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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9017  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.24290 of 2012)

Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. and others Appellants

Versus

State of Kerala and others Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.   9020, 9029 & 9023  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.24291 of 2012, 13796 and 13797  

of 2013)

J U D G M E N T

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. We are, in these appeals, concerned with the question  

whether a co-operative society registered under the Kerala  

Co-operative  Societies  Act,  1969  (for  short  “the  Societies

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2 Act”) will fall within the definition of “public authority” under  

Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short  

“the RTI Act”) and be bound by the obligations to provide  

information sought for by a citizen under the RTI Act.  

3. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in its judgment  

reported in AIR 2012 Ker 124, answered the question in the  

affirmative  and  upheld  the  Circular  No.23  of  2006  dated  

01.06.2006,  issued  by  the  Registrar  of  the  Co-operative  

Societies, Kerala stating that all the co-operative institutions  

coming under the administrative control of the Registrar, are  

“public authorities” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the  

RTI  Act  and obliged to  provide  information as  sought  for.  

The question was answered by the Full Bench in view of the  

conflicting views expressed by a Division Bench of the Kerala  

High Court in Writ Appeal No.1688 of 2009, with an earlier  

judgment  of  the  Division  Bench  reported  in  Thalapalam  

Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v.  Union of India AIR  

2010  Ker  6,  wherein  the  Bench  took  the  view  that  the  

question as to whether a co-operative society will fall under

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3 Section 2(h) of the RTI Act is a question of fact, which will  

depend  upon  the  question  whether  it  is  substantially  

financed, directly or indirectly, by the funds provided by the  

State Government which, the Court held, has to be decided  

depending upon the facts situation of each case.

4. Mr.  K.  Padmanabhan  Nair,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for some of the societies submitted that the views  

expressed by the Division Bench in  Thalapalam Service  

Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) is the correct view, which  

calls  for  our  approval.   Learned  senior  counsel  took  us  

through the various provisions of the Societies Act as well as  

of  the  RTI  Act  and  submitted  that  the  societies  are  

autonomous  bodies  and  merely  because  the  officers  

functioning  under  the  Societies  Act  have  got  supervisory  

control over the societies will not make the societies public  

authorities within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.  

Learned senior counsel also submitted that these societies  

are not owned, controlled or substantially financed, directly  

or  indirectly,  by  the  State  Government.   Learned  senior

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4 counsel also submitted that the societies are not statutory  

bodies and are not performing any public functions and will  

not come within the expression “state” within the meaning  

under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

5. Mr.  Ramesh Babu MR,  learned counsel  appearing for  

the  State,  supported  the  reasoning  of  the  impugned  

judgment and submitted that such a circular was issued by  

the  Registrar  taking  into  consideration  the  larger  public  

interest so as to promote transparency and accountability in  

the  working  of  every  co-operative  society  in  the  State  of  

Kerala.  Reference was also made to various provisions of  

the Societies Act and submitted that those provisions would  

indicate that the Registrar has got all pervading control over  

the societies, including audit, enquiry and inspection and the  

power  to  initiate  surcharge  proceedings.   Power  is  also  

vested on the Registrar under Section 32 of the Societies Act  

to supersede the management of the society and to appoint  

an administrator.  This would indicate that though societies  

are body corporates, they are under the statutory control of

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5 the  Registrar  of  Co-operative  Societies.   Learned  counsel  

submitted  that  in  such  a  situation  they  fall  under  the  

definition of “pubic authority” within the meaning of Section  

2(h) of the RTI Act.   Shri Ajay, learned counsel appearing for  

the  State  Information  Commission,  stated  that  the  

applicability of the RTI Act cannot be excluded in terms of  

the clear provision of the Act and they are to be interpreted  

to  achieve  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  Act.   Learned  

counsel  submitted  that  at  any  rate  having  regard  to  the  

definition  of  “information”  in  Section  2(f)  of  the  Act,  the  

access  to  information  in  relation  to  Societies  cannot  be  

denied to a citizen.    

Facts:

6. We may, for the disposal of these appeals, refer to the  

facts pertaining to Mulloor Rural Co-operative Society Ltd.  In  

that  case,  one  Sunil  Kumar  stated  to  have  filed  an  

application  dated  8.5.2007  under  the  RTI  Act  seeking  

particulars relating to the bank accounts of certain members  

of  the  society,  which  the  society  did  not  provide.    Sunil

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6 Kumar then filed a complaint dated 6.8.2007 to the State  

Information Officer, Kerala who, in turn, addressed a letter  

dated 14.11.2007 to the Society stating that application filed  

by  Sunil  Kumar  was  left  unattended.   Society,  then,  vide  

letter  dated  24.11.2007  informed  the  applicant  that  the  

information sought  for  is  “confidential  in  nature”  and one  

warranting “commercial confidence”.   Further, it was also  

pointed  out  that  the disclosure  of  the  information  has no  

relationship to any “public activity” and held by the society  

in a “fiduciary capacity”.  Society was, however, served with  

an  order  dated  16.1.2008  by  the  State  Information  

Commission, Kerala, stating that the Society has violated the  

mandatory  provisions  of  Section  7(1)  of  the  RTI  Act  

rendering themselves liable to be punished under Section 20  

of the Act.   State Information Officer is purported to have  

relied upon a circular No.23/2006 dated 01.06.2006 issued  

by  the  Registrar,  Co-operative  Societies  bringing  in  all  

societies under the administrative control of the Registrar of  

Co-operative Societies, as “public authorities” under Section  

2(h) of the RTI Act.  

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7. Mulloor  Co-operative  Society  then  filed  Writ  Petition  

No.3351  of  2008  challenging  the  order  dated  16.1.2008,  

which was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court  

along  with  other  writ  petitions.   All  the  petitions  were  

disposed  of  by  a  common  judgment  dated  03.04.2009  

holding that all  co-operative societies registered under the  

Societies Act are public authorities for the purpose of the RTI  

Act and are bound to act in conformity with the obligations in  

Chapter 11 of the Act and amenable to the jurisdiction of the  

State Information Commission.  The Society  then preferred  

Writ  Appeal  No.1688  of  2009.   While  that  appeal  was  

pending, few other appeals including  WA No.1417 of 2009,  

filed  against  the  common judgment  of  the  learned Single  

Judge dated 03.04.2009 came up for  consideration before  

another Division Bench of the High Court which set aside the  

judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 03.04.2009, the  

judgment of which is reported in AIR 2010 Ker 6.  The Bench  

held that the obedience to Circular No.23 dated 1.6.2006 is  

optional in the sense that if the Society feels that it satisfies

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8 the definition of Section 2(h), it can appoint an Information  

Officer  under  the  RTI  Act  or  else  the  State  Information  

Commissioner will  decide when the matter reaches before  

him,  after  examining  the  question  whether  the  Society  is  

substantially  financed,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  funds  

provided  by  the  State  Government.   The  Division  Bench,  

therefore,  held that the question whether the Society is a  

public  authority  or  not  under  Section  2(h)  is  a  disputed  

question of fact which has to be resolved by the authorities  

under the RTI Act.  

8. Writ  Appeal  No.1688  of  2009  later  came  up  before  

another  Division  Bench,  the  Bench  expressed  some  

reservations  about  the  views  expressed  by  the  earlier  

Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1417 of 2009 and vide its  

order dated 24.3.2011 referred the matter to a Full Bench, to  

examine  the  question  whether  co-operative  societies  

registered  under  the  Societies  Act  are  generally  covered  

under the definition of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.  The Full  

Bench  answered  the  question  in  the  affirmative  giving  a

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9 liberal construction of the words “public authority”, bearing  

in mind the “transformation of law” which, according to the  

Full  Bench,  is  to  achieve  transparency  and  accountability  

with regard to affairs of a public body.

9. We  notice,  the  issue  raised  in  these  appeals  is  of  

considerable  importance  and  may have  impact  on  similar  

other  Societies  registered  under  the  various  State  

enactments across the country.

10. The State of Kerala has issued a letter dated 5.5.2006  

to  the  Registrar  of  Co-operative  Societies,  Kerala  with  

reference to the RTI Act, which led to the issuance of Circular  

No.23/2006 dated 01.06.2006, which reads as under:

“G1/40332/05 Registrar of Co-operative Societies,

Thiruvananthapuram, Dated 01.06.2006

Circular No.23/2006

Sub: Right to Information Act, 2005- Co-operative  Institutions included in the definition of “Public Authority”

Ref: Governments Letter No.3159/P.S.1/06  Dated 05.05.2006

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10 According to Right to Information Act, 2005, sub-section  (1) and (2) of Section 5 of the Act severy public authority  within 100 days of the enactment of this Act designate as  many  officers  as  public  information  officers  as  may  be  necessary to provide information to persons requesting for  information under the Act.  In this Act Section 2(h) defines  institutions  which  come  under  the  definition  of  public  authority.    As per the reference letter the government  informed  that,  according  to  Section  2(h)  of  the  Act  all  institutions formed by laws made by state legislature  is a  “public  authority”  and  therefore  all  co-operative  institutions  coming  under  the  administrative  control  of  The  Registrar  of  co-operative  societies  are  also  public  authorities.

In  the  above  circumstance  the  following  directions  are  issued: 1. All  co-operative  institutions  coming  under  the  

administrative control of the Registrar of co-operative  societies  are  “public  authorities”  under  the  Right  to  Information Act, 2005 (central law No.22 of 2005).  Co- operative institutions are bound to give all information  to applications under the RTI Act, if not given they will  be subjected to punishment under the Act.  For this all  co-operative  societies  should  appoint  public  information/assistant  public  information  officers  immediately  and  this  should  be  published  in  the  government website.

2. For giving information for applicants government order  No.8026/05/government administration department act

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11 and  rule  can  be  applicable  and  10  rupees  can  be  charged as fees for each application.  Also as per GAD  Act  and  rule  and  the  government  Order  No.2383/06  dated 01.04.2006.

3. Details of Right to Information Act are available in the  government website (www.kerala.gov.in..... ) or right to  information gov.in ) other details regarding the Act are  also available in the government website.

4. Hereafter application for information from co-operative  institutions  need not  be accepted by the information  officers  of  this  department.   But  if  they  get  such  applications  it  should  be  given  back  showing  the  reasons or should be forwarded to the respective co- operative institutions with necessary directions and the  applicant should be informed about this.  In this case it  is directed to follow the time limit strictly.

5. It is directed that all joint registrars/assistant registrars  should take immediate steps to bring this to the urgent  notice  of  all  co-operative  institutions.   They  should  inform to this office the steps taken within one week.  The Government Order No.2389/06 dated 01.04.2006 is  also enclosed.

                                                   Sd/- V. Reghunath

Registrar of co-operative societies (in  charge)”

11. The State Government, it is seen, vide its letter dated  

5.5.2006  has  informed  the  Registrar  of  Co-operative

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12 Societies that, as per Section 2(h) of the Act, all institutions  

formed  by  laws  made  by  State  Legislature  is  a  “public  

authority”  and,  therefore,  all  co-operative  institutions  

coming under the administrative control of the Registrar of  

Co-operative Societies are also public authorities.   

12. We are in these appeals concerned only with the co-

operative  societies  registered or  deemed to  be  registered  

under the Co-operative Societies Act, which are not owned,  

controlled or substantially financed by the State or Central  

Government  or  formed,  established  or  constituted  by  law  

made by Parliament or State Legislature.    

Co-operative  Societies  and  Article  12  of  the  Constitution:

13. We  may  first  examine,  whether  the  Co-operative  

Societies, with which we are concerned, will fall within the  

expression “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the  

Constitution of India and, hence subject to all constitutional  

limitations as enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.  This

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13 Court  in  U.P.  State  Co-operative  Land  Development  

Bank  Limited v.  Chandra  Bhan  Dubey  and  others  

(1999) 1 SCC 741,  while dealing with the question of  the  

maintainability of the writ petition against the U.P. State Co-

operative Development Bank Limited held the same as an  

instrumentality of the State and an authority mentioned in  

Article 12 of the Constitution.   On facts, the Court noticed  

that the control of the State Government on the Bank is all  

pervasive and that the affairs of the Bank are controlled by  

the  State  Government  though  it  is  functioning  as  a  co-

operative society,  it  is  an extended arm of  the State and  

thus  an  instrumentality  of  the  State  or  authority  as  

mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution.   In All India  

Sainik  Schools  employees’  Association v.  Defence  

Minister-cum-Chairman  Board  of  Governors,  Sainik  

Schools  Society,  New  Delhi  and  others (1989)  

Supplement  1   SCC  205,  this  Court  held  that  the  Sainik  

School society is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of  

the Constitution after having found that the entire funding is  

by the State Government and by the Central  Government

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14 and the overall control vests in the governmental authority  

and the  main  object  of  the  society  is  to  run  schools  and  

prepare  students  for  the  purpose  feeding  the  National  

Defence Academy.

14. This Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree  

College,  Shamli  and  Others  v.  Lakshmi  Narain  and  

Others   (1976) 2 SCC 58, while dealing with the status of  

the  Executive  Committee  of  a  Degree  College  registered  

under the Co-operative Societies Act, held as follows:

“10………It seems to us that before an institution  can be a statutory body it must be created by or  under  the  statute  and  owe  its  existence  to  a  statute.  This must be the primary thing which has  got to be established.  Here a distinction must be  made between an institution which is not created  by or under a statute but is governed by certain  statutory  provisions  for  the  proper  maintenance  and administration of the institution.  There have  been a  number  of  institutions  which  though not  created  by  or  under  any  statute  have  adopted  certain  statutory  provisions,  but  that  by itself  is  not,  in  our  opinion,  sufficient  to  clothe  the  institution with a statutory character……….”

15. We can, therefore, draw a clear distinction between a  

body which is created by a Statute and a body which, after

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15 having come into existence, is governed in accordance with  

the provisions of a Statute.   Societies, with which we are  

concerned, fall under the later category that is governed by  

the Societies Act and are not statutory bodies, but only body  

corporate within the meaning of Section 9 of the Kerala Co-

operative  Societies  Act  having  perpetual  succession  and  

common seal and hence have the power to hold property,  

enter  into  contract,  institute  and defend  suites  and  other  

legal  proceedings  and  to  do  all  things  necessary  for  the  

purpose,  for  which  it  was  constituted.  Section  27  of  the  

Societies Act categorically states that the final authority of a  

society vests in the general body of its members and every  

society is managed by the managing committee constituted  

in terms of the bye-laws as provided under Section 28 of the  

Societies  Act.   Final  authority  so  far  as  such  types  of  

Societies are concerned, as Statute says, is the general body  

and  not  the  Registrar  of  Cooperative  Societies  or  State  

Government.  

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16 16. This Court in  Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas  

and Others (2003) 10 SCC 733, held as follows:

“32.Merely  because  Reserve  Bank  of  India  lays  the  banking  policy  in  the  interest  of  the  banking  system  or  in  the  interest  of  monetary  stability  or  sound  economic  growth  having  due  regard to the interests  of  the depositors  etc.  as  provided  under  Section  5(c)(a)  of  the  Banking  Regulation  Act  does  not  mean  that  the  private  companies carrying on the business or commercial  activity of banking, discharge any public function  or public duty. These are all regulatory measures  applicable  to  those  carrying  on  commercial  activity in banking and these companies are to act  according to these provisions failing which certain  consequences follow as indicated in the Act itself.  As  to  the  provision  regarding  acquisition  of  a  banking company by the Government, it may be  pointed  out  that  any  private  property  can  be  acquired by the Government in public interest. It is  now  a  judicially  accepted  norm  that  private  interest has to give way to the public interest. If a  private  property  is  acquired  in  public  interest  it  does not mean that the party whose property is  acquired is performing or discharging any function  or duty of public character though it would be so  for the acquiring authority”.

17. Societies are, of course, subject to the control of the  

statutory  authorities  like  Registrar,  Joint  Registrar,  the  

Government, etc. but cannot be said that the State exercises  

any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the society

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17 which  is  deep  and  all  pervasive.   Supervisory  or  general  

regulation under the statute over the co-operative societies,  

which are body corporate does not render activities of the  

body so regulated as subject to such control of the State so  

as  to  bring  it  within  the  meaning  of  the  “State”  or  

instrumentality  of  the  State.   Above  principle  has  been  

approved  by  this  Court  in  S.S.  Rana v.  Registrar,  Co-

operative Societies and another (2006) 11 SCC 634.  In  

that case this Court was dealing with the maintainability of  

the  writ  petition  against  the  Kangra  Central  Co-operative  

Society  Bank  Limited,  a  society  registered  under  the  

provisions  of  the  Himachal  Pradesh  Co-operative Societies  

Act, 1968.  After examining various provisions of the H.P. Co-

operative Societies Act this Court held as follows:

“9. It  is  not in dispute that the Society has not  been constituted under an Act.  Its  functions like  any  other  cooperative  society  are  mainly  regulated  in  terms of  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  except as provided in the bye-laws of the Society.  The  State  has  no  say  in  the  functions  of  the  Society. Membership, acquisition of shares and all  other  matters  are  governed  by  the  bye-laws  framed under the Act. The terms and conditions of  an officer of the cooperative society, indisputably,  are  governed  by  the  Rules.  Rule  56,  to  which

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18 reference has been made by Mr Vijay Kumar, does  not  contain  any  provision  in  terms  whereof  any  legal right as such is conferred upon an officer of  the Society.

10. It has not been shown before us that the State  exercises  any  direct  or  indirect  control  over  the  affairs  of  the  Society  for  deep  and  pervasive  control. The State furthermore is not the majority  shareholder.  The  State  has  the  power  only  to  nominate  one  Director.  It  cannot,  thus,  be  said  that  the  State  exercises  any  functional  control  over the affairs of the Society in the sense that the  majority Directors are nominated by the State. For  arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  the  State  has  a  deep  and  pervasive  control  over  the  Society,  several other relevant questions are required to be  considered,  namely,  (1)  How  was  the  Society  created?  (2)  Whether  it  enjoys  any  monopoly  character?  (3)  Do  the  functions  of  the  Society  partake to statutory functions or public functions?  and  (4)  Can  it  be  characterised  as  public  authority?

11. Respondent  2,  the Society  does not  answer  any of the aforementioned tests. In the case of a  non-statutory society, the control thereover would  mean that the same satisfies the tests laid down  by  this  Court  in  Ajay  Hasia v.  Khalid  Mujib  Sehravardi.  [See  Zoroastrian  Coop.  Housing  Society  Ltd. v.  Distt.  Registrar,  Coop.  Societies  (Urban).]

12. It is well settled that general regulations under  an Act, like the Companies Act or the Cooperative  Societies Act, would not render the activities of a  company or a society as subject to control of the  State.  Such control  in terms of the provisions of  the Act are meant to ensure proper functioning of

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19 the society and the State or statutory authorities  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  its  day-to-day  functions.”

18. We  have,  on  facts,  found  that  the  Co-operative  

Societies, with which we are concerned in these appeals, will  

not fall within the expression “State” or “instrumentalities of  

the  State”  within  the  meaning  of  Article  12  of  the  

Constitution  and  hence  not  subject  to  all  constitutional  

limitations as enshrined in Part III  of the Constitution.  We  

may,  however,  come  across  situations  where  a  body  or  

organization  though  not  a  State  or  instrumentality  of  the  

State,  may  still  satisfy  the  definition  of  public  authority  

within  the  meaning  of  Section  2(h)  of  the  Act,  an  aspect  

which we may discuss in the later part of this Judgment.

Constitutional provisions and Co-operative autonomy:

19. Rights  of  the  citizens  to  form  co-operative  societies  

voluntarily, is now raised to the level of a fundamental right  

and  State  shall  endeavour  to  promote  their  autonomous  

functioning.  The Parliament, with a view to enhance public  

faith in the co-operative institutions and to insulate them to

Page 20

20 avoidable  political  or  bureaucratic  interference  brought  in  

Constitutional (97th Amendment) Act, 2011, which received  

the assent of the President on 12.01.2012, notified in the  

Gazette  of  India  on  13.01.2012  and  came  into  force  on  

15.02.2012.   

20. Constitutional  amendment  has  been  effected  to  

encourage economic activities of co-operatives which in turn  

help progress of rural India.  Societies are expected not only  

to  ensure  autonomous  and  democratic  functioning  of  co-

operatives, but also accountability of the management to the  

members and other share stake-holders.  Article 19 protects  

certain  rights  regarding  freedom of  speech.   By  virtue  of  

above  amendment  under  Article  19(1)(c)  the  words  “co-

operative  societies”  are  added.   Article  19(1)(c)  reads  as  

under:

“19(1)(c) – All citizens shall have the right to form  associations or unions or co-operative societies”.

Article 19(1)(c), therefore, guarantees the freedom to form  

an association, unions and co-operative societies.  Right to

Page 21

21 form a co-operative society is, therefore, raised to the level  

of a fundamental right, guaranteed under the Constitution of  

India.   Constitutional  97th Amendment  Act  also  inserted  a  

new Article 43B with reads as follows :-

“the State shall  endeavour to promote voluntary  formation,  autonomous  functioning,  democratic  control  and  professional  management  of  co- operative societies”.   

21. By virtue of the above-mentioned amendment, Part IX-

B  was  also  inserted  containing  Articles  243ZH  to  243ZT.  

Cooperative Societies are, however, not treated as units of  

self-government, like Panchayats and Municipalities.

22. Article  243(ZL)  dealing  with  the  supersession  and  

suspension  of  board  and interim management  states  that  

notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time  

being in force, no board shall be superseded or kept under  

suspension for a period exceeding six months.  It  provided  

further that the Board of any such co-operative society shall  

not be superseded or kept under suspension where there is  

no government shareholding or loan or financial assistance

Page 22

22 or any guarantee by the Government.  Such a constitutional  

restriction has been placed after recognizing the fact that  

there are co-operative societies with no government share  

holding or loan or financial assistance or any guarantee by  

the government.   

23. Co-operative society is a state subject under Entry 32  

List I Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.  Most of  

the States in India enacted their own Co-operative Societies  

Act with a view to provide for their orderly development of  

the cooperative sector in the state to achieve the objects of  

equity,  social  justice  and  economic  development,  as  

envisaged  in  the  Directive  Principles  of  State  Policy,  

enunciated  in  the  Constitution  of  India.   For  co-operative  

societies working in more than one State, The Multi State Co-

operative Societies Act, 1984 was enacted by the Parliament  

under  Entry  44  List  I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  of  the  

Constitution.   Co-operative  society  is  essentially  an  

association  or  an  association  of  persons  who  have  come

Page 23

23 together for a common purpose of economic development or  

for mutual help.   

Right to Information Act

24. The RTI Act is an Act enacted to provide for citizens to  

secure,  access  to  information  under  the  control  of  public  

authorities and to promote transparency and accountability  

in the working of every public authority.   The preamble of  

the Act reads as follows:

“An  Act to  provide  for  setting  out  the  practical regime of right to information for citizens  to secure access to information under the control  of  public  authorities,  in  order  to  promote  transparency and accountability in the working of  every  public  authority,  the  constitution  of  a  Central  Information  Commission  and  State  Information  Commissions  and  for  matters  connected therewith or incidental thereto.

WHEREAS  the  Constitution  of  India  has  established democratic Republic;

        AND WHEREAS democracy requires  an  informed citizenry and transparency of information  which  are  vital  to  its  functioning  and  also  to  contain corruption and to hold Governments and  their  instrumentalities  accountable  to  the  governed;

Page 24

24 AND WHEREAS  revelation  of  information  in  

actual practice is likely to conflict with other public  interests  including  efficient  operations  of  the  Governments,  optimum  use  of  limited  fiscal  resources and the preservation of confidentiality of  sensitive information;

       AND WHEREAS it is necessary to harmonise  these  conflicting  interests  while  preserving  the  paramountcy of the democratic ideal;

      NOW, THEREFORE, it is expedient to provide  for furnishing certain information to citizens who  desire to have it.”

25. Every public authority is also obliged to maintain all its  

record duly catalogued and indexed in  a manner and the  

form which facilitates the right to information under this Act  

and  ensure  that  all  records  that  are  appropriate  to  be  

computerized are, within a reasonable time and subject to  

availability  of  resources,  computerized  and  connected  

through a network all over the country on different systems  

so that access to such record is facilitated.  Public authority  

has also to carry out certain other functions also, as provided  

under the Act.    

26. The  expression  “public  authority”  is  defined  under  

Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, which reads as follows:

Page 25

25 “2. Definitions._  In this Act,  unless the context  otherwise requires :

(h)  "public  authority"  means  any  authority  or  body  or  institution  of  self-government  established or constituted—  

(a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament;  (c) by any other law made by State  Legislature;  (d)  by notification issued or  order  made by  

the   appropriate  Government,   and  includes any—  

(i)    body  owned,  controlled  or  substantially financed;  

(ii) non-Government  organisation  substantially  financed,  directly  or  indirectly  by  funds  provided  by  the  appropriate Government”

 27. Legislature, in its wisdom, while defining the expression  

“public authority” under Section 2(h), intended to embrace  

only those categories, which are specifically included, unless  

the context of the Act otherwise requires.  Section 2(h) has  

used the expressions ‘means’ and includes’.  When a word is  

defined to ‘mean’  something,  the definition is  prima facie  

restrictive and where the word is defined to ‘include’ some

Page 26

26 other thing, the definition is prima facie extensive.  But when  

both the expressions “means” and “includes” are used, the  

categories  mentioned  there  would  exhaust  themselves.  

Meanings of the expressions  ‘means’ and ‘includes’  have  

been  explained  by  this  Court  in Delhi  Development  

Authority v.   Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) by LRs and  

others   (2011) 2 SCC 54, (in paras 25 to 28).  When such  

expressions  are  used,  they  may  afford  an  exhaustive  

explanation of the meaning which for the purpose of the Act,  

must invariably be attached to those words and expressions.  

28. Section  2(h)  exhausts  the  categories  mentioned  

therein.  The former part of 2(h) deals with:

(1) an authority or body or institution of self-government  established by or under the Constitution,  

(2) an  authority  or  body  or  institution  of  self-  government established or constituted by any other  law made by the Parliament,  

(3) an authority or body or institution of self-government  established or constituted by any other law made by  the State legislature, and

Page 27

27  (4) an authority or body or institution of self-government  

established or  constituted  by notification issued or  order made by the appropriate government.   

29. Societies, with which we are concerned, admittedly, do  

not fall in the above mentioned categories, because none of  

them  is  either  a  body  or  institution  of  self-government,  

established  or  constituted  under  the  Constitution,  by  law  

made  by  the  Parliament,  by  law  made  by  the  State  

Legislature or by way of a notification issued or made by the  

appropriate government.  Let us now examine whether they  

fall  in  the  later  part  of  Section  2(h)  of  the  Act,  which  

embraces within its fold:

(5) a  body  owned,  controlled  or  substantially  financed,  directly  or  indirectly  by  funds  provided  by  the  appropriate government,  

(6)  non-governmental  organizations substantially financed  directly  or  indirectly  by  funds  provided  by  the  appropriate government.   

30 The  expression  ‘Appropriate  Government’  has  also  

been defined under Section 2(a) of the RTI Act, which reads  

as follows :  

Page 28

28 “2(a).   “appropriate  Government”  means  in  

relation  to  a  public  authority  which  is  established, constituted, owned, controlled  or substantially financed by funds provided  directly or indirectly-

(i) by  the  Central  Government  or  the  Union  territory  administration,  the  Central Government;

(ii) by  the  State  Government,  the  State  Government.”

31. The  RTI  Act,  therefore,  deals  with  bodies  which  are  

owned,  controlled  or  substantially  financed,  directly  or  

indirectly, by funds provided by the appropriate government  

and  also  non-government  organizations  substantially  

financed,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  funds  provided  by  the  

appropriate government, in the event of which they may fall  

within the definition of Section 2(h)(d)(i) or (ii) respectively.  

As already pointed out, a body, institution or an organization,  

which is neither a State within the meaning of Article 12 of  

the  Constitution  or  instrumentalities,  may still  answer  the  

definition of public authority under Section 2(h)d (i) or (ii).

(a)  Body owned by  the appropriate  government –  A  

body  owned  by  the  appropriate  government  clearly  falls  

under Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act.  A body owned, means to

Page 29

29 have a good legal title to it having the ultimate control over  

the affairs of that body, ownership takes in its fold control,  

finance  etc.    Further  discussion  of  this  concept  is  

unnecessary because, admittedly, the societies in question  

are not owned by the appropriate government.

(b)   Body Controlled by the Appropriate Government  

A  body  which  is  controlled  by  the  appropriate  

government can fall under the definition of public authority  

under Section 2h(d)(i).  Let us examine the meaning of the  

expression “controlled” in the context of RTI Act and not in  

the  context  of  the  expression  “controlled”  judicially  

interpreted  while  examining  the  scope  of  the  expression  

“State” under Article 12 of the Constitution or in the context  

of maintainability of a writ against a body or authority under  

Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India.        The  word  

“control” or “controlled” has not been defined in the RTI Act,  

and  hence,  we  have  to  understand  the  scope  of  the  

expression  ‘controlled’  in  the  context  of  the  words  which  

exist  prior  and  subsequent  i.e.  “body  owned”  and

Page 30

30 “substantially financed” respectively.   The meaning of the  

word  “control”  has  come  up  for  consideration  in  several  

cases before this Court in different contexts.  In  State of  

West Bengal and another v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi,  

AIR 1966 SC 447 while interpreting the scope of Article 235  

of  the  Constitution  of  India,  which  confers  control  by  the  

High Court over District Courts, this Court held that the word  

“control” includes the power to take disciplinary action and  

all other incidental or consequential steps to effectuate this  

end and made the following observations :

“The word ‘control’, as we have seen, was used for  the  first  time  in  the  Constitution  and  it  is  accompanied by the word ‘vest’ which is a strong  word.  It  shows that  the High Court  is  made the  sole  custodian  of  the  control  over  the  judiciary.  Control,  therefore,  is  not  merely  the  power  to  arrange the day to day working of the court but  contemplates  disciplinary  jurisdiction  over  the  presiding  Judge....  In  our  judgment,  the  control  which is  vested in the High Court is  a complete  control subject only to the power of the Governor  in the matter of appointment (including dismissal  and  removal)  and  posting  and  promotion  of  District Judges. Within the exercise of the control  vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold  enquiries,  impose  punishments  other  than  dismissal or removal, ...”

Page 31

31

32. The above position has been reiterated by this Court in  

Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others v. L.V.A.   

Dixitulu and others (1979) 2 SCC 34.  In Corporation of  

the City of Nagpur Civil Lines, Nagpur and another v.   

Ramchandra  and  others (1981)  2  SCC  714,  while  

interpreting the  provisions  of  Section 59(3)  of  the City  of  

Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, this Court held as follows :

“4.  It is thus now settled by this Court that the  term “control” is of a very wide connotation and  amplitude and includes a large variety of powers  which are incidental  or  consequential  to achieve  the  powers-vested  in  the  authority  concerned…….”

33. The word “control” is also sometimes used synonyms  

with  superintendence,  management  or  authority  to  direct,  

restrict or regulate by a superior authority in exercise of its  

supervisory power.  This Court in The Shamrao Vithal Co-

operative  Bank  Ltd.  v.  Kasargode  Pandhuranga  

Mallya (1972) 4 SCC 600, held that the word “control” does  

not  comprehend  within  itself  the  adjudication  of  a  claim  

made by a co-operative society against  its  members.  The

Page 32

32 meaning of the word “control” has also been considered by  

this Court in  State of Mysore v. Allum Karibasappa &  

Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 498, while interpreting Section 54 of the  

Mysore Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 and Court held that  

the word “control” suggests check, restraint or influence and  

intended to regulate and hold in check and restraint from  

action.   The  expression  “control”  again  came  up  for  

consideration  before  this  Court  in  Madan  Mohan  

Choudhary v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 396, in  

the context of Article 235 of the Constitution and the Court  

held  that  the  expression  “control”  includes  disciplinary  

control, transfer, promotion, confirmation, including transfer  

of a District Judge or recall of a District Judge posted on ex-

cadre post or on deputation or on administrative post etc. so  

also premature and compulsory retirement.   Reference may  

also be made to few other judgments of this Court reported  

in Gauhati High Court and another v. Kuladhar Phukan  

and  another  (2002)  4  SCC  524,  State  of  Haryana  v.  

Inder Prakash Anand HCS and others (1976) 2 SCC 977,  

High  Court  of  Judicature  for  Rajasthan  v.  Ramesh

Page 33

33 Chand Paliwal and Another (1998) 3 SCC 72,  Kanhaiya  

Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi and others  (1985) 4 SCC 628,  

TMA Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka  

(2002)  8  SCC  481,  Ram  Singh  and  others  v.  Union  

Territory, Chandigarh and others  (2004) 1 SCC 126, etc.  

34. We are of the opinion that when we test the meaning of  

expression “controlled” which figures in between the words  

“body owned” and “substantially financed”, the control by  

the  appropriate  government  must  be  a  control  of  a  

substantial nature.  The mere ‘supervision’ or ‘regulation’ as  

such by a statute or otherwise of a body would not make  

that body a “public authority” within the meaning of Section  

2(h)(d)(i)  of  the RTI  Act.   In  other  words just  like  a  body  

owned  or  body  substantially  financed  by  the  appropriate  

government,  the  control  of  the  body  by  the  appropriate  

government  would  also  be  substantial  and  not  merely  

supervisory or regulatory.  Powers exercised by the Registrar  

of Cooperative Societies and others under the Cooperative  

Societies Act are only regulatory or supervisory in nature,

Page 34

34 which will not amount to dominating or interfering with the  

management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled.  

Management  and  control  are  statutorily  conferred  on  the  

Management  Committee  or  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  

Society by the respective Cooperative Societies Act and not  

on the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act.   

35. We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  the  word  

“controlled” used in Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act has to be  

understood in the context in which it has been used vis-a-vis  

a body owned or substantially financed by the appropriate  

government,  that  is  the  control  of  the  body  is  of  such  a  

degree  which  amounts  to  substantial  control  over  the  

management and affairs of the body.  

SUBSTANTIALLY FINANCED

36. The words “substantially financed” have been used in  

Sections 2(h)(d)(i) & (ii), while defining the expression public

Page 35

35 authority as well as in Section 2(a) of the Act, while defining  

the expression “appropriate Government”.  A body can be  

substantially  financed,  directly  or  indirectly  by  funds  

provided by the appropriate Government.   The expression  

“substantially  financed”,  as  such,  has  not  been  defined  

under  the  Act.    “Substantial”  means  “in  a  substantial  

manner so as to be substantial”.   In  Palser v. Grimling  

(1948) 1 All ER 1, 11 (HL), while interpreting the provisions  

of  Section  10(1)  of  the  Rent  and  Mortgage  Interest  

Restrictions  Act,  1923,  the  House  of  Lords  held  that  

“substantial” is not the same as “not unsubstantial” i.e. just  

enough  to  avoid  the  de  minimis principle.   The  word  

“substantial” literally means solid, massive etc.   Legislature  

has used the expression “substantially financed” in Sections  

2(h)(d)(i) and (ii) indicating that the degree of financing must  

be actual, existing, positive and real to a substantial extent,  

not moderate, ordinary,  tolerable etc.    

37. We often use the expressions “questions of law” and  

“substantial questions of law” and explain that any question

Page 36

36 of law affecting the right of parties would not by itself be a  

substantial  question  of  law.   In  Black's  Law Dictionary  

(6th Edn.), the word 'substantial' is defined as 'of real worth  

and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging  

to  substance;  actually  existing;  real:  not  seeming  or  

imaginary;  not  illusive;  solid;  true;  veritable.  Something  

worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or  

merely  nominal.  Synonymous  with  material.'  The  word  

'substantially' has been defined to mean 'essentially; without  

material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially.'  

In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word  

'substantial' means 'of ample or considerable amount of size;  

sizeable,  fairly  large;  having  solid  worth  or  value,  of  real  

significance; sold; weighty; important, worthwhile; of an act,  

measure etc. having force or effect, effective, thorough.' The  

word 'substantially' has been defined to mean 'in substance;  

as  a  substantial  thing  or  being;  essentially,  intrinsically.'  

Therefore  the  word  'substantial'  is  not  synonymous  with  

'dominant'  or  'majority'.  It  is  closer  to  'material'  or  

'important' or 'of considerable value.' 'Substantially' is closer

Page 37

37 to  'essentially'.    Both  words  can  signify  varying  degrees  

depending on the context.  

38. Merely  providing  subsidiaries,  grants,  exemptions,  

privileges  etc.,  as  such,  cannot  be  said  to  be  providing  

funding to a substantial extent, unless the record shows that  

the funding was so substantial to the body which practically  

runs  by  such  funding  and  but  for  such  funding,  it  would  

struggle to exist.   The State may also float many schemes  

generally for the betterment and welfare of the cooperative  

sector like deposit guarantee scheme, scheme of assistance  

from NABARD etc., but those facilities or assistance cannot  

be  termed  as  “substantially  financed”  by  the  State  

Government  to  bring  the  body  within  the  fold  of  “public  

authority” under Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act.  But, there are  

instances,  where  private  educational  institutions  getting  

ninety  five  per  cent  grant-in-aid  from  the  appropriate  

government,  may answer the definition of public authority  

under Section 2(h)(d)(i).

Page 38

38 NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS:

39. The term “Non-Government  Organizations”  (NGO),  as  

such, is not defined under the Act.   But,  over a period of  

time, the expression has got its own meaning and, it has to  

be seen in that context, when used in the Act.   Government  

used  to  finance  substantially,  several  non-government  

organizations,  which  carry  on  various  social  and  welfare  

activities,  since  those  organizations  sometimes  carry  on  

functions  which  are  otherwise  governmental.    Now,  the  

question, whether an NGO has been substantially financed or  

not by the appropriate Government, may be a question of  

fact, to be examined by the authorities concerned under the  

RTI Act.    Such organization can be substantially financed  

either  directly  or  indirectly  by  funds  provided  by  the  

appropriate Government.   Government  may not  have any  

statutory  control  over  the  NGOs,  as  such,  still  it  can  be  

established  that  a  particular  NGO  has  been  substantially  

financed directly or indirectly by the funds provided by the  

appropriate Government, in such an event, that organization

Page 39

39 will fall within the scope of Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act.  

Consequently, even private organizations which are, though  

not  owned or  controlled but  substantially  financed by the  

appropriate Government will also fall within the definition of  

“public authority” under Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the Act.        

BURDEN TO SHOW:

40. The burden to show that a body is owned, controlled or  

substantially  financed  or  that  a  non-government  

organization is substantially financed directly or indirectly by  

the funds provided by the appropriate Government is on the  

applicant  who  seeks  information  or  the  appropriate  

Government and can be examined by the State Information  

Commission or the Central Information Commission as the  

case may be, when the question comes up for consideration.  

A body or NGO is also free to establish that it is not owned,  

controlled or substantially financed directly or indirectly by  

the appropriate Government.   

Page 40

40 41. Powers have been conferred on the Central Information  

Commissioner or the State Information Commissioner under  

Section 18 of the Act to inquire into any complaint received  

from any person and the reason for the refusal to access to  

any information requested from a body owned, controlled or  

substantially  financed,  or  a  non-government  organization  

substantially  financed  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  funds  

provided by the appropriate Government.  Section 19 of the  

Act provides for an appeal against the decision of the Central  

Information Officer or the State Information Officer to such  

officer  who  is  senior  in  rank  to  the  Central  Information  

Officer or the State Information Officer, as the case may be,  

in  each  public  authority.    Therefore,  there  is  inbuilt  

mechanism in the Act itself to examine whether a body is  

owned,  controlled  or  substantially  financed  or  an  NGO  is  

substantially  financed,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  funds  

provided by the appropriate authority.

42. Legislative  intention  is  clear  and  is  discernible  from  

Section  2(h)  that  intends  to  include  various  categories,

Page 41

41 discussed earlier.  It is trite law that the primarily language  

employed  is  the  determinative  factor  of  the  legislative  

intention and the intention of the legislature must be found  

in the words used by the legislature itself.  In  Magor and  

St.  Mellons  Rural  District  Council v. New  Port  

Corporation (1951) 2 All ER 839(HL) stated that the courts  

are warned that they are not entitled to usurp the legislative  

function under the guise of  interpretation.    This  Court  in  

D.A.  Venkatachalam  and  others v.  Dy.  Transport  

Commissioner and others (1977) 2 SCC 273,  Union of  

India  v.  Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co.  Ltd.   

and others (2001) 4 SCC 139,  District Mining Officer  

and others v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. and another (2001)  

7 SCC 358,  Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and others  v.  

State  of  Tamil  Nadu  and  others  (2002)  3  SCC  533,  

Maulvi  Hussain  Haji  Abraham  Umarji v.  State  of  

Gujarat and another (2004) 6 SCC 672 held that the court  

must  avoid  the  danger  of  an  apriori determination  of  the  

meaning  of  a  provision  based  on  their  own  preconceived  

notions  of  ideological  structure  or  scheme into  which  the

Page 42

42 provisions to be interpreted is somehow fitted.   It is trite law  

that words of a statute are clear, plain and unambiguous i.e.  

they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning,  the  

courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective  

of the consequences, meaning thereby when the language is  

clear and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no  

question of construction of a statute arises, for the statute  

speaks  for  itself.  This  Court  in  Kanai  Lal  Sur v.  

Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR 1957 SC 907 held that “if the  

words  used  are  capable  of  one  construction  only  then  it  

would not be open to courts to adopt any other hypothetical  

construction on the ground that such construction is more  

consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.”

43. We are of  the view that  the High Court  has  given a  

complete  go-bye  to  the  above-mentioned  statutory  

principles  and  gone  at  a  tangent  by  mis-interpreting  the  

meaning and content of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.  Court  

has  given  a  liberal  construction  to  expression  “public  

authority” under Section 2(h) of the Act, bearing in mind the

Page 43

43 “transformation  of  law”  and  its  “ultimate  object”  i.e.  to  

achieve “transparency and accountability”, which according  

to the court could alone advance the objective of the Act.  

Further,  the  High  Court  has  also  opined  that  RTI  Act  will  

certainly help as a protection against the mismanagement of  

the society by the managing committee and the society’s  

liabilities and that vigilant members of the public body by  

obtaining information through the RTI  Act,  will  be able  to  

detect and prevent mismanagement in time.  In our view,  

the categories mentioned in Section 2(h) of the Act exhaust  

themselves, hence, there is no question of adopting a liberal  

construction to the expression “public authority” to bring in  

other categories into its fold, which do not satisfy the tests  

we have laid down.  Court cannot, when language is clear  

and  unambiguous,  adopt  such  a  construction  which,  

according to the Court, would only advance the objective of  

the  Act.  We  are  also  aware  of  the  opening  part  of  the  

definition clause which states “unless the context otherwise  

requires”.  No materials have been made available to show  

that the cooperative societies, with which we are concerned,

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44 in the context of the Act, would fall within the definition of  

Section 2(h) of the Act.   

 Right to Information and the Right to Privacy

44. People’s right to have access to an official information  

finds place in Resolution 59(1) of the UN General Assembly  

held  in  1946.   It  states  that  freedom of  information  is  a  

fundamental  human  right  and  the  touchstone  to  all  the  

freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.   India  

is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political  

Rights and hence India is under an obligation to effectively  

guarantee  the  right  to  information.   Article  19  of  the  

Universal Declaration of Human Rights also recognizes right  

to information.  Right to information also emanates from the  

fundamental right guaranteed to citizens under Article 19(1)

(a) of the Constitution of India.  Constitution of India does not  

explicitly grant a right to information.   In Bennet Coleman  

& Co. and others Vs. Union of India and others (1972)  

2 SCC 788, this Court observed that it is indisputable that by  

“Freedom of Press” meant the right of all citizens to speak,

Page 45

45 publish and express their views and freedom of speech and  

expression  includes  within  its  compass  the  right  of  all  

citizens to read and be informed.   In  Union of India Vs.  

Association of Democratic Reforms and another (2002)  

5 SCC 294, this Court held that the right to know about the  

antecedents  including  criminal  past  of  the  candidates  

contesting the election for Parliament and State Assembly is  

a very important and basic facets for survival of democracy  

and for this purpose, information about the candidates to be  

selected  must  be  disclosed.   In  State  of  U.P.  Vs. Raj  

Narain and others (1975) 4 SCC 428, this Court recognized  

that the right to know is the right that flows from the right of  

freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article  

19(1)(a) of the Constitution.   In  People’s Union for Civil   

Liberties  (PUCL)  and others  Vs.  Union of  India  and  

another (2003)  4  SCC 399,  this  Court  observed that  the  

right  to  information  is  a  facet  of  freedom of  speech  and  

expression contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of  

India.   Right  to  information  thus  indisputably  is  a

Page 46

46 fundamental  right,  so  held  in  several  judgments  of  this  

Court, which calls for no further elucidation.  

45. The  Right  to  Information  Act,  2005  is  an  Act  which  

provides  for  setting  up  the  practical  regime  of  right  to  

information  for  citizens  to  secure  access  to  information  

under the control of public authorities in order to promote  

transparency  and  accountability  in  the  working  of  every  

public authority.   Preamble of the Act also states that the  

democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency  

of information which are vital to its functioning and also to  

contain  corruption  and  to  hold  Governments  and  their  

instrumentalities  accountable  to  the  governed.    Citizens  

have, however, the right to secure access to information of  

only those matters which are “under the control  of  public  

authorities”,  the  purpose  is  to  hold  “Government  and  its  

instrumentalities”  accountable  to  the  governed.  

Consequently,  though  right  to  get  information  is  a  

fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the  

Constitution, limits are being prescribed under the Act itself,

Page 47

47 which  are  reasonable  restrictions  within  the  meaning  of  

Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India.    

46. Right to privacy is also not expressly guaranteed under  

the Constitution of India.  However, the Privacy Bill, 2011 to  

provide for  the right to privacy to citizens of India and to  

regulate  the  collection,  maintenance and dissemination of  

their personal information and for penalization for violation  

of such rights and matters connected therewith, is pending.  

In several judgments including Kharak Singh Vs. State of  

U.P. and others AIR 1963 SC 1295,  R. Rajagopal alias  

R.R. Gopal and another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and  

others (1994)  6  SCC  632,  People’s  Union  for  Civil   

Liberties (PUCL) Vs. Union of India and another (1997)  

1 SCC 301 and State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharat Shanti   

Lal  Shah  and  others  (2008)  13  SCC  5,  this  Court  has  

recognized  the  right  to  privacy  as  a  fundamental  right  

emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  Right  

to privacy is also recognized as a basic human right under

Page 48

48 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Act,  

1948, which states as follows:

“No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  arbitrary  interference  with  his  privacy,  family,  home  or  correspondence,  not  to  attack  upon  his  honour  and  reputation.   Everyone  has  the  right  to  the  protection  of  law  against  such  interference  or  attacks.”

Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political  

Rights Act, 1966, to which India is a party also protects that  

right and states as follows:  

“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful  interference  with  his  privacy,  family,  home  and  correspondence  nor  to  unlawful  attacks  on  his  honour and reputation….”

This Court in R. Rajagopal  (supra) held as follows :-

“The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life  and  liberty  guaranteed  to  the  citizens  of  this  country  by  Article  21.   It  is  a  “right  to  be  let  alone”.  A  citizen  has  a  right  to  safeguard  the  privacy  of  his  own,  his  family,  marriage,  procreation,  motherhood,  child  bearing  and  education among other matters.”

Page 49

49

Restrictions and Limitations:

47. Right to information and Right to privacy are, therefore,  

not absolute rights, both the rights, one of which falls under  

Article  19(1)(a)  and  the  other  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution of India, can obviously be regulated, restricted  

and  curtailed  in  the  larger  public  interest.   Absolute  or  

uncontrolled individual rights do not and cannot exist in any  

modern State.  Citizens’ right to get information is statutorily  

recognized by the RTI Act, but at the same time limitations  

are also provided in the Act itself, which is discernible from  

the Preamble and other provisions of the Act.  First of all, the  

scope and ambit  of  the  expression  “public  authority”  has  

been restricted by a statutory definition under Section 2(h)  

limiting it to the categories mentioned therein which exhaust  

itself,  unless the context otherwise requires.   Citizens, as  

already indicated by us, have a right to get information, but  

can have access only to the information “held” and under  

the “control  of  public  authorities”,  with limitations.   If  the

Page 50

50 information is not statutorily accessible by a public authority,  

as  defined  in  Section  2(h)  of  the  Act,  evidently,  those  

information  will  not  be  under  the  “control  of  the  public  

authority”.  Resultantly, it will not be possible for the citizens  

to secure access to those information which are not under  

the control of the public authority.  Citizens, in that event,  

can always claim a right to privacy, the right of a citizen to  

access information should be respected, so also a citizen’s  

right to privacy.   

48. Public  authority  also is  not  legally  obliged to give or  

provide information even if it is held, or under its control, if  

that information falls under clause (j) of Sub-section (1) of  

Section 8.   Section 8(1)(j) is of considerable importance so  

far as this case is concerned, hence given below, for ready  

reference:-   

“8.    Exemption  from  disclosure  of  information  –  (1)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation  to give any citizen –  

(a) to (i) xxx xxx xxx

Page 51

51 (j)  information  which  relates  to  personal  information  the  disclosure  of  which  has  no  relationship  to  any public  activity  or  interest,  or  which  would  cause  unwarranted  invasion  of  the  privacy of the individual unless the Central Public  Information Officer or the State Public Information  Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may  be,  is  satisfied  that  the  larger  public  interest  justifies  the  disclosure  of  such  information:  Provided  that  the  information  which  cannot  be  denied  to  the  Parliament  or  a  State  Legislature  shall not be denied to any person.”  

49. Section  8  begins  with  a  non  obstante  clause,  which  

gives that Section an overriding effect,  in case of conflict,  

over the other provisions of the Act.  Even if, there is any  

indication to the contrary, still there is no obligation on the  

public authority to give information to any citizen of what  

has been mentioned in clauses (a) to (j).   Public authority,  

as already indicated, cannot access all the information from  

a private individual, but only those information which he is  

legally obliged to pass on to a public authority by law, and  

also only those information to which the public authority can  

have  access  in  accordance  with  law.   Even  those  

information,  if  personal  in  nature,  can  be  made available  

only subject to the limitations provided in Section 8(j) of the

Page 52

52 RTI Act.  Right to be left alone, as propounded in Olmstead  

v. The United States reported in 1927 (277) US 438 is the  

most  comprehensive  of  the  rights  and  most  valued  by  

civilized man.   

50. Recognizing  the  fact  that  the  right  to  privacy  is  a  

sacrosanct  facet  of  Article  21  of  the  Constitution,  the  

legislation has put a lot of safeguards to protect the rights  

under Section 8(j), as already indicated.  If the information  

sought  for  is  personal  and  has  no  relationship  with  any  

public activity or interest or it will not sub-serve larger public  

interest, the public authority or the officer concerned is not  

legally obliged to provide those information.  Reference may  

be  made  to  a  recent  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Girish  

Ramchandra  Deshpande  v.  Central  Information  

Commissioner and others (2013) 1 SCC 212, wherein this  

Court held that since there is no bona fide public interest in  

seeking information, the disclosure of said information would  

cause  unwarranted  invasion  of  privacy  of  the  individual  

under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act.   Further, if the authority

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53 finds that information sought for can be made available in  

the larger public interest, then the officer should record his  

reasons in writing before providing the information, because  

the person from whom information is sought for, has also a  

right  to  privacy  guaranteed  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution.  

51. We have found,  on facts,  that the Societies,  in these  

appeals,  are not  public  authorities and,  hence,  not  legally  

obliged to  furnish any information sought for  by a citizen  

under the RTI Act.   All the same, if there is any dispute on  

facts as to whether a particular Society is a public authority  

or not, the State Information Commission can examine the  

same and find out whether the Society in question satisfies  

the test laid in this judgment.   Now, the next question is  

whether  a  citizen  can  have  access  to  any  information  of  

these  Societies  through  the  Registrar  of  Cooperative  

Societies,  who is  a public  authority within the meaning of  

Section 2(h) of the Act.   

Registrar of Cooperative Societies

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54

52. Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under the  

Cooperative  Societies  Act  is  a  public  authority  within  the  

meaning of Section 2(h) of the Act.   As a public authority,  

Registrar of Co-operative Societies has been conferred with  

lot of statutory powers under the respective Act under which  

he is functioning.  He is also duty bound to comply with the  

obligations under the RTI Act and furnish information to a  

citizen under the RTI Act.  Information which he is expected  

to provide is the information enumerated in Section 2(f) of  

the RTI Act subject to the limitations provided under Section  

8 of the Act.   Registrar can also, to the extent law permits,  

gather  information  from  a  Society,  on  which  he  has  

supervisory or administrative control under the Cooperative  

Societies Act. Consequently, apart from the information as is  

available to him, under Section 2(f), he can also gather those  

information from the Society, to the extent permitted by law.  

Registrar is also not obliged to disclose those information if  

those information fall under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act.    No  

provision has been brought to our knowledge indicating that,

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55 under the Cooperative Societies Act, a Registrar can call for  

the details of the bank accounts maintained by the citizens  

or members in a cooperative bank.  Only those information  

which a Registrar of Cooperative Societies can have access  

under the Cooperative Societies Act from a Society could be  

said  to  be  the  information  which  is  “held”  or  “under  the  

control  of  public  authority”.  Even  those  information,  

Registrar,  as  already  indicated,  is  not  legally  obliged  to  

provide  if  those  information  falls  under  the  exempted  

category mentioned in Section 8(j) of the Act.  Apart from  

the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, there may be other  

public  authorities  who can  access  information  from a  Co-

operative  Bank  of  a  private  account  maintained  by  a  

member of Society under law, in the event of which, in a  

given  situation,  the  society  will  have  to  part  with  that  

information.  But the demand should have statutory backing.

53. Consequently,  an information which has been sought  

for relates to personal information, the disclosure of which  

has no relationship to any public activity or interest or which

Page 56

56 would  cause  unwarranted  invasion  of  the  privacy  of  the  

individual, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, even if he  

has got that information, is not bound to furnish the same to  

an  applicant,  unless  he  is  satisfied  that  the  larger  public  

interest justifies the disclosure of such information, that too,  

for reasons to be recorded in writing.  

54. We,  therefore,  hold  that  the  Cooperative  Societies  

registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act will  

not fall within the definition of “public authority” as defined  

under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act and the State Government  

letter  dated  5.5.2006  and  the  circular  dated  01.06.2006  

issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kerala, to  

the extent, made applicable to societies registered under the  

Kerala  Co-operative  Societies  Act  would  stand quashed in  

the  absence  of  materials  to  show  that  they  are  owned,  

controlled  or  substantially  financed  by  the  appropriate  

Government.   Appeals  are,  therefore,  allowed  as  above,  

however, with no order as to costs.

Page 57

57 ………..………………….J.

                                                         (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

……………………………J.                   (A.K. Sikri)

New Delhi, October 07, 2013