, for

the private respondent(s).   

 8.  The foremost reason which weighed with the High Court is,

the direction issued  by the  High  Court vide order  dated  12th

December, 2003 had attained finality. Indubitably, that order has

not been challenged by the State or any other State Authority.

Nevertheless, the purport of the order  is  nothing more than a

direction to the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board “to consider” the representation(s)  made  by the  private

respondent(s) for allotment of an alternative housing site in any

one of the housing projects promoted by the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board, as a special category of displaced persons. Thus, the

direction is not in the nature of a peremptory direction to allot an

alternative housing site despite absence of any policy with

reference to the project under consideration or obligation flowing

from the provisions of 1894 Act. This is the first fallacy

committed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.

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9. As regards the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to

by the High Court,  we must agree with the appellant that the

same have no application to the fact situation of the present case.

For, in  State of U.P.  Vs. Smt. Pista Devi and Ors.2, the

direction  was issued to the  development authority  which  had

acquired the land for the public purpose of developing housing

schemes with a view to provide housing accommodation to the

residents of Meerut City. Reliance has been placed upon

paragraph Nos.9 and 10, which read thus:  

“9. It is, however, argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that many of the persons from whom lands  have  been  acquired are also  persons  without houses or shop sites and if they are to be thrown out of their land they would be exposed to serious prejudice. Since the land is being acquired for providing residential accommodation to the people of Meerut those who are being expropriated on account of the acquisition proceedings would also be eligible for some relief at the hands of the Meerut Development Authority. We may at this stage refer to the provision contained in Section 21(2)  of the Delhi  Development Act, 1957 which reads as follows:

“21. (2) The powers of the Authority or, as the case may be, the local authority concerned with respect to the disposal of land under sub­section 1 shall be so exercised as to secure, so far as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land shall, if they desire to obtain accommodation on land belonging to the Authority or the local authority concerned

2 (1986) 4 SCC 251

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and are willing to comply with any requirements of the Authority or the local authority concerned as to its development and  use,  have an opportunity to obtain thereon  accommodation  suitable to their reasonable requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them: Provided that where the Authority or the local authority concerned proposes to dispose of  by sale  any  land without any development having been  undertaken or carried out thereon, it shall offer the land in the first instance to the persons from whom  it  was  acquired, if they  desire to purchase it subject to such requirements as to its development and use as the Authority or the local authority concerned may think fit to impose.”

10. Although the said section is not in terms applicable to the present acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the above provision in the Delhi Development Act contains a wholesome principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas. We hope and trust that the Meerut Development Authority, for whose benefit the land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicable provide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each  of the expropriated persons  who have no houses or shop buildings in the urban area in question.”

The dictum in this  judgment concerns the acquisition of large

tracts of  land, for the purposes of  land development, in urban

areas. The acquisition in the present case is certainly not for the

purpose of development of urban area or for providing a housing

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scheme to the residents of the urban area in which the acquired

lands are situated. The acquisition, as aforementioned, is for a

project of MRTS (Railways) on behalf of the Ministry of Railway,

Government of India and not for the State Government or State

Authority. Furthermore, admittedly, no scheme has been

formulated in relation to the stated railway project implemented

by the Central Government for providing alternative housing sites

to project affected persons. In the absence of such a scheme, it is

unfathomable that the High Court could still issue a direction to

the State Government and Tamil Nadu Housing Board, in

exercise  of  writ jurisdiction, to  provide  alternative land  to the

private respondent(s) as a special category of displaced persons.

Such a direction cannot be countenanced in law. This is

reinforced from the principle underlying the dictum in the case of

New Reviera  Coop.  Housing  Society  and  Anr. Vs.  Special

Land Acquisition Officer and Ors.3 In paragraph 9 of the said

decision, the Court noted that it would be a different matter if the

State had come forward with a proposal to provide an alternative

site but that principle cannot be extended as a condition in all

3 (1996) 1 SCC 731

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cases of acquisition of the land that the owner must be given an

alternative site or flat.  The  Court  unambiguously rejected the

contention of the affected persons that acquisition of their land

without providing them an alternative site would impinge upon

their right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

 10. Again, in the  case  of  State of  Kerala and Ors.  Vs.  M.

Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr.4,  the Court negatived the claim of

the land owners that the unused acquired land for construction

of  national  highway  should  be  returned to them. Instead, the

Court held that since the acquisition had been completed and the

land had vested in the State Government, the unutilised acquired

land could be disposed of only through public auction so that the

public would benefit by getting a higher value. In another case,

Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran (dead) by

Lrs. And Ors.5, the Court restated the doctrine of public trust

disabling the State from giving back the property for a

consideration less than the market value, if it could not be used

for  any other  public  purpose by  the  State in  cases where  the

4 (1997) 5 SCC 432 5 (2010) 2 SCC 786

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acquisition process had been completed under the 1894 Act. A

similar  view has  been expressed  in  V.  Chandrasekaran and

Anr. Vs. Administrative Officer and Ors.6.  In paragraph 31,

the Court observed thus:  

 “31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallised to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free  from all  encumbrances, it is  not the concern of the landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose.  He becomes  persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding  is  itself  challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person interested nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect.”

11. The private respondents, however, would urge that the State

Government had initiated the acquisition proceedings and was

intently concerned with the stated project within the State and,

for which reason, it could not be extricated from its obligation

flowing from the existing State policy at the relevant time

enabling the State Government to exercise discretionary quota.

The private respondent(s)  have relied on instances where such

6 (2012) 12 SCC 133

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allotments have been made, as is evident from the

communications  annexed  at  R4,  R5  and  R6  to the  additional

affidavit filed on 15th  April, 2019, as per the liberty granted by

this Court.  

12. We have  perused the said communications. It is evident

that, in these cases, the acquisition was made for construction of

houses under LIG/MIG scheme in respect of which a policy

existed for grant of alternative housing site to the affected

persons. Those schemes were implemented by the State Housing

Board. These instances will be of no avail to the private

respondents whose lands have been acquired for implementation

of MRTS Project implemented by the Government of India

(Railways). The private respondent(s) have been duly

compensated in conformity with the mandate of the Act of 1894.

Therefore, they cannot expect any further relief much less from

the State Government or, for that matter, the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board.  

13. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to dilate

on the plea taken by the appellant that the policy regarding grant

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of alternative housing site as a discretionary power of the State

Government has been discontinued from the year 2011. For the

completion of record, however, we must note the argument of the

private respondent(s) that their claim must be decided only on

the basis of policy as it existed at the relevant time and at least at

the time of direction issued by the High Court vide the impugned

judgment in the year 2006. As aforementioned, it is not

necessary for us to take this argument any further as we have

held that the schemes applicable to the acquisition for

development of houses  have  no  application to the  project for

which the lands owned by the private respondent(s) came to be

acquired for implementation of a project by the Government of

India (Railways).  

14. The other decision which commended to the High Court also

has no application to the present case. For,  in  Bharat Singh

and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.7,  the land was

acquired for development and utilization for industrial purpose.

The dictum in paragraph No.18 of the said decision, in no way,

7 (1988) 4 SCC 534

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can be construed to mean that even if no policy for allotment of

alternative housing site in connection with the stated project to

be executed by the Railways is in force, yet the project affected

land owners should be provided an alternative housing site that

too by the State. On the other hand, the observation therein is

merely to direct that the land owners who had become landless

by the acquisition of their land should make an application for

allotment of alternative land and that they may be given priority

in the matter of allotment provided they fulfill the conditions for

such allotment and if land is available. In the case of  S.B.

Kishore Vs. Union of India8, the acquisition was for the purpose

of development of the urban area and the relief given to the land

owner was in the peculiar facts of that case. More importantly,

the  relief  was  with  reference to the  existing  policy  of  allotting

alternative housing sites to the affected land owners. Even in the

case of Hansraj H. Jain (supra), the acquisition was for setting

up a new township and a policy decision of the Government to

offer alternative housing site to the affected land owner  was

8 AIR 1991 SC 90

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applicable to such acquisition, as can be discerned from

paragraph 33 of the said judgment.  

15. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in setting aside

the impugned judgment and, resultantly, dismissing the  writ

petitions filed by the private respondent(s).

16. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. The impugned

common judgment and order of the High Court dated 28th April,

2006 in writ petition Nos.39279 of 2005, 11907 of 2006, 11908

of 2006 and 19029 of 2006, respectively, is set aside. Resultantly,

the aforementioned writ petitions are dismissed. All pending

interim applications are disposed of. No order as to costs.  

     ……………………………..J       (A.M. Khanwilkar)

     ……………………………..J       (Ajay Rastogi)

New Delhi; July 01, 2019.