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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No 9423  of 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No 10115 of 2019)

The Director General of Police & Anr                   .... Appellant(s)

      Versus

M Jeyanthi                  ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1 Leave granted.

2 This  appeal  arises  from  a  judgment  of  a  Division  Bench  of  the

Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court dated 27 March 2019.  Allowing

a writ appeal, the Division Bench set aside an order of the learned Single

Judge which had dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent and

directed  the  State  to  reinstate  the  respondent  back  into  service  with

continuity.   

3. The facts, insofar as they are material to the controversy, are thus:

The respondent was working as a Grade II Police Constable at the

IXth Batallion, Manimuthar, Palayamkottai.  She was appointed on 1 April

2010.  While working at the All Women’s Police Station, Thoothukudi, the

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respondent tendered her resignation on 1 June 2017 and sought to be

relieved from her job.  The resignation was accepted on 12 June 2017.  On

13  July  2017,  the  respondent  purported  to  address  a  communication

withdrawing  the  resignation.   The  respondent  instituted  a  writ  petition1

before the High Court  which was disposed of on 1 March 2018 with a

direction to the Director General of Police to consider the representation

and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.   

4 On 2 June 2018,  the Director  General  of  Police2 passed an order

rejecting the representation.  In doing so, the DGP relied on the provisions

of  Rule  35A of  the  Special  Rules  of  Tamil  Nadu  Police  Subordinate

Services3.  The order of the DGP was challenged before a learned Single

Judge in a writ petition4 which was dismissed by an order dated 21 August

2018.  The writ  appeal5 filed by the respondent was, however,  allowed.

The Division Bench came to the conclusion that in terms of Section 50 of

the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act 20166, a

period of ninety days’ notice is necessary.  In the view of the High Court,

this  period  of  ninety  days  is  intended  for  the  benefit  not  only  of  the

authority,  but  for  the  person  who  tendered  the  resignation  to  rethink

whether the resignation should be withdrawn.  The High Court found fault

with the appellants for having accepted the resignation without waiting for

the  period  of  notice  to  expire  and  accordingly  set  aside  the  decision.

Consequently, reinstatement was granted with continuity of service.

1 Writ Petition No 3888 of 2018 2 “DGP” 3 “Rules” 4 Writ Petition No 18211 of 2018 5 Writ Appeal No 1596 of 2018 6 “Act of 2016”

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5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, at the outset,

submits that the High Court has relied on the provisions of Section 50 of

the Act of 2016 whereas the respondent was governed by Rule 35A of the

Rules.  Moreover, it  was submitted that the provisions of Section 50(2),

which have been extracted in the judgment of the High Court, contained an

omission which would have a bearing on the interpretation of the provision.

Learned counsel submitted that once the resignation was accepted, it was

not open to the respondent to withdraw it.   

6 Opposing this submission, it was urged on behalf of the respondent

that the acceptance of the resignation on 12 June 2017 was not valid in

law since it  was subject to the grant of Vigilance and other clearances.

Moreover, learned counsel supported the reasoning of the Division Bench

that in view of the requirement of ninety days’ notice, it was open to the

employee to withdraw the resignation before the period of notice expired

and the acceptance of the resignation in the meantime would not affect

that entitlement.

7 The provisions of Rule 35A of the Rules are analogous to Section 50

of the Act of 2016.  The respondent, as a police constable, was governed

by Rule 35A, which is extracted below:

“35A Acceptance of Resignation

(a) The member of the service may resign his appointment by giving notice of not less than three months in writing direct to the appointing authority  with a copy marked to  his  immediate Superior  Officer.   The period  of  three months  notice shall  be reckoned  from  the  date  of  receipt  of  such  notice  by  the appointing authority.

(b) The member of the service may withdraw the notice of his resignation  before its acceptance.  Withdrawal of resignation

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will  not  be  permitted  after  its  acceptance  by  the  appointing authority.

(c) The appointing authority shall issue orders on the notice of resignation before the date of expiry of notice either accepting the resignation from a date not later than the date of expiry of the notice or rejecting the same, giving the reasons thereof.  If no such order is passed, the resignation shall be deemed to have been accepted on the expiry of the period of notice.”

8 Clause (a) of Rule 35A requires that before resigning, a member of

the service must furnish not less than three months’ notice in writing to the

appointing  authority.   Under  clause  (b),  the  notice  may  be  withdrawn

before its acceptance.  Withdrawal of the resignation is not permitted after

acceptance by the appointing authority.  Under clause (c), the appointing

authority is required to issue orders on the notice of resignation before the

date of expiry of the notice.  If the resignation is being accepted, the date

of acceptance is not to be later than the date of the expiry of the notice.  If

no  order  has  been  passed,  the  resignation  is  deemed  to  have  been

accepted on the expiry of the period of notice.  The provisions of clauses

(b) and (c) of Rule 35A make it abundantly clear that:

(i) A resignation can be withdrawn before its acceptance; and

(ii) Upon acceptance, the employee loses the entitlement to withdraw the

resignation.

Moreover, it  is evident from clause (c)  of Rule 35A that the appointing

authority, while accepting the resignation, is empowered to indicate a date

from which it will take effect which will not be later than the date of expiry

of  the notice.  In other words, the authority can legitimately accept  the

resignation from a date anterior  to  the expiry  of  the notice.   Upon the

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acceptance of the resignation, the cessation of service takes place and it is

not open to the employee to withdraw the resignation.   

9 In the present case, as the facts which have been narrated indicate,

the resignation dated 1 June 2017 was accepted on 12 June 2017.  It was

only a month thereafter on 13 July 2017 that the respondent purported to

withdraw the resignation.   The resignation having taken effect  upon its

acceptance, the withdrawal was of no consequence.  We do not find merit

in the submission that the acceptance of the resignation was invalid.  The

order  which  was  passed  clearly  indicates  the  acceptance  of  the

resignation.  The order, however, provides that if  the Vigilance and Anti

Corruption  Department  indicated  that  any  adverse  remarks  or  if  any

adverse  noting  was  made  by  the  Special  Branch  CID,  the  resignation

would  be  cancelled.   The  fact  of  the  matter,  however,  is  that  the

acceptance of the resignation was complete on 12 June 2017.  Once this

was the position, the withdrawal was of no consequence in law.

10 The High Court  was not  justified  in  coming to the conclusion that

within a period of ninety days, which is the period of notice required under

the Rules, it was open to the employee to withdraw the resignation even

after acceptance.  This construction is clearly contrary to the provisions of

Rule 35A.

11 We  accordingly  allow  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned

judgment and order of the High Court dated 27 March 2019, affirming the

dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge.  There shall be

no order as to costs.

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12 We, however, clarify that this order will not come in the way of the

respondent  applying for  appointment  afresh as and when any selection

takes place and any such application may be considered in accordance

with law.

…………...…...….......………………........J.                                                                     [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.                              [Hrishikesh Roy]

 New Delhi; December 13, 2019

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ITEM NO.52               COURT NO.8               SECTION XII

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).10115/2019

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  27-03-2019 in WAMD No. 1596/2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras at Madurai)

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE & ANR.              Petitioner(s)

                               VERSUS

M JEYANTHI                                         Respondent(s)

(WITH IA No. 65739/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)   Date : 13-12-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :           HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY

For Petitioner(s) Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna, AOR Mr. Karthik Rajendran, Adv. Ms. Uma Prasuna Bachu, Adv.

                   For Respondent(s) Mr. (Dr.) P. Jyothimani, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Sumit Kumar, AOR Mr. Hemant Kumar, Adv. Mr. Bhupendra Kumar, Adv. Mr. Gunjan Kumar, Adv.                     

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                               O R D E R

Leave granted.

The  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed

reportable judgment.

Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

 (SANJAY KUMAR-I)                (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)      AR-CUM-PS                           COURT MASTER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)