REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.336 OF 2019    (Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013)

The State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant

Versus

Dhruv Gurjar and another ..Respondents

      WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.337 OF 2019 (Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013)

State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant

Versus

Tinku Sharma and others ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.

2. As  common question of law and  facts  arise in  both

these appeals, they are being disposed of by this common

judgment and order.

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Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013

3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order dated 8.4.2013 passed by the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh,  Bench at  Gwalior in  Miscellaneous  Criminal

Petition No. 2572/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the

said application preferred by the respondents herein/original

accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise

of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused for

the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the

IPC, the State of  Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present

appeal.

4. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was

lodged  against the  accused  at  police station,  Kotwali,  District

Datia for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and

34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime No. 552/2012.   It

was alleged that at about 8:00 p.m. in the night on 17.12.2012

when after distributing the milk, Cheeni @ Devasik Yadav came

in  front   of  his house situated at Rajghat Viram, at  the same

time,  Dhruv  Gurjar (accused)  being  armed with  12  bore gun,

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Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3 to 4 other

persons came there and asked him to take out his nephew, and

they will kill him as on account of enmity of scuffle took place

between  his  nephew Anand  and the  accused  persons.  When

complainant told them that my nephew is not here at the same

time all of them started to  abuse the  complainant  with filthy

language and when he asked them not to do so,  at  the same

time, Sonu  Khamaria, Rohit  Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3­4

other persons spoken that “kill this bastard”, at the same time,

Dhruv Gurjar made a fire with intention to kill him, whose pellets

struck  on three  places of  his  body, i.e., on  his forehead, left

shoulder and left ear, due to which, he sustained injuries and

blood started oozing from it. According to the complainant,

Rampratap Yadav and Indrapal Singh were present on the spot,

who had witnessed the incident.   On hearing the noise of fire,

when other  people  of  vicinity  reached there, then,  all  of these

persons fled away from the spot of the incident.

4.1 On the basis of a report, a Dehati Nalishi bearing No.

0/12 was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC.

As the complainant sustained injuries, his MLC was performed.

On the basis of the contents of the said report, a Crime bearing

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No. 552/2012 was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of

the IPC and the criminal investigation was triggered.  Thereafter,

the investigation team reached the spot and prepared the spot

map and articles were seized.

4.2 That on 18.12.2012, the statements of the witnesses

were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.   That on

21.03.2013, the police arrested the accused.

4.3 The accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No.

2572 of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court

of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal

proceedings against the accused arising out of the FIR, on the

basis of a compromise arrived at between the accused and the

complainant.

5. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High

Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has

quashed the  criminal  proceedings  against the  accused  on the

ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the

disputes amicably.  While quashing the criminal proceedings

against the accused, the High Court has considered and relied

upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji @ Pappu and

others vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705.

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6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned

judgment and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against

the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294

and 34 of the IPC, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the

present appeal.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013

7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order dated 15.3.2013 passed by the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh,  Bench at  Gwalior in  Miscellaneous  Criminal

Petition No. 1936/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the

said application preferred by the respondents herein/original

accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise

of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused for

the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of

M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of Madhya

Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.

8. The facts leading to this appeal are, that on

21.12.2012 one truck driver by name Janki Kushwah informed

the complainant  –  Malkhan Singh Yadav,  who  is  also a  truck

driver that his truck was having some problem and he is near

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Sitapur village.   The complainant reached there and found that

his brother Mangal had also reached there with his truck.   It is

alleged that  when they were busy  in repairing  the  truck, four

persons at around 5:00 a.m. came from the Sitapur village and

they had beaten all of them with legs and fists and snatched cash

of Rs.7,300/­ and two Nokia mobiles having Sim Nos.

9411955930  & 7599256400 from  the complainant –  Malkhan

Singh  Yadav,  Rs.19,000/­ from Mangal  and  Rs.16,500/­ from

Janki Kushwah and a Spice mobile having Sim No. 8756194727.

That the complainant is driving on that route since last 7 to 8

years and sometimes also stayed in Sitapur village.  According to

the complainant, all the four persons were known to him and one

of them, namely, accused Tinku Sharma was having ‘Addhi’  in

his hand, the second one was Ravi Sharma, who was having gun

in his hand, and the other two were Babloo Sharma and

Bhurerai.  All the accused persons after robbing the complainant,

Mangal and Janki Kushwah, went towards Sitapur village.  

8.1 That at 6:30 a.m., the complainant went to Goraghat Police

Station,  District  Datia  and  lodged  the first information report,

which  was registered as  Crime  No. 159 of 2012 against the

accused under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act

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and 25/27 of  the Arms Act.  Thereafter,  the  investigation was

started and the police reached the spot of the incident and

prepared spot map and also recorded the statement of witnesses.

Thereafter, they sent the complainant and two other persons to

the District Hospital, Datia for medical examination, where the

Medical  Officer  found simple  injuries on various body parts of

them.   

8.2 The police on 27.01.2013 reached to the house of the

accused persons and in the village but could not found them and

ultimately prepared the ascendance panchnama. On 14.03.2013,

the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia issued proclamation

under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to

appear before him on 16.04.2013.   Meanwhile, on 12.03.2013,

the accused persons approached the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior  for quashing of  FIR No. 159/2012,

registered against them at Police Station Goraghat, District Datia

for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13

of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act.  

9. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court,

in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has

quashed the  criminal  proceedings  against the  accused  on the

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ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the

disputes amicably.  While quashing the criminal proceedings

against the accused, the High Court has considered and relied

upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra).

10. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned

judgment and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against

the accused for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the

IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the

State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.

11. So far as the criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.

9859/2013 is concerned, it is required to be noted that the

accused  were facing the criminal  proceedings for the  offences

punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC.   It was

alleged against the accused that at the time of commission of the

offence, the accused Dhruv Gurjar fired from his fire arm on the

original complainant with an intention to kill him, and the

original  complainant sustained serious  injuries and the pellets

struck  on three  places  of  his  body, i.e., on the forehead, left

shoulder and left ear.   That incident took place on 17.12.2012

and the investigating officer commenced the investigation,

recorded the statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the

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Cr.P.C. on 18.12.2012.   The investigating officer also seized the

articles.   The Investigating officer also collected the  medical

evidence.   It appears that one of the co­accused, namely, Rohit

Gurjar  was arrested on 21.03.2013.  Nothing in  on  record to

show,  whether in fact the respondent no.1 herein, the  main

accused – original accused no.1 was arrested or not.  It appears

that during the investigation, immediately, the original accused

no.1 – Dhruv Gurjar approached the High Court on 5.4.2013 by

filing an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for

quashing the FIR.  Immediately on the fourth day of filing of the

application, by the impugned judgment and order dated

8.4.2013, the  High  Court  has  quashed the  FIR solely on the

ground that there is a settlement arrived at between the

complainant and the accused.  While quashing the FIR, the High

Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of

Shjji (supra),  specially the observations recorded by  this  Court

“that where there is no chance of recording conviction against the

accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial destined to be

exercise of futility, the criminal case registered against the

accused persons, though it may not be compoundable, can be

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quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C”.

12. Now so far as the criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No.

9860/2013 is concerned, original accused were facing the

criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 394 of the

IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms

Act.   The incident was alleged to happen on 21.12.2012.

Immediately, the investigating  officer started the investigation.

All the accused were absconding.   That when the investigation

was in progress, the original accused approached the High Court

by way of  an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on

12.03.2013 and prayed for quashing of the FIR.   That on

14.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued

proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused

persons to appear before him on 16.04.2013.   That, by the

impugned judgment and order dated 15.03.2013, the High Court

has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that the original

complainant  and  the  accused has entered  into  a  compromise.

Hence, the present appeals.

13. Shri Varun K. Chopra, learned advocate appearing on behalf

of the State of Madhya Pradesh has vehemently submitted that in

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both these cases, the High Court has committed a grave error in

quashing the respective FIRs which were for the offences under

Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of

M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act

respectively.

13.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf  of the appellant­State that in  the present

cases the High Court has quashed the respective FIRs

mechanically and solely on the basis of the

settlement/compromise between the complainant and the

accused, without even considering the gravity and seriousness of

the offences alleged against the accused persons.

13.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant­State that while exercising

the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the

respective FIRs, the High Court has not at all considered the fact

that the offences alleged were against the society at large and not

restricted to the personal disputes between the two individuals.

13.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant­State that the High Court

has misread the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra),

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while quashing the respective FIRs.   It is vehemently submitted

by the learned counsel that the High Court ought to have

appreciated that in all the cases  where the complainant has

compromised/entered  into a settlement with the accused,  that

need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording

conviction and/or the  entire  exercise  of  a trial  destined  to  be

exercise of futility.   It is  vehemently submitted by the  learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant­State that in a given

case despite the complainant may not support in future and in

the trial in view of the settlement and compromise  with the

accused,  still the  prosecution may prove the  case  against the

accused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any,

and/or on the basis of the medical evidence and/or other

evidence/material.  It is submitted that in the present cases the

investigation  was in progress and even the statement of the

witnesses was recorded and the medical evidence was also

collected.   It is submitted that therefore in the facts and

circumstances of the case, the High Court has clearly erred in

considering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the

case of Shiji (supra).

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13.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf  of the appellant­State that as such in the

appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, in fact, the

accused were absconding from the day of the commission of the

offence and, in fact, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia

issued a proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the

accused persons to appear before him.   It is submitted that in

between the day of the alleged commission of the offence and

filing of the application before the High Court under Section 482

Cr.P.C., and while they were absconding, the accused managed

to get the affidavits of the complainant and other  witnesses,

which were dated 9.2.2013.   It is submitted that all these

aforesaid circumstances and the conduct on the part of the

accused were required to be considered by the High Court while

quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under Section

482 of the  Cr.P.C., and  more particularly  when the offences

alleged were against  the society  at large,  namely,  robbery and

under the Arms Act, and in fact non­compoundable.  In support

of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant­State has

placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Gian

Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303;   State of Madhya

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Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh

vs.  Manish (2015) 8  SCC  307; J.Ramesh  Kamath vs.  Mohana

Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer

Singh (2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat

(2017) 9 SCC 641;   and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya

Pradesh vs. Kalyan Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal

No. 14/2019.  

13.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the

aforesaid decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant­State  has  prayed to allow the  present

appeals and quash and set aside the impugned judgments and

orders passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the

respective FIRs, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C.

14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

accused has supported the impugned judgments and orders

passed by the High Court.

14.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned advocate

appearing on behalf of the accused that in the facts and

circumstances of the case and when the complainant and the

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accused entered into a compromise and settled the disputes

amicably among themselves, and therefore when the High Court

found that there is no chance of recording conviction against the

accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be an

exercise of futility, the High Court has rightly exercised the

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has rightly quashed the

respective FIRs.  In support of his submissions, learned counsel

for the accused has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court

in the cases of  Jitendra  Raghuvanshi vs.  Babita  Raghuvanshi

(2013) 4 SCC  58; Anita  Maria  Dias vs. State of  Maharashtra

(2018) 3 SCC 290; and Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar  vs.

Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443.

14.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the

aforesaid decisions of this  Court, it is prayed to dismiss the

present appeals.

15. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties at

length.

16. At  the outset, it is required to be noted that in  the

present appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIRs for the offences

under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC,

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11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act

respectively,  solely  on  the  basis  of  a  compromise  between  the

complainant and the accused.   That in view of the compromise

and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision

of this  Court in the  case  of  Shiji (supra), the  High Court  has

observed that there is no chance of recording conviction against

the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be

exercise  in futility,  the High Court has quashed the respective

FIRs.   

16.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the

fact that the offences alleged were non­compoundable offences as

per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.   From the impugned judgments

and orders, it appears that the High Court has not at all

considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case,

more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social

impact.  From the impugned judgments and orders passed by the

High  Court, it appears that the  High  Court  has  mechanically

quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers  under

Section 482 Cr.P.C.  The High Court has not at all considered the

distinction  between a personal or private  wrong and a social

wrong and the social impact.   As observed by this Court in the

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case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15

SCC 29,  the Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers

under  Section 482 Cr.P.C. to  quash  the  criminal  proceedings,

should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the

allegations and the crux of the settlement.  As observed, it is the

experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said

experience should  be  used  with care, caution, circumspection

and courageous prudence.  In the case at hand, the High Court

has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of

facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal

proceedings mechanically.   Even, the quashing of the respective

FIRs  by the  High Court in the  present  cases for the  offences

under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC,

11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act

respectively, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482

of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court

in a catena of decisions.

16.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this

Court has observed and held as under:

“61.  The position that emerges from the above discussion can be  summarised  thus: the  power  of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or

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FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences  under  Section  320  of the  Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the  process  of  any  court. In  what cases  power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and  the  offender in relation  to the  offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc.  or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal  in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of

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the criminal case  would  put the  accused to  great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the  interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process  of law despite  settlement  and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High  Court  shall  be  well  within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

16.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014)

6 SCC 466,  after considering the decision  in the case of  Gian

Singh (supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:

“29.  In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the

Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have

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settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3.  Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public  servants while  working  in  that  capacity  are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship  or family  disputes  should  be  quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and  bleak  and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC

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in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It  would be open to the  High  Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or  not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge­sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those  cases  where the  charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material  mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is

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almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the  matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases  where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

16.4 In the case of  Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this

Court has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court

can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise

of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point, this

Court summarised the following propositions:

“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new  powers.   It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. (2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High

Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding  on the  ground that  a settlement  has  been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the

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same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.   While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of  Section 320 CrPC.  The  power to  quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non­ compoundable. (3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal

proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate  whether the  ends of justice  would  justify the exercise of the inherent power. (4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a

wide  ambit  and plenitude  it  has to  be  exercised  (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. (5) the  decision as to  whether  a complaint  or first

information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate. (6) In the exercise of  the power under Section 482

and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the  High  Court  must  have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or  the family  of the victim have settled the dispute.   Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society.   The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. (7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may

be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute.  They stand on a distinct footing insofar  as the  exercise  of the inherent power to quash is concerned. (8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise

from commercial, financial,  mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may

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in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. (9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the

criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out

in  Propositions (8) and (9) above.  Economic offences involving the financial and economic  well­being  of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants.   The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the  act complained  of  upon  the financial  or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

16.5 In the case of  Manish (supra),  this Court has

specifically observed and held that, when it comes to the question

of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC

(as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9859/2013) along with Sections

25 and 27 of the  Arms Act (as in the appeal  @ SLP(Crl.)  No.

9860/2013), by no stretch of imagination, can it be held to be an

offence as between the private parties simpliciter.  It is observed

that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at

large.   It is further observed that where the accused are facing

trial under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 IPC as well as

Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, as the offences are definitely

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against the society, accused will have to necessarily face trial and

come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.

16.6 In the case of  Deepak (supra),  this Court has

specifically  observed that  as offence under  Section 307  IPC  is

non­compoundable and as the offence under Section 307 is not a

private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime

against the society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a

compromise is not permissible.  Similar is the view taken by this

Court in a recent decision of this Court in the case of  Kalyan

Singh (supra).

17. Now so far as the decisions of this Court upon which

the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has

placed reliance, referred to hereinabove, are concerned, none of

the decisions shall  be of any assistance to the accused in the

present case.   In all the aforesaid cases, the dispute  was a

matrimonial dispute, and/or the dispute predominantly of a civil

dispute, and/or of the dispute where the wrong is basically

private or personal.

18. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of

this Court in the case of  Shiji (supra), while quashing the

respective FIRs by observing that as the complainant has

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compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of

recording a conviction, and/or the further trial  would be an

exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the

High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIRs on the

aforesaid ground.  It appears that the High Court has misread or

misapplied the said decision to the facts of the cases on hand.

The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every

case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with

the accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations

are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. In a given

case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove the guilt

by  leading cogent evidence and examining  the other witnesses

and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the

dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature

and/or is not a private wrong.   In the case of  Shiji (supra), this

Court found that the case  had its origin in the civil dispute

between the parties,  which dispute was resolved by them and

therefore this Court observed that, ‘that being so, continuance of

the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support

the allegations…will be a futile exercise that will serve no

purpose’.  In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed ‘that

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even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the

complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version’, and

to that this Court observed and held ‘that the continuance of the

proceedings is nothing but an empty formality and Section 482

Cr.P.C. can, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the

High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby

preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below.  Even in the

said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:

“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature  of the  power itself  demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only  in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the  above, the  High Court  will  have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.”

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18.1 Therefore, the said  decision  may  be  applicable in a

case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties;

the  parties  have resolved the  dispute; that the  offence is  not

against the society at large and/or the same may not have social

impact; the  dispute is  a family/matrimonial  dispute  etc.  The

aforesaid  decision may not  be  applicable in  a  case  where the

offences  alleged are  very  serious and grave  offences,  having  a

social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC and 25/27 of

the Arms Act etc.  Therefore, without proper application of mind

to the relevant facts and circumstances,  in our view, the High

Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the

respective  FIRs,  by  observing that in  view of the  compromise,

there are no chances of recording conviction and/or the further

trial would be an exercise in futility.   The High Court has

mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in

the case of Shiji (supra),  without considering the relevant facts

and circumstances of the case.  

18.2 Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the

case of the  appeal  arising from SLP(Crl.)  No. 9860/2013, the

High Court has erred in quashing the FIR.   It is required to be

noted that the  FIR  was lodged  on  21.12.2012 for the  offence

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alleged to happen on 21.12.2012.   All the accused were

absconding.   After a period of approximately three months, they

approached the  High  Court  by  way  of filing a  petition  under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e., on 12.03.2013.  The learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate  issued a proclamation under Section 82 of

the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons on 14.03.2013.   In the

meantime, the accused  managed to get the affidavits of the

complainant and the two witnesses dated 09.02.2013, and the

High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013, i.e., within a period

of three days from the date of filing the petition.  The High Court

has also not considered the antecedents of the accused.   It has

come on record that the accused persons were facing number of

trials for the serious offences.   The aforesaid would be relevant

factors, while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C and while  considering  the  application  for  quashing  the

FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings. In fact, in such a situation,

the High Court ought to have been more vigilant and ought to

have considered relevant facts and circumstances under which

the accused got the settlement entered into. The High Court has

not at all considered the aforesaid relevant circumstances, while

exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

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19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, both

these appeals succeed, and are hereby allowed.   The impugned

judgments and orders passed by the High Court are hereby set

aside, and the respective FIRs/investigation/criminal

proceedings  be  proceeded  against the respective  accused,  and

they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.

……………………………….J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

NEW DELHI; ……………………………….J. FEBRUARY 22, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]    

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