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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 624/2016

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                        APPELLANT(s)

                               VERSUS

NANDE @ NANDKISHORE SINGH                          RESPONDENT(s)

JUDGMENT    

N.V. RAMANA,  J.

This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment dated 22nd

April, 2009 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior,

passed in Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2002. By the said judgment, the

High Court reversed the order of  conviction against the respondent

herein for the offences punishable under Section 304, Part I and 307,

IPC  passed  by  the  learned  trial  Court,  and  acquitted  him  of  the

charges.

2. According to the prosecution, on 1st June, 1994 at about

9.30 p.m. Rajendra Pathak (PW 12), the SHO of P.S. Singhonia  on

receiving a telephone call from Khariyahar hospital that some women

belonging to the village Kotla Ka Pura were admitted in the hospital

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with  serious  burn  injuries,  rushed  to  the  hospital  and  conducted

inquiry.  In the investigation, it was revealed that on the said date, the

victims,  namely,  Parvesh,  Deepa,  Maya,  Rekha  and  Baby  were

attending marriage celebrations at the house of Nathi Singh (PW 3),

when  the  accused—respondent  herein  hurled  a  burning  cow  dung

cake  at  them  and  caused  serious  burn  injuries  to  them.  After

recording the statements of injured witnesses, the I.O. prepared spot

map, recovered a can of kerosene oil and registered the crime case.  

3. While undergoing treatment, Deepa died on account of burn

injuries on 3rd June, 1994 and Maya, another victim, succumbed to

the  injuries  on 18th June,  1994.  Accordingly,  charges  were  levelled

against  the  accused—respondent  for  the  offences punishable  under

Sections 307 and 302, IPC and committed the case to the Court of

Sessions.   

4. The  learned  trial  Judge,  upon finding  that  there  was  no

proof that the accused had intentionally killed the deceased, came to

the conclusion that the burning cow dung cake was carelessly thrown

by the accused on the women for which he is liable to be punished

under Section 304, Part I, IPC instead of Section 302, IPC. In that view

of the matter, the trial Court convicted the accused—respondent and

sentenced  him  to  suffer  rigorous  imprisonment  for  ten  years  (two

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counts) for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part I, IPC and

rigorous  imprisonment  for  seven  years  for  the  offence  punishable

under Section 307, IPC, with default clause.

5. Against the order of conviction and sentence passed by the

trial  Court,  the respondent—accused approached the High Court in

appeal. The High Court, by the judgment impugned herein, allowed

the appeal of the accused observing that the prosecution has failed to

establish the crime beyond all reasonable doubts, and acquitted him

of the charges. Hence the State is in appeal.

6. The case of the State is that the judgment of the trial Court

convicting the accused was passed after accurate appreciation of the

facts and law duly analyzing the statements of prosecution witnesses

in a prudent manner. But, the High Court, on erroneous appreciation

of  facts  and  overlooking  the  evidences  set  aside  the  trial  Court

judgment and acquitted the accused by applying a flawed appreciation

of law. Learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the

accused had knowingly committed the offence of  culpable homicide

with due knowledge that his act would cause severe burn injuries to

the victims which may lead to their death.  The High Court did not

give due weightage to the statements of eyewitnesses, but giving more

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importance to the delay in registering FIR exonerated the accused and

wrongly declared that the respondent—accused had no intention to

commit the overt act.

7. On the  other  hand,  Ms.  Nidhi,  learned  counsel  who was

appointed through the Supreme Court  Legal  Services Committee to

represent  the  accused—respondent,  supported  the  impugned

judgment.   

8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel

and  perused  the  material  available  on record.  There  is  no  dispute

regarding facts and events in the case. At the same time, both the

Courts below have come to the common conclusion that the accused—

respondent does not bear an intention to kill a particular person. By

going through the record, prima facie it appears that the trial Court

passed  the  order  of  conviction  against  the  accused—respondent  in

consequence of statements of alleged eyewitnesses (PWs 5 & 7) and

considering the concurrent chain of events. But, the fact remains that

the prosecution should be able to prove its case beyond all reasonable

doubts, for awarding conviction to an accused.  

9. In the instant case, admittedly there was no enmity between

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the  accused and the  victims.  Out of  the 12 prosecution witnesses,

Maya—injured  (PW  1),  Natthi  Singh  (PW  3),  Jugraj  Singh  (PW 4),

Parvesh--injured  (PW 6)  and  Ranjeet  Singh  Tomar  (PW 8),  did  not

support the case of prosecution and they turned hostile. As far as the

statements of alleged eyewitnesses P.W.5 and P.W.7 are concerned, on

which learned counsel for the State has heavily relied on, there were

material  contradictions  inasmuch  as  PW  5  (Rekha)  in  her  cross

examination stated that when the incident took place it was moonless

night, the area was surrounded in darkness as there was no light and

one cannot identify  another.  She also  admitted that  she  heard the

name of the accused for the first time after the incident.  However,

Sobaran Singh (P.W.7)  contradicted  the  same.  In  his  deposition  at

para 8 stated that in the light of the gas light all persons were visible.

It did not happen that electricity supply was cut and it became dark.

10. Another  discrepancy  in  the  prosecution  case  is  that  the

First Information Report was lodged on 16.06.1994 i.e. 13 days after

the incident and there is no plausible explanation coming forth from

the  prosecution  for  this  inordinate  delay.  We  also  find  that  the

statements of the witnesses were recorded on 28.06.1994 and there is

no explanation of such huge delay in recording the statements.

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11. Generally, this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution, does not interfere with the impugned

judgment  unless  among  other  things,  there  is  a  glaring  mistake

committed  by  the  court  below  or  there  has  been  an  omission  to

consider vital pieces of evidence. But here in the case on hand, in our

considered view, the High Court has thoroughly considered all aspects

of the case and rightly taken them into account. Only after considering

the credibility of the eyewitnesses and the circumstances in which the

incident occurred, the High Court reached to the correct conclusion

that this is certainly not a case where the guilt of the accused could be

said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt and in a great

detail, expressed the reasons for its conclusion.

12. In view of the above, we find no cogent reason to disturb the

order of acquittal passed by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly

dismissed.   

...............................J.              [N.V. RAMANA]

...............................J.             [S. ABDUL NAZEER]

NEW DELHI, JANUARY 23, 2018.