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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2545_OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.4199 of 2013)

The Secretary to Government, Public (Law and Order-F) and another …..Appellants

Versus

Nabila and another     …..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

M.Y. EQBAL, J.

Leave granted.

2. By way of present appeal by special leave, Secretary to  

the  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu,  Public  (Law and  Order-F)  

Department,  Chennai  has  assailed  the  Order  dated  

26.4.2013 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High  

Court at Madurai Bench by which order of detention passed  

by  the  appellant  under  Section  3  (1)(a)of  the  National  

Security Act 1980 has been quashed.  

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3. The respondent-writ  petitioner,  being  the  wife  of  the  

detenu, by way of Habeas Corpus Petition before the High  

Court, challenged the detention order mainly on the ground  

that the detenu was detained on the solitary ground case  

and the sponsoring authority has failed to place any material  

before the detaining authority to show that either the detenu  

himself  or  his  relatives  have  taken  any  step  to  file  bail  

application in a solitary ground case.  The High Court held  

that  the  satisfaction  arrived  at  by  the  detaining  authority  

that there is real or imminent possibility of the detenu being  

enlarged on bail is vitiated in law.

4. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. L. Nageshwara Rao,  

learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants,  

submitted that the detention of the detenu on the solitary  

ground case cannot be held to be erroneous and even on  

solitary  ground  the  detenu  can  be  detained  in  custody  if  

sufficient  materials  on  record  are  available  to  the  

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satisfaction  of  the  authority  concerned.   Learned  counsel  

relied upon the decision of this Court in Shiv Ratan Makim  

vs. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 404, and Union of India  

& Anr. vs. Chhaya Ghosal & Anr., (2004) 10 SCC 97.

5. Mr.  Rao then submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  not  

appreciated  the  law  in  holding  that  the  subjective  

satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority that there is  

a real or imminent possibility of the detenu being enlarged  

on bail and if he is released on bail, he would indulge in such  

activities which would be prejudicial to the security of the  

State.  In this connection, learned senior counsel relied upon  

Constitution  Bench  judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Haradhan Saha vs. State of West Bengal and others,  

(1975) 3 SCC 198, Ahmad Nssar vs. State of Tamil Nadu  

& Ors., (1999) 8 SCC 473 and  Baby Devassy Chully vs.   

Union of India & Ors., (2013) 4 SCC 531.

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6. Mr. Rao, learned senior counsel, lastly submitted that  

by reason of the detention order dated 5.12.2012 the detenu  

remained in jail till the order passed by the High Court dated  

26.4.2013.   On the  question  as  to  whether  the  detenu is  

required to undergo remaining period of detention, learned  

counsel fairly submitted that the matter is to be sent to the  

detaining authority to decide the same in accordance with  

law.  In this regard, learned counsel relied upon the decision  

of  this  Court  in  the  case  of   Sunil  Fulchand Shah  vs.  

Union  of  India  &  Ors.,  (2000)  3  SCC  409  and  

Chanddrakant Baddi vs. ADM  & Police Commissioner  

& Ors., (2008) 17 SCC 290.

7. Mr.  S.  Gowthaman,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  

respondent no.1, at the very outset submitted that no bail  

application  was  filed  on  the  date  of  passing  of  detention  

order  although  the  respondent  was  confined  in  jail  since  

16.9.2012 and hence the detaining authority ought to have  

been satisfied while passing the order of detention that the  

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detenu was  likely  to  be released on bail.   In  this  regard,  

learned  counsel  relied  upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi  vs. State of Manipur and  

others, (2010) 9 SCC 618.  Learned counsel also relied upon  

T.V.  Sravanan  alias  A.R.  Prasana  Venkatachaariar   

Chaturvedi  vs.  State through Secretary and another,  

(2006) 2 SCC 664.

8. On  the  question  of  detention  on  solitary  ground,  

learned  counsel  submitted  that  no  criminal  prosecution  

against the detenu is pending in any court of law except the  

instant  case  where  the  detenu  was  detained  without  any  

subjective  satisfaction.   There  is  no  material  against  the  

detenu for the purpose of passing order of detention.  In this  

connection, learned counsel relied upon the case of  Ayub  

alias Pappukhan Nawabkhan Pathan  vs.  S.N. Sinha  

and another, (1990) 4 SCC 552.  

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9. Learned  counsel,  on  the  question  of  undergoing  

remaining period of detention when the period of detention  

has  expired,  relied  upon  Fulchand Shah vs.   Union of  

India  and  Others (supra).   Mr.  Gowthaman  lastly  

contended that very stringent conditions have been imposed  

while allowing the bail petition, as a result he has not gone  

to his hometown and is always available in Trichy.  In that  

view  of  the  matter  there  is  no  need  for  the  detenu  to  

undergo the remaining period of detention.

10. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the  

parties  and  perused  the  orders  passed  by  the  Detaining  

Authority and the High Court.

11. The Habeas Corpus Writ Petition under Article 226 of  

the Constitution of India was filed by the respondent No.1,  

the wife of the detenu.  The order of detention was primarily  

based on the information received by the Sub-Inspector of  

Police  Q.  Branch,  CID,  Trichy,  who went  to  TVS toll  gate,  

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Trichy  along  with  his  force  and  detenu  was  arrested  and  

confessional statement was recorded which lead to seizure  

of incriminating articles containing official secrets relating to  

Indian Defence Forces and other articles.  The Inspector of  

Police ‘Q’ Branch CID, Karur received those incriminating and  

other articles along with the special report and registered a  

case in  Crime No.1 of  2012 under  Sections  3,4,  and 9 of  

Official  Secrets  Act,  1923  read  with  Section  120(B)  IPC.  

Later  on  the  detenu  was  produced  before  the  Court  of  

Judicial Magistrate No.2, Trichy and was remanded to judicial  

custody  and  his  remand  was  periodically  extended.   The  

Detaining Authority being satisfied with the material placed  

by the Sponsoring Authority that the activities of the detenu  

are prejudicial to the security of the State, passed the order  

of detention on 5.12.2012.  

12. As noticed above, the order of detention in the Habeas  

Corpus Petition was challenged before the High Court mainly  

on the ground that the detenu is involved in a solitary case  

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and has not filed any application for bail.  But the order of  

detention  was  passed  without  recording  any  subjective  

satisfaction as to the real imminent possibility of the detenu  

being enlarged  on bail as would indulge in such activities  

which have prejudicial to the security of the State.  The High  

court while allowing the habeas corpus petition and quashing  

the order of detention observed as under:-

“A  perusal  of  paragraph  No.11  of  the  grounds of detention would disclose that  the  detenu  is  in  remand  in  connection  with  the  solitary  grounds  case  and  admittedly  he  has  not  filed  any  bail  application.  The sponsoring authority has  failed  to  place  any  material  before  the  detaining  authority  to  show  that  either  the  detenu  himself  or  his  relatives  are  taking steps to file application for bail in  the  solitary  ground  case  and  in  the  absence  of  such  vital  and  cogent  materials,  the  subjective  satisfaction  arrived at by the detaining authority that  there is a real or imminent possibility of  the detenu being enlarged on bail and if  he is released on bail, he would indulge in  such activities which would be prejudicial  to the security of the state, is vitiated and  therefore  on  this  sole  ground  the  impugned order of detention  is liable to  be quashed.”

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13. Indisputably, the object of law of preventive detention  

is not punitive, but only preventive.  In case of preventive  

detention  no  offence  is  to  be  proved  nor  is  any  charge  

formulated.  The justification of such detention is suspicion  

and reasonability and there is no criminal conviction which  

can  only  be  warranted  by  legal  evidence.   However,  the  

detaining  authority  must  keep  in  mind  while  passing  the  

order of detention the civil and constitutional right granted  

to  every  citizen  by  Article  21 of  the  Constitution  of  India  

inasmuch as no person shall be deprived of life and liberty  

except in accordance with the procedure established by law.  

The laws of Preventive Detention are to be strictly construed  

and the procedure provided must be meticulously complied  

with.

14. In the instant case, as noticed above, the High Court  

quashed the order of detention mainly on the ground that  

the detenu was in  remand in connection with the solitary  

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ground  case  when  there  was  no  material  before  the  

detaining authority to show that either the detenu himself or  

his relatives are taking steps to file application for bail in the  

solitary ground case.  In our opinion, the view taken by the  

High  Court  while  passing  the  impugned  order  cannot  be  

sustained in law.  This point was considered by this Court in  

the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Chhaya Ghosal &  

Anr., (2004) 10 SCC 97, and observed:-

“23.  So  far  as  the  finding  of  the  High  Court that there was only one incident is  really  a  conclusion  based  on  erroneous  premises.  It  is  not  the  number  of  acts  which  determine  the  question  as  to  whether detention is warranted. It is the  impact of the act, the factual position as  highlighted  goes  to  show  that  the  financial  consequences  were  enormous  and ran into crores of rupees, as alleged  by  the  detaining  authority.  The  High  Court seems to have been swayed away  that  there  was  only  one  incident  and  none after release on bail. The approach  was  not  certainly  correct  and  the  judgment  on  that  score  also  is  vulnerable.  At  the  cost  of  repetition  it  may be said that it is not the number of  acts  which  is  material,  it  is  the  impact  and  effect  of  the  act  which  is  determinative.  The  High  Court’s  conclusions  in  this  regard are therefore  not sustainable.”

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15. In  Shiv  Ratan  Makim’s case  (supra),  the  same  

question arose where on the basis of information received  

the customs officer  intercepted one auto-rickshaw and on  

search two foreign mark gold in the shape of round tablets  

were  recovered  from  the  possession  of  the  husband  of  

respondent  no.1.   He  was  immediately  arrested  and  was  

detained  by  the  order  passed  by  the  government  under  

Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.  The said order was assailed  

on the ground that the detention order was passed on the  

solitary  incident  which  cannot  be  sustained  in  law.   This  

Court, while rejecting the said view, held:-

“3. Though several grounds were taken in the  writ petition only three were seriously pressed  by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the  petitioner.  The  first  ground  was  that  the  order  of  detention  was based on the solitary  incident in which two pieces of foreign marked  gold  were  recovered  from the  pocket  of  the  trousers  of  the  petitioner  on  November  20,  1984 and apart from this incident there were  no  other  incidents  showing  that  he  was  habitually smuggling gold. The second ground  was  that  considerable  time  had  elapsed  between the  date  when he was  found  to  be  carrying two pieces of foreign marked gold and  the date of the order of detention and this long  

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lapse  of  time  showed  that  the  order  of  detention was vitiated by mala fides. And the  last ground was that the order of detention was  made  with  a  view  to  circumventing  or  bypassing  the  criminal  prosecution  instituted  against  the  petitioner  and  the  detaining  authority had not applied its mind to the vital  aspect that the power of detention cannot be  used  to  subvert,  supplant  or  substitute  the  punitive  law.  We  do  not  think  any  of  these  three grounds can be sustained. 4.  So  far  the  first  ground  is  concerned,  it  is  obvious that having regard to the nature of the  activity  of  smuggling,  an  inference  could  legitimately  be  drawn  even  from  a  single  incident  of  smuggling that the petitioner  was  indulging in smuggling of gold. Moreover, the  written  statement  given  by  the  petitioner  clearly  indicated  that  the  petitioner  was  engaged in the business of purchase and sale  of foreign marked gold and that this incident in  which  he  was  caught  was  not  a  solitary  incident. The facts stated by the petitioner in  his  written  statement  could  legitimately  give  rise to the inference that the petitioner was a  member of a smuggling syndicate and merely  because only one incident of smuggling by the  petitioner came to light, it did not mean that  this was the first and only occasion on which  the petitioner tried to smuggle gold. There can  be no doubt that having regard to the nature of  the activity and the circumstances in which the  petitioner was caught smuggling gold and the  facts set out by him in his written statement,  the  second  respondent  was  justified  in  reaching  the  satisfaction  that  the  petitioner  was engaged smuggling gold and that with  a  view to preventing him from smuggling gold, it  was necessary to detain him.

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16.  Mr.  Gowthaman,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondent vehemently argued that on the date of passing  

the detention order no bail  was sought for  by the detenu  

hence the detaining authority while passing the impugned  

order  must  be  satisfied  that  the  detenu  was  likely  to  be  

released on bail.  Learned counsel submitted that there is no  

material  or  evidence  in  this  regard.   In  our  view,  the  

detention order cannot be set aside merely on this ground.  

The Constitution Bench of this Court in Haradhan Saha  vs.  

State of West Bengal & Others, (1975) 3 SCC 198, while  

considering  the  constitutional  validity  of  maintenance  of  

Internal Security Act 1971, as being ultra vires and violates  

Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, observed:-

“32.  The  power  of  preventive  detention  is  qualitatively  different  from  punitive  detention.  The  power  of  preventive  detention  is  a  precautionary  power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or  may  not  relate  to  an  offence.  It  is  not  a  parallel  proceeding.  It  does  not  overlap  with  prosecution  even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution  may be launched or  may have been launched.  An  order of preventive detention may be, made before  or  during  prosecution.  An  order  of  preventive  detention may be made with or without prosecution  and  in  anticipation  or  after  discharge  or  even  acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no  bar to  

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an  order  of  preventive  detention.  An  order  of  preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 33.  Article  14  is  inapplicable  because  preventive  detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The  purposes are different. The authorities are different.  The  nature  of  proceedings  is  different.  In  a  prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for  a past act.  In preventive detention, the past act is  merely  the material  for  inference about  the  future  course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu.

34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject  are many. The decisions in  Borjahan Gorey v.  State  of  W.B.,  Ashim Kumar Ray v.  State of  W.B.;  Abdul  Aziz v.  District  Magistrate,  Burdwan and  Debu  Mahato v.  State  of  W.B. correctly  lay  down  the  principles to be followed as to whether a detention  order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v.  State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 573, which is a Division  Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to  the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of  three  learned  Judges.  The  principles  which  can  be  broadly  stated  are  these.  First,  merely  because  a  detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the  commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded  against for preventing him from committing offences  dealt  with  in  Chapter  VIII  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure would not by itself debar the Government  from taking action for his detention under the Act.  Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and  later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to  prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure  and even lodges a first information report may be no  bar against the District  Magistrate issuing an order  under  the  preventive  detention.  Third,  where  the  concerned  person is  actually  in  jail  custody at  the  time when an order of  detention is passed against  him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of  time, it may be possible to contend that there could  be  no  satisfaction  on  the  part  of  the  detaining  authority  as  to  the  likelihood  of  such  a  person  indulging  in  activities  which  would  jeopardise  the  security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the  

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mere circumstance that a detention order is passed  during  the  pendency  of  the  prosecution  will  not  violate the order.  Fifth,  the order of  detention is a  precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable  prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based  on his past conduct in the light of  the surrounding  circumstances.”

17. The submission of Mr. Gowthaman that in absence of  

any satisfaction having been recorded by the authority while  

passing the impugned order of detention that detenu was  

likely  to  be  released  on  bail  cannot  be  accepted.   The  

detaining authority has arrived at the conclusion that there  

is  a  real  and  imminent  possibility  of  the  detenu  being  

enlarged on bail cannot be said to be erroneous.  This point  

was considered by this Court in the case of Ahamed Nassar  

vs.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu,  (1999)  8  SCC  473,  held  as  

under:-

“46. So before the detaining authority, there existed  not only the order dated 12-4-1999 rejecting his bail  application but the contents of  the bail  application  dated  1-4-1999.  The  averments  made  therein  are  relevant  material  on  which  subjective  satisfaction  could legitimately be drawn either way. Thus in spite  of  rejection of  the bail  application by a court,  it  is  open to the detaining authority to come to his own  satisfaction  based  on  the  contents  of  the  bail  application keeping in mind the circumstances that  

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there is likelihood of the detenu being released on  bail.  Merely  because  no  bail  application  was  then  pending  is  no  premise  to  hold  that  there  was  no  likelihood of  his  being released on bail.  The words  “likely  to  be  released”  connote  chances  of  being  bailed out, in case there be pending bail application  or in case if it is moved in future is decided. The word  “likely” shows it can be either way. So without taking  any such risk if  on the facts and circumstances of  each case, the type of crime to be dealt with under  the  criminal  law,  including  contents  of  the  bail  application, each separately or all this compositely,  all  would  constitute  to  be  relevant  material  for  arriving  at  any conclusion.  As  the  contents  of  bail  application would vary from one case to the other,  coupled  with  the  different  set  of  circumstances  in  each case, it may be legitimately possible in a given  case for a detaining authority to draw an inference  that there is likelihood of the detenu released on bail.  The detention order records:

“The  Administrator  of  the  National  Capital  Territory  of  Delhi  is  aware  that  you are  in  judicial  custody and had not moved any bail  application in  the court(s) after 9-6-1992 but nothing prevents you  from moving bail applications and possibility of your  release on bail cannot be ruled out in the near future.  Keeping  in  view  your  modus  operandi  to  smuggle  gold  into  India  and  frequent  visits  to  India,  the  Administrator  of  the  National  Capital  Territory  of  Delhi  is  satisfied  that  unless  prevented  you  will  continue to engage yourself  in prejudicial  activities  once you are released.”

18. Having regard to  the law discussed hereinabove,  the  

impugned  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  quashing  the  

order of detention on solitary ground case is erroneous in  

law.

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19. Admittedly,  the  detenu  was  confined  in  jail  since  

16.9.2012.  The detention order was passed on 5.12.2012,  

after about three months from the date of arrest, and the  

said  order  of  detention  was  finally  quashed  by  the  High  

Court  by passing the impugned order  on 26.4.2013.   The  

question,  therefore,  that  needs  to  be  considered  is  as  to  

whether if the impugned order passed by the High Court is  

quashed,  can  the  detenu  be  then  asked  to  undergo  the  

remaining period of detention.  In this regard Mr. Rao relied  

upon the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Sunil  

Fulchand Shah vs. Union of India and Others, (2000) 3  

SCC 409,  and fairly  submitted that  it  is  for  the  detaining  

authority  to  consider  the  matter  afresh.   Relevant  

paragraphs from the judgment in Fulchand Shah’s case are  

worth to be quoted hereinbelow:-

“32.  The quashing of  an order of  detention by the  High Court brings to an end such an order and if an  appeal is allowed against the order of the High Court,  the question whether or  not  the detenu should be  made to surrender to undergo the remaining period  of detention, would depend upon a variety of factors  

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and in  particular  on  the  question  of  lapse  of  time  between the date of detention, the order of the High  Court, and the order of this Court, setting aside the  order of the High Court. A detenu need not be sent  back to undergo the remaining period of detention,  after a long lapse of time, when even the maximum  prescribed period intended in the order of detention  has  expired,  unless  there  still exists  a  proximate  temporal  nexus  between  the  period  of  detention  prescribed  when  the  detenu  was  required  to  be  detained and the date when the detenu is required to  be detained pursuant to the appellate order and the  State  is  able  to  satisfy  the  court  about  the  desirability  of  “further”  or  “continued”  detention.  Where, however, a long time has  not lapsed or the  period  of  detention  initially  fixed  in  the  order  of  detention has also not expired, the detenu may be  sent  back  to  undergo  the  balance  period  of  detention.  It  is  open  to  the  appellate  court,  considering  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case, to decide whether the period during which the  detenu was free on the basis of an erroneous order  should be excluded while computing the total period  of detention as indicated in the order of detention,  though normally the period during which the detenu  was  free  on  the  basis  of  such  an erroneous  order  may not be given as a “set-off”  against the total   period  of  detention.  The  actual  period  of  incarceration  cannot,  however,  be  permitted  to  exceed the maximum period of detention, as fixed in  the order, as per the prescription of the statute.

33. The  summary  of  my  conclusions  by  way  of  answer to the questions posed in the earlier portion  of this order are:

1.  Personal liberty is  one of  the most cherished  freedoms, perhaps more important than the other  freedoms  guaranteed  under  the  Constitution.  It  was  for  this  reason  that  the  Founding  Fathers  enacted  the  safeguards  in  Article  22  in  the  Constitution so as to limit the power of the State  to  detain  a  person  without  trial,  which  may  otherwise  pass  the  test  of  Article  21,  by  

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humanising  the  harsh  authority  over  individual  liberty.  In a democracy governed by the rule of  law, the drastic power to detain a person without  trial for security of the State and/or maintenance  of  public  order,  must  be  strictly  construed.  However,  where  individual  liberty  comes  into  conflict  with  an  interest  of  the  security  of  the  State  or  public  order,  then  the  liberty  of  the  individual must give way to the larger interest of  the nation. ……… ………. 5.  That  parole  does  not  interrupt  the  period  of  detention  and,  thus,  that  period  needs  to  be  counted  towards  the  total  period  of  detention  unless  the  terms  for  grant  of  parole,  rules  or  instructions, prescribe otherwise. 6. The quashing of an order of detention by the  High Court brings to an end such an order and if  an appeal is allowed against the order of the High  Court,  the  question  whether  or  not  the  detenu  should  be  made  to  surrender  to  undergo  the  remaining  period  of  detention,  would  depend  upon a variety of factors and in particular on the  question  of  lapse  of  time  between  the  date  of  detention,  the order  of  the High Court,  and the  order of this Court, setting aside the order of the  High Court. A detenu need not be sent back to undergo the  remaining period of detention, after a long lapse  of  time,  when  even  the  maximum  prescribed  period  intended  in  the  order  of  detention  has  expired,  unless  there  still exists  a  proximate  temporal nexus between the period of detention  indicated in the order by which the detenu was  required to be detained and the date when the  detenu is required to be detained pursuant to the  appellate order and the State is able to satisfy the  court  about  the  desirability  of  “further”  or  “continued” detention. 7.  That  where,  however,  a  long  time  has  not  lapsed or the period of detention initially fixed in  

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the order of detention has not expired, the detenu  may be sent back to undergo the balance period  of  detention.  It  is  open  to  the  appellate  court,  considering the facts and circumstances of each  case, to decide whether the period during which  the detenu was free on the basis of an erroneous  order  should  be  excluded  while  computing  the  total period of detention as indicated in the order  of  detention  though  normally  the  period  during  which the detenu was free on the basis of such an  erroneous order may not be given as a “set-off”  against the total period of detention. The actual  period  of  incarceration  cannot,  however,  be  permitted  to  exceed  the  maximum  period  of  detention,  as  fixed  in  the  order,  as  per  the  prescription of the statute.”

20. Fulchand Shah’s case was also considered in the case  

of  Chandrakant  Baddi  vs.  Additional  District   

Magistrate & Police Commissioner and Others, (2008)  

17 SCC 290, paragraph nos.5 & 6 of which are reproduced  

hereunder:-

“5. This judgment (in Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of  India) was followed in Alagar case, (2006) 7 SCC 540,  and in para 9 it was observed that: (SCC p. 542)

“9. The residual question is whether it would be  appropriate  to  direct  the  respondent  to  surrender  for  serving  remaining  period  of  detention in view of passage of time. As was  noticed  in  Sunil  Fulchand  Shah v.  Union  of  India, (2000) 3 SCC 409, and  State of T.N. v.  Kethiyan Perumal,  (2004) 8 SCC 780, it is for  the appropriate State to consider whether the  impact of  the acts, which led to the order of  detention still survives and whether it would be  

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desirable to send back the detenu for serving  remainder period of detention. Necessary order  in  this  regard  shall  be  passed  within  two  months by the appellant State. Passage of time  in all cases cannot be a ground not to send the  detenu  to  serve  remainder  of  the  period  of  detention. It all depends on the facts of the act  and the continuance or otherwise of the effect  of  the  objectionable  acts.  The  State  shall  consider whether there still exists a proximate  temporal  nexus  between  the  period  of  detention indicated in the order by which the  detenu was  required  to  be  detained and the  date  when  the  detenu  is  required  to  be  detained pursuant to the present order.”

6. A reading of the above quoted paragraphs would  reveal that when an order of a court  quashing the  detention is set aside, the remittance of the detenu  to jail  to serve out the balance period of detention  does not automatically follow and it is open to the  detaining  authority  to  go  into  the  various  factors  delineated  in  the  judgments  aforequoted  so  as  to  find  out  as  to  whether  it  would  be  appropriate  to  send the detenu back to serve out the balance period  of detention. In this view of the matter, we are of the  opinion  that  the  detaining  authority  must  be  permitted to re-examine the matter  and to  take a  decision thereon within a period of  3 months from  the date of the supply of the copy of this order. We  further  direct  that  during  this  period  the  interim  order in favour of the appellant given by us on 30-4- 2007 will continue to operate.”

21. As noticed above, the detenu was taken into custody in  

September, 2012, and the order of detention was passed in  

December,  2012.   The said order  of  detention was finally  

quashed  by  the  High  Court  in  terms  of  Order  dated  

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26.4.2013.   Apparently,  therefore,  a  long time has lapsed  

inasmuch as the period of  detention fixed in  the order  of  

detention has already expired in  April,  2014.   Even if  the  

impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside, the  

detenu  cannot  and  shall  not  be  taken  into  custody  for  

serving the remaining period of detention unless there still  

exist materials to the satisfaction of the detaining authority  

for  putting  him  under  detention.   In  other  words,  initial  

detention order having been expired long back, it is for the  

detaining  authority  to  take  a  decision  in  accordance  with  

law.

22. In the facts  and circumstances of  the case and after  

giving out anxious consideration in the matter, we are of the  

considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the  

High Court cannot be sustained.  Therefore, this appeal is  

allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court,  

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quashing the order of detention, is hereby set aside with the  

direction and observations made hereinabove.

…………………………….J. (M.Y. Eqbal)

……………………………..J. (Shiva Kirti Singh)

New Delhi December 09, 2014

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