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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    Criminal Appeal No.  485    of 2019      (@SLP(Crl) No. 10129 of 2018)

The State of Madhya Pradesh                                …Appellant  

Versus

Deepak                                    …Respondent  

J U D G M E N T

    Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.

1 Leave granted.

2 The present appeal arises from a judgment dated 31 January,  2018 of a

learned Single Judge of the Indore Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh1

discharging the Respondent from charges framed by the Special Judge, Neemuch.

The Special Judge, Neemuch had by an order dated 13.10.17 in Special Case No.

51 of 2017 framed charges against the respondent under Section 306 of the Indian

Penal  Code,  18602 and  Section  3(2)(V)  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

1 In Criminal Revision No. 458 of 2018 2 “Penal Code”

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3 In pursuance of the notice issued by this Court on 19 November, 2018, the

respondent has entered appearance through learned counsel. We have heard the

Deputy Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh and learned counsel for

the respondent.

4 On 9 August 2017, Jyoti Sharma committed suicide by consuming poison at

her  residence  at  Neemuch.  Immediately  after  she  consumed  poison,  she  was

moved to the District hospital for treatment.  The dying declaration of the victim

was recorded on 9 August 2017 in the presence of the Naib Tehsildar, Neemuch.

The relevant part of the dying declaration is extracted below:

“Question: What has happened to you? Answer:  I have consumed poison. Question: Why you have consumed poison? Answer: I am not able to get the job, wherever I go, Deepak Bhamawat  R/o  Jeeran,  get  me  sacked  out  from  the  job. Earlier he had molested me, on which, I had instituted a case against him, since then, he is harassing me. Question: Whether you want to say anything else? Answer: No.”

5 Jyoti Sharma died on 10 August 2017 at a hospital in Udaipur where she

was admitted for treatment. The First  Information Report3 was registered on 16

August 2017. During the course of the investigation, the respondent was arrested

on 6 September 2017. On the completion of  the investigation, the investigating

officer submitted a charge-sheet on 22 September 2017 under Section 306 of the

Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) and Section 3(2)(v)(a) of the Scheduled Castes

and  Scheduled  Tribes  (Prevention  of  Atrocities)  Act  before  the  Special  Judge,

Neemuch. Cognizance was taken on 13 October 2017. Charges were framed on

10 January 2018. Challenging the order framing charges, a Criminal Revision was

filed before the High Court.  

3 “FIR”

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6 The Single Judge, by the order impugned in these proceedings, set aside

the order of the trial judge and directed that the respondent be discharged.

7 The Deputy Advocate General has adverted to the charge-sheet which has

been submitted after the investigation was completed. Learned counsel submitted

that there is a dying declaration of the victim which was recorded on 9 August

2017. It was urged that the investigation has disclosed that the respondent and the

deceased were employees in the Central Bank. The respondent had obtained a

loan in the name of the deceased, allegedly after forging her signature.  The loan

was not paid, as a result of which on 3 August, 2017, Central Bank issued a notice

to  the  deceased  for  the  repayment  of  the  loan.  During  the  course  of  the

investigation, the investigating agency found that three complaints were submitted

by the victim: on 1 November 2016 to the Station House Officer, P.S. Jeeran; in

December 2016 at P.S. Jeeran and another on 6 January 2017 to the Collector,

Neemuch making specific allegations that the respondent was harassing her. The

respondent  is  alleged  to  have  caused  the  deceased  to  be  terminated  from

employment and also allegedly caused her landlord to oust her from possession.

On this material, which has emerged in the course of the investigation, it is urged

that the case for discharge was not made out.

8 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent

placed reliance on the fact that in the FIR all that has been adverted to is that the

respondent had got the deceased terminated from her job in the Central Bank and

thereby harassed her  and tortured her  as  a  woman belonging to  a Scheduled

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Caste for depositing the installments of the loan.  Learned counsel submitted that

on the contents of the FIR, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion

that there was no provocation, inducement or incitement that would fall within the

description of ‘abetment’ to sustain a charge under Section 306 of the Penal Code.

9 The only circumstance which has weighed with the High Court in passing the

impugned order is what has been stated in the following extract:

“11. …. Merely the deceased was failing to get any job and she is under impression that the petitioner is creating burden and hence she did not get any new job.  He never intended that deceased should commit suicide.”

The High Court held thus:  

“16  …in  the  facts  and circumstances  of  the  present  case, there is no evidence with regard to provocation, incitement or encouragement  for  commitment  of  suicide  by  the deceased…”

10 We  shall  now  examine  whether  the  High  Court  has  correctly  exercised  its

revisional  jurisdiction  under  Section  397  read  with  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal

Procedure, 19734 in discharging the respondent of the charges framed by the Special

Judge, Neemuch.  

11 In Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander5, a two-judge bench of this Court elucidated

on the revisional power of the Court under Section 397. Justice Swatanter Kumar noted

thus:

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision  is  to  set  right  a  patent  defect  or  an  error  of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it

4 “Procedure Code” 5 (2012) 9 SCC 460

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may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which  upon  the  face  of  it  bears  a  token  of  careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under  challenge  are  grossly  erroneous,  there  is  no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive  classes,  but  are  merely  indicative.  Each  case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another  well-accepted  norm  is  that  the  revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be  exercised  in  a  routine  manner.  One  of  the  inbuilt restrictions  is  that  it  should  not  be  against  an  interim  or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise  of  revisional  jurisdiction  itself  should  not  lead  to injustice  ex  facie.  Where  the  Court  is  dealing  with  the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and  in  accordance  with  law  in  a  given  case,  it  may  be reluctant to interfere in exercise of  its revisional  jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories afore- stated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.”

The Court also enunciated a set of principles which the High Courts must keep in mind

while exercising their jurisdiction under the provision:

“27. ..  At  best  and  upon  objective  analysis  of  various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly,  with  regard  to  quashing  of  charge  either  in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.2.  The  Court  should  apply  the  test  as  to  whether  the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of  the case  and  the  documents  submitted  therewith  prima  facie establish  the  offence  or  not.  If  the  allegations  are  so patently  absurd  and  inherently  improbable  that  no prudent  person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The  High  Court  should  not  unduly  interfere.  No meticulous  examination  of  the  evidence  is  needed  for considering whether the case would end in conviction or

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not  at  the  stage  of  framing  of  charge  or  quashing  of charge.

27.4. Where  the  exercise  of  such  power  is  absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the  subordinate  courts  even  in  such  cases,  the  High Court  should be loath to interfere,  at  the threshold,  to throttle  the  prosecution  in  exercise  of  its  inherent powers.

27.9. Another  very  significant  caution  that  the  courts have  to  observe  is  that  it  cannot  examine  the  facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would  end  in  a  conviction;  the  court  is  concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied,  the  Court  should  be  more  inclined  to  permit continuation of  prosecution rather than its  quashing at  that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with  a  view  to  decide  admissibility  and  reliability  of  the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.”

                                                     (Emphasis supplied)

12 In  State of Rajasthan v Fatehkaran Mehdu6, a two-judge bench of this Court

has elucidated on the scope of the interference permissible under Section 397 with re-

gard to the framing of a charge. Justice Ashok Bhushan held thus:

“26. The  scope  of  interference  and  exercise  of  jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold

6 (2017) 3 SCC 198

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something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

(Emphasis supplied)   

13 In view of the above decisions of this Court, we shall now determine whether the

High Court has correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction.  The High Court had held

that the lower court had erred in framing charges in the present case as there was no

evidence with regard to provocation, incitement or encouragement which would lead to

the commission of suicide by the deceased.  

14 It is of relevance to refer to certain judgements of this Court. In Chitresh Kumar

Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi)7, the appellant and two other individuals were charged

under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. It had been alleged that the

appellant and the other accused persons had forcibly compelled the deceased to sign a

settlement giving up a part of his share in the profits from the sale of certain land. This

led to a dispute and as a result of the mental harassment suffered by the deceased, he

committed suicide. The Court affirmed the framing of charges by the trial court.  The

two-judge Bench of this Court laid down the ingredients of the offence of abetment of

suicide. Justice D K Jain held thus:  

“19. As  observed  in Ramesh  Kumar [(2001)  9  SCC  618  : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] ,  where the accused by his acts or by  a  continued  course  of  conduct  creates  such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an “instigation” may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted  commission  of  suicide  by  a  person,  it  has  to  be established that:

(i)  the  accused  kept  on  irritating  or  annoying  the deceased by words, deeds or willful omission or conduct which may even be a willful  silence until  the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds,

7 (2009) 16 SCC 605

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words  or  willful  omission  or  conduct  to  make  the deceased  move  forward  more  quickly  in  a  forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.”

               (Emphasis supplied)

After  due consideration of  the facts and circumstances,  the Court  noted that  prima

facie, the offence of abetment of suicide was made out:

“22. In  the  present  case,  apart  from  the  suicide  note, extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the course  of  investigation,  tend  to  show  that  on  account  of business  transactions  with  the  accused,  including  the appellant  herein,  the deceased was put  under  tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima  facie,  it  appears  that  the  conduct  of  the appellant  and  his  accomplices  was  such  that  the deceased was left with no other option except to end his life and therefore, clause Firstly of Section 107 IPC was attracted.”

(Emphasis supplied)

It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the

material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused

had committed the offence:  

“25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with  a  view to  finding  out  if  the  facts  emerging  therefrom, taken at  their  face  value,  disclose  the  existence of  all  the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this  limited  purpose,  the  court  may  sift  the  evidence  as  it cannot  be  expected even at  the  initial  stage  to  accept  as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if  there  is  ground  for  “presuming”  that  the  accused  has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.”

15 A two-judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v State of U P8 noted that in

8 (2006) 4 SCC 51

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accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is “sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused” or there is ground for “presuming” that the

offence has been committed. Justice G P Mathur held thus:

“9. In Stree  Atyachar  Virodhi  Parishad v. Dilip  Nathumal Chordia, the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under:  

“… Section 227 itself  contains enough guidelines as to the  scope of  inquiry  for  the  purpose of  discharging  an accused. It provides that ‘the judge shall discharge when he  considers  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for proceeding  against  the  accused’.  The  ‘ground’  in  the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the  evidentiary  material  on  record,  if  generally accepted,  would  reasonably  connect  the  accused with the crime.”

10. The High Court did not at all apply the relevant test, namely, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against  the  accused  or  whether  there  is  ground  for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. If the  answer  is  in  the  affirmative  an order  of  discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that “as the firing was aimed at  the other  persons and accidentally  the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit” and further observing that “the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste” set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for  judging the validity  of  the order  passed by  the learned Special  Judge directing  framing of  charges  have not  been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside.”

(Emphasis supplied)   

16 In the present case, there is sufficient material on record to uphold the order

framing charges of the Trial Court. The discharge of the accused was not justified.

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The High Court has evidently ignored what has emerged during the course of the

investigation. The  material  indicates  that  several  complaints  were  filed  by  the

deceased. The last of them was filed a few days before the suicide. It is alleged

that the respondent had taken a loan of Rs 5 lakhs through fraudulent means in the

name  of  the  deceased  and  an  altercation  took  place  between  him  and  the

deceased in  that  regard.  Moreover,  the  respondent  is  alleged  to  have got  the

deceased evicted from a rented house as well as terminated from her employment

at Central Bank. There is a dying declaration.  

17 We, however, clarify that this judgment shall not affect the merits of the trial.

18 For  the  above  reasons,  we  allow  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned

judgment and order of the High Court dated 31 January 2018.

………...……………………................................J.                [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

..…………………………….…..............................J.                          [Hemant Gupta]

New Delhi MARCH 13, 2019