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PETITIONER: TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/01/1951

BENCH: KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ) BENCH: KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ) FAZAL ALI, SAIYID SASTRI, M. PATANJALI MUKHERJEA, B.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA

CITATION:  1951 AIR  174            1951 SCR  212  CITATOR INFO :  R          1952 SC 350  (11)  E          1974 SC 183  (32)  R          1979 SC1925  (8,13)

ACT:     Constitution  of  India, 1950, Art.  22  (5)--Preventive detention-Duty  to communicate grounds of detention as  soon as may be--DUty to give earliest opportunity to make  repre- sentation--Grounds furnished after 15 days--"  Supplementary grounds"    furnished    after   4    months--Legality    of detention--Vague  grounds  and  irrelevant  grounds  distin- guishd--Supply  of grounds first and details  laterLegality- Serving printed orders on same date on several  persons-Bona fides of detention.

HEADNOTE:     A large number of persons were detained under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930.  The validity of this  Act was  being  challenged in the High  Court.   Meanwhile,  the Preventive  Detention Act of 1950 was passed on 26th  Febru- ary, 1950, and on the same date detention orders under  this Act  were  served on them.  The grounds  of  detention  were served on them on the 14th of March, and on the 16th of July the  Government  served on them "supplementary  grounds"  in continuation of the grounds already furnished on the 14th of March.   A  second set of grounds were communicated  to  the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July. They applied to  the High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending that  the  orders  of  detention  were  invalid  on  various grounds.   The  High Court rejected these  applications  and they appealed to the’ Supreme Court.   Held per KANIA C.J., FAZAL ALI, MUKHERJEA and  CHANDRASEK- HARA AIYAR JJ.--(i) that in the particular circumstances of the case, especially in view of the fact that a large number of causes had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preven- tive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds were not communicated to the appellants "as soon as nay be" within the meaning of Art. 22 (5);            ’

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213     (ii)  it  cannot be held that the  appellants  were  not given  the "earliest opportunity" to make a  representation, as  required by Art. 22(5), merely because  further  details and  facts were communicated to the appellants on  the  16th July  and  22nd July as these later communications  did  not contain  any new or additional grounds  (though  they   were described  as "supplementary grounds ") but  only  furnished details of the heads of grounds furnished on the 14th March;     (iii)  merely  because a ground is vague  it  cannot  be considered that it is no ground at all and therefore  cannot be  sufficient  to ’ satisfy ’.the authorities; a  ’  vague’ ground  does not stand on the same footing as an  irrelevant ground, which can have no connection at all with the  satis- faction of the Government;     (iv) the sufficiency of the grounds for the purposes  of satisfaction of the Government is not a matter for  examina- tion  by the court; their sufficiency to give  the  detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by the court, but only from that point of view.     Held  also, per DAS J.--The fact that a large number  of fresh orders of detention were made overnight did not neces- sarily indicate bad faith on the part of the authorities  in the  circumstances  of these cases as  the  authorities  had already  applied their minds to the suspected activities  of each  of the detenus and were satisfied that with a view  to prevent them from  doing some prejudicial act, it was neces- sary to detain them.   The  State  of Bombay, v. Atma Ram  Sridhar  Vaidya  supra P.167 followed.

JUDGMENT:                  CRIMINAL  APPELATE JURISDICTION: (Case  No. 24 of 1050).  Appeal under Art. 132 (1) of the  Constitution of  India, against the judgment and order of the High  Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 361 of 1050.     A.C. Gupta  and  Sudhansu  Sekhar  Mukherjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and S.N. Mukherjee, with them) for the appellants.     M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General, (B. Sen, with him)  for the respondent.     1051.  Jan.  25. The Judgment of Kania C.J.,  Fazl  Ali, Mukherjea  and  Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ., was  delivered  by Kania  C.J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ. delivered  separate judgments. KANIA  C.J.--This  is  an appeal under article  132  of  the Constitution of India from the judgment of the 214 High  Court  at Calcutta, which rejected the  habeas  corpus petitions of the appellants. The detention orders under  the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, in all cases were served  on the  appellants on the 26th February, 1950, and the  grounds for  the detention were served on the 14th March, 1950.   By way of specimen we quote one of them:     "You  are  beings detained in pursuance of  a  detention order made under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of subsection (1)of section a of the Preventive Detention Act,  1950, (Act IV of 1950), on  the  following grounds:-     (1)  That you have been assisting the operations of  the Communist  Party  of India, which along with  its  volunteer organisations has been declared unlawful by Government under section 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (Act XIV of 1908), and which has for its object commission of rioting

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with deadly weapons, robbery, dacoity, arson and murder  and possession  and use of arms and ammunitions  and  explosives and  thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the  maintenance of public order and that it is necessary to prevent you from acting in such manner.     (2) That as a member of the C.P.I. on its Kishan  front, you  have  fomented trouble amongst the peasants  of  Howrah District  and incited them to acts of lawlessness  and  vio- lence:     and  have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial  to  the maintenance of public order:     That as a worker of the C.P.I. you have tried to  foment trouble  amongst the tramways men and other workers at  Cal- cutta and in speeches which you delivered at the  University Hall and other places you actually incited them to resort to acts of violence and lawlessness; and have thereby acted  in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."     On the 16th of July, 1950, the Government of West Bengal served  on  the appellants "in continuation of  the  grounds already furnished on the 14th of March, 1950,  supplementary grounds"  for their detention a specimen of which is in  the following terms:-- 215     "In continuation of the grounds already furnished  under order  No. 6163 H.S. dated 14th March, 1950, you  are  being informed  of  the supplementary grounds for  your  detention which are as follows: -     You  as  the  Secretary of the  Bengal  Chatkar  Mazdoor Union, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federa- tion of Mercantile Employees’ Union, as the honorary report- er of the ’Khabar’ newspaper (C. P.I. organ) carried on  the disruptive  programme of the C.P.I. On the 29th July,  1948, you  along with others led a procession at Howrah  preaching discontent against Government and have been thus acting in a manner  prejudicial to the maintenance  of public order. ’’     As  in the case of the first grounds, these  "supplemen- tary grounds" were also served on each appellant separately. The appellants applied for a Rule of habeas corpus separate- ly  under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and  on the  21st July, 1950, the High Court issued a Rule  in  each case  on the Chief Secretary to the Government of West  Ben- gal.   A  second  set of grounds were  communicated  to  the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July, 1950.  A specimen of one is in the following terms:--     "In continuation of the grounds already furnished  under order  No.  12820 dated 14th July, 1950, you are  being  in- formed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows:--     1. That in a meeting held at the University Institute on the  19th  March, 1947, under the auspices of  the  Calcutta Tramway  Workers’  Union, you held out the threat  that  any attempt to take out tram cars on the 20th March, 1947, would be  inviting disaster and you further said that if  the  au- thorities  tried  to resume the tram service  you  and  your friends would not hesitate to remove the tram lines and  cut the wires.     2.  That  on the 13th June, 1948, you  presided  over  a meeting under  the  auspices  of  the  Students’  Federation (C. P.I. controlled) and delivered speech 28 216 advocating withdrawal of ban on the Communist Party of India and its organ Swadhinta."     The  High Court after considering the whole  matter  re- jected  the petitions of the appellants and  the  appellants

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have thereupon come in appeal before us.     In  the High Court, it was first contended on behalf  of the  appellants that the communication of the grounds  dated the  14th March was not a compliance with article  22  (5)of the Constitution of India, as those grounds were not  commu- nicated  "as soon as may be." The High Court  rejected  this contention.   Under the circumstances of the case, we  agree with the High Court and are unable to hold that in  furnish- ing the grounds dated the 14th March, 1950, the  authorities had failed to act in accordance with the procedure laid down in  article  22 (5) of the Constitution.  Under  the  Bengal Criminal  Law  Amendment Act, 1930, a very large  number  of persons  were detained. The validity of that Act  was  being challenged  in the High Court and the judgment was  expected to  be  delivered  towards the end of  February,  1950.  The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament of  India  in  the last week of February,  1950,  and  these orders  on  all  those detenus were served on  the  26th  of February,  1950. Having regard to the fact that the  Provin- cial  Government  had  thus suddenly to deal  with  a  large number  of  cases on one day, we are unable to  accept  this contention of the appellants.     On behalf of the appellants it was next urged that there has  been a non-compliance with the procedure laid  down  in article  22  (s)of  the Constitution and section  7  of  the Preventive Detention Act in the manner of supplying  grounds to  the appellants resulting in not providing to the  appel- lants  the  earliest opportunity to make  a  representation, which  they had a right to make. In the  judgment  delivered today in Case No. 22 of 1950(1) we have discussed in  detail the nature of the two rights conferred under article 22 (5). We  have  to  apply those principles to the  facts  of  this appeal for its decision. (11 Supra, P. 167. 217     When  the  authorities sent their  second  communication dated  16th July,  1950,  to  the  appellants they described it  as  "in continuation of the grounds  already  furnished" and   as  the  "supplementary grounds for  your  detention". Relying  on the wording of this communication it was  argued that  these were additional grounds which were furnished  to the  detenu  and therefore the  procedure  prescribed  under article  22 (5) had not been followed.  It was  argued  that the  obligation to communicate grounds "as soon as  may  be" was absolute.  The grounds for detention must be before  the Provincial  Government before they could be satisfied  about the necessity for making the detention order. If the grounds before  the detaining authorities on the 26th  of  February, 1950, were only those which they communicated on the 14th of March,  they  cannot  support the  detention  on  additional grounds  which  were not before them on that day  and  which they set out in the second communication four months  later. It  was also contended that the fact of  this  communication showed that the authorities were not satisfied on the origi- nal grounds and had therefore put forth these  supplementary grounds  as an afterthought. In our opinion these  arguments cannot  be accepted. A ’description of the contents  of  the second  communication  as "supplementary grounds"  does  not necessarily make them additional or new grounds. One has  to look  at  the  contents to find out  whether  they  are  new grounds  as  explained  in our judgment in Case  No.  92  of 1950(1).  Examining the contents of the later  communication in  that way we find that they only furnish details  of  the second  heads  of the grounds furnished to  the  appropriate appellant on 14th March, 1950, in respect of his activities.

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We are unable to treat them as new grounds and we agree with the High Court in its conclusion that these are not fresh or new grounds.  We do not think it proper to consider the true effect  of  the communication only by  reading  its  opening words.  The whole of it must be read and considered  togeth- er.  The contention that the authorities were not  satisfied on the original (1) Supra, p. 167. 218 grounds  and therefore put forth this. communication as  the supplemental grounds is again unsound.  The fact that  these details  were communicated later does not  necessarily  show that  they were not within the knowledge of the  authorities when  they sent the communication dated the 14th  of  March. The contention that this communication of the 16th of  July, 1950, was not "as soon as may be", has to be rejected having regard to the principles set out in our judgment in Case No. 22 of 1950.  The facts in each case have to to be taken into consideration and if the detained person contends that  this part  of the procedure prescribed in article 22 (5) was  not complied with, the authorities will have to place  materials before the court to refute that contention.  In the  present case  the High Court has considered that there has  been  no infringement of this procedural law and we see no reason  to come to a different conclusion.     It  was next argued that the grounds being  vague,  they could not be considered as grounds at all and therefore they could  not be sufficient "to satisfy" the  authorities.   On this point we have nothing to add to what we have stated  in our  judgment  in  Case No. 22 of 1950.  We  are  unable  to accept the contention that "vague grounds" stand on the same footing  as "irrelevant grounds".  An irrelevant ground  has no connection at all with the satisfaction of the Provincial Government  which  makes the  order of  detention.  For  the reasons stated in that judgment we are also unable to accept the  contention that if the grounds are vague and no  repre- sentation  is possible there can be no satisfaction  of  the authority  as  required under section 3  of  the  Preventive Detention  Act.  This argument mixes up  two  objects.   The sufficiency  of the grounds, which gives rise to the  satis- faction  of the Provincial Government, is not a  matter  for examination by the court. The sufficiency of the grounds  to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make  a representation  can be examined by the court, but only  from that  point of view. We are therefore unable to  accept  the contention that the quality and characteristic of 219 the grounds should be the same for both tests. On the  ques- tion  of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one  person may  be,  but  another may not be,  satisfied  on  the  same grounds.   That aspect however is not for the  determination of  the court, having regard to the words used in  the  Act. The second part of the enquiry is clearly open to the  court under article 22 (5). We are therefore unable to accept  the argument that if the grounds are not sufficient or  adequate for  making the representation the grounds cannot be  suffi- cient for the subjective satisfaction of the authority.     As  regards the grounds furnished by the  Government  in each  case in its first communication, it is  sufficient  to notice  that  while the first ground is common  to  all  the appellants,  the second ground is different in  most  cases. The High Court has considered the case of each appellant  in respect of the communication dated the 14th of March,  1950, sent  to him. In their opinion those grounds are not  vague. They  have held that the procedural requirement to give  the

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detained person the earliest opportunity to make a represen- tation  has not been infringed by the communication  of  the grounds of the 14th of March and by the subsequent  communi- cation  made to the appellants in July.  This point was  not seriously pressed before us.  After hearing counsel for  the appellant we see no reason to differ from the conclusion  of the  High  Court  on this point.   The result  is  that  the appeal fails and is dismissed.     PATANJALI  SASTRI J.--This appeal was heard  along  with Case No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya)(1),  as the main question involved was the same.  In the  view I have expressed on that question in  my  judgment delivered today in that case, this appeal cannot succeed and I agree that it should be dismissed.     DAS J.--The same important questions have been raised in this  appeal by 100 detenus against an order of a  Bench  of the Calcutta High Court as were raised (1) Supra, p. 167, 220 by the detenu in the appeal of the State of Bombay in  which judgment  has  just  been delivered.  One  additional  point raised in this appeal was that the fact that a large  number of fresh orders of detention were made "overnight" indicates bad  faith on the part of the authorities, for the  authori- ties  could not have applied their minds to each  individual case. I am unable to accept this contention as correct.  The authorities had already applied their minds to the suspected activities  of each of the detenus and were  satisfied  that with a view to prevent them from doing some prejudicial  act of  a particular kind it was necessary to make an  order  of detention  against  them under the local Acts.  There  being doubt  as to the validity of the local Acts and the  Preven- tive  Detention Act having been passed in the  meantime  the question was  to make a fresh order under the new Act.   The minds  of the authorities having already been made up as  to the expediency of making an order of detention against them, an elaborate application of mind, such as is now  suggested, does not appear to me to be necessary at all. I do not think there was any failure of duty on the part of the authorities which  will establish bad faith on their part. In  my  view, for reasons stated in my judgment in the other appeal, there being no proof of any mala fides on the part of the authori- ties,  no  fundamental rights of the petitioners  have  been infringed.  In the case of each of the detenus,  apart  from the  common ground, there were one or more specific  grounds of detention which are quite sufficient to enable the detenu concerned  to make his representation. Therefore, the  ques- tion of supplementary particulars does not arise at all.  In my  opinion the  conclusions arrived at by Roxburgh J.  were correct and well-founded, and, therefore, this appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: P.K. Chatterjee. Agent for the respondent: P.K. Bose. 221