1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11356 OF 2018 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.17404 of 2016)

State of Madhya Pradesh and others                   ……Appellants

VERSUS

Abhijit Singh Pawar                     ..…. Respondent

JUDGMENT

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

1. Leave granted.  This  appeal  challenges  correctness  of  the  judgment

and order dated 22.09.2015 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at

Indore in Writ Appeal No.132 of 2015.

2. In 2012, the Professional Examination Board, Madhya Pradesh invited

applications for filling up the posts of Subedars, Platoon Commanders and

Inspectors of Police.  Clause 1.13 of the advertisement dealt with character

2

verification of the candidates.  True translation of said clause 1.13 along with

Note appended thereto was to the following effect:

“1.13 Appointment:  The  character  verification  shall  be carried out about the selected candidates and the appointment only of the candidates found in the selection list upon finding them  fit  in  character.   The  medical  examination  of  the candidates  also  shall  be  conducted.   The  candidate  to  be medically  fit  for  the  entitlement  of  the  appointment  is  also required.

Note:  To save time and for the convenience, the verification form is sent earlier to the candidates declared fit to sit in the physical  fitness  examination,  which  the  candidates  have  to submit after filling up and the character and earlier verification of  all  the  candidates  to  appear  in  interview  is  made.   The candidate who is not selected, his form will not used further. The candidates should fill up full and correct information in the character verification form.  They should not provide any false  information,  incomplete  information  and  semi  true information.  They should not conceal any information as well. Particularly it is required to fill up the correct information in column  no.12.    Now  according  to  the  new  guidelines  of Madhya Pradesh Government regarding character verification, to give the undertaking to this effect is required that he has not concealed any fact in the details given by him earlier about the criminal cases.”

3. The respondent participated in the selection process and as mandated,

tendered an affidavit on 22.12.2012 disclosing following information:

“I  affirm on oath  that  Case  No.592/06 under  Sections  323, 325, 506, 34 was registered in Police Station Madhav Nagar against me the deponent.  I the deponent myself had come to the court.  I was never arrested.  The aforesaid case is pending in the Court.  In addition no criminal record is registered in

3

any police  station  anywhere  in  India,  nor  has  the  deponent convicted by the Court in any criminal case.”

4. According to the disclosure, a case registered in the year 2006 was

pending on the date when the affidavit was tendered.  However, it appears that

within  four  days,  a  compromise  was  entered  into  between  the  original

complainant  and  the  respondent  and  an  application  for  compounding  the

offences  was  filed  under  Section  320  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.   True

translation of relevant portions of the proceedings dated 26.12.2012 before the

Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ujjain, M.P. is as under:

“The  case  was  perused.   This  case  is  listed  for  the presence of the accused.  The accused was taken in judicial custody.   …….

The bond forfeiture  amount  on behalf  of  the accused was  deposited  in  compliance  with  the  order,  vide  receipt No.85.  The receipt was given to the accused….

At this very stage, Rajiv Rawat submitted an application for compromise under Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. and expressed that  a  compromise  has  been  made  between  him  and  the accused  persons  so  the  permission  for  compounding  be granted.   Copy of the application was given to ADPO. The remaining  accused  persons  with  Sashank  Advocate  are present.  I heard the matter regarding compromise.  The case was perused.

It is clear from perusal that the case being of offences under  Sections 294,  325/34,  323,  506 Part-2,  IPC is  fit  for compromise.  The present complainant is a competent party for the compromise.  Hence, the permission for compounding can be granted.

4

The  parties  submitted  a  deed  of  compromise,  jointly signed  having photographs.   The parties  were  identified  by their  counsel.   Both  the  parties  have  stated  that  the compromise was arrived at voluntarily without any fear and pressure.   Hence,  the  application  for  compounding  was allowed after verification.  As a result of the composition, the accused persons are acquitted of the charges under Sections 294, 325/34, 323, 506 Part-2 IPC.

The bail bonds of the accused persons are discharged.”

5. The proceedings, thus, indicate that the amount of bond submitted on

the  earlier  occasion  had  been  forfeited  for  non-compliance;  that  the

respondent was taken in judicial custody and that after the compromise was

entered  into  between  the  parties,  the  application  for  compounding  of  the

offences was allowed.

6. The  respondent  was  selected  in  the  written  examination  and  was

called  for  medical  examination.   Around  the  same  time,  his  character

verification  was  also  undertaken.   After  due  consideration  of  character

verification report, the candidature of the respondent was however rejected

vide order  dated 19.07.2013 passed by the Additional  Director  General  of

Police  (Selection/Recruitment),  Police  Headquarters,  Bhopal.   Said  order

observed as under:-

“3-B The  services  of  the  persons  seeking  uniform service/employment comes under the category different from other  services  and  candidates.   The  duty  of  the  candidates selected is to maintain law and order of the State and to protect

5

the life and property of the public.  The high moral conduct and not to be involved in the criminal activities is required for the police service.

3-C According to the principles about the excellent conduct with the Government in respect of the Government Servants, the Government Servants should be of high character.  Since the officers of the Police Department are responsible to control the persons of criminal nature, it is not proper to appoint the persons of criminal record in public interest.”

7. The respondent being aggrieved, filed Writ Petition No.9412 of 2013

before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore challenging the aforesaid

order dated 19.07.2013.  A Single Judge of the High Court allowed said writ

petition and directed as under:

“… The petitioner shall be appointed in case his name finds place in the merit  list  and is entitled to be appointed as per merit.   The petitioner  shall  be  entitled for  all  consequential benefits, except back wages.”

8. The State challenged the decision of the Single Judge by filing Writ

Appeal No.132 of 2015, which challenge was found to be without any merit

by  the  Division  Bench.    The  view taken  by  the  Single  Judge  was  thus

affirmed by the Division Bench vide its judgment and order dated 22.09.2015

which decision is presently under challenge.

9. Since the respondent, despite being served in the matter had chosen

not to enter appearance, this Court requested Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned

6

Advocate to assist as Amicus Curiae and appear on behalf of the respondent.

We  heard  Mr.  Rajesh  Srivastava,  learned  Advocate  for  the  State  and  Mr.

Siddhartha Dave, learned Amicus Curiae for the respondent.

10. It was submitted by Mr. Rajesh Srivastava, learned Advocate that in

terms  of  Rule  12(3)  of  M.P.  Police  Executive  (Non-Gazetted)  Services

Recruitment Rules, 1996,  inclusion of a candidate’s name in the list would

not confer  any right  to appointment and that  a candidate had to be found

suitable in all respects before he could be appointed.  Relying on the decisions

of this Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another v.  Mehar

Singh1, State of Madhya Pradesh and others  v.  Parvez Khan2 and Union

Territory,  Chandigarh Administration and others v.  Pradeep Kumar and

another3 he  submitted  that  the  candidature  of  the  respondent  was  rightly

rejected and there being no allegation of mala fides, no interference with the

decision in question was called for.  Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Amicus

Curiae,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  by  virtue  of  Section  320(8)  of

Cr.P.C. composition of an offence would have the effect of an acquittal.  He

further submitted that the respondent had not suppressed any information and

he having been acquitted, the High Court was right in accepting his challenge.

1(2013) 7 SCC 685 2(2015) 2 SCC  591 3(2018) 1 SCC  797

7

Mr. Dave further relied upon the decisions of this Court in  Avtar Singh v.

Union  of  India  and  others4  and  In  Mohammed  Imran v.  State  of

Maharashtra and others5.   

11. In Mehar Singh (supra) the selection in question was for the post of

Constable  (Executive).    The  offences  alleged  against  Mehar  Singh  were

under Sections 341, 323 and 427 of the IPC.  He had arrived at a compromise

with the complainant and in terms of the compromise, Mehar Singh and other

co-accused were acquitted of the offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427 of

the IPC on 30.01.2009.  In the selection which was undertaken thereafter, said

Mehar  Singh had disclosed the  factum regarding his  involvement  and his

acquittal.   His candidature was, however cancelled in terms of the concerned

Standing  Order.   The  challenge  raised  by  him  was  accepted  by  the

Administrative Tribunal and the Delhi High Court.   But this Court reversed

said decisions and the observations in paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 33 to 35 of the

decision of this Court are quite relevant for the present purposes:-  

“ 23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal  or  discharge  is  on  technical  grounds  or  not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights

4 (2016) 8 SCC 471 5 In Civil Appeal No.10571 of 2018, decided on 12.10.2018.

8

to  cancel  the candidature  of  a  candidate  if  it  finds  that  the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile.  It  is  only  experienced  officers  of  the  Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in  a  police  force.  The  Screening  Committee  will  have  to consider the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in the  crime  and  his  propensity  of  becoming  a  cause  for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.

24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the  respondents’ candidature,  the  Screening  Committee  has overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of co-relation between a criminal case and a departmental enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection  with  it  because  the  issue  involved  is  somewhat identical,  namely,  whether  to  allow a  person  with  doubtful integrity  to  work  in  the  department.  While  the  standard  of proof  in  a  criminal  case  is  the  proof  beyond all  reasonable doubt,  the  proof  in  a  departmental  proceeding  is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In  R.P. Kapur v.  Union of India6 this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable.

6 AIR 1964 SC 787

9

25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered by this  Court  in  S.  Samuthiram7.  In  that  case  this  Court  was concerned  with  a  situation  where  disciplinary  proceedings were  initiated  against  a  police  officer.  Criminal  case  was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4  of  the  Eve-Teasing  Act.  He  was  acquitted  in  that  case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses  turned  hostile.  Referring  to  the  judgment  of  this Court in  RBI v.  Bhopal Singh Panchal8,  where in somewhat similar  fact  situation,  this  Court  upheld  a  bank’s  action  of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court  held  that  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  setting aside  the  punishment  imposed  in  the  departmental proceedings.  This  Court  observed  that  the  expressions “honourable  acquittal”,  “acquitted  of  blame”  and  “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It  is  difficult  to  define  what  is  meant  by  the  expression “honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission.  Compromises  or  settlements  have  to  be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged  also  to  reduce  arrears  of  cases  and  save  the litigants  from  the  agony  of  pending  litigation.  But  these considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to maintain

7 (2013) 1 SCC 598 8 (1994) 1 SCC 541

10

integrity  and  high  standard  of  police  force,  the  Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if  it  appears  to  it  to  be  dubious.  The Screening Committee cannot be faulted for that.

34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact that  in  their  application  and/or  attestation  form  they  have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity  are  inbuilt  requirements  of  the  police  force.  The respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points  because  of  this  disclosure.  Besides,  this  has  no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later on acquitted or discharged should  be  appointed  to  a  post  in  the  police  force,  what  is relevant  is  the  nature  of  the  offence,  the  extent  of  his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal  by  giving  benefit  of  doubt  because  the  witnesses turned  hostile  or  because  of  some  serious  flaw  in  the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only  be  taken  by the  Screening  Committee  created  for  that purpose  by  the  Delhi  Police.  If  the  Screening  Committee’s decision  is  not  mala  fide  or  actuated  by  extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned.

35. The police  force  is  a  disciplined force.  It  shoulders  the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He  must  have  impeccable  character  and  integrity.  A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if  he  is  acquitted  or  discharged  in  the  criminal  case,  that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether  he  has  been  completely  exonerated  in  the  case

11

because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses  a  threat  to  the  discipline  of  the  police  force.  The Standing  Order,  therefore,  has  entrusted  the  task  of  taking decisions in these matters  to  the Screening Committee.  The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force.  At  the  same time,  the  Screening  Committee  must  be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand.”

 12. The conclusions in Mehar Singh (supra) have been followed and the

principles reiterated by this Court in later decisions, namely in State of M.P.

v. Parvez Khan (supra) and in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration

and others v. Pradeep Kumar and another (supra).

13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh v.  Union of India

(supra) was required to consider the difference of opinion in decisions of this

Court on the question of suppression of information or submission of false

information in the verification form on issues pertaining to involvement in

criminal cases and the effect thereof.  The law on the point was settled by this

Court in following terms in paragraph No.38 of its decision as under:

12

“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus:

38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.

38.2. While  passing  order  of  termination  of  services  or cancellation  of  candidature for  giving false  information,  the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.

38.3. The  employer  shall  take  into  consideration  the government  orders/instructions/rules,  applicable  to  the employee, at the time of taking the decision.

38.4. In  case  there  is  suppression  or  false  information  of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had  already  been  recorded  before  filling  of  the application/verification  form  and  such  fact  later  comes  to knowledge  of  employer,  any  of  the  following  recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted:

38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence  which  if  disclosed  would  not  have  rendered  an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.

38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not  trivial  in  nature,  employer  may  cancel  candidature  or terminate services of the employee.

13

38.4.3. If  acquittal  had  already  been  recorded  in  a  case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take  appropriate  decision  as  to  the  continuance  of  the employee.

38.5. In  a  case  where  the  employee  has  made  declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

38.6. In  case  when  fact  has  been  truthfully  declared  in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple  pending cases  such false  information by itself  will assume  significance  and  an  employer  may  pass  appropriate order  cancelling  candidature  or  terminating  services  as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.

38.8. If  criminal  case  was  pending  but  not  known  to  the candidate  at  the  time  of  filling  the  form,  still  it  may  have adverse  impact  and  the  appointing  authority  would  take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service,  holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of  termination/removal  or  dismissal  on  the  ground  of suppression  or  submitting  false  information  in  verification form.

14

38.10. For  determining  suppression  or  false  information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such  information  which  was  required  to  be  specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be  considered  in  an  objective  manner  while  addressing  the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.

38.11. Before  a  person  is  held  guilty  of  suppressio  veri  or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.”

14. In  Avtar Singh (supra), though this Court was principally concerned

with the question as to non-disclosure or wrong disclosure of information, it

was observed in paragraph 38.5 that even in cases where a truthful disclosure

about a concluded case was made, the employer would still have a right to

consider antecedents of the candidate and could not be compelled to appoint

such candidate.

15. In the present case, as on the date when the respondent had applied, a

criminal case was pending against him.  Compromise was entered into only

after  an  affidavit  disclosing  such  pendency  was  filed.    On  the  issue  of

compounding of offences and the effect of acquittal under Section 320(8) of

Cr.P.C., the law declared by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra), specially in

paragraphs  34  and  35  completely  concludes  the  issue.   Even  after  the

15

disclosure is made by a candidate,  the employer would be well within his

rights to consider the antecedents and the suitability of the candidate.  While

so considering, the employer can certainly take into account the job profile for

which the selection is undertaken, the severity of the charges levelled against

the  candidate  and  whether  the  acquittal  in  question  was  an  honourable

acquittal or was merely on the ground of benefit of doubt or as a result of

composition.   

16. The  reliance  placed  by  Mr.  Dave,  learned  Amicus  Curiae  on  the

decision of this Court in  Mohammed Imran (supra) is not quite correct and

said decision cannot be of any assistance to the respondent.   In para 5 of said

decision, this Court had found that the only allegation against the appellant

therein was that he was travelling in an auto-rickshaw which was following

the  auto-rickshaw  in  which  the  prime  accused,  who  was  charged  under

Section 376 IPC, was travelling with the prosecutrix in question and that all

the accused were acquitted as the prosecutrix did not support the allegation.

The decision in  Mohammed Imran (supra) thus turned on individual facts

and cannot in any way be said to have departed from the line of decisions

rendered by this Court  in  Mehar Singh (supra),  Parvez Khan (supra)  and

Pradeep Kumar (supra).

16

17. We  must  observe  at  this  stage  that  there  is  nothing  on  record  to

suggest that the decision taken by the concerned authorities in rejecting the

candidature  of  the  respondent  was  in  any  way  actuated  by  mala  fides  or

suffered on any other count.   The decision on the question of suitability of the

respondent, in our considered view, was absolutely correct and did not call for

any interference.   We,  therefore,  allow this  appeal,  set  aside the decisions

rendered by the Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench and dismiss

Writ Petition No.9412 of 2013 preferred by the respondent.   No costs.

18. Before we part, we must record our appreciation for the efforts put in

by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned Amicus Curiae and the assistance rendered by

him.

......…….…………………..……J.       (Uday Umesh Lalit)

..……..…………….……………J.            (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud)

New Delhi, November 26, 2018